Opinion
G061697
09-20-2023
In re Marriage of DEBORAH L. and EDWARD L. CLARK, JR. v. EDWARD L. CLARK, JR., Appellant. DEBORAH L. CLARK, Respondent,
Edward L. Clark, Jr., in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 05D000275 Yolanda V. Torres, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward L. Clark, Jr., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, J.
INTRODUCTION
Edward Clark, representing himself, appeals from two orders entered in June and July 2022 in the family court. The effect of the first order is not entirely clear. It is a ruling on Edward's motion, but the relief he requests is uncertain. It is probably a motion to dismiss the dissolution action filed by his ex-wife, Deborah Clark, in 2005, in which judgment was entered in 2007. Edward based this motion on a settlement he received in a civil suit he filed against Deborah in 2019.
The family court denied this motion. The second order, probably a motion for reconsideration, was also denied.
Edward has been before this court in the past. The prior appeal (In re Marriage of Clark (Dec. 2, 2020, G058030/G058284) [nonpub. opn.]) involved a 2018 order from the family court requiring him to resume the equalization payments owed to Deborah pursuant to the dissolution judgment of 2007, which Edward claimed he no longer owed. The family court disagreed and found that he still owed her nearly $500,000, which he was ordered to pay in accordance with the marital settlement agreement of 2006. One of Edward's arguments in the 2018 trial of the equalization payments was that the family court no longer had jurisdiction in the dissolution action.
Edward did not appeal from the 2018 order requiring him to resume the payments. Instead he appealed from a ruling on a subsequent motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set it aside, which the family court denied. In the course of affirming that order in the prior appeal, we held that the family court still had jurisdiction over the dissolution action and the judgment entered in 2007, despite Edward's arguments to the contrary.
Before we issued our opinion in the family court appeal, Edward filed a declaratory relief action against Deborah in civil court. This action subsequently settled and was dismissed. Edward then moved in the family court to dismiss the dissolution action, claiming that the civil settlement required this dismissal.
Although judicial officers have tried to explain to Edward that any modification of a family court judgment must take place in family court before a family court judge under family court rules, he still maintains that the family court must honor the civil court settlement agreement and dismiss the dissolution action on that basis.
We affirm the two orders from which Edward has now appealed. The family court correctly ruled that the civil settlement has no effect in family court. As Edward based both motions on the outcome of the civil suit, the family court properly denied both motions.
FACTS
We recite the facts from the prior appeal that are pertinent to this one.
"Edward and Deborah were divorced in 2007. The marital settlement agreement, which became part of the judgment in 2006, provided that, in lieu of a lumpsum equalization payment to Deborah, Edward would pay her $250,000 at the time and the rest ($1.7 million) in installments of $9,227 per month over 30 years, at five percent interest. The parties waived spousal support. Deborah later testified that the monthly payment was her sole source of income.
"Edward presented the court with an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment (full) ostensibly signed by Deborah on January 14, 2013, and recorded the same day. The register of actions in the divorce case does not reflect the filing of an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment or a demand for the filing of an acknowledgement. Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment, Edward continued to make the monthly payments mandated by the marital settlement agreement/judgment until 2016.
At trial in September 2018, Deborah testified that she had no memory of the document. In fact, it was recorded but never filed.
"In 2016, Edward still owed Deborah $1.3 million in equalization payments. He told Deborah he could no longer make the monthly payments because he found himself in financial difficulties. If she would sign some papers, he could take $1 million in equity out of his house and put it in her bank account, then use $150,000 of it to pay his taxes. She could live on the remaining $850,000 for the estimated two years that it would take Edward to reorganize his finances. He would then resume the monthly payments until the balance - some $300,000 plus the $150,000 he took for taxes - was finally paid off. Deborah agreed, largely because Edward told her that if she did not, she would get nothing.
"Deborah signed a debt settlement agreement on March 21, 2016. Under the terms of the debt settlement agreement, Deborah was supposed to receive the entire $1 million. Edward nevertheless took $150,000 of that amount, pursuant to the previously made oral agreement. He sent two text messages to Deborah acknowledging the agreement to pay her the balance of the equalization payment.
