Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. EAD68885, Marshall Rieger, Temporary Judge. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Robert Lee Chaney, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance on behalf of Respondent Barbara Lynn Chaney.
Lisa M. Garrett, Chief Attorney, Tammy Nakada, Staff Attorney for Respondent County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Department.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Robert L. Chaney appeals from an order determining child support arrearages and issuing a wage and earnings assignment. He challenges the jurisdiction of the court, the procedure employed by the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Department (the County), and enforceability of the child support order. He claims that his obligation was terminated in 1989. He also challenges the impartiality of the trial court judge, and asserts that his obligation was discharged in bankruptcy. We find no basis to reverse, and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Robert Chaney filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Barbara Chaney in March 1981. On May 3, 1982, the family court ordered Robert to pay $150 per month to Barbara for the support of their child, who was born in January 1976. Appellant was ordered to pay Barbara $150 per month for child support commencing in September 1982. That order directed the payments be made “through the court trustee’s office as [Barbara] has advised [Robert] that she is receiving financial aid from the County of Los Angeles. In the event [Barbara] ceases receiving financial aid from the County of Los Angeles [Robert] may terminate payment through the court trustee.” The final judgment of dissolution of marriage was filed on November 2, 1982.
The County provided public assistance for the minor during two periods: June 16, 1982 through February 28, 1990 and June 29, 1992 through March 31, 1993. Barbara assigned her rights to receive child support from Robert to the County as a condition of receiving aid pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11477, subdivision (a)(1)(i). Robert’s child support obligation was suspended as of April 25, 1986, because he was unemployed. He was ordered to notify the County within 10 days of obtaining employment. In March 1987, following a hearing, Robert’s child support obligation was increased to $187 per month, effective in April, payable through the Office of the Court Trustee.
In September 1988, Robert notified the court that he had moved to Ohio. Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) then in effect, when the party responsible to pay child support moved to another state, the California case would be closed and the new state of residence would be asked to file a new action to enforce the child support obligations. Pursuant to that practice, in November 1989, the County filed a “Notice of Motion to Terminate District Attorney Enforcement of Support Orders and to Delete Requirement that Payments be Made Through the Office of the Court Trustee.” The County asked that Robert no longer be required to make child support payments through the Office of the Court Trustee, effective September 1989. It warned: “Nothing herein is intended to affect the District Attorney’s obligation to collect child support arrearages.” The motion was granted.
Effective January 1, 1998, California adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Fam. Code, § 4900 et seq.) which supersedes the URESA and governs establishment, enforcement and modification of child and spousal support orders in interstate cases. (In re Marriage of Comer (1996) 14 Cal.4th 504, 511-512; In re Marriage of Newman (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 846, 849.)
In 1990, the County filed a URESA request with the Los Angeles Superior Court in order to enforce Robert’s child support obligation with the assistance of the state of Ohio. Pursuant to an order by the Los Angeles Superior Court, the County established a case in Ohio for enforcement of the child support order. But the County maintained its accounting of support arrearages under the Los Angeles dissolution case No. EAD68885. In December 1996, the County recorded a lien in Los Angeles County in an effort to collect the arrearages, and did the same in San Bernardino County in March 1999. Both liens remain active.
In 2003, the County sent a wage and income withholding order directly to Robert’s employer in Florida. Robert obtained an order from a Florida court enjoining enforcement of the wage order until the County obtained an arrears order in California and registered that order in Florida. In September 2005, the County filed a motion to determine arrears for the public assistance given the minor, and for issuance of a wage and earnings assignment in the dissolution, pursuant to Family Code sections 17400, 17406, and 17526, subdivision (c) (statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated). At the time, Robert was a resident of Florida. The motion was granted on June 20, 2006, and Robert was ordered to pay $14,105.98 principal, plus $16,429.50 in interest, for a total of $30,535.48 as of December 31, 2005. This appeal followed.
