Opinion
A21-1608
11-07-2022
In re the Marriage of: Ritesh Singh, petitioner, Appellant, v. Rina Singh, Respondent.
Ritesh Singh, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (pro se appellant) Michael L. Gjesdahl, Gjesdahl Law, P.C., Fargo, North Dakota (for respondent)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Becker County District Court File No. 03-FA-20-1370
Ritesh Singh, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Michael L. Gjesdahl, Gjesdahl Law, P.C., Fargo, North Dakota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Hooten, Judge.
HOOTEN, JUDGE [*]
In this appeal from a judgment dissolving the parties' marriage, appellant-father argues that the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact and abused its discretion by awarding the parties joint physical custody of their children and by making respondent-mother's residence the children's primary residence. Appellant also argues that the district court erred by ruling that certain real property in Nepal is part of the marital estate, clearly erred in valuing the marital home, and abused its discretion in its award of spousal maintenance to respondent. Because the district court's findings of fact underlying its inclusion of the Nepal property in the marital estate are inadequate to allow us to review that ruling, we remand for further findings. But we affirm in all other respects.
FACTS
Appellant-father Ritesh Singh and respondent-mother Rina Singh married in May 2005, in Birgunz, Nepal. At the time of the marriage, appellant had completed his education as a physician in Nepal and respondent was attending dentistry school. In 2008, after appellant was licensed as a physician in the United States, the parties moved to the United States so that appellant could complete his residency there. Because respondent's dentistry college lost its accreditation, she was not able to practice dentistry in the United States.
In September 2009, the parties' first child was born. The family moved to Minnesota in 2011 when appellant accepted a position as a physician in Detroit Lakes. The parties' second child was born in February 2014. Respondent was a stay-at-home parent throughout the marriage.
The parties separated in September 2019, and appellant moved out of the marital home. In June 2020, appellant petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. Some months later, appellant purchased a new home in Detroit Lakes near the marital home.
Throughout the proceeding, the district court issued temporary orders granting respondent sole physical custody of the children subject to appellant's reasonable parenting time. The temporary orders also required that appellant pay respondent $2,000 per month in temporary spousal maintenance and continue to pay the mortgage, utilities, maintenance, and upkeep expenses for the marital home. After the temporary orders were filed, the district court granted appellant's motion to appoint a custody evaluator.
The district court held a three-day court trial in June and July of 2021. The parties, the children's paternal grandmother, and a certified real-estate expert, among others, testified at trial. The custody evaluator also testified, and the district court received the custody evaluator's report into evidence. The district court heard testimony and received evidence from respondent that respondent had enrolled in the dental-hygiene program at a community college in Moorhead, Minnesota, and that pursuit of her studies as a full-time student would require her to move to Moorhead, which is approximately a 50-minute drive from appellant's home in Detroit Lakes. During the trial, respondent asked the court for its decision on physical custody, the children's primary residence, and whether respondent could move to Moorhead with the children in advance of its decision on the balance of the issues to allow time for respondent to secure housing, relocate, and ready the children and herself for the start of the school year.
At the close of trial, the district court ordered the parties to submit simultaneous proposed findings and post-trial briefings to the court 14 days after the close of trial, at which time the matter would be taken under advisement. Six days after the close of trial, the district court filed an order allowing respondent to move to Moorhead with no change to her parenting time, awarding joint physical custody of the children to the parties, ordering the children's primary residence to be with respondent, and establishing a parenting-time schedule. The order stated that joint physical custody is in the children's best interests and that findings of fact, conclusions of law, an order, judgment and decree would follow within the required 90-day timeline, to include the required detailed findings on the best-interests' factors.
In October 2021, the district court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, order, judgment and decree (the judgment and decree) reiterating its custody and parenting-time determination, analyzing the best-interests' factors, and disposing of all other issues in the dissolution. The district court awarded spousal maintenance to respondent; found that the parties jointly owned the marital home and appellant's home in Detroit Lakes and established valuations of those homes; found that the parties had an interest in a home in Nepal where the children's paternal grandmother lives and established a valuation for that property; ordered appellant to pay child support; and distributed the marital estate, awarding the marital home to respondent, and both appellant's home and the parties' interest in the home in Nepal to appellant. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The findings of fact supporting an award of joint physical custody with the determination that respondent's home would be the children's primary residence are not clearly erroneous.
Appellant first argues that the district court clearly erred by finding facts in support of its award to the parties of joint physical custody of the children and its ruling that respondent's home in Moorhead would be the children's primary residence. Appellant's arguments are not persuasive.
