Opinion
E043325
4-25-2008
In re the Marriage of DOMINGA and JOSE LUIS OLGUIN. DOMINGA OLGUIN, Appellant, v. JOSE LUIS OLGUIN, Respondent.
Luis E. Lopez, for Appellant. Law Offices of Carlos M. Cabrera and Carlos M. Cabrera, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appellant Dominga Olguin (wife) appeals from a ruling granting the motion of respondent, Jose Luis Olguin (husband), to enforce a stipulated judgment dividing the marital property. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties were married on June 10, 1995. They separated nearly 10 years later, in approximately February 2005, but continued to live in the same residence. In March 2005, wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in propria persona. On May 24, 2005, husband approached wife with a stipulated judgment, prepared by his attorney. Wife did sign the document on that date.
Husband later filed a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, requesting the court to enter and enforce the stipulated judgment as a judgment. Husband alleged that wife was refusing to file a required declaration of disclosure, and that the clerks office had therefore rejected the stipulated judgment for filing.
Wife had finally retained counsel and opposed husbands motion. She argued that the trial court should refuse to enforce the stipulated judgment, because it was obtained by fraud and duress (citing Fam. Code, § 2120, subds. (a), (b)), or by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (citing Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b)).
The trial court heard the motion. Husband and wife each was sworn and testified. The trial court issued a statement of decision finding that wifes evidence was not credible and that husbands testimony was more credible and consistent. The court found no fraud, duress or undue influence. The court ordered wife to prepare and file her preliminary declaration of disclosure, and found that the stipulated judgment was enforceable.
Wife appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Wife argues that the trial court erred in enforcing the stipulated judgment, because husband failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he did not obtain an advantage through undue influence. That is, wife argues that the stipulated judgment, together with her testimony, showed that husband had obtained an advantage by the agreement, thus raising a presumption of undue influence, which husband failed to rebut.
"Whether an interspousal transaction gives one spouse an unfair advantage is a question for the trier of fact." (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 734.) We review the trial courts findings under a deferential substantial evidence standard.
II. Wife Failed to Establish That Husband" Obtained an Advantage," to Which the Presumption of Undue Influence Applied
Family Code section 721 expressly embodies the fiduciary relationship between marital partners: "[I]n transactions between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners. . . ." (Fam. Code, § 721, subd. (b).)
In addition, "whenever [spouses] enter into an agreement in which one party gains an advantage, the advantaged party bears the burden of demonstrating that the agreement was not obtained through undue influence. . . ." (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 27; see also In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 293.)
In comprehensive marital transactions involving the division of community assets, the nature of the "advantage" required to raise a presumption of undue influence must necessarily be an unfair advantage. (In re Marriage of Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 730, 732.)
Wife contends that husband obtained an unfair advantage under the marital settlement agreement, and that the court should therefore have applied the presumption of undue influence.
Wife points to the terms of the agreement, which provided, among other things, for: (1) approximately equal child custody and visitation; (2) child support from husband to wife of $800 per month for the parties four minor children; (3) waivers of spousal support by each spouse; (4) awarding to wife as her sole and separate property her personal items and two cars; (5) awarding to husband as his sole and separate property three parcels of improved real property, all furnishings located at the improved properties, two cars, bank accounts, and all husbands pension and retirement benefits; (6) a stipulation that there were no community debts to divide; and (7) an equalization payment of $30,000 cash to wife.
Wife also points to her own testimony that she has less than a third grade education in Mexico, that she does not speak, read or write English, that husband first met her in Mexico when she was 14 years old and he was 32, that he brought her to the United States, that husband handled all finances during the marriage, that wife does not know how to balance a checking account, that there were no discussions about division of the property when she filed the dissolution papers, and that she was intimidated by husband, who battered her. She signed the document husband presented to her, but she did not know how to read it or what it stated. Husband told her she should sign the document to complete the divorce. He told her that they would share custody of the children, that husband would pay $800 per month for child support, and that she would receive $30,000 for her share of the property. Husband did not show her any documents concerning any equity in any of the real properties, but he did tell her that "they didnt have any money in them."