Barbara is not pursuing an action for arrearages in child support payments which were payable directly to her during the periods when the minor was not receiving public assistance.
DISCUSSION
I
We begin with an examination of the federal and state statutory schemes governing a county’s collection of child support payments due to a parent who received public assistance for a minor. “In 1974, Congress enacted title IV-D of the Social Security Act ‘[f]or the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such children are living.’ (42 U.S.C. former § 651; see generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b.) This ‘IV-D’ program was intended ‘to recoup welfare costs from the absent parents of children being given public assistance.’ [Citations.] [¶] In return for receiving federal funding for public assistance, title IV-D requires the states to provide services related to the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support obligations. (42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A).) The California Legislature has enacted statutes designed to ensure that our state complies with its title IV-D obligations. (See, inter alia, . . . § 4002, et seq.; former Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 11350, 11350.1, 11475.1, 11476 & 11478.2.) In 1999, the Legislature enacted a new statutory scheme that created a Department of Child Support Services within the California Health and Human Services Agency, to establish, collect, and distribute child support. [Fn. omitted.] (. . . § 17200 et seq., Stats. 1999, ch. 478, § 1; see also County of Yuba v. Savedra [(2000)] 78 Cal.App.4th [1311,] 1317.) The pertinent Welfare and Institutions Code sections were repealed and replaced with . . . sections 17400, 17402, 17404, 17406, and 17415. (Stats. 1999, ch. 478, § 1, as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 480, §§ 13, 14, 15, 16, Stats. 1999, ch. 980, § 14.2 and Stats. 1999, ch. 653, § 15.)” (County of Lake v. Palla (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 418, 421-422.) Each county maintains a local child support agency with responsibility for establishing, modifying, and enforcing child support obligations. (§ 17400.)
Public assistance grants are conditioned on the assignment of rights to support. (In re Marriage of Comer, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 527 (Comer).) A recipient of public aid assigns to the county, by operation of law, any right to support. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11477, subd. (a)(1)(i).) Contrary to Robert’s argument, the County therefore is an indispensable party to subsequent proceedings in a dissolution action relating to child support. (In re Marriage of Mena (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 12, 18-19 ; In re Marriage of Lugo (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 427, 433.) Here, Los Angeles County became an indispensable party by operation of law on June 16, 1982, when the minor first received public assistance. (See In re Marriage of Mena, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 19.)
Mena applied former Civil Code section 248 which provided: “The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the county may proceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his right of support against the obligor. Whenever the county furnishes support to an obligee, it has the same right as the obligee to whom the support was furnished, for the purpose of securing reimbursement and of obtaining continuing support. . . .” Sections 4002 and 4303, subdivision (b) continue former Civil Code section 248 without substantive change to the extent that the former section related to enforcement of child support by the county. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29F West’s Ann. Fam. Code (2004 ed.) foll. §§ 4002, 4303, pp. 78, 219.)
When a child receives public assistance, the county must enforce child support obligations, and collect arrearages. (§ 17500.) “‘There is thus a strong and manifest policy, obviously adopted for the benefit of the public, to the effect that a county which provides public assistance to a mother and children shall have the right to reimbursement from the primary obligor, the father.’” (Comer, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 522, quoting In re Marriage of Lugo, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at pp. 435-436.) “When a public agency is asked to provide financial assistance by a custodial parent who is not receiving court-ordered child support from the noncustodial parent, public policy strongly favors that agency’s entitlement to seek reimbursement for funds released to the family. . . . Such reimbursement helps ensure that public funds will be available for distribution to other families with similar needs.” (Comer, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 527-528.)
Any party to an action involving child support enforcement services of the local child support agency may request a judicial determination of arrearages. (§ 17526.) The motion must include a monthly breakdown showing amounts ordered and amounts paid, in addition to any other relevant information. (Ibid.) Our conclusion that the County became an indispensable party to the dissolution action in June 1982 by operation of law disposes of Robert’s contention that it was not authorized to request a judicial determination of arrearages under section 17526 because it was not a party. Robert argues that the County has taken inconsistent positions as to its status, citing its objection to his request for admissions on the ground that it was not a named party to the action. But as we have seen, the County was a party by operation of law.
