Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04FL04289
RAYE, Acting P. J.In May 2004 appellant Joan Drelinger (Mother) registered in Sacramento County a 1973 order for child support issued in the State of Nevada. Mother sought to enforce the order, seeking $39,479 in arrears. After hearing evidence from both sides, the trial court confirmed the order’s registration but found respondent Jay Drelinger (Father) had satisfied his child support obligation. In a subsequent hearing, the court deferred ruling on the parties’ competing motions for attorney fees. Mother appeals both orders.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties were divorced in Washoe County, Nevada, in November 1973. Under the terms of the Nevada divorce decree, Father was to pay to Mother $60 per month in child support for their son, who was then six months old. Almost 31 years later, Mother registered that support order in Sacramento and sought $39,479 in arrears, claiming Father failed to make any child support payments. Father requested a hearing on the registration, claiming “[s]ome or all of the arrears are not enforceable.”
After numerous delays, the matter was set for trial in February 2007. At trial, Father testified that soon after the divorce he was already falling behind on his child support payments when Mother approached him with an idea: Father could satisfy his child support obligation by transferring to Mother a piece of real property in Reno. Mother had calculated the total amount of child support Father would owe over 18 years and told him it was “about the same” as the value of the Reno property. Mother also asked Father to agree to provide additional financial assistance if and when she needed it. Father agreed to Mother’s proposal and in May 1974 quitclaimed the Reno property to Mother.
Father testified that the agreement was made in 1976. The quitclaim deed, however, is dated May 11, 1974. The court noted the discrepancy in its ruling, attributing it to the passage of time and dimming of memories.
Mother did not disagree that Father transferred the Reno property to her; however, she claimed he did not do it to satisfy his child support obligation. Mother claimed the Reno property was a community asset awarded to Father in the divorce. Mother testified that after the divorce, her name remained on the title, and when Father fell behind on the payments, she asked him to transfer the property to her so it would not be lost in foreclosure and to stop the creditors from “coming for [her].” She denied ever agreeing to take the property as satisfaction of Father’s child support obligation.
Father also testified that, over the years, he and Mother remained in contact, and he would occasionally send her small checks when she asked for money, including a $200 check in 2001. When their son was old enough, Father even offered to share in the cost of buying a car for him. Despite their regular contact, Father said that Mother never asked for child support and never tried to enforce the child support order.
Mother challenged Father’s testimony. She initially denied having receiving the $200 check from Father, but she changed her testimony when Father produced a copy of the canceled check with her signature on it. Mother first explained that Father sent her the check when she lost her job “as an effect of 9/11.” Then the court pointed out that the check was dated May 2001, four months before 9/11. Faced with the discrepancy, Mother offered only that she must have the dates wrong but was certain she lost her job on November 30, 2001.
Mother also claimed that she and Father did not maintain regular contact over the years; she testified that at times, she did not even know how to contact him. After Father produced copies of telephone bills and e-mails, however, Mother conceded they had maintained more frequent contact and acknowledged that she never asked for child support.
At trial, the parties both acknowledged that their relationship was sometimes sexual, even though Father was married to another woman. They also agreed that after a weekend together in Phoenix, Arizona, in February 2004, Father ended their relationship. Father argued it was this rejection of Mother that motivated her to enforce the 1973 child support order after more than 30 years.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court ruled as follows: “The court finds that each of the parties[’] memories [has] somewhat dimmed as to specifics in this 35 yr [sic] matter. [Father’s] memory of the specifics of the bargain (while off as to the timing) confinces [sic] the court of the existence of the agreement. The parties left the matter according to the terms of the agreement until the breakup of their extramarital affair in 2004. At which time, [Mother,] spurned, decided to pursue to [sic] old [child support] order.
“[Mother] admitted that [Father] made little money as a musician yet even when he became a businessman some years later, she declined to pursue the matter.
“Both parties were harmed by the passage of time, the dimming of memories, the lack of documentary evidence.
“The judgment of the court confirms the registration with a finding that the [child support] has been satisfied by the agreement of the parties.” Neither party requested a statement of decision.
Mother and Father then filed separate motions seeking attorney fees. In their motions, both parties requested fees for appellate counsel. At the hearing on the motions, the trial court ruled as follows: “In my review of the file it reflects substantial assets that each party has, and I think we are all well aware of the fact that on occasion, if not most of the time, the Court of Appeal makes decisions as to who should bear the costs of that appeal. So I’m going to defer any action on each of the parties’ motion[s] pending the resolution of the appeal. But I do believe that the Court of Appeal gets first shot at deciding this issue.”
II
DISCUSSION
Mother makes numerous claims on appeal, many of which are buried under a single heading in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) and none of which have merit.