This evidence, wife argues, was sufficient to show that husband received an unfair advantage as a result of the stipulated judgment: He received three real property homes and all the furniture and furnishings, and he received all the bank accounts, as well as his retirement. Wife received $30,000, and no spousal support, even though she was illiterate and had devoted her efforts to caring for the parties children, rather than working outside the home.
Wife has, however, emphasized the facts in her own favor, and disregarded other evidence.
On cross-examination, wife indicated that she never called police about any of the alleged incidents of domestic violence; she testified that she did not call police "because I was afraid." She also negotiated with husband over the amount of child support he would pay. Instead of paying $500 per month for the four children, he agreed to pay $800 per month. She admitted that husband had described the main terms of the settlement agreement to her. She knew that custody would be shared, she negotiated an increase in child support, and she knew that she would receive $30,000 cash.
Husband testified, and wifes testimony confirmed her understanding, that there was little to no equity in any of the parcels of real property. Husband estimated that $30,000 represented half the estate, including the equity in all the real properties. Husband testified that he had no retirement plan.
Wife denied that husband had paid her any of the settlement money, but this assertion was contradicted by both husbands testimony and her own admissions. Husband testified that he had given wife half the amounts in the bank accounts. He also gave her approximately half of their tax refund. Wife agreed that she had been given several checks, but apparently had a different understanding of what those amounts were for.
In the statement of decision, the trial court found that wifes testimony was not credible and that husbands was more comprehensive and consistent. Wife objects to the trial courts finding because it was based in part on some of wifes statements, but the record does not bear out that wife ever made those statements. That is, the court found that "[i]nitially [wife] had testified that she had never signed the stipulated judgment and later disputed that it was her signature when it was produced. The court found this testimony not to be credible." As wife points out, she nowhere stated or testified that she had not signed the stipulated judgment, and there is no indication whatsoever in the record that she disputed her signature. She readily admitted signing the document, and identified her signature. The courts specific finding in this instance is based on a misrecollection of the record. Nonetheless, the remainder of the courts factual findings accurately reflect the evidence, issues, and arguments. The court found that neither party was very sophisticated and disbelieved wifes testimony that she signed out of fear, inasmuch as wife never reported any incidents of domestic violence and had successfully negotiated an increase in child support from $500 to $800 per month. The court found that, "[a] party negotiating terms of an agreement hardly appears to be someone who was under undue duress." Wife could present no evidence to support that there was any greater value in the marital estate than was fairly represented by the share she received. Each party received mutual advantages under the stipulated judgment. (In re Marriage of Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 735-736.) Substantial evidence supports the trial courts determination that wife failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that husband had received an unfair advantage, to which the presumption of undue influence would apply. (Id. at pp. 731, 737.)
Wife argues that husband committed extrinsic fraud, relying on In re Marriage of Adkins (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 68. Adkins is distinguishable. There, the husband was an unsophisticated party of limited education. His wife threatened that she could "get a lawyer, remove him from the family home, `take everything, and he would end up paying the rest of his life if he failed to accede to her wishes." (Id. at p. 72.) Both the wife and the wifes attorney made affirmative representations to the husband to dissuade him from retaining his own counsel, and urged that if he signed the papers, he would not have to go to court. He had no understanding of the documents he was signing or of his community property rights.
Here, both parties were unsophisticated. Neither was aware of community property rights, but did express an intention to divide the property approximately equally. Although husband did consult an attorney to draft the stipulated property settlement, husband testified that he and wife had talked about the terms beforehand, and that the written document represented the result of their mutual discussions. In contrast to Adkins, here, wife was apprised of the salient terms of the agreement. Husbands attorney made no misrepresentations to wife. In addition, there was no evidence to demonstrate that the division was unfair or inequitable.
Substantial evidence supports the findings of the trial court, that there was no unfair advantage, no undue influence and no extrinsic fraud.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We Concur:
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
KING, J.