We note that the validity of the County’s request for admissions is not before us because Robert did not bring a motion to compel further answers.
We turn to Robert’s various challenges to the order determining arrearages.
II
Robert raises various procedural challenges to the court’s order.
A. Jurisdiction
First, he challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the family court. Robert cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions which state the basic principles of subject matter jurisdiction, but does not present a basis to conclude the family court lacks jurisdiction here. As the County points out, section 200 confers jurisdiction over family law matters on the superior court: “The superior court has jurisdiction in proceedings under this code.” Section 2010 gives the court jurisdiction to “inquire into and render any judgment and make orders that are appropriate concerning the following: . . . [¶] (c) The support of children for whom support may be ordered, . . . .” Under section 4405, “The court retains jurisdiction to modify or terminate an order for support where justice requires.” In short, the superior court has jurisdiction to enforce child support orders. (In re Marriage of Lackey (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 698, 702.)
B. Procedure
Robert cites the 1989 order terminating collection efforts by the County, and relies upon County of Orange v. Rosales (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1214 to argue that the County’s motion was unauthorized. Rosales is distinguishable. In that case, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office sued for reimbursement of welfare monies expended on the defendant’s children, and obtained a preliminary child support order. Ten years passed during which defendant made no payments on the preliminary order, as interest mounted. When Orange County obtained a default judgment, the defendant moved to dismiss the case under Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360 because it had not been brought to trial within five years of filing the complaint. (Id. at p. 1216.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the order dismissing the action.
Here, no complaint was filed by the County, and therefore Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360 do not apply. The arrearage order in this case was generated through the statutory procedure provided in section 17526, subdivision (c) for determination of support arrearages. This was done through a motion brought in Robert’s dissolution action.
In a related argument, Robert contends that the County’s only option to collect the arrearages was to file an action under sections 17400 and 17406. He contends that such an action can go back only one year from the date of filing. He also asserts that the County used the wrong form (FL-301) instead of the proper form, FL-1299.01. Robert cites County of Lake v. Palla, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at page 425, footnote 6, to support his contention that the motion was unauthorized because it was not on the proper Judicial Council form. The Palla court discusses the exclusivity of the appropriate Judicial Council forms in actions brought under section 17400 et seq. (Ibid.)
Robert confuses determination of arrearages with enforcement of an order determining arrearages. The form cited by Robert is used when a county or governmental agency files a separate action under sections 17400 and 17406. The order appealed from in this case was a determination under section 17526, subdivision (c), of the amount owed the County for support which Robert should have paid to the court trustee during the periods when the minor was receiving welfare assistance. Because the County did not file an action under section 17400 and 17406, it was not required to use the Judicial Council forms developed for that procedure.
III
Robert raises several arguments to the effect that the child support order was not enforceable, and therefore, he was not responsible for arrearages.
A. One-Year Limitation
Robert argues that the County was only allowed to go back one year from the date of filing its motion to collect arrearages, not 20 years. The one-year limitation was found in former section 17402, subdivision (a)(2). In 2004, the Legislature amended former section 17402 and deleted the provision permitting the County to commence the child support obligation incurred more than one year before the filing of its complaint in public assistance cases. (Stats. 2004, ch. 305.) As the County points out, former section 17402 does not apply here because it governs only separate actions instituted by the County. As we discuss in more detail below, under section 291, subdivision (a) a judgment for child support is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied.
B. March 1987 Support Order
Robert argues that there has been no valid, enforceable child support order since April 1986, when the original support order was suspended because he was unemployed. That position is not supported by the record. The County has established that Robert was ordered to resume child support payments in the amount of $187 monthly at a hearing on March 27, 1987, which he attended. At that hearing, the district attorney informed the court that there were child support arrearages, but that matter was not before the court at that proceeding.
