Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County No. 13690, Gerald W. Corman, Commissioner.
Law Offices of Arthur R. Collins and Arthur R. Collins for Appellant.
Law Offices of William A. Vaughn and William A. Vaughn for Respondent.
OPINION
Cornell, J.
Daniel F. Carbery and Rebecca G. Carbery had been married for nine years when Daniel filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Two trials were held, the first resolving most property division issues and the second resolving the issues related to the family residence located in Los Banos, California.
As is customary in family law cases where parties share the same surname, we refer to the parties by their first names for ease of reference, and mean no disrespect.
Daniel first attempts to revisit issues resolved in the first judgment. We conclude the first judgment is final and reject these arguments as untimely. Daniel also complains because the value of the Los Banos residence has continued to fall since the second judgment was issued. He asks us to require the trial court to utilize an unspecified method to protect homeowners in a falling market. We reject this argument because it was not raised in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Daniel and Rebecca were married on March 19, 1993. They have no children together. Daniel filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on August 21, 2002, and Rebecca filed a timely response. The parties represented themselves for lengthy periods of time.
On December 14, 2005, a trial was held to resolve the issues related to determination of which property was community property and the separation of the community property. The judgment of dissolution was not signed until June 20, 2006, but was entered nunc pro tunc as of December 14, 2005.
The judgment provided for the division of various items of community property, designated several accounts as Daniel’s separate property, and divided an employee stock purchase account between community and separate property. In addition, the judgment stated that after a contested hearing, the trial court determined that property the parties purchased in the Philippines was community property, determined the value of the property, and awarded the property to Rebecca. The trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine unresolved issues related to the primary residence located in Los Banos. Notice of entry of judgment was served on June 20, 2006.
On October 24, 2007, a contested hearing was held on the issues related to the Los Banos residence, which Daniel had purchased prior to marrying Rebecca. The order on reserved issues determined the community interest in the property at 37 percent. The trial court also valued that interest at $116,848. The remaining value of the property was confirmed as Daniel’s separate property. Daniel was ordered to make an equalizing payment to Rebecca in the amount of $43,639.50, which included a deduction for the value of the property in the Philippines previously awarded to Rebecca.
Notice of entry of judgment was served on January 9, 2008. Daniel filed a notice of appeal on March 3, 2008.
DISCUSSION
I. Calculation of the Community Property Interest in the Property in the Philippines
Daniel contends the trial court erred when it determined the property in the Philippines was all community property. Instead, Daniel claims that he had a 27 percent separate property interest in the property. We reject the argument for two reasons.
First, the judgment determining the character of the property was signed on June 20, 2006, and the notice of entry of judgment was served on the same day. The notice of appeal was not filed until March 3, 2008. Daniel had 60 days from the date the notice of entry of judgment was served to file his notice of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) Therefore, the time to appeal any issues arising from this judgment expired on or about August 20, 2006. His notice of appeal filed on March 3, 2008, precludes consideration of any argument related to this property. (Id., rule 8.104(b).)
The judgment was appealable immediately. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 113-116.)
Second, there is nothing in the record in this court to support any contention related to the property in the Philippines. The record consists of one volume of clerk’s transcript and a reporter’s transcript of a hearing on October 24, 2007. The only references in the clerk’s transcript to the property in the Philippines are in Rebecca’s pretrial briefs and in the June 20, 2006, judgment. There was no evidence about the property in the Philippines admitted at the October 24, 2007, hearing.
It is Daniel’s obligation, as the appellant, to provide an adequate record to support his argument. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296.) The failure to provide an adequate record requires that the issue be resolved against Daniel. (Ibid.)
We also reject any contention suggesting that we should review the documents attached to Daniel’s opening brief as support for his argument. There is no request that we take judicial notice of these documents, nor are they the type of documents of which judicial notice may be taken. (Evid. Code, § 450 et seq.)
In a related argument Daniel contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to revisit the issue of the property in the Philippines at the October 24, 2007, hearing. The trial court did not err. As explained above, the time to appeal the judgment had expired. Nor did Daniel make a motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 or 1008. Accordingly, the judgment was final.
A motion under either statute filed in 2007 would have been untimely. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (b) & 1008, subd. (a).)
Also, any evidence or argument related to the Philippines was not relevant to the reserved issues being contested at the October 24, 2007, hearing. (Evid. Code, § 210.) Since only relevant evidence is admissible, the trial court did not err in refusing to hear Daniel’s arguments or purported evidence about the property in the Philippines. (Id., § 350.)
II. Decrease in the Value of the Los Banos Property
Daniel’s final argument relates to the value of the residence located in Los Banos. At the October 24, 2007, hearing the trial court determined the value of the Los Banos residence, the community interest in that property, and the resulting equalizing payment due from Daniel to Rebecca.
The trial court’s valuation of the Los Banos property was based on Rebecca’s testimony. Both parties agreed that the value of the Los Banos property was considerably higher at the 2005 trial. Therefore, the delay in valuation of the property worked to the advantage of Daniel. Nonetheless, Daniel believes the trial court valued the property above its market value.
Although far from clear, it appears Daniel is arguing that the trial court, because property values were falling, should have used some other method to determine the value of the Los Banos property. What method Daniel proposes is not stated.
Regardless, there is no error. There is nothing in the record here to suggest that Daniel requested the trial court utilize some alternative method for valuation of the property. The record reflects that Daniel did not present any evidence on the value of the property. Daniel’s failure to raise the issue in the trial court forfeits any claim of error that may have occurred. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)
We emphasize that we are not stating the trial court erred in any manner. In fact, the record before us precludes any such finding. We merely are stating that if there was error, Daniel has forfeited the right to so argue by failing to object in the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The appeal of the judgment entered June 20, 2006, is dismissed. The order made on October 24, 2007, is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Rebecca G. Carbery.
WE CONCUR: Ardaiz, P.J., Vartabedian, J.