Opinion
2 CA-CV 2022-0074-FC
02-28-2023
In re the Marriage of Monica Avila-Dabdoub, Petitioner/Appellant, and Carlos Saavedra-Mada, Respondent/Appellee.
Monica Avila-Dabdoub, Tucson In Propria Persona Carlos Saavedra-Mada, Rio Rico In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Santa Cruz County No. S1200DO202100182 The Honorable Vanessa A. Cartwright, Judge
Monica Avila-Dabdoub, Tucson In Propria Persona
Carlos Saavedra-Mada, Rio Rico In Propria Persona
Judge O'Neil authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge Sklar concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
O'NEIL, Judge
¶1 Monica Avila-Dabdoub appeals the decree dissolving her marriage to Carlos Saavedra-Mada. She challenges the trial court's decisions on property valuations and divisions, contributions toward separate property, loan obligations, and historical tax returns. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the decree of dissolution. See In re Marriage of Foster, 240 Ariz. 99, ¶ 2 (App. 2016). In July 2021, Monica petitioned for dissolution of her 24-year marriage to Carlos. The marital community owned several pieces of real property in Arizona and Mexico, and Monica operated a business with her sole and separate property. At a bench trial, the parties offered conflicting evidence concerning the value of some property, including a piece of real property in Mexico. The parties also disputed the value of Carlos's contributions toward Monica's separate property and business interests, the remaining balance of a loan, and their respective interests in certain personal property.
¶3 In May 2022, the trial court entered a written decree of dissolution. The court incorporated various stipulations between the parties into an overall allocation of assets and debts that the court determined was "fair and equitable under the circumstances." The court noted the parties' agreement during trial that a house and a manufactured home, both located on the same lot in Tucson, would be equally divided among the parties' adult children, and Monica would "retain and maintain all debts related to this property." These debts included a "$7,000 Title Security Agency Loan" for the house and a "$41,170.64 Manufactured Home Loan (original loan amount $70,000)" for the manufactured home.
¶4 Although Carlos claimed a value of $40,600 for his contributions to Monica's separate property and business, the trial court found that "community time, efforts and resources were put toward the separate property/business of [Monica], for an amount equal to approximately $20,000." As an equitable reimbursement for this contribution, the court awarded a piece of real property in Mexico to Carlos alone, explaining that "[t]his property shall satisfy the community contribution and future earning interest toward [Monica]'s separate property." Despite Monica's conflicting evidence that the value of the property in Mexico was $39,473.68, the court adopted Carlos's valuation at $23,815.78.
¶5 The trial court assigned equal responsibility for a separate debt on a property in Nogales in the amount of $9,075.68, for a loan whose existence the parties disputed. Both Carlos and Monica sought to be awarded a 1977 Airstream, but the court awarded it to Carlos, deeming the award equitable "in consideration of [Monica] being awarded all the household items." Monica also sought an order to amend previous tax filings in which Carlos had filed separately and received a refund. The court denied this request, finding that Carlos's separate tax filings were "from an agreement and understanding between the Parties" and "any tax returns or child tax credits received during the marriage went toward the community."
¶6 This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Discussion
¶7 On appeal, Monica contends the record does not support the trial court's findings concerning the value of the property in Mexico, the existence and value of community contributions to Monica's separate property and business, and the existence of a loan on the property in Nogales. Monica further argues the court acted inequitably by awarding the Airstream to Carlos and failing to order an amendment to previous tax filings. Lastly, Monica asserts the court misconstrued a stipulation between the parties by assigning her sole responsibility for outstanding loans on the house and manufactured home in Tucson.
Validity and Value of Property and Debt
¶8 Monica maintains the trial court erred by accepting Carlos's testimony over her own on various factual disputes. The court, however, is in the best position to weigh the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, ¶ 16 (App. 2009). We will uphold its factual findings "unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence." Valento v. Valento, 225 Ariz. 477, ¶ 11 (App. 2010).
¶9 The trial court's factual findings are supported by the record here. Carlos testified, with the support of an appraisal, that the property in Mexico was worth $23,815.78. After hearing testimony concerning each of Carlos's claimed contributions, "considering the testimony and credibility of the Parties," the court determined that Carlos had contributed community resources valued at $20,000 towards Monica's separate property, less than half the amount Carlos claimed. The court's conclusion that the disputed loan on the Nogales property was a community debt was supported by Carlos's testimony as well. The court's allocation of equal responsibility for this debt "is not to be considered a determination of validity or invalidity of the alleged debt[]," Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118, 124 (App. 1982), but the court was within its discretion to allocate responsibility for the debt as a community liability. To the extent that Monica invites us to consider the relative strength of conflicting evidence in each of these disputes, we will not reweigh evidence or credibility on appeal. Id. at 123.