The March 1987 support order was to be paid by wage assignment. Robert contends he was never instructed to make payments in the event wage assignments did not satisfy the support order. But as we have seen, the only issue before the court in March 1987 was the resumption of Robert’s current support obligations, not the collection of arrearages which had accumulated.
Second, Robert’s apparent position is that the March 27, 1987 oral order for support of $187 per month is not enforceable because it was not reduced to writing. As the County points out, the record contains the minute order for that date which reflects the $187 support order. The minute order was followed by a written order filed May 4, 1987. There is no proof of service attached to the May 1987 order. But the order directs the district attorney to serve the order on Robert. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 664, we presume that official duty was regularly performed, absent evidence to the contrary. (Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 919, 925 [presumption that documents timely mailed by city].) In addition, as the County points out, Robert was present and participated at the March 1987 hearing. The record also reflects that Robert filed an order to show cause re modification of child support in April 1987, which would not have been necessary had his support obligation not been resumed.
Evidence Code section 664 provides: “It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. This presumption does not apply on an issue as to the lawfulness of an arrest if it is found or otherwise established that the arrest was made without a warrant.”
Based on this record, we conclude that Robert had full notice of the March 1987 support order, which was enforceable.
C. Impact of 1989 Order Terminating Enforcement
Robert argues that there is no presently enforceable child support order upon which arrearages may be based. This is true, he argues, because the order terminating enforcement excused any arrearage, citing County of Orange v. Rosales, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1214. The motion to terminate enforcement stated plainly that “Nothing herein is intended to affect the District Attorney’s obligation to collect child support arrearages.” It also stated that the motion was to terminate enforcement “of orders for the payment of current child support herein and deleting the requirement that such payments be . . . paid through the office of the Court Trustee, effective September 23, 1989.” The order granting the motion is silent as to arrearages, but stated that enforcement was terminated under former Civil Code section 4702, subdivision (a). That statute directed that payment of support to a parent receiving welfare for a minor child be made to the county officer designated by the court for that purpose.
Former Civil Code section 4702, subdivision (a) read in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4701, in any proceeding where a court makes or has made an order requiring the payment of child support to a parent receiving welfare moneys for the maintenance of minor children, the court shall direct that the payments of support shall be made to the county officer designated by the court for that purpose, and shall direct the district attorney to appear on behalf of the welfare recipient in any proceeding to enforce the order.”
The record reflects that the County did pursue a URESA action to establish a child support case in Ohio where Robert then resided. That filing noted the arrearage due as of April 1990.
There is no statute of limitations on the collection of child support arrearages either under former section 4502 or the present version of section 291. The support order need not be renewed to remain enforceable. (§ 291, subd. (b).) This is illustrated in In re Marriage of Sweeney (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 343 (Sweeney), where the court reviewed the application of former section 4502. In that case, the wife attempted in 1997 to enforce a child support order issued in November 1963. The court reviewed the legislative history of former section 4502, which was a successor to former Civil Code section 4384.5 (hereafter section 4384.5). Under the original version of section 4384.5, child support judgments could be renewed like any other judgment. But in 1992, the statute was amended to reflect the language now found in section 291, that support orders were enforceable until paid in full. (Sweeney, supra, at p. 346.) “‘As of the effective date of the 1992 enactment of former Civil Code section 4384.5 (Jan. 1, 1993, see Gov. Code, § 9600), all extant support judgments became enforceable “until paid in full” as far as California law was concerned.’ [¶] ‘Prior to 1993 support installments were enforceable (by execution) for 10 years. [Citations.] That period could be extended . . . .’” (Id. at p. 347, quoting Trend v. Bell (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1097-1098.)
Former section 4502 provides: “The period for enforcement and procedure for renewal of a judgment or order for child, family, or spousal support is governed by Section 291.”
