In re Marriage of Brust

2 Citing cases

  1. In re Marriage of Cianchetti

    351 Ill. App. 3d 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 8 times
    Finding the income of the respondent's new husband can be "properly used to examine the extent to which her income can be freed through reliance on her husband for support"

    Mario argues that, in addition to the factors stated in section 513(b), the court should adhere to an alleged preference in the cases for public schools over private. In support, he cites Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290 (1868); In re Marriage of Brust, 145 Ill. App. 3d 257, 261-62, 495 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1986), and In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 551-52, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1986). In Pearson, the supreme court ordered that the original trial court order requiring the respondent to pay $100 per month for his son's post-high-school tuition be reinstated, and reversed an order of the appellate court requiring the respondent to pay $5,150 a year for two years.

  2. Alliance Syndicate v. Brad Foote Gear Works

    614 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 2 times

    In support of that proposition, Alliance cites Weigel v. O'Connor (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 1017, 373 N.E.2d 421, and Baldi v. Chicago Title Trust Co. (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 29, 446 N.E.2d 1205. However, Weigel, Baldi, and cases citing them, such as In re Application of Busse (1989), 183 Ill. App.3d 682, 685, 539 N.E.2d 323, and In re Marriage of Brust (1986), 145 Ill. App.3d 257, 261, 495 N.E.2d 133, provide that orders or judgments ought to be examined like other written instruments and should be reasonably construed as a whole to give effect to the intention of the court and must be read, understood and construed in connection with the pleadings on file. Weigel, 57 Ill. App.3d at 1026-27; Baldi, 113 Ill. App.3d at 33. The sparse language of the court's ruling and the order do not provide us with the expanded intention of the court that Alliance urges upon us. To the contrary, in its brief remarks, the trial court states that "[t]he '89 policy is the only one which is sufficiently — definitely set out for the court to make a determination as to coverage."