Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05FL06347
BUTZ, J.Following stipulations by the parties to waive spousal support, Linda Condon appeals from a family court order denying her motion to set aside judgment terminating the court’s jurisdiction to award spousal support. Finding the court acted within its discretion, we shall affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 17, 2006, at the conclusion of their first mandatory settlement conference, plaintiff Robert W. Condon and defendant Linda L. Condon agreed to an order terminating the court’s jurisdiction to award spousal support: “Each party terminates their right to spousal support. The parties acknowledgment [sic] that this is a long-term marriage. Both parties are self-supporting and each can support themselves with the earnings of their own. [Robert] had a serious injury in April 2005 and was receiving disability. [Linda] is in good health.”
Eight months later, the parties affirmed their agreement in a second stipulation and order: “Both parties waive spousal support. They have both been advised that by waiving spousal support at this time they can never come back to this court or any other court to have spousal support awarded no matter what the circumstances.”
According to her declaration, in January 2007 Linda retrieved the records of the dissolution proceeding from her former attorney. Contained within those records was a statement from Robert’s bank account dated June 2005. That statement showed deposits totaling $12,531 for that month. Linda claimed she had never seen this statement before and it was inconsistent with Robert’s August 2005 “Income and Expense Declaration,” wherein he stated that his monthly income was only $3,340. Based on her discovery of this document, Linda filed a motion in August 2007 to set aside the order terminating the court’s jurisdiction to award spousal support.
In support of her motion, Linda stated that her decision to terminate the court’s jurisdiction over spousal support was based on Robert’s representation that his only income was his disability income, and he was too ill to work. She argued this June 2005 bank statement proved that was not true. Thus, she asked the trial court to set aside the mutual waivers of spousal support on the bases of Family Code section 2122, subdivisions (a) (fraud), (b) (perjury), and (f) (Robert’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
Robert filed his own declaration in response to Linda’s motion, claiming the deposits were not income. Robert explained that, with his contacts in the construction industry, he was able to secure jobs for other people; the client would pay Robert, then Robert would use the money for materials and to pay the people who performed the work. Robert further declared that none of this was new information to Linda, that all of his bank statements were reviewed at the settlement conference, and had been discussed in detail along with his Income and Expense Declaration. He also described how he had agreed to award the family residence to Linda in lieu of spousal support, giving up his share of equity (a value of approximately $45,000), allowing her to keep the residence.
On October 15, 2007, the parties appeared before the trial court on Linda’s motion. The trial court told Linda’s counsel to review the audio recordings from the January and August 2006 settlement conferences, to determine if there was any discussion on the record regarding these deposits. The court also ordered Robert to produce to Linda “copies of any checks received by [Robert] in June of 2005.” The court then continued the matter to November 28, 2007.
There was no court reporter present at this hearing, but an August 5, 2008 settled statement has been included in the record on appeal, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137.
In a November 21, 2007 declaration opposing Linda’s motion, Robert’s counsel specifically recalled that Linda’s prior counsel had subpoenaed all of Robert’s bank statements; that they were delivered to the court under seal; and that the parties reviewed them during the settlement conference. Counsel reiterated that the parties’ division of community property assets, in particular, the family residence, was part and parcel of the parties’ agreement to waive spousal support.
At the continued November 28, 2007 hearing, the court denied Linda’s motion, finding that “both parties had a clear understanding of the facts before entering into the January 17, 2006 and August 10, 2006 stipulations and orders.” Linda appeals the order denying her motion to set aside the waivers of spousal support.
DISCUSSION
The Family Code provides for relief from judgments in marital dissolution cases where the division of property or the award of support “is inequitable... due to the nondisclosure or other misconduct of one of the parties.” (§ 2120, subd. (b).) Pursuant to Family Code section 2122, the court may relieve a spouse from a judgment, or any portion thereof, after the six-month time limit of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 has run, if the spouse: (1) complies with the time limits of section 2122; (2) establishes one or more of the grounds for relief set forth in section 2122 (i.e., actual fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity, mistake, or failure to comply with disclosure requirements); and (3) establishes that the grounds for relief materially affected the original outcome and that the moving party would materially benefit from the granting of the relief. (§ 2121; In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 684-685 (Rosevear).)
Section 2122 provides, in relevant part:
“The grounds and time limits for a motion to set aside a judgment [of dissolution of marriage], or any part or parts thereof, are governed by this section and shall be one of the following:
“(a) Actual fraud where the defrauded party was kept in ignorance or in some other manner was fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding. An action or motion based on fraud shall be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either did discover, or should have discovered, the fraud.
“(b) Perjury. An action or motion based on perjury in the preliminary or final declaration of disclosure, the waiver of the final declaration of disclosure, or in the current income and expense statement shall be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either did discover, or should have discovered, the perjury. [¶]... [¶]
“(f) Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 2100). An action or motion based on failure to comply with the disclosure requirements shall be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either discovered, or should have discovered, the failure to comply.”
The trial court’s denial of a set-aside motion under section 2122 is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 128, 138.) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 682, quoting Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272.) Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision was based on reasonable inferences drawn from the facts.
Here the court determined that Robert did not commit fraud or perjury, nor did he fail to comply with the disclosure requirements. Rather, the court concluded that “both parties had a clear understanding of the facts before entering into the January 17, 2006 and August 10, 2006 stipulation and orders,” and denied Linda’s motion accordingly.
This ruling was well within the court’s discretion and is supported by the record. The only evidence submitted on this motion was the declarations from Linda, her current attorney, Robert, and his attorney. Evidently, the court gave the declarations of Robert and his attorney, both of whom were present at the settlement conferences, greater weight than those of Linda and her attorney, who was not present at the settlement conference. Such evidence is sufficient to support the court’s ruling.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Linda’s motion to set aside the spousal support waivers and reopen discovery is affirmed. Linda shall reimburse Robert for his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., HULL, J.