The issue in Sweeney was whether the support judgment issued in 1963 was “extant” when the 1992 amendment to section 4384.5 became effective in January 1993. The court distinguished between dormant judgments, which were extant, and barred judgments, which were not. (Sweeney, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 347-348.) In Sweeney, the wife attempted to execute on the dormant support judgment in 1979, and failed to appeal the trial court order denying her motion. (Id. at p. 345.) This 1979 judgment barred the later attempt to enforce the judgment under the principles of res judicata. Since it was not extant in 1993, section 4384.5 did not apply to extend the enforceability of the judgment until it was satisfied. (Id. at pp. 347-348.)
Unlike Sweeney, there is no bar to the enforcement of the 1982 or 1987 support orders before us. Since neither the County nor Barbara had unsuccessfully attempted to enforce the order, there was no adjudication which would bar enforcement under the principles of res judicata. The support orders were “extant” as of January 1993 within the meaning of section 4384.5 and section 291, and could be enforced until paid in full. Robert argues the dissolution action was not active or pending, citing the County’s response to interrogatories he propounded in 1992. The County objected to the interrogatories on the ground there was no pending action. As defined in Sweeney, this action was dormant at that time, but as we have concluded, the arrearages obligation was still extant and collectable. (Sweeney, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 347-348.)
Since the minor received aid during two periods (June 16, 1982 through February 28, 1990, and again from June 29, 1992 through March 31, 1993) the arrearages arise from both the original 1982 support order to pay $150 a month, and the 1987 modification to pay $187 a month.
Robert cites County of San Mateo v. Green (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001, No. M1999-00112) 2001 WL 120729, for the proposition that there is a three-year statute of limitations. That case relies on County of Riverside v. Burt (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 28. The cases are distinguishable. Each involved an action initiated by a county to obtain a support order where there was no preexisting family court order stemming from a dissolution as we have here. The Tennessee court recognized that a custodial parent may obtain and enforce a judgment for past-due child support without time limitation, under former section 4502. (2001 WL 120729, fn. 3.) As we have discussed, the motion in the case before us was brought in the dissolution action to recoup arrearages that accrued from the original child support order obtained by Barbara. That was not an action instituted by the County.
Robert cites a July 1992 statement of payments prepared by the County of Los Angeles Court Trustee which states that child support was stopped on September 15, 1980. He relies on this statement to support his argument that there is no enforceable child support order. Once again, he confuses collection of ongoing support with collection of arrearages. As we have seen, the 1989 termination order did not impact the County’s obligation to collect arrearages.
In a related argument, Robert argues that in order to collect the arrearages, the County was required to bring a motion to modify the 1989 termination order, but failed to do so. He concludes that the order determining arrearages from which he now appeals therefore constituted an improper modification of support. Our conclusion that the 1989 order terminated only present child support obligations but not arrearages disposes of this argument.
IV
Robert invokes the doctrine of judicial estoppel to argue that the County does not represent Barbara and is not a party to this action. “The concept of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a judicial proceeding that is contrary or inconsistent with a position previously asserted in a prior proceeding. The purpose is to protect the integrity of the judicial process and not the parties of the lawsuit. [Citation.]” (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 345, 350.) “It is a doctrine invoked by courts in their discretion. [Citation.] However, ‘. . . the doctrine should apply when: (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. [Citations.]’” (Id. at p. 351, quoting Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183.)
Robert’s argument is based upon the manner in which the County stated its appearance on the title page of the motion for determination of arrearages and on the order after the hearing on that motion. On the first page, counsel for the Child Support Services Department division is listed as attorney for “App. Per Fam. Code secs 17400 & 17406.” The appearance on the order is similar, listing counsel as attorney for “App. Family Code 17400, et seq.”
We find no inconsistency to support the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The motion states that it is brought under section 17526, subdivision (c) to determine arrearages. We construe the references to the Family Code cited by Robert to be to chapter 2 of that code, section 17400 et seq. of which section 17526 is a part. The County made it clear that it was acting under its statutory obligation to recoup support because of the aid received by Robert’s daughter.
