Opinion
No. 6-106 / 05-1095
Filed March 29, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Patrick R. Grady, Judge.
Christoph Beckermann appeals from various economic provisions of a dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.
Sharon A. Mellon of Mellon Spies, Iowa City, for appellant.
Maurine A. Braddock of Honohan, Epley, Braddock Brenneman, Iowa City, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Eisenhauer, J., and Brown, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
Christoph Beckermann appeals the spousal support and property provisions of a dissolution decree. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Beckermann and Susan Totten married in 1986 and divorced in 2005. They have two minor children whose welfare is not at issue.
The parties agreed to joint custody and shared physical care. They stipulated to a visitation schedule and, although child support was an issue at trial, it has not been raised as an issue on appeal.
Beckermann has been a professor of engineering at the University of Iowa for almost two decades. At the time of trial, his salary was $160,619.24. In addition, he earned consulting fees, and honoraria.
By agreement, Totten cared for the home and children. When the parties' younger child entered kindergarten, Totten began working toward an undergraduate degree. She obtained that degree and continued her studies, eventually receiving a master's degree in social work. At the time of trial, she was earning approximately $31,000 annually as a social worker.
The parties stipulated to most outstanding issues, including the amount of spousal support Beckermann would pay Totten and the disposition of their retirement assets. At trial, they focused on two issues: (1) the duration of the spousal support award and (2) the distribution of Beckermann's retirement accounts. These are also the issues on appeal.
II. Spousal Support
The district court awarded Totten spousal support of $1000 per month for five years. The court characterized the support as "rehabilitative alimony" and concluded the duration was reasonable "for her to further establish her practice and wind down her parental responsibilities."
On appeal, Beckermann asserts that the court should have limited the duration of the award to two and a half years. In his view, Totten requires this payment only to maintain the acreage on which the children were raised and, once the younger child graduates from high school, this obligation could end. He also notes that Totten was only forty-three years old and in good health at the time of trial, had an advanced degree, and had been working for four years in her chosen field. Totten counters that "[i]t would be consistent with legal precedent for this Court to grant Susan [traditional] alimony for life or until her remarriage." She notes that she served as the children's primary caretaker throughout the marriage, deferred her education and career for several years in order to care for the children, and has a lower earning capacity than Beckermann.
Although our review of this issue is de novo, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.4, "we afford the trial court considerable latitude in making this determination and will disturb the ruling only when there has been a failure to do equity." In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996).
The district court did not fail to do equity. The parties' marriage was a long one and Beckermann earned substantially more than Totten. These factors militate in favor of a five-year award rather than a two and a half year award, despite the fact that Totten was relatively young and was healthy, educated, and gainfully employed. See Iowa Code §§ 598.21(3)(a), (e) (2003).
We turn to Totten's claim of entitlement to traditional alimony. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315-16 (Iowa 2005) (discussing and defining traditional alimony). This claim was not raised in the district court. At trial, Totten specifically discounted the need for long-term alimony, stating "I don't mean for Beckermann to-that he needs to support a lifestyle for which I'm accustomed to for an extended period of time. But yeah, for the foreseeable future." She stated, "I'm requesting . . . Beckermann to provide spousal support for eight years."
Counsel's statement of requested relief filed with the district court was consistent with Totten's trial testimony. The document stated Totten was seeking spousal support for "eight years, until both children are ineligible for post-high school educational support, or she dies or remarries, whichever first occurs."
As Totten did not raise her claim for traditional alimony in the district court and has not crossed-appealed from the court's spousal support award, she did not preserve her argument for review. Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Iowa 2005).
III. Property Distribution
At the time of trial, Beckermann had several TIAA-CREF retirement accounts with a total balance of approximately $509,000. The district court used the holdings in these accounts "to balance the property settlement in such a way that neither spouse owes the other anything." In light of the real property awarded to the parties and the retirement account held by Totten, which was valued at approximately $13,000, the district court ordered Beckermann to transfer $139,700 to Totten.
Beckermann takes issue with this method of distribution. He contends the district court should have separately equalized the parties' non-retirement assets and debts and the parties' retirement assets. In his view, this alternate method would have required Totten to pay him approximately $109,000, which he could have used to pay down the mortgage on a condominium he purchased during the parties' separation.
We see no reason to disturb the district court's ruling. As the court noted, Beckermann's proposal "would result in Susan being required to cash in some of the CREF holdings, pay income taxes on the amount withdrawn traceable to an increase in earnings and pay Christoph over $100,000 to balance the property settlement."
We recognize that Totten could have made the proposed equalizing payment without cashing out her portion of the CREF holdings. For example, she could have taken a mortgage on the real estate that was awarded to her. However, this alternative would have left her with debt that she was far less capable of servicing than Beckermann. As the court stated, Beckermann's proposal "yields a result where a spouse with a substantially smaller earning capacity who was economically dependent for the majority of the marriage owes substantial debt to the economically more secure spouse."
Totten's property division arguments are not preserved. Otterberg, 696 N.W.2d at 28. We affirm the district court's property division in its entirety.
IV. Attorney Fees and Costs
Totten seeks appellate attorney fees. Such an award rests within our discretion. In re Marriage of Vieth, 591 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
Based on the resources of the parties and the merits of the arguments, we deny her request. The costs of this appeal are evenly divided between the parties.