The correct measure of the community's equitable lien on the separate property is "the separate property's total increase in value resulting from the community's contributions." Saba v. Khoury, 516 P.3d 891, ¶ 8 (2022). The trial court instead looked at the "efforts and resources" that Carlos contributed, which are not necessarily equal to the separate property's increase in value. However, Monica has not argued on appeal that the court applied the wrong standard in calculating the equitable lien. She simply disagrees with the court's factual findings, which were supported by the evidence. And in any event, the court has wide discretion in deciding how to value the separate property's increase in value. Id. ¶ 16.
Equitable Distribution
¶10 Monica further challenges the equitability of the trial court's property division. Community property must be equitably divided. A.R.S. § 25-318(A). We review the court's allocation of marital property and finding of fairness for an abuse of discretion. See Hutki v. Hutki, 244 Ariz. 39, ¶¶ 13-14 (App. 2018). A trial court abuses its discretion if no competent evidence supports its decision. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, ¶ 16. We will not reweigh evidence, id., which is construed in the light most favorable to affirming the decision, Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, ¶ 14 (App. 2019).
¶11 The trial court awarded the Airstream, "purchased in 2019 for an amount of $700," to Carlos "in consideration of [Monica] being awarded all the household items." The record demonstrates that the court considered and weighed the value of the Airstream against the household items awarded to Monica. "In determining an equitable division, the family court has broad discretion in the specific allocation of individual assets and liabilities." In re Marriage of Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, ¶ 14 (App. 2010). The record supports the court's decision.
¶12 The record also supports the trial court's denial of Monica's request for an order to amend old tax findings. At trial, Monica acknowledged her "understanding" with Carlos that "he would file separately]" while Monica would "file [her] own [taxes] because of the business." The court's finding that the decision to file taxes separately was "from an agreement and understanding between the Parties" is supported by the record. The court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion.
Stipulation at Trial
¶13 The parties reached a stipulation at trial concerning a house and a manufactured home, both built on the same lot in Tucson. Monica acknowledges her stipulation to maintain separate responsibility for the remaining balance of a $70,000 loan against the manufactured home, but asserts that the trial court erred by assigning her sole responsibility for an additional $7,000 loan on the house.
¶14 The two residential structures on the property shared the same address and could not readily be divided. The parties stipulated that their respective interests in both structures would be divided equally among their children. Explaining its decision to assign both the debt on the house and the debt on the manufactured home to Monica, the trial court concluded "that in fairly and equitably allocating the community assets and community debts, and in consideration of the Parties' filing and agreements during the hearings, [Monica] shall be solely responsible for" both debts. The court specifically observed that the transfer of the parties' interest in the house to the children was "[u]pon agreement of the parties" and that Monica "agrees to retain and maintain all debts related to this property as part of this agreement."
¶15 The record supports the trial court's recitation of the parties' stipulation. The assignment to Monica of both debts is consistent with the stipulation of the parties at trial and the arrangement between the parties before dissolution. Both Carlos and Monica confirmed their prior agreement and understanding that, in addition to Monica's separate loan for $70,000 on the manufactured home, "there's $7,000 owed on the Tucson property" and "that Monica would pay that" in exchange for Carlos's responsibility for other obligations.
¶16 The parties agreed at trial that they would both "relinquish their ownership" to "put all the names of [their] children on that title." Based on this agreement, the trial court asked the parties whether the debt against both the house and the manufactured home would need to be discharged before transferring title to the children. Monica proposed instead that
if [Carlos] agrees to 25 percent each, I would pay the $7,000, which I agree to pay, and the $70,000 on the manufactured home, which is added to that home, I would continue to pay for it. It's a gift for my kids that I would-give up everything for them.The court clarified its understanding of the stipulation concerning the $7,000 loan on the house that "if the parties agreed to essentially relinquish [their] ownership rights to the home, . . . that [Monica] would retain that debt and continue to pay that." The parties agreed. The court later recited the terms of the stipulation again, when Monica agreed to assume property tax payments on the property. Monica confirmed her agreement to accept responsibility for "the debts that are related to the home that's on the property."
¶17 Stipulations are not only "binding on parties, but they are favored by the law because they reduce the time of trial and narrow the issues." Pulliam v. Pulliam, 139 Ariz. 343, 345 (App. 1984). Here, the trial court found that the stipulation was fair and equitable. See Quijada v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 217, ¶ 17 (App. 2019) ("When spouses settle their property rights by agreement, if the settlement is fair and equitable, free from fraud and undue influence, the court normally will approve it." (citations omitted)). Neither Monica nor Carlos sought to withdraw from their stipulation or have it set aside. The court did not err by incorporating the stipulation into its decree.
Attorney Fees
¶18 Carlos requests his attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. Having reviewed the record as to the financial resources of both parties and having considered the reasonableness of the parties' positions throughout the proceedings, in our discretion, we deny Carlos's request. However, as the prevailing party, Carlos is entitled to his costs upon compliance with Rule 21(b), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
Disposition
¶19 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the decree of dissolution.