Robert also invokes the related bar of res judicata in two respects. First, he argues the County’s motion is barred because it could have sought a judicial determination of arrearages before the 1989 motion to terminate support, but did not do so. As we have discussed, under section 291, the arrearages may be collected until paid in full. The County was under no obligation to seek a judicial determination in 1989. The issue preclusion aspect of the doctrine of res judicata does not apply here because the specific issue of the arrearages was not previously litigated and decided adversely to the County (unlike Sweeney, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 343, which we have discussed above). (See Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 530-531.)
Second, Robert argues the Ohio enforcement action brought by the County bars this action. Without citation to the record, he claims that action was dismissed. Robert has not demonstrated that the question of arrearages was actually litigated in Ohio and decided adversely. Res judicata provides no defense on this record.
V
Robert also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the calculation of arrearages, claiming there is “no admissible ‘evidence’ that Barbara received welfare aid from the County, let alone any specific dollar amounts.” The County supported its motion with a declaration by Ingrid Teel, eligibility worker and custodian of records for the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services. Ms. Teel reviewed the County records and determined that the minor received Temporary Assistance to Needy Family benefits from June 16, 1982 through February 28, 1990, and again from June 29, 1992 through March 31, 1993. The County also provided a declaration by Roubin Tarvirdi, a case auditor with the County of Los Angeles, who prepared an audit determining the amount of arrearages. This is substantial evidence to support the court’s determination.
VI
Robert contends his obligation to pay arrearages was discharged in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2001. Child support obligations are not discharged in bankruptcy. (See In re Cervantes (9th Cir. 2000) 219 F.3d 955, 956-957, 959-962 [applying 42 U.S.C. § 656, subd. (b) to any bankruptcy case]; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523, subd. (a)(18).)
VII
In his reply brief, Robert cites a provision in the California Department of Child Support Service Manual of Policies and Procedures, attached as exhibit A, to argue that unreimbursed aid does not accrue interest. Only a single page is attached to his brief. The cited portion is a subdivision under a definition for “Temporarily Assigned Arrearages” which is defined to mean unpaid support that accrues after October 1, 1998 and before the period the family receives aid, and any unassigned arrearages that accrued before October 1, 1998, when the family goes on aid after October 1, 1998. Here, no aid was given the minor after March 1993, so the cited provision does not apply.
VIII
Finally, Robert contends that Barbara, rather than he, was the noncustodial parent whose absence created the need for the minor to receive public aid. He cites County of San Diego v. Lamb (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 845. He fails to cite the record to support this assertion. For that reason the issue is forfeited: “‘[T]he failure to provide citation to the record is a violation of California Rules of Court, rule 15(a).6 A violation of the rules of court may result in the striking of the offending document, the waiver of the arguments made therein, the imposition of fines and/or the dismissal of the appeal. [Citations.] In addition, it is counsel’s duty to point out portions of the record that support the position taken on appeal. The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error. Again, any point raised that lacks citation may, in this court’s discretion, be deemed waived. [Citation.]’” [Footnote 6 of the quoted passage provides: See now California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a).] (Kinney v. Overton (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 482, 497, quoting Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768; see also Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1 [appellate court does not consider matters outside the record].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent County is to have its costs on appeal.
We concur: WILLHITE, J., SUZUKAWA, J.
Section 291, subdivision (a) provides: “A money judgment . . . that is made or entered under this code, including a judgment for child, family, or spousal support, is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied.” Section 291, subdivision (b) provides: “A judgment described in this section is exempt from any requirement that a judgment be renewed. Failure to renew a judgment described in this section has no effect on the enforceability of the judgment.” These provisions were added by Statutes of 2006, chapter 86, which continued the substance of former section 4502. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29C West’s Ann. Fam. Code (2008 supp.) foll. § 291, p. 15.)