Appellate courts review a district court's decisions regarding custody and parenting determinations for an abuse of discretion. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985) (custody); Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (modification of custody); Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2018) (parenting time). "A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record." Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)).
Appellant challenges no particular factual findings in the district court's judgment and decree; rather, he alleges that respondent's testimony included "numerous lies" the district court should not have credited. A district court's findings of fact are not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 52.01 in a family-law appeal). The clear-error standard of review "is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision." In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021). "When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary." Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). When applying the clear-error standard of review, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus, an appellate court need not engage in extended discussion of the evidence to demonstrate the correctness of the district court's findings; rather, it need only fairly consider all the evidence and determine that the evidence reasonably supports the decision. Id. at 222; see Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn.App. 2000) (discussing clear-error standard of review).
In light of Kenney's statements that appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence, appellant's argument that the district court should not have credited certain aspects of respondent's testimony does not merit relief. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (noting that appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations).
Appellant also argues that the district court's parenting determinations are based on its temporary order granting sole physical custody of the children to respondent, which, per appellant, overlooked appellant's willingness and capability as a caregiver and provider, as well as appellant's work schedule, which he asserts is favorable for equal parenting time. Appellant seems to allege that factual findings from the temporary order influenced the final judgment and decree. But appellant does not indicate any specific finding in the temporary order that the district court relied upon, either expressly or implicitly, in its final ruling. Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 9(a) (2020) states that a temporary order "[s]hall not prejudice the rights of the parties . . . to be adjudicated at subsequent hearings in the proceeding." Absent an indication that the district court actually based its final decision on the temporary order, appellant's argument asks that we assume the district court erred by acting in contravention of Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 9(a). "[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it." Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted); see Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn.App. 1999) (applying this aspect of Loth). Because the differing results in the two orders suggest that the district court did not base its final order on the temporary order, and because we cannot assume the district court erred by acting in a manner contrary to the statute, appellant's argument that the district court based its final decision on the temporary order does not merit relief.
Rather, the district court's findings of fact explain its award of physical custody and its determination that respondent's home should be the children's primary residence. The findings also show these rulings to be in the children's best interests. The district court found that (1) appellant disparaged respondent to the children and inappropriately placed the children in the midst of the parents' conflict; (2) respondent had been, and continued to be, the children's primary caregiver; and (3) the older child, being nearly 12 years old, had implicitly expressed a preference for living with respondent. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(11), (6), (3) (2020) (directing a district court to consider the parents' disposition to support the child's relationship with the other parent, the parents' provision of care to a child, and, if certain prerequisites are satisfied, any "reasonable" custodial preference of a child, when addressing a child's best interests); cf. Ross v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn.App. 1991) (stating that the preference of an older teenage child may be an "overwhelming consideration" when determining custody). These findings, as well as the district court's other best-interests findings, are supported by the record. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (noting that "an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court," and that an appellate court's "duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably supports the decision." (quotations omitted)).
Appellant also appears to argue that the district court relied excessively on the custody evaluator's recommendations for its findings on the children's best interests. We reject this argument as inconsistent with the record; where the custody evaluator asserted that none of the best-interests factors favored appellant, the district court found one factor did favor appellant.
Finally, appellant argues that the district court erred by filing its order awarding custody and identifying the children's primary residence after the trial but prior to the deadline for the parties to submit proposed findings. Because appellant cites no legal authority for this assertion, we need not address it. See State Dep't of Labor &Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an issue absent adequate briefing); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn.App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal). Even so, we note both that an award of temporary custody and parenting time pending the final disposition of a dissolution proceeding is allowed by Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 1 (2020), and that an existing temporary order may be modified by the district court before the proceeding's final disposition under Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 9 (2020). Here, at the conclusion of the trial, respondent asked the district court-based on the evidence submitted at trial-to promptly address the children's custody and primary residence. She did so, given her intent to move to Moorhead, so that, if she was allowed to move to Moorhead with the children, she could do so prior to the start of her and the children's fall classes. Appellant raised no objection to this request, and the district court both granted respondent's request for an accelerated ruling on the custody and primary residence questions, and made rulings on those matters in respondent's favor. Thereafter, the district court entered its judgment and decree dissolving the parties' marriage and addressing all other issues related to the dissolution. Because an existing temporary order was in place, we conclude that the district court acted within its authority to amend or modify that existing temporary order under Minn. Stat. § 518.131 (2020).
II. The district court's findings regarding the home in Nepal are insufficient to allow appellate review.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by factoring appellant's mother's home in Nepal into its division of the parties' marital property and awarding the value of that asset to appellant.