A. Laches
Mother first contends that her claim is not barred by laches. We agree. (See Fam. Code, §§ 4502, 291; In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 186-187.) However, the trial court did not rule that Mother’s claim was barred by laches, finding instead that Father’s child support obligation had been satisfied by the parties’ agreement. Thus, the issue of laches is not preserved for resolution.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
B. Waiver
Mother also claims the trial court erred in finding she waived child support in consideration for the Reno property; Mother argues that a parent cannot agree to waive a child’s right to receive support. Regardless of whether such an agreement would be lawful, the court did not find Mother waived child support. On the contrary, the court found that Father satisfied his child support obligation. Accordingly, this claim also is without merit.
C. Accord and Satisfaction
Mother also argues any agreement to transfer the Reno property in exchange for child support must have been an accord and satisfaction, but “[t]here is... no evidence here that the parties were agreeing to settle for a lesser sum than was owed, so there can be no accord and satisfaction here either.” Buried under a heading that reads, “EVEN IF JOAN REALLY DID AGREE TO ACCEPT THE RENO PROPERTY IN LIEU OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS, THAT AGREEMENT WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE ONE PARENT CANNOT WAIVE A CHILD’S RIGHT TO SUPPORT FROM THE OTHER PARENT” (hereinafter referred to as “the waiver heading”), this claim was not properly raised in this court and may be forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831, fn. 4 (Opdyk) [appellant must present each point separately in the opening brief under an appropriate heading showing the nature of the question presented and the point to be made].) Regardless, the claim is without merit.
Neither party argued at trial that the agreement was an accord and satisfaction, and the court did not rule that Father’s obligation was resolved through an accord and satisfaction. Mother raises accord and satisfaction on appeal only to argue there was insufficient evidence of an accord and satisfaction. Again, Mother attempts to fabricate an issue that is not raised by the record of proceedings and is not properly preserved for resolution.
D. Insufficient Evidence
Mother also argues there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the value of the Reno property was enough to satisfy Father’s child support obligation. This argument also is buried under the waiver heading and not presented separately under an appropriate heading showing the nature of the question presented and the point to be made. Accordingly, it too may be deemed forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Opdyk, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1830-1831, fn. 4.) In any event, the claim fails on the merits.
Mother claims the evidence is insufficient because Father offered nothing to support his claim other than his own recollection that the property was worth $16,500. As the owner of the land, however, Father was competent to testify as to its value at the time of transfer. (In re Marriage of Stoll (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) Additionally, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a judgment or finding unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1075; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608-609; see also Evid. Code, § 411 [“Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact”].)
Mother offered no evidence to rebut Father’s valuation other than her own recollection that they purchased the property for $5,000 and she sold it for $7,000. Mother thus failed to show that Father’s recollection was demonstrably false or physically impossible. Furthermore, in finding the agreement to transfer the Reno property satisfied Father’s child support obligation, which the trial court calculated to be approximately $11,880 plus interest, the court apparently found Father’s testimony more credible and gave his estimate of value greater weight. (See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 339-340 [154 L.Ed.2d 931] [trial court’s credibility determinations are entitled to “‘great deference on appeal’” and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous].) We will not second-guess that determination on appeal.
E. Improper Offset
Mother further contends any agreement to transfer the Reno property to her would be an improper agreement to offset Father’s child support obligation by transferring an asset to Mother.
Mother buries this claim under the waiver heading as well, saying only that Father “cannot offset his support obligation to [their son] by transferring an asset to [Mother].” Mother offers a single citation in support of her claim, Keck v. Keck (1933) 219 Cal. 316, 319-320, a 75-year-old case addressing spousal support, and provides no analysis other than “support obligations are ‘not an ordinary debt’. [Citation.] Such obligations are treated differently from other debts –- and other assets –- and cannot be offset against them. [Citation.]” Such a perfunctory argument may be forfeited on appeal. (People v. Harper (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4 (Harper).) The claim fails in any event.
Section 291, subdivision (a) states that an order for child support “is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied.” (Italics added.) Trial courts retain equitable jurisdiction to determine, or modify, the manner in which child support payments are made or deemed satisfied. (In re Marriage of McClellan (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 247, 258, citing Keith G. v. Suzanne H. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 853, 858–859, Jackson v. Jackson (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 363, 366–367, & In re Marriage of Trainotti (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1075 (Trainotti).)
Child support obligations have been deemed satisfied in a number of ways other than monthly cash payments. In Trainotti, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d 1072, the court deemed a child support obligation satisfied when the father took custody of the minor, with the mother’s consent, and provided the minor with direct support. (Id. at pp. 1075-1076.) In Colby v. Colby (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 602, the father’s child support obligation was deemed satisfied by a lump-sum payment, agreed to by the mother, in lieu of monthly payments. (Id. at p. 605.) And in Nicholas v. Nicholas (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 349, the father’s child support obligation was deemed satisfied when he gave the mother real property, the income stream from which they agreed would be used to support the children. (Id. at pp. 352-353.)
