Opinion
G030983.
10-24-2003
In re Marriage of CARLOS and CHRISTINA HERNANDEZ. CARLOS HERNANDEZ, Respondent, v. CHRISTINA HERNANDEZ, Appellant.
Law Offices of Darlene Allen and Darlene Allen for Respondent and Appellant. Suanne I. Honey for Petitioner and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Sills, P. J., Rylaarsdam, J., and Ikola, J.
Appellant Christina Hernandez (Christina) appeals from the order granting respondent Carlos Hernandezs (Carlos) motion to enforce the dissolution judgment.
We refer to the parties by their first names for clarity; no disrespect is intended.
We agree with the lower court that it had jurisdiction to order the sale of the family home to enforce compliance with its earlier judgment. We conclude that the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion in ordering the sale (or the refinance) of the property.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Carlos sought dissolution of his 19-year marriage to Christina on June 21, 1995. A judgment of dissolution was entered on November 1, 1996. The main item in the property division was the community property house located in Garden Grove, which had a market value of $205,000 and $11,000 in equity. For settlement purposes Carlos agreed to accept $2,500 for his community property interest, which Christina was ordered to pay to him no later than July 30, 1998. Judgment was entered on November 4, 1996.
In April of 2002, Carlos moved to enforce the judgment by seeking a court-ordered sale of the family home. According to the parties declarations, they continued to reside in the family home together after the divorce (until April of 2000 when Carlos moved out) and they took out a second mortgage on the home in October of 1998. In 2002 Carlos no longer desired to be responsible for payments on the home. Carlos asked the court to order the sale of the home so the first and second mortgages could be paid off and the equity divided between Carlos and Christina. He also sought attorneys fees and costs.
Christina responded that she initially paid Carlos $430 toward her $2,500 obligation but then suffered a work-related injury and has been disabled since that time. Christina stated she later paid Carlos $1,000 on July 27, 1999, and $1,400 on December 28, 1999, but Carlos failed to fulfill his obligation to convey all rights, title and interest in the property to Christina. Christina declared the parties agreed to obtain the second mortgage in the amount of $50,000 to pay off their credit card debt. Carlos agreed to make monthly payments of $ 607 until the second loan was paid in full, and would receive the interest deduction for purposes of his income taxes. Christina contended the community no longer had an interest in the family home. Moreover, she argued the agreement between the parties on the second mortgage occurred on November 15, 1998, and as such was outside the scope of the November 1, 1996 judgment.
Carlos countered that the payments he received from Christina were to reimburse him for payments he made on his credit card for his father-in-laws taxes and for taxes incurred on the community home, and were not payments on his community interest in the home per the judgment of dissolution.
On May 1, 2002, the court granted Carloss motion to enforce the judgment and ordered Christina to sell or refinance the home (provided Carlos was no longer liable for any mortgage, lien or encumbrance) and to pay Carlos the sum of $2,500 plus interest for the equalization payment originally ordered on July 30, 1996. Judgment was entered on July 12, 2002.
DISCUSSION
Christina contends, erroneously, that the family law court did not reserve continuing jurisdiction over the division of real property when it rendered the judgment. The dissolution judgment sets forth at paragraph 3.h. that "Jurisdiction is reserved to make other orders necessary to carry out this judgment."
The 1996 judgment incorporates the parties marital settlement agreement as an attachment. That attachment recites the "community" house in Garden Grove had a market value of $205,000 and an equity value of $11,000. Presumably, then, each party had approximately $5,500 worth of equity in the house. The attachment continues, stating "for settlement purposes" Carlos agrees to accept $2,500 for his community property interest in the house. The following paragraph states "Respondent [Christina] shall pay to Petitioner [Carlos] the $ 2,500 not later than 7-30-98." In turn, Carlos would convey "all rights, title and interest to Respondent." Carlos and Christina remained as tenants in common in the interim.
"Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally." (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) The language of the judgment above incorporating the marital settlement agreement "is clear, explicit, and unequivocal." (Id. at p. 1440.) Christina was to pay Carlos $2,500 by July 30, 1998, and Carlos would then transfer his community property interest in the home to Christina.
By the time Carlos filed his February 25, 2002 motion to enforce the judgment, several events had transpired. The parties had remained in the family home together until the year 2000; Christina may have nursed Carlos through a bout of hepatitis; Christina stated she became disabled at work; and, the parties had taken out a second mortgage against the value of the home. As discussed below, none of these later events are relevant for purposes of this appeal.
The first question the court had to answer in 2002 was: Did Christina pay Carlos the $2,500 by July 30, 1998? The answer was no. Christinas handwritten notes indicate the payments of $430 on December 11, 1997, $1,000 on July 27, 1999, and $1,400 on December 28, 1999, were for "Carlos taxes or payment on house if not paid back." But the court made a factual finding that these payments were unrelated to the $ 2,500 equalization payment. This finding was based on reasonable, credible evidence and was not an abuse of the courts discretion.
When Christina failed to pay Carlos, Carlos had no obligation to transfer his interest in the home to her, so the parties remained in the same status as they were in 1996 before the settlement was reached: They each had an equal community property interest in the house.
The second issue for the court to address was how to enforce the original division of the main community property asset, the house. In 1996 the court accepted the parties negotiation of a $2,500 equalization payment to Carlos. In 2002 the court pondered were there any proceeds left at the close of escrow following a sale of the house whether Carlos would be entitled to any more than his claim for $2,500 plus interest. At the courts suggestion the parties discussed the matter outside the courtroom. The court cautioned the parties that if they could not reach agreement, it would have no alternative other than to order the community property home sold or refinanced, and "at the close of escrow . . . the court making some decisions about the net proceeds." The parties attempted to negotiate, but seemed stuck on two issues. One, Carlos wanted to be free of the property so that he could buy other property. A mere monetary satisfaction would not clear his name from the title. Two, despite the courts urging, Christina was adamant that she could not refinance the house because of her disability status. Absent a mutual resolution of the matter, the court ruled in favor of Carlos.
Christinas argument that Carlos should be estopped from benefiting from the relief granted by the trial court is unpersuasive. "Estoppel will be enforced to prevent a person from asserting a right where his conduct or silence makes it unconscionable for him to assert it. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 658.) Christina presented no evidence of conduct by Carlos that would bar him from asserting his rights under the judgment. The court noted if she wanted to show she "brought groceries for him when he was ill or she paid what allegedly was his credit-card bill, theres a whole separate hearing . . . ."
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Christina to sell or to refinance the family home and to pay Carlos the $2,500 plus interest it originally ordered her to pay in 1996.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 26.)