See e.g., In re Araujo, 464 B.R. 15 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001); Glueck, 223 B.R. at 514; McElroy, 339 B.R. 185; In re Johnson, 117 B.R. 577 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). Given the nature of Chapter 13 proceedings, it is often "impractical to require expert testimony to determine valuation under Rash . . . ."
The replacement value of the Vehicle takes account of what a buyer in the Debtors' situation would pay for a vehicle of like age and condition.See In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761, 768 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001) (citing Rash, 520 U.S. at 965 n. 6) (determining replacement value requires adjustments based on features and conditions of the vehicle); Rash, 520 U.S. at 959 n. 2. The Vehicle, as it presently exists, carries an extended warranty — that is, the Warranty is an attribute of the Vehicle.
See also In re Engebregtsen, 337 B.R. 677,. 679 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.2006) ("This court is persuaded that the time of filing is the appropriate time to value a claim."); In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761 (Bankra..Ariz. 2001) (determining a automobile's value as of the petition date and reducing that value to the extent that adequate protections payment were made between the petition date and the confirmation date). 2.
Rash, 520 U.S. at 959 at n. 2. See also Mulvania v. IRS ( In re Mulvania), 214 B.R. 1, 9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761, 765-66 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001). In short, Ms. Schwalb's plan must pay, over time, an amount equal to the present value of the replacement cost of each vehicle.
Getz and its progeny which have adopted the averaging approach must recognize that, in order to comply with Rash, the average is merely the starting point subject to adjustment by other evidence introduced by the parties. In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761, 766 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001). The court in In re Gonzales, 295 B.R. 584, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003), interpreted Rash as rejecting all "starting points, benchmarks, polestars, shortcuts and rules of thumb."
, In re Stem bridge, 287 B.R. 658, 664 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Farmer, 257 B.R. 556, 561 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000); In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. 967, 974 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995). But see In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761, 768 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001) (calculating replacement value of collateral securing claim as of petition date). To determine the value of the collateral, the Supreme Court VA Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117S. Ct. 1879, 138 L.Ed.2d 148 (1997), held that, when chapter 13 debtors choose to keep and use the secured property at issue, bankruptcy courts must apply the replacement-value standard, rather than a foreclosure valuation or a split-the-difference approach, for valuation purposes.
See, e.g., in re Gray, 285 B.R. 379, 384 n. 18 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 2002); In re Renzelman, 227 B.R. 740, 742 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1998) (retail minus 5%). Others employ an average of retail and wholesale values, see, e.g., in re Getz, 242 B.R. 916, 919 (6th Cir. BAP 2000); In re Marquez, 270 B.R. 761, 766 (Bankr.D.Ariz. 2001), despite the disapproval of this method in Rash,see Rash, 520 U.S. at 964, 117 S.Ct. 1879. One commentator has advocated using wholesale values.