Here the trial court found Father’s child support obligation was satisfied by the parties’ agreement to transfer title in the Reno property to Mother more than 30 years ago. Under these circumstances, we cannot say this decision exceeded the bounds of reason.
Mother also takes exception to the trial court’s finding that Father’s decision to end their relationship motivated her to register the child support order. However, she makes no legal argument and cites no authority for whatever error she perceives was made. Any claim she intended is therefore forfeited. (Harper, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419, fn. 4 [argument may be forfeited if raised without supporting analysis or authority].)
F. Reply Brief
Mother raises two arguments for the first time in her reply brief: (1) any agreement made could not “absolve” Father of the child support he owed at the time of the agreement; and (2) any agreement she may have made with Father was made under duress. Having failed to raise either of these claims in her opening brief, we deem them forfeited. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453 (American Drug Stores).) In any event, both of Mother’s arguments are meritless.
First, it is correct to say that a child support order cannot be retroactively modified, but that is not what occurred here. (See In re Marriage of Perez (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 77 [finding trial court erred in reducing $5,000 in child support arrears to $2,000]; § 3651, subd. (c).) Again, Mother’s argument is based on the faulty premise that the value of the real property Father gave to Mother in lieu of cash payments was less than the total amount of Father’s child support obligation. The court found otherwise.
Second, there was no evidence submitted at trial, and thus none in the record on appeal, that Mother was under duress when she entered into the agreement with Father. Accordingly, this issue is not properly preserved for resolution on appeal.
G. Oral Argument
At oral argument, Mother argued for the first time on appeal that she was blindsided at trial by Father’s claim that the child support debt was satisfied by the parties’ agreement to exchange real property for cash payments. Mother failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal as well because, as counsel admitted in oral argument, Mother raised no objections to Father’s claim at trial. (Dimmick v. Dimmick (1962) 58 Cal.2d 417, 422 [points not raised in trial court will not be considered on appeal].)
Even had she preserved the issue for appeal, however, Mother’s failure to raise it prior to oral argument would have resulted in a forfeiture of the claim. (Cf. American Drug Stores, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453 [points raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered absent a showing of good cause].)
H. Attorney Fees
Mother makes three claims with regard to her motion for attorney fees: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in not ruling on her motion; (2) the court’s deferral was a de facto denial of her motion; and (3) the evidence submitted overwhelmingly supported her motion for fees. We agree the court erred in failing to rule on Mother’s motion.
As a threshold issue we must determine under which provision of the Family Code Mother sought an award of attorney fees. That task is complicated by Mother’s failure to cite any statutory authority in her motion for fees. She fails to do so also on appeal. There are three possible provisions: (1) section 2030, which gives the court discretion to award fees during the pendency of proceedings based on the parties’ needs and abilities to pay; (2) section 3557, which requires the trial court to award fees to any party pursuing enforcement of a support order based on need and ability to pay, absent good cause not to do so; and (3) section 4927, which gives the court discretion to award fees to the parent seeking to enforce an out-of-state support order, but only if he or she prevails.
Notably, in his own motion for attorney fees, Father also failed to identify the statutory basis for his request.
On appeal, Mother has referred repeatedly to the parties’ “need and ability to pay” and “pendente lite fees.” Mother’s arguments on appeal also rely solely on case law addressing section 2030, pendente lite fees. She never argues the fee award was mandatory, as it would be under section 3557, or that she would only be entitled to fees if she prevailed, as she would be under section 4927. We are thus led to conclude that Mother’s request for fees was for pendente lite fees pursuant to section 2030.
Father, however, argues that because the underlying motion was one made to enforce an out-of-state child support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) provisions of the Family Code, section 4900 et seq., Mother’s sole recourse is an award under section 4927. We disagree.
Section 4927, subdivision (b) states, in relevant part, that “[i]f an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal may assess against an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, other costs, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee’s witnesses. The tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the initiating or the responding state, except as provided by other law.”
The obligee is defined in relevant part as “[a]n individual to whom a duty of support is, or is alleged to be, owed or in whose favor a support order has been issued or a judgment determining parentage has been rendered.” (§ 4901, subd. (l)(1).) Here, the obligee is Mother. The obligor is “an individual, or the estate of a decedent, who... [¶] (1)... is alleged to owe a duty of support.” (§ 4901, subd. (m)(1).) Here, the obligor is Father.
Standing alone, this provision may be read to limit fee awards in a proceeding to enforce an out-of-state support order to an obligee, and then only if he or she prevails. (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 14:55, pp. 14-20.) Such an interpretation, however, ignores other provisions of the Family Code, including other provisions of the UIFSA.
