Opinion
No. 4-806 / 04-0453
Filed January 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.
John Crall appeals from the dissolution of his marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Theodore F. Sporer of Sporer Ilic, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Barbara Romar of Barbara Durden Romar, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
John Crall appeals from the dissolution of his marriage. We affirm as modified.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
John and Joanne Crall were married in 1979. At the time Joanne petitioned to dissolve the marriage in 2003, John was fifty-two years old while Joanne was forty-five. John is employed at John Deere, where he has worked for over thirty years and has earned substantial pension benefits. Joanne rejoined the workforce in 1995 and is currently employed at the Des Moines Area Community College (DMACC).
The Cralls' marriage produced three children. Only one, Brian, was still a minor at the time of the dissolution. The dissolution decree entered December 31, 2003, allocated the physical care of Brian to Joanne. The district court ordered John to pay $724.79 each month for child support until 2007, when Brian graduates from high school. This amount was based on the district court's finding that John has an annual gross income of $73,007, and that Joanne's income was shown to be $30,516. In addition to the child support obligation, the district court's decree ordered John to pay Joanne monthly spousal support in the amount of $585 until 2007 when the child support for Brian terminates, at which time spousal support would increase to $1,310 per month until Joanne reaches age sixty-two or dies.
John claimed income of approximately $61,000 in his initial financial affidavit, and then claimed income of $67,382.57 in his amended financial affidavit. His 2002 tax return showed a gross income of $81,398. The district court relied upon John's 2003 pay stub from John Deere to find John's gross annual income was $73,007 for purposes of child support and alimony computations.
The district court, charged with making an equitable division of the Cralls' martial property, found and set aside as separate non-marital property approximately $7,000 in various bank accounts in Joanne's name that consisted of gifts from her father that were never co-mingled with marital funds. John also claimed premarital equity in a home he purchased prior to the marriage which we will refer to as the "Trilein home." John claimed he owned approximately $12,700 equity in the Trilein home before the marriage, but the district court found documentary proof of payments evidencing less than $6,000 of this claim. The district court's decree did not specifically set aside to John in the property division any amount in recognition for his claimed premarital equity in the residential real estate. John also claimed as his separate property family gifts in the amount of $18,000, but the district court found that those funds had been co-mingled and became marital assets.
The district court's decree divided the assets and debts but did not make findings as to the values allocated to each party. The court noted that it found John's financial affidavits were either inaccurate or incredible, and that John had knowingly withheld financial information from Joanne. Moreover, the district court specifically observed that "Mr. Crall's credibility regarding finances and monies is suspect and not forthcoming unless the Respondent is faced with evidence of error or misstatement." The decree ordered John to pay Joanne $5,662.50, about one-half of the total fees incurred by Joanne at the trial court level.
John appeals the financial aspects of the parties' dissolution, specifically contending (1) the division of marital assets is inequitable under the circumstances, (2) the award of alimony is excessive in both amount and duration, and (3) the district court erred in awarding Joanne attorney's fees.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review the financial aspects of a dissolution decree de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We review the entire record and adjudicate anew all economic issues properly presented on appeal. In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1981). While we are not bound by the findings of the district court, we will pay particular heed to the district court's assessment of the credibility of the parties. In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984). With regard to attorney's fees, considerable discretion is possessed by the district court, and we review for abuse of discretion its decision to award such fees. In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Iowa 1977).
III. Discussion.
A. Property Division.
John first contends on appeal that the division of marital assets is inequitable. He claims the decree creates a $32,365 disparity in the value of marital assets transferred to the parties in favor of Joanne. We note at the outset that the district court, while charged with making an equitable division, is not required to "achieve a precisely equal division in awards of marital property." In re Marriage of Webb, 426 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1988). We also note that where "one party brings property into the marriage, there need not necessarily be a division [of that asset]." In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Iowa Ct.App. 1982).
We find the district court failed to set aside to John the value of the equity in the Trilein home that he purchased prior to the marriage. John testified that he paid some $12,700 for the equity in the home prior to the marriage. John offered in evidence the warranty deed evidencing his purchase of the property in 1979. The real estate transfer stamps on the document and the applicable tax tables show the consideration for the transaction was $57,000. That consideration included John's assumption of the seller's mortgage in the amount of $44,300. We find this evidence of a sale of real estate in close temporal proximity to the date of marriage sufficient to establish that John brought into the marriage real estate equity valued at $12,700. We therefore consider that evidence as we determine whether the district court's division of assets is equitable in this case.