"In 2017, Deborah called Edward to find out when he was going to resume the monthly payments, assuming that his financial problems would be on the way to resolution. Edward told Deborah he was not going to pay her. He might repay her the $150,000 he took for his taxes, but nothing else.
"Deborah filed a request for order (RFO) on April 17, 2018, in the divorce case, asking for an order to enforce the judgment - in particular the remaining monthly payments. The moving papers included the debt settlement agreement and the acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment as exhibits and a declaration from Deborah explaining how she had come to sign them. The RFO was personally served on Edward on May 7, 2018. Edward filed an opposition on August 22, 2018, denying that he owed Deborah any more money and giving his version of events.
"The case was tried to a family law commissioner over two days, September 18 and October 12, 2018. Both Edward and Deborah testified. At the end of trial, the court ruled in Deborah's favor. It found that she had been due $488,500 as of April 30, 2016, per the marital settlement agreement. The components of this amount were (1) the balance of the monthly payments due under the marital settlement agreement/judgment of 2006 ($388,500) and (2) the $150,000 that Edward had taken from the $1 million to pay his taxes. In other words, Edward had to pay the full amount agreed to in the marital settlement agreement/judgment and was not entitled to discount that amount by means of the debt settlement agreement and the satisfaction of judgment.He received a credit for the $850,000 Deborah received from the home equity loan. But he had to pay the rest ($525,137, including interest as of October 2018) in monthly installments, as mandated by the original judgment." (In re Marriage of Clark, supra, G058030/G058284, at pp. *2-*5.)
The court noted that the amount Edward proposed as his final payoff, $850,000, was an unreasonable 35.8 percent discount on the balance still owing, and even the total amount borrowed, $1 million, was a 24.5 percent discount, also unreasonable.
The ruling included a payment amortization schedule for monthly payments beginning November 1, 2018.
Edward appealed, not from this order, but from an order denying his motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set it aside. We affirmed the denial of the set-aside motion, pointing out that a motion under this code section was not the proper vehicle to complain about the evidence presented at trial. (In re Marriage of Clark, supra, G058030/G058284, at p. *1.) We observed that the record belied one of his contentions - that he had not stipulated to the matter being heard by a commissioner. (In re Marriage of Clark, supra, G058030/G058284, at p. *10.) We also held that because the matter involved the enforcement of an executory family court judgment, the family court had jurisdiction over the matter. (In re Marriage of Clark, supra, G058030/G058284, at p. *2.)
One of Edward's contentions in the 2018 trial was that, Deborah having signed a satisfaction of judgment in 2013, the divorce case was over. If Deborah wanted to complain about his failure to pay her the remainder of her equalization payments, then she had to sue him in civil court and serve a summons and complaint on him. We explained in the prior opinion that this contention was incorrect; under Family Code section 290, the family court had the authority to enforce a family court judgment. (In re Marriage of Clark, supra, G058030/G058284, at p. *15.) Our prior opinion was issued on December 2, 2020.
Edward filed a declaratory relief action in civil court against Deborah on August 2, 2019. He made the same allegations regarding the 2013 satisfaction of judgment and the 2016 debt settlement agreement that he had made during the 2018 trial in the family court. The civil suit resulted in a settlement and a dismissal in July 2021.
As we pointed out in our prior opinion, the satisfaction of judgment was recorded but never filed with the court. Deborah had never filed an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 724.030, and Edward had never filed a demand that she do so under section 724.050. The satisfaction of judgment was therefore unenforceable. (In re Marriage of Clark, supra, G058030/G058284, at p. *14.).
