"For a relationship to be intimate' within the meaning of the statute, it must be direct, not one that is based upon multiple degrees of separation or that exists only through a shared connection with a third party" (Matter of Mark W. v Damion W., 25 Misc 3d 1148, 1151 [NY Fam Ct 2009 (O'Shea, J.)]; see Matter of Perrella v Freely, 90 AD3d 664, 665 [2nd Dept 2011]). Moreover, the Legislature expressly excluded from the definition a "casual acquaintance" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts" (Family Ct. Act § 812[1][e]).
ilarly-situated, including, "the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family services" (74 N.Y.2d 201, 212-213 [1989]). Our courts have been making these assessments in the housing context since the 1980s, so it is familiar terrain. Our courts have also made these determinations of what constitutes a "family" in cases involving zoning (Baer v Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 943 [1989] [five unrelated elderly women who lived together in a home were a family]), domestic relations (Matter of Brooke S.B. v Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1, 26 [2016] [overruling a narrow definition of "parent" that excluded non-biological and non-adoptive caregivers]), and in domestic violence cases which often require evaluation of whether there was an "intimate relationship" (Matter of Mark W. v Damion W., 25 Misc.3d 1148, 1150 [Fam Ct 2009]).
Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812, the Family Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the criminal courts over proceedings concerning certain criminal acts occurring "between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household" (Family Ct Act § 812[1]). The statute "offers victims of domestic violence a kinder and gentler way of stopping violence that does not involve the harshness and stigma of criminal sanctions [and] provides practical help in a civil proceeding to the victim by requiring a lower burden of proof to be met than is necessary to obtain similar protections in a criminal proceeding" (Matter of Mark W. v Damion W., 25 Misc 3d 1148, 1149 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]; see Family Ct Act § 812[2][b], [c]). Insofar as relevant here, "members of the same family or household" includes "persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time" (Family Ct Act § 812[1][e]). Expressly excluded from the definition of "intimate relationship" are a "casual acquaintance" and "ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts" (Family Ct Act § 812[1][e]).
Indeed, the petitioner testified that he “didn't believe [they] had any kind of relationship.” Accordingly, the Family Court properly concluded that the parties did not have an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of the statute, and properly granted the motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, in effect, dismissed the petition ( see Matter of Riedel v. Vasquez, 88 A.D.3d 725, 727, 930 N.Y.S.2d 238;Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d 975, 977, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112;Matter of Mark W. v. Damion W., 25 Misc.3d 1148, 887 N.Y.S.2d 822;cf. Matter of Jose M. v. Angel V., 99 A.D.3d 243, 951 N.Y.S.2d 195 [2d Dept. 2012];Morales v. Roman, 30 Misc.3d 297, 912 N.Y.S.2d 395).
r boyfriend, with whom the petitioner had a child; the parties had only met during the course of court proceedings and the respondent had never met the petitioner's child]; Matter of Riedel v. Vasquez, 88 A.D.3d 725, 725, 930 N.Y.S.2d 238 [holding that the petitioner was not in an “intimate relationship” with the respondent, who was the estranged wife of the petitioner's live-in boyfriend, even though both had children with the same man]; Matter of Tyrone T. v. Katherine M., 78 A.D.3d 545, 545, 911 N.Y.S.2d 56 [concluding that the petitioner, who was the boyfriend of the respondent's sister, and a friend of the respondent, did not have an “intimate relationship” with the respondent]; Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d at 977, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112 [concluding that an “intimate relationship” did not exist where the parties had no direct relationship and were only connected by virtue of the fact that the petitioner and the respondent's brother, who never were married, had a child in common]; Matter of Mark W. v. Damion W., 25 Misc.3d 1148, 1149–1151, 887 N.Y.S.2d 822 [finding no “intimate relationship” between the petitioner and the live-in boyfriend of the mother of the petitioner's children] ). Nonetheless, under the facts of this case, we find that the child and the boyfriend were in an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) such that the Family Court has jurisdiction over the proceeding.
