In re Marriage of Carrier, 332 Ill. App. 3d 654, 660, 773 N.E.2d 657, 663 (2d Dist. 2002); see also In re Marriage of Polsky, 387 Ill. App. 3d 126, 141, 899 N.E.2d 454, 467 (1st Dist. 2008) ("Interest on dissolution judgments is within the discretion of the trial court."). ΒΆ 67 In In re Marriage of Ahlness, 229 Ill. App. 3d 761, 763-64, 593 N.E.2d 1064, 1066-67 (1992), this court determined Finley should be given a "broad application" and upheld the imposition of 8% interest by the trial court in connection with a property-settlement award despite the appellant's contention that she should receive the statutory interest rate of 9%. In that case, the 8% interest ordered by the trial court on late payments was given retroactive treatment and ordered to "accrue[] beginning one year prior to the due date of the payment."
In re Marriage of Carrier, 332 Ill. App. 3d 654, 660 (2002); see also In re Marriage of Polsky, 387 Ill. App. 3d 126, 141 (2008) ("Interest on dissolution judgments is within the discretion of the trial court."). Further, in In re Marriage of Ahlness, 229 Ill. App. 3d 761, 763 (1992), this court emphasized the "broad application" of Finley and the importance of equitable considerations in the context of divorce property settlements. In Ahlness, we quoted a portion of the Finley case, stating: " ' "In a proper case, equitable considerations permit a court of equity to allow or disallow interest as the equities of the case may demand.
" In re Marriage of Carrier, 332 Ill. App. 3d 654, 660, 773 N.E.2d 657, 663 (2002); see also In re Marriage of Polsky, 387 Ill. App. 3d 126, 141, 899 N.E.2d 454, 467 (2008) ("Interest on dissolution judgments is within the discretion of the trial court."); In re Marriage of Ahlness, 229 Ill. App. 3d 761, 763-64, 593 N.E.2d 1064, 1066-67 (1992) (finding Finley should be given a "broad application" and upholding the imposition of interest by the trial court in connection with a property-settlement award).ΒΆ 43 Accordingly, contrary to Lisa's argument on appeal in the instant case, we find that the supreme court's ruling in Wiszowaty did not make the imposition of interest mandatory on all judgments; rather, it pertained only to judgments for child support payments.
However, we note that our decision in Sloane is at odds with numerous other appellate decisions that have given broad effect to the reasoning in Finley. See In re Marriage of Ahlness, 229 Ill. App. 3d 761, 763 (4th Dist. 1992); Robinson v. Robinson, 140 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612 (1st Dist. 1986); In re Marriage of Bjorklund, 88 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580-81 (1st Dist. 1980). These courts have held that, under the rule expressed in Finley, section 2-1303 of the Code does not apply to dissolution judgments awarding property, maintenance, or attorney fees.
Three appellate court cases subsequent to Finley have followed its reasoning. See In re Marriage of Ahlness, 229 Ill. App.3d 761, 763 (4th Dist. 1992) (citing Finley and stating Finley should be given broad application in dissolution proceedings); Robinson v. Robinson, 140 Ill. App.3d 610, 612 (1st Dist. 2d Div. 1986) ("in the context of a divorce proceeding, the provisions of section 2-1303 are not mandatory, but rather the allowance of interest is within the sound discretion of the trial court"); In re Marriage of Bjorklund, 88 Ill. App.3d 576, 580-81 (1st Dist. 1st Div. 1980) (following and citing Finley; interest on delinquent child support payments is discretionary based on the equities). However, the next time the first division of the first district encountered the issue in In re Marriage of Morris, 190 Ill. App.3d 293, 297 (1989), it held that Finley was applicable only to "past-due periodic child support" payments and not to a property settlement payment.