On March 22, 2022, Edward filed a request for order (RFO) in the family court. He checked the "other" relief box and "specif[ied]" the following: "on. Attached Ex A; Satisfaction of Judgment filed by Petioner [sic] in Orange county 1/14/2013, Ex B Contract Deb" [¶] . . . [¶] "attached hereto and incorpoated [sic] herein by reference is [¶] Exhibit 'A': Proof of Service 15 - day notice [¶] Exhibit 'B' Contract entered (stipulation) witnessed and entered into the record by a superior court judge. [¶] Exhibit 'C' satsfaction [sic] of judgment entered by Petioner in the county of orange 1/14/2013 [¶] Exhibit 'D' Contract entered and executed between the parties 3/21/2016" The supporting declaration stated, "I, Respondent, served Petioner 15-day notice to enter satisfaction of judgment for case 05D000275 pursuant to ccp 724.030 and contract (via stipulation) entered and witnessed by a superior court judge July 12, 2021. To date Petitioner has failed to file satisfaction of judgment as requested." The register of actions in the dissolution case does not reflect the filing of a demand for acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050. Deborah did not file an opposition to the RFO.
Edward's RFO was heard on June 3, 2022. Deborah did not appear. The court ruled that the civil court had no jurisdiction over family court orders and denied the motion.
Although it is not clear from the RFO itself what Edward wanted the court to do, it appears from the oral argument that he wanted the court to dismiss the dissolution case pursuant to the stipulation and settlement entered in the civil action, now dismissed. The judge patiently tried to explain that what happened on the civil side had no bearing in family court. The parties had to use family law procedures in family court if they wanted a ruling from a family court judge. This explanation had no effect.
Edward filed another RFO on June 9, 2022. This time the relief requested was "Motion to Amend order entered 6/3/2022 to dismiss case 05D000275 in compliance with California rules of the court Rule 3.1385 (B)[.]" Edward attached an "objection to order entered 6/3/2022" and a "notice of motion and motion to amend order entered June 3, 2021 [sic]." The notice stated that Edward would move to amend the court's order refusing to dismiss the dissolution action pursuant to "California Rules of the Court 3.1385 (B). order entered 6/2/2022 [sic] pursuant to CCP 1008(a) on the grounds that said ruling was created with and entered based on Extrinsic Fraud, self serving to the court fabricating evidence in support of various judicial officers alleged to be engaged with racketeering and corrupt business practices in federal court." After accusing the court of fraud and other misdeeds, Edward stated that the court "must dismiss the entire case 45-days after notice of settlement," pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385. Edward then continued to accuse the court of fraud "designed to fabricate, deceive and create evidence." Most of the remaining argument is either unintelligible or completely untethered to anything in the record . . . or both. One thing is clear, however. Edward accuses several judicial officers of fraud in refusing to dismiss the dissolution case.
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(a) provides in pertinent part, "Notice of settlement [¶] (1) Court and other persons to be notified [¶] If an entire case is settled or otherwise disposed of, each plaintiff or other party seeking affirmative relief must immediately file written notice of the settlement or other disposition with the court and serve the notice on all parties and any arbitrator or other court-connected alternative dispute resolution (ADR) neutral involved in the case. Each plaintiff or other party seeking affirmative relief must also immediately give oral notice to all of the above if a hearing, conference, or trial is scheduled to take place within 10 days." California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(b) provides, "Dismissal of case [¶] Except as provided in (c) or (d), each plaintiff or other party seeking affirmative relief must serve and file a request for dismissal of the entire case within 45 days after the date of settlement of the case. If the plaintiff or other party required to serve and file the request for dismissal does not do so, the court must dismiss the entire case 45 days after it receives notice of settlement unless good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed."
The court heard this second RFO on July 22, 2022. The court deemed the motion a motion for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. It denied the motion because Edward had failed to provide any new or additional facts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) During the hearing Edward berated the court for not following California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385 and dismissing the dissolution case.
"[Edward]: And the rule specifically states 'the court must dismiss.' [¶] So I'm not sure what part of that rule the court doesn't understand."
Edward has appealed from the orders denying his RFOs entered on June 3 and July 22, 2022. Deborah did not file a respondent's brief.
DISCUSSION
Our first task is to determine whether the two orders from which Edward is appealing are appealable orders. This is difficult because Edward does not clearly identify the nature of the order in his moving papers or in his opening brief. From the first RFO itself, it would appear that Edward is applying to the court under Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050, subdivision (d), for an order requiring Deborah to file an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment with the court. An order denying such an application is appealable. (Horath v. Hess (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 456, 462.) In reality, however, Edward seems to be appealing from an order denying his request to modify the final judgment of dissolution by dismissing the case. We will therefore regard the appeal as being from a postjudgment order, appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (2). (Cf. In re Marriage of Olson (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1462 [postjudgment order not appealable if further proceedings contemplated].) That being so, the second order, denying Edward's motion for reconsideration, is also appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (g).
The acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment was recorded, but nothing in the dissolution case's register of actions indicates that it was ever filed with the court.
Edward represented himself in the family court below, and he is representing himself in this court. Although people are constitutionally entitled to represent themselves, doing so is generally a bad idea. It certainly has been in this case.
The same rules that apply to attorneys apply to parties representing themselves. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) For example, although he leans heavily on California Rule of Court, rule 3.1385, Edward fails to observe California Rules of Court, rule 8.204, which specifies the content of briefs. This rule requires an appellant to support any reference to a matter in the record by citing to the page number where the matter appears and limit statements of fact to matters in the record. The record in this case consists only of the RFO's, with exhibits, and the minute orders. Edward's opening brief frequently states facts either unsupported by references to the record or requiring information outside the record.
In addition, Edward uses legal terms without evidently understanding what they mean. For example, he repeatedly refers to an "order to show cause" or "motion to show cause" that he issued, apparently unaware that a court, not a party, issues an order of this kind, or that other sorts of documents are not orders to show cause. There is no reference in the register of actions to any order to show cause. He states that the two orders from which he appeals are appealable because "denying the order [sic: motion?] extends the threat of extortion where the lower court ordered payments of $9,000/month on top of the $9,000 refinance payments to pay Respondent $850,000 cash payment for full settlement, exceeds the $5,000 threshold." There are no citations to the record for any of the monetary amounts, and Edward evidently believes that the $5,000 threshold for appealing a sanctions order under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivisions (11) and (12), applies across the board. He thinks that a motion for reconsideration is "a motion that you file when you want the judge to take a second look at a decision that you feel is incorrect. A valid motion to reconsider when you believe the judge did not consider or properly examine certain evidence or correctly apply the law, Evidence Code §452(a) and (e)." [Sic.] Edward ignores the condition set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), that a motion for reconsideration requires "new or different facts, circumstances, or law." The relevance of the Evidence Code statute on judicial notice is unexplained.
Edward states that he provided Deborah, "[p]ursuant to CCP § 724.010," with a "15-day notice to show cause if there was a reason for [the dissolution case] not to be dismissed." Code of Civil Procedure section 724.010 establishes the conditions under which a judgment creditor files a satisfaction of judgment. The statute does not mention dismissal. He cites a depublished case, Kurwa v. Kislinger (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 21, to support his argument that the two orders are appealable, thereby violating California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115. (See People v. Williams (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529.) He also relies exclusively on cases from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court to support his contentions about the standard of review.
Edward's chief contention is that the stipulation and settlement agreement he and Deborah entered in the civil case should be given effect in the dissolution matter; specifically, they should result in dismissing the dissolution judgment. At least two judicial officers have tried to explain to Edward the crucial distinction between the civil court and the family court, to no avail. We will give it a shot.
Edward cites the stipulation, which was evidently entered into without benefit of counsel for either party, as rendering the commissioner's order of 2018 regarding Edward's payment of the equalization payment "void." Whether a judgment or order is void is a legal conclusion that neither party is qualified to make.
The civil court and the family court are separate domains. They have separate judges, who have no working relationship with each other. Although the Code of Civil Procedure is sometimes used in family court, family law has its own procedures and rules. When there is a family law rule, the family court uses that rule and not the Code of Civil Procedure. The California Rules of Court also has a separate section of rules governing family law matters: the 5 series.
It might help to think of the two courts as separate countries - for example, Norway and Kenya. While there are some similarities between them (streets, houses, supermarkets), Norwegian laws do not apply in Kenya, and Kenyan money is no good in Norway. Edward is, in essence, trying to spend civil court money in family court.