When a marriage is dissolved, the district court "shall make a just and equitable division of the marital property of the parties." Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020). Property of spouses is either marital property or nonmarital property. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2020) (defining marital and nonmarital property). "Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law, but a reviewing court must defer to the [district] court's underlying findings of fact." Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). When parties to a dissolution disagree about whether property is their marital property or is the nonmarital property of one of them, appellate courts review de novo whether the property is marital or nonmarital, but defer to the district court's underlying findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). When parties to a dissolution challenge the district court's division of their marital property, appellate courts review that division for an abuse of discretion. Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002); see Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (defining an abuse of discretion).
Here, appellant argues that the house in Nepal belongs to his mother. Thus, appellant is asserting that the Nepal property is neither the marital property of the parties nor the nonmarital property of one of the parties-rather, he is asserting that the house in Nepal is extramarital property; that is, it is property owned by a nonparty to the dissolution. In a dissolution proceeding, a district court "lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty's property rights." Danielson v. Danielson, 721 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn.App. 2006). Thus, if appellant's mother owns the house in Nepal, that house is not marital property, and the district court should not have factored that house into its division of the parties' marital property.
It is undisputed that appellant's mother acquired the house in Nepal, at least in part, with funds originating with the parties. The judgment and decree, however, does not address whether the transfers of those funds to appellant's mother were merely loans or were gifts. A valid gift requires that the donor intend to make a gift, that the gifted property be delivered, and that the donor absolutely dispose of that property. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800 (citing Oehler v. Falstrom, 142 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Minn. 1966)). Questions of donative intent are fact questions demonstrated by the surrounding circumstances. Id. The party asserting that there is a valid gift must prove the elements of a valid gift by clear and convincing evidence. Muschik v. Conner-Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn.App. 2018).
Here, despite record evidence addressing several aspects of the transfers to appellant's mother-including testimony that was pertinent to that question from appellant's mother, appellant, and respondent-the dissolution judgment addresses neither whether the funds transferred to appellant's mother for the purchase of the house were a gift, nor the amount of any marital funds that may have been given as a gift.
Neither party briefed a gift analysis to this court, and thus the gift question is arguably not properly before this court. Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480; Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d at 479. Appellate courts can, however, address a question in the interests of justice. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. Further, appellate courts have a responsibility "to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel's oversights, lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities." State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted); see Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 875 (Minn. 2010) (citing Hannuksela in a civil case). Because a gift requires an absolute disposition of the relevant property, whether the transfers of funds to appellant's mother were gifts or loans may significantly impact the scope of the marital estate that Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 requires the district court to divide equitably. Therefore, we will address the gift analysis. In doing so, we note that much of the dissolution caselaw analyzing gifts addresses whether a transfer of property was a gift of that property to one or both of the parties to the marriage, rather than whether a transfer to a non-spouse was a gift of that property to a non-spouse, as is the question here. Caselaw beyond the dissolution context, however, confirms that the Oehler gift analysis used by the supreme court in Olsen also applies in other contexts. See, e.g, In re Estate of Lobe, 348 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Minn.App. 1984); Weber v. Hvass, 626 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn.App. 2001), rev denied (Minn. Jun 27, 2001); Barnier v. Wells, 476 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.App. 1991).
In reaching its determination that the parties have an interest in the home in Nepal, the district court made no findings on the credibility of the testimony addressing whether the money provided to appellant's mother was a gift. Nor does the district court address whether any interest either or both parties may have in the Nepal house is marital or nonmarital property. In finding the parties' interest in, and the value of, the Nepal house, the district court appears to have looked to respondent's valuation provided in the parties' exhibit listing the disputed and agreed-on asset valuations, where respondent listed the value of the property as $215,658, and appellant listed the value as "zero." There is no testimony or documentation in the record regarding the value of the real property or whether the funds that were provided to appellant's mother were a loan or investment by the parties, and the only testimony on whether either party had a marital interest in the property was appellant's, stating that he had no ownership interest in the property.
The district court's findings do not enable us to ascertain the district court's rationale for treating the Nepal house as a marital asset and assigning its value to appellant. Nor are there findings of fact on the parties' donative intent or the credibility of testimony pertinent to that question. Without those findings, it is not clear why the district court ruled as it did. We therefore are unable to review the question on appeal. Kucera v. Kucera, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966) ("It is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal."); see Clark v. Clark, 642 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn.App. 2002 (citing this aspect of Kucera). Therefore, we remand to the district court for that court to address whether, and to what extent, the transfers of funds to appellant's mother were gifts, to reevaluate whether and to what extent-if any-the house in Nepal is marital property, and to make any adjustment to its division of the parties' marital property necessary to accomplish the equitable division of the marital estate required by Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. If the result of the proceedings on remand would justify an apportionment of nonmarital property under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2020), the district court shall have authority to do so; and on remand the district court shall have discretion regarding whether to reopen the record to address the remanded questions.
