(§ 4320, subds. (a)-(h); In re Marriage of Stephenson, at p. 78; In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 496.) The court must also consider the "balance of the hardships" to the parties and "[a]ny other factors [it] determines are just and equitable."
“[T]he reason for the change of circumstances rule is to preclude relitigation of the same facts.” (In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 501, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 553( Baker ).) As the court in In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480, 274 Cal.Rptr. 911, explained:
In deciding whether to retain jurisdiction, the court considers, among other factors, each party's ability to adequately provide for his or her needs, the age and health of the parties, and the length of the marriage. (In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453; In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498-499.) The court must rely on evidence in the record and may not engage in speculation.
"It is within the broad discretion of the trial judge to fix the amount and duration of spousal support." (In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 496 (Baker).) In exercising that discretion, the trial court must evaluate the factors set out in section 4320.
(In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 305.) An “opulent” marital standard of living was described in In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 495. The husband “routinely” earned over $100,000 annually in the insurance business; the couple lived in a 3, 800-square-foot house on one acre in Lafayette that previously sold for $775,000; they had use of German luxury cars and vacationed abroad and in Hawaii; they had part ownership of a yacht; and the wife had $50,000 in jewelry, including Rolex watches.
The spousal support decision must be made based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time the modification is requested and the order is made. (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572, 575; In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, 824; In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498; In re Marriage of Prietsch & Calhoun (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 645, 656.) Section 4320 states: “In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances: [¶] (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following: [¶] (1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
It is within the trial court’s broad discretion to fix the amount and duration of spousal support. (In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 496; see also In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 454.) In awarding spousal support, the trial court must consider the mandatory guidelines of section 4320.
In balancing the applicable statutory factors, the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord to each. ( In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498.) But the "court may not be arbitrary; it must exercise its discretion along legal lines, taking into consideration the applicable circumstances of the parties set forth in [the statute], especially reasonable needs and their financial abilities."
"In balancing the applicable statutory factors, the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord to each. (In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498.) But the "court may not be arbitrary; it must exercise its discretion along legal lines, taking into consideration the applicable circumstances of the parties set forth in [the statute], especially reasonable needs and their financial abilities."
Although our review of the order denying Gallardo’s petition is de novo, it is a canon of appellate review that we, as the reviewing court, are "neither authorized nor inclined to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial court." (In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 553.) Accordingly, the request for judicial notice is denied.