That is why a civil court has no jurisdiction over a family law matter. Edward was free to sue Deborah in civil court. But nothing occurring there had any effect whatsoever on the dissolution case in family court. To put it as simply as possible, as far as the family court is concerned, the civil action never happened. If Edward's purpose in suing Deborah in civil court was to get out of paying the arrears he owed her, he wasted his time and, if he was represented by counsel, his money.
Neal v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 22 (Neal), illustrates this point. In Neal, the judgment of dissolution required the husband to pay the wife $25,000, $21,000 of which was an equalization payment. He was to pay part of it immediately and to give a promissory note for the rest. He did not pay the balance of the note, and the wife sold it for half its value to a collection agency. She also enlisted the district attorney to assist her in collecting back child support. (Id. at pp. 23-24.)
The parties then stipulated to a payment of $11,500 as an accord and satisfaction, which the husband still had not paid as of six months later. So the wife moved in the family court to set the stipulation aside. (Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 24.)
The husband then filed suit against the wife and the collection agency in civil court, for declaratory relief among other causes of action, alleging that he had paid everything he owed. The wife demurred, on the ground that this was a family law matter. The trial court overruled the demurrer, and we reversed. (Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 24-25, 26.)
As we stated in Neal, "[F]amily law cases should not be allowed to spill over into civil law .... Almost all events in family law litigation can be reframed as civil law actions if a litigant wants to be creative with various causes of action.... [¶] The instant case is a perfect example. [Husband] sued his ex-wife for breach of contract simply because she did not comply with the terms of a family law judgment.... He has sued her for declaratory relief based on the dispute in the family law case over whether he has paid what he owes under the family law judgment. In substance, this case is a family law OSC with civil headings. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [Husband's] civil complaint is essentially about whether he paid the money that the family law judgment obligated him to pay." (Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 25-26.)
Not only did we direct the civil court to enter an order sustaining the wife's demurrer for lack of jurisdiction, we also ordered the family court to award her attorney fees under Family Code section 271 "for having been dragged through this unnecessary excursion in the civil court." (Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 26-27; see also D'Elia v. D'Elia (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 415, 432 [misrepresentation of value of community stock in dissolution action litigated in civil court; "[W]hen the fraud claim is predicated on misrepresentations of value . . . made in the process of dissolution, the remedy is the traditional one of timely seeking to set aside the judgment . . . in the appropriate forum, not a securities fraud suit."]
Family Code section 290 provides, "A judgment or order made or entered pursuant to this code may be enforced by the court by execution, the appointment of a receiver, or contempt, or by any other order as the court in its discretion determines from time to time to be necessary." Family Code section 291, subdivision (a), provides, "A money judgment or judgment for possession or sale of property that is made or entered under this code, including a judgment for child, family, or spousal support, is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied." The family court ruled in 2018 that Edward still owed Deborah money under the dissolution judgment, and the family court is the one to decide whether that judgment has or has not been satisfied.
The only person who can alter a family court judgment is a family court judge. The parties themselves cannot do it, either by contract or by stipulation. (Cf. Martins v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 870, 876 [parties cannot agree to contempt for nonpayment; "contempt sanctions must . . . be based . . . on a court order."]) They can ask the family court judge to do it, by initiating process in family court, but they must follow the procedures set out for this purpose in family law, without reference to the outcome of any civil suit. A ruling or disposition from civil court cannot form the basis for a family court order.
The family court correctly denied Edward's first RFO on June 3, 2022, regardless of what it entailed, because there was no legal basis for relief. He never filed a request for an order requiring Deborah to file an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment, and it would not matter if he had made a proper request for such an order. As part of the trial in 2018, the commissioner found that the acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment was without effect, and Edward never appealed from that order. If what Edward wanted was to have the dissolution case dismissed, the court correctly denied that request as well. The sole basis for Edward's RFO was a stipulation and settlement agreement that had no force in a family law case.
The family court also correctly denied Edward's second RFO on July 22, 2022. Diagnosing the RFO as a motion for reconsideration, the court denied it on the ground that Edward had not presented any "new or different facts, circumstances, or law," the basic requirement of a motion for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a). There are no errors here.
DISPOSITION
The orders of June 3 and July 22, 2022, are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J., MOORE, J.