Given these undisputed facts, no hearing was required, as the Family Court possessed sufficient information to determine that the parties are not and never have been in an “intimate relationship” as defined by Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) ( see Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d at 977, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112; cf. Matter of Jeffers v. Hicks, 67 A.D.3d 800, 801, 888 N.Y.S.2d 593). Under these circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to conduct a hearing, and properly concluded that the petitioner and the respondent are not, and never were, in an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) ( see Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 A.D.3d at 977, 900 N.Y.S.2d 112; Matter of Mark W. v. Damion W., 25 Misc.3d 1148, 1151, 887 N.Y.S.2d 822). Consequently, the Family Court properly granted, without a hearing, the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Before: Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, McGuire, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ. Petitioner's claim that he was the boyfriend of respondent's sister, and a friend of respondent, was insufficient to establish an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812 (1) (e) so as to afford the Family Court jurisdiction over this matter ( see Sponsor's Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2008, ch 326; Matter of Seye v Lamar, 72 AD3d 975; Matter of Mark W. v Damion W., 25 Misc 3d 1148 [Fam Ct, Kings County 2009]; Matter of K.J. v K.K., 23 Misc 3d 754, 758-759 [Fam Ct, Orange County 2009]). In any event, assuming the court had jurisdiction, petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent committed the family offense of first degree harassment against him because his alleged fear that respondent would harm him was not objectively reasonable ( see Penal Law § 240.
The interactions between the petitioner and the respondent over the approximately five years that they have known each other have been infrequent at most. Under such circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in determining, without a hearing, that the petitioner and the respondent are not, and never were, in an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812 (1) (e) ( see Matter of Mark W. v Damion W., 25 Misc 3d 1148; see also Sponsor's Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2008, ch 326; Social Services Law § 459-a; 18 NYCRR 452.2 [g] [2] [vi]; cf. Matter of Jessica D. v Jeremy H., 24 Misc 3d 664; Matter of Maria B. v Ndoc S., 2009 NY Misc LEXIS 2636 [Sup Ct, NY County 2009]; Matter of K.J. v K.K., 23 Misc 3d 754; Matter of K.V. v K.F., 22 Misc 3d 372). Accordingly, the Family Court properly dismissed the petition on the ground that the parties are not "members of the same family or household" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812 (1).
"The legislative history of the 2008 Amendment indicates that the legislature intended to extend the protections of the Family Court Act primarily to dating couples who are not married or who do not share a child in common, and same-sex partners." Mark W. v. Damion W., 25 Misc.3d 1148, 1150 (Kings Cnty. Fam. Ct. 2009). The Third Department also explained that the intent of the amendment was to reach "(1) unrelated persons who are continually or at regular intervals living in the same household or who have in the past continually or at regular intervals lived in the same household and (2) persons who are or have been in an intimate or dating relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time."
By "radically expand[ing]" the definition of "members of the same family or household" to include "persons … who are or have been in an intimate relationship" in 2008, the "Legislature intended to extend the statute's reach to … (1) unrelated persons who are continually or at regular intervals living in the same household or who have in the past continually or at regular intervals lived in the same household and (2) persons who are or have been in an intimate or dating relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time." Matter of Jessica D. v Jeremy H., 77 A.D.3d 87, 90 (3d Dept 2010); see Matter of Mark W v. Damion W, 25 Misc.3d 1148, 1150 (Fam Ct, Kings County 2009) ("The legislative history of the 2008 Amendment indicates that the legislature intended to extend the protections of the Family Court Act primarily to dating couples who are not married or who do not share a child in common, and same-sex partners"); Matter of Amanda AA. v Jennifer BB., Fam Ct, Tompkins County, Sept. 23, 2010, Brockway, J. at 2, available at http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/fcas/fcas_docs/2010sep/54013902010101_1285342402608_fam.pdf (accessed Jun. 10, 2022). The parties clearly have never been in a dating-type relationship and the allegations do not demonstrate that the parties ever lived in the same household, but that they are only connected through Petitioner's deceased husband.