John's claim that the district court's division of assets and debts left Joanne with an advantage of $32,365 is consistent with his post-trial itemization of the assets and his opinions as to their values. We reject John's claim, however, because it is based on certain inaccuracies which render it misleading. Although the district court failed to specifically value the assets divided in the decree, after de novo review we find the division achieved was more than equitable under the circumstances. Moreover, we conclude the property division achieved in the decree is equitable notwithstanding the district court's failure to set aside John's premarital equity, and we therefore affirm the district court on this issue. B. Alimony Award.
We note that John urges asset valuations which accentuate the disparity between the parties' awards. For example, his valuation of the marital residence is based upon the 2001 property tax assessment rather than a more recent, and in our opinion more relevant, 2003 assessment. John also includes certain assets and omits others that tend to skew his assessment of the district court's asset division. John includes in Joanne's column a diamond ring which he values at $4,830. Evidence of the ring and its value was not before the district court, and the district court specifically excluded its value from the property division. John's analysis also includes in Joanne's column the separate property clearly set aside by the district court, some $7,000 in various bank accounts funded by gifts. John also counts as Joanne's asset and his debt the amount of attorney fees he was ordered to pay. Lastly, John's analysis of the property division apparently fails to count as his asset the Van Guard Growth Index with a value of $9,257.10 allocated to him by the decree.
Joanne points to the fact that both John and his financial affidavits were found by the district court to lack credibility. Joanne points to precedent for the proposition that a party who lied in discovery in order to conceal assets from the other party and the court cannot thereafter challenge the asset distribution as inequitable. In re Marriage of Hanson, 475 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). We find the cited precedent persuasive; however we need not rely on it as we find the asset division was ultimately equitable under the circumstances.
Where a proper assessment of the values of the assets is performed, even when John's values of the assets are used, and the $12,700 in pre-marital equity is set aside to him, John receives approximately forty-nine percent of the total marital assets.
John next contends the district court erred in awarding Joanne alimony in the amount of $1,310 per month from 2007 until Joanne reaches age sixty-two or dies. We note that an award of alimony is not an absolute right, but rather the availability and advisability of such an award is arrived at by the district court after considering the numerous factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21(3) (2003). In re Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983). The central focus of our inquiry is aimed at maintaining both parties' standard of living while balancing the relative ability to pay of the higher earning spouse against the relative financial needs of the other. In re Marriage of Imhoff, 461 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990).
John concedes Joanne is eligible for some form of spousal support given the disparity in monthly incomes and expenses between the parties and the parties' current standard of living. John contends, however, that his obligation should terminate altogether no later than 2013 when he reaches age sixty-two. John supports this position by arguing that he plans to be retired when he reaches age sixty-two, and he will then experience a significant decrease in both earning capacity and monthly income. Joanne will at that time, John contends, be enjoying her maximum earning capacity at DMACC. We find this argument persuasive and find that equity dictates we modify the district court's award of alimony. John shall pay spousal support in the amount of $585 per month so long as he is obligated to pay child support. From the date when John's child support obligation terminates in 2007 until he reaches age sixty-two in 2013, he shall pay spousal support of $1,310 per month. Thereafter until Joanne reaches age sixty-two, John shall pay spousal support of $655 per month. The decree is modified accordingly.
C. Award of Attorney's Fees.
Our review on this issue is for abuse of discretion. We allow the district court a great deal of latitude in its decision to award a party a portion of their attorney's fees. Winegard, 257 N.W.2d at 618. Under the circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused that considerable discretion. John is clearly the higher wage earner, and given the almost equal property division, John is clearly the party with a greater ability to pay. The district court also found that John, who exclusively controlled the majority of the marital assets, was less than forthcoming about the nature and value of those assets. We are convinced that at least part of Joanne's attorney's fees was incurred as a direct result of John's obfuscation, and we therefore affirm the district court's attorney fee award.