III. The district court did not clearly err in its valuation of the marital home.
Appellant argues that the district court's valuation of the marital home was clear error because respondent sold the property for above the amount the court found to be its fair market value. Again, appellant's argument is not persuasive.
A district court's valuation of an item of property is a finding of fact and it will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). The district court is not required to be exact in its valuation of assets; on appellate review "it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures." Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979); see Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22 (discussing the clear-error standard of review).
Here, the district court found the fair market value of the marital home to be $323,700. It based this finding on the testimony of a realtor whom the parties agreed was a qualified real-estate expert. The report of the agreed-upon expert recommended a sale price of $323,700 and suggested that a list price of $339,000 was realistic. Appellant claimed that the value of the home was $350,000. The fair market value the district court found for the marital home was within the range, albeit the low end of the range, of the values presented to the court and thus "lies within a reasonable range of figures." Johnson, 277 N.W.2d at 211. Thus, this record gives us no reason to conclude that the district court's valuation of the marital home was clearly erroneous because it was outside a reasonable range of figures.
Appellant's primary complaint seems to be that after the home was awarded to respondent, who put the house up for sale as ordered by the district court, appellant claims the home was listed at $355,000 and sold for $361,500. This argument, however, is based on events occurring after the district court entered its judgment and decree, and therefore was not raised to the district court and is thus not properly before us on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating both that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented to the district court, and that appellate courts do not consider matters outside the record on appeal); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal as the record presented to the district court).
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding spousal maintenance to respondent.
Appellant challenges the district court's award of $6,000 in monthly maintenance to respondent for 15 years, arguing, primarily, that the duration of maintenance awarded should have been shorter due to respondent's plan to pursue education and future employment, and that appellant's smaller proposed monthly maintenance amount was "reasonable." We disagree.
The district court may grant spousal maintenance if it finds that one spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for their reasonable needs or is unable to provide adequate self-support through appropriate employment, after considering the standard of living established during the marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2020). A district court's grant of spousal maintenance must be in an amount and duration it deems just, considering all relevant factors. Id., subd. 2 (2020). Relevant factors include the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to the party; the time necessary for the party seeking maintenance to acquire sufficient education or training to find appropriate employment and become self-supporting; the duration of the marriage; the length of a homemaker's absence from employment and the extent to which that party's earning capacity has become permanently diminished; and the ability of the party from whom maintenance is sought to meet needs while meeting the other party's needs. Id.
Appellate courts review a district court's decisions on the amount and duration of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Minn.App. 2021). "A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on the record." Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (quoting Bender, 971 N.W.2d at 262).
In its judgment and decree, the district court found that respondent is unemployed, has no monthly income and no income-generating assets or liquid assets with which to meet her or the children's monthly expenses, and has enrolled in community college in Moorhead to pursue a degree in dental hygiene. The district court found that respondent requires time, education, and retraining in order to obtain meaningful employment with which to support herself and the children, specifically finding that the degree will take two years to complete and that if she is able to become employed as a dental hygienist, respondent will earn approximately $30 per hour. Importantly, the district court also found that the parties had been married since 2005, and that respondent had trained in dentistry in Nepal but gave up a dental career in Nepal "to marry [appellant] and support their household for many years," acting as a stay-at-home mother and caretaker. The district court further found that appellant's gross annual income as a hospitalist is $336,403 according to his tax return, which was entered as evidence.
Evidence in the record supports these findings of fact. While appellant argues that the district court "should have considered [respondent's] completion of a degree and selfemployment within the two-to-three-year timeframe," the district court in fact appears to have considered all the relevant factors in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2, when making its determinations on the amount and duration of maintenance. Because those determinations were not contrary to logic and the facts in the record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
In conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting joint physical custody with the children to primarily reside with respondent in Moorhead, or in its award of spousal maintenance to respondent. Nor did the district court clearly err in its valuation of the marital home. However, the district court's findings on the parties' interest in the home in Nepal are inadequate to determine whether including it in the distribution of marital property and assigning its value to appellant was an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm in part and remand for further findings on the parties' interest in the Nepal home. We leave to the district court's discretion whether soliciting additional evidence is necessary to make those findings, and whether the resulting findings require reapportionment of marital property or reevaluation of the maintenance award.
By separate motion, respondent moved for attorney fees on appeal. In his response to respondent's motion, appellant argues that the district court should have awarded attorney fees to appellant. We will address the motion and response by separate order.
Affirmed in part and remanded.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.