Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, Ct. No. FL600938. Judith K. Dulcich, Judge.
Kilpatrick & White and Michael R. Kilpatrick for Appellant.
Law Offices of Roger Grass and Roger R. Grass for Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Kane, J.
In a subsequent proceeding after the parties to a contested marriage dissolution orally recited on the record a stipulation for judgment, the family court granted the husband’s motion to set aside the stipulation and deny entry of judgment based on the wife’s failure to timely disclose alleged community property assets. (Fam. Code, §§ 2105, subd. (a), 2107, subd. (d).) Not finding any legal basis to treat the stipulation as a final judgment, we must dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Charles Cline (Cline) and Ronda Edwards, also known as Olga Cline, (Edwards) married in November 1998 and separated on June 30, 2005. After a lengthy period of unsuccessful negotiations, the matter was set for trial for trial on October 1, 2007, at which time Cline requested to relieve his counsel and sought a continuance. The trial court advised Cline he was free to dismiss his counsel, but that the court would not postpone the proceedings. Cline retained his counsel and following a recess, the parties recited a stipulation for judgment to distribute the community assets.
On November 5, 2007, the parties returned to the trial court to finalize the dissolution and to transfer properties, but Cline refused to sign the documents claiming Edwards failed to disclose certain community assets held in Russia under her mother’s name, that the documents looked forged, and that he had not been able to retrieve his personal property as per the stipulated agreement. The matter was continued and subsequently transferred to a different trial court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 170.3.)
On February 15, 2008, Edwards moved for entry of judgment following the oral stipulation pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6, and to execute the transfer documents. Cline objected and requested the court set aside and vacate the stipulation for judgment.
On September 24, 2008, following numerous additional motions and proceedings involving allegations of domestic violence, the trial court granted Cline’s motion to set aside and vacate the oral stipulation. The trial court found Edwards failed to comply with the asset disclosure requirements based on Cline’s offer of proof that property held in Russia was community property. (Fam. Code, §§ 2105, subd. (a), 2107, subd. (d).) Accordingly, the trial court also denied Edwards’ motion to enter judgment.
The parties participated in a settlement conference on November 13, 2008, where the trial court ordered the parties to file proposed property division statements and revised income and expense declarations in preparation for trial set for February 2, 2009. But on December 30, 2008, Edwards filed a Notice of Appeal “from the ruling issued…on September 24, 2008, in favor of Petitioner, Charles Cline.” On our own motion, we directed the parties to file letter briefs addressing whether the trial court’s order setting aside and vacating the stipulation for judgment is immediately appealable.
DISCUSSION
“The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. Thus, this court is obligated to review the question of appealability.” (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292 (Doran); Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) “‘“There is no constitutional right to an appeal; the appellate procedure is entirely statutory and subject to complete legislative control.”’” (In re Marriage of Lafkas (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1432.) “In civil cases there normally can only be an appeal from a final judgment.” (Ibid.) “If there are unresolved causes of action between the parties, the judgment is not final and an appeal therefrom must be dismissed.” (Ibid.) Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 authorized appellate review from Superior Court judgments, except those which are interlocutory, or from orders expressly appealable by statute.
Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6 (section 664.6) provides in pertinent part that, “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” Edwards filed a motion expressly requesting “entry of judgment pursuant to stipulation recited on record pursuant to CCP sec. 664.6,” which the trial court denied based on its finding she had violated the disclosure requirements. Edwards agrees in her briefing to this court that if the trial court’s action was “purely the denial of a motion pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 [to enforce settlement made in writing or orally before trial court] that said orders are clearly not appealable” under Doran, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 1287. But Edwards believes that unlike “the classic order denying a motion to enforce settlement,” the stipulation here is distinguishable because it was “judicially supervised” following extensive negotiations.
In Doran, the defendant brought a motion for judgment under section 664.6 based on a stipulated settlement in a creditor action. (Doran, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.) The trial court denied the motion and the defendant filed a notice of appeal. (Ibid.) In reviewing whether this court had jurisdiction to review the denial of entry of judgment, we noted:
“It is the substance and effect of the adjudication, and not the form, which determine if the order is interlocutory and nonappealable, or final and appealable. [Citation.] If no issues in the action remain for further consideration, the decree is final and appealable. But if further judicial action is required for a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory. [Citation.] The decree will not be appealable ‘unless it comes within the statutory classes of appealable interlocutory judgments.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1293.)
Not finding any statutory provision or case specifically addressing whether the denial of a motion to enter a stipulation for judgment under section 664.6 is appealable, we concluded in Doran that such an order cannot be a final judgment because it does not finally dispose of the action. To the contrary, it “expressly leaves it open.” (Doran, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293.) In this regard, we found the denial of a motion to enter judgment similar to an unappealable denial of a motion for summary judgment. (Ibid.)
We are unpersuaded by Edwards’ claim that because the stipulation here was entered into the record after exhaustive deliberations that it is somehow distinguishable from the denial of entry of judgment from Doran. Section 664.6 applies equally to “a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court, or orally before the court.” A stipulated settlement presented orally by the parties or their counsel to a judge on the record satisfies the “‘before the court’” requirement of section 664.6. (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 906.) Nor do we find merit in Edwards’ contention that the denial of entry of judgment here constituted “an order granted a new trial” appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(4). There can be no “new trial” until after a judgment is first rendered. And although Edwards suggests Cline has been acting in bad faith, as allegedly demonstrated by his request to relieve his counsel to delay the proceedings, the parties intentions and behavior do not confer jurisdiction on this court.
Moreover, Edwards fails to acknowledge that the reason the trial court set aside the stipulation was based on Cline’s offer of proof that Edwards failed to disclose certain foreign properties that, if found to be community assets, could make the previously stipulated agreement inequitable. Even after a court enters judgment in a dissolution proceeding, it may set that judgment aside where the disclosure rules have not been followed. (Fam. Code, § 2107, subd. (e).) Further, “failure to comply with the disclosure requirements does not constitute harmless error.” (Ibid.) Given that the trial court could have set aside the judgment, even after entered, we conclude that the order denying Edwards’ motion for entry of judgment under section 664.6 is nonappealable.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order denying entry of judgment.