Section 4903, subdivision (a) (part of the UIFSA) states that “[r]emedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the availability of remedies under other law....” Section 4919, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] responding tribunal of this state, to the extent not prohibited by other law, may do one or more of the following: [¶]... [¶] (11) Award reasonable attorney’s fees and other fees and costs.”
As discussed above, there are two other provisions of the Family Code that authorize attorney fees, sections 2030 and 3557. Unlike an award of fees under section 4927, an award of fees pursuant to either of those provisions depends solely on the parties’ respective need and ability to pay. And unlike sections 4927 and 2030, which grant the court discretion to award fees, section 3557 mandates an award of fees to any party seeking to enforce a child support order, absent good cause not to award fees.
Reading these provisions in harmony, as we must, it is evident that section 4927 was intended to provide an additional avenue for a supported parent to obtain attorney fees when seeking to enforce an out-of-state order of support. To read the section otherwise would render nugatory those provisions of the UIFSA that indicate the remedies are intended to be cumulative (§ 4903) and that grant the trial court the authority to impose attorney fees authorized by other law (§ 4919, subd. (11)). We therefore conclude that Mother is permitted to seek fees pursuant to section 2030.
We next address the question whether the court abused its discretion by deferring ruling on Mother’s motion for fees. The answer to that question is simple and can be found in section 2031, subdivision (a)(2), which requires a trial court to rule on an application for attorney fees made during the pendency of proceedings “within 15 days of the hearing on the motion or order to show cause.” Mother’s motion was heard on June 25, 2007, over a year ago. The court erred in failing to consider Mother’s application within the required time frame.
Mother further claims that (1) the trial court’s failure to rule on her motion was a de facto denial, and (2) a denial of her motion would be an abuse of discretion because the evidence in support of her motion was “overwhelming.”
Mother’s claim, in part, is based on Father’s response to her motion, which she interprets as a concession. While Father’s response to Mother’s motion for fees may be characterized as terse, he did not concede; he opposed the motion. Father stated in his response that he brings home only $2,360 per month, and his wife only $2,361. He stated, quite clearly, that he cannot afford to pay for Mother’s attorney fees and requested that her motion be denied.
Moreover, at the time Mother’s motion for attorney fees was filed, Father had his own motion for fees pending. Their motions were heard together on June 25, 2007. At that hearing, Mother acknowledged having received Father’s income and expense declaration, which the record indicates is dated April 24, 2007.
Pursuant to the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Local Rules, rule 14.00(C), before the hearing on any motion where such information would be relevant, both parties are required to complete a current income and expense declaration. An income and expense declaration is “current” if it was “completed within the past three months providing no facts have changed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.128.) On the face of this record, it appears Father complied with that rule.
Mother also acknowledged having received Father’s 2005 personal income tax returns and schedule C for his business, along with a letter indicating he had not yet prepared his tax returns for 2006. Mother noted that Father was routinely late in filing his tax returns. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Local Rules, rule 14.00(D) requires both parties to “exchange copies of their most recently filed federal and state personal income tax returns at least five court days prior to the date set for hearing unless otherwise ordered by the court.” (Italics added.) Father thus appears to have complied with this rule as well.
Mother argued at trial that the tax returns were incomplete because Father did not include the schedule A filed with the returns for his hearing aid business. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Local Rules, rule 14.00(D), however, requires only that the parties’ “personal income tax returns” be exchanged. Father was thus not obligated to turn over the tax returns for his business without a subpoena duces tecum or order from the court.
Father’s financial documents show that at the time of the hearing, his total monthly income was $2,361.18, his assets were $307,000, and his monthly expenses were $4,065, $2,032.50 of which were paid by “others.” Mother’s income and expense declaration, on the other hand, showed her average monthly income was $2,178, with assets totaling $101,900 and monthly expenses of $3,700. Mother argued Father was underreporting and otherwise hiding his income, and her attorney provided a lengthy analysis of Father’s financial documents. On the other hand, Father argued he was unable to pay Mother’s fees, that Mother was able to pay her own fees, and that the entire proceeding was motivated by Mother’s vindictiveness.
On such a record, we cannot conclude that Mother’s motion was essentially “unopposed,” as she claimed in oral argument, or that the evidence was so overwhelmingly in her favor that it was an abuse of discretion to deny her request, de facto or otherwise. Nor can we rule that she was entitled to fees as a matter of law. We will, therefore, remand the matter and direct the trial court to rule on Mother’s motion for section 2030 pendente lite attorney fees.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions to rule on Mother’s motion for section 2030 pendente lite attorney fees. In all other respects the order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: HULL, J. BUTZ, J.