Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD219404
OPINION
HULL, J.
Sara H. (appellant), the mother of Mark T. (the minor), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further unspecified section references are to this code.) Appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in failing to apply a statutory exception to adoption to the dependency proceedings. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). Appellant also claims the court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request for a bonding assessment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order.
Facts and Proceedings
On June 3, 2003, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed an original juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the three-year-old minor. That petition alleged in part that the minor was at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm due to appellant’s substance abuse problem. The juvenile court sustained the petition in part, adjudged the minor a dependant child, and ordered appellant to comply with the requirements of a case plan promulgated by DHHS. The court also ordered the minor placed with his maternal great-aunt and uncle.
The juvenile court granted appellant regular, supervised visitation with the minor. DHHS described appellant’s visitation pattern as sporadic. According to one report, appellant failed to appear at some scheduled visits. However, another report noted that appellant had maintained contact with the minor by telephone.
In December 2004, the juvenile court ordered the minor’s return to appellant under DHHS supervision. Thereafter, in February 2005, the minor was detained and returned to the custody of the minor’s great-aunt and uncle. In June 2005, the minor again was placed with appellant until July 1, 2005.
In a September 2005 report, DHHS recommended a permanent plan of guardianship for the minor. That report also contained a statement by the minor’s maternal great-aunt that the minor had a “strong and positive attachment” to appellant. Thereafter, the juvenile court ordered adoption as the permanent plan for the minor.
At April 7, 2006, and July 14, 2006, hearings, the juvenile court denied requests by appellant for a bonding assessment. The report prepared by DHHS for the section 366.26 hearing noted appellant’s visitation with the minor had been inconsistent. A supplemental report stated in part that appellant “[did] not visit with the [minor], but rather [saw] him only incidentally when [appellant] visits the relative caregiver’s home to carry out her business. According to the relative caregiver, [appellant] sporadically comes to the home in order to pick up mail or dismantle her trailer, which is parked on the property. At those times [appellant] will walk by the [minor] without speaking to him.”
At the September 28, 2006, section 366.26 hearing, appellant testified that at one point in time she had visited with the minor on a daily basis. More recently, however, she had seen the minor while “just passing by.” Referring to the close bond they shared, appellant opposed adoption as the minor’s recommended permanent plan, preferring instead either return of the minor to her custody or a guardianship.
At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for appellant argued that guardianship, rather than adoption, was the appropriate permanent plan for the minor. Appellant’s counsel also asked the juvenile court to apply the statutory exception to adoption based on appellant’s relationship to the minor to the proceedings.
In finding it likely the minor would be adopted and terminating appellant’s parental rights, the juvenile court stated in part that “[t]here seems to be a conflict in the evidence as to what the nature and qualities of the visits are. [¶] The representations in the report from the caretaker are that the visits are whenever [appellant] comes around to take care of her other business, and there are times when she will walk by the [minor] without even speaking to the [minor]. The visits are coincidental as opposed to being planned and focused directly on the [minor] which is in direct contradiction to the testimony given by [appellant]. I find that evidence to be more compelling and more believable.”
Discussion
I
The Beneficial Relationship Exception
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s failure to apply the beneficial relationship exception to adoption contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), is not supported by substantial evidence. Noting the evidence of a strong bond existing between appellant and the minor, and the frequent contact she had with the minor, appellant argues the court committed reversible error in terminating her parental rights.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
One of the circumstances under which termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor is: “The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The benefit to the child must promote “the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373.) The juvenile court is not required to find that termination of parental rights will not be detrimental due to specified circumstances. (Id. at p. 1373.) Even frequent and loving contact is not sufficient to establish the benefit exception absent significant, positive emotional attachment between parent and child. (In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)
In this case, although the record discloses that appellant had some contact with the minor, there is ample evidence that the contact was sporadic and inconsistent. For example, at one point the maternal great-aunt reported that appellant had not contacted her about arranging a visit with the minor in some time. Other reports noted that, while appellant did see the minor occasionally, she was not consistent. In the meantime, as the record also suggests, the minor was developing the capability to maintain relationships with other adult figures, establishing a strong bond with his relative caretaker.
Section 366.26 requires both a showing of regular contact and a separate showing that the child actually would benefit from continuing the relationship. In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, interprets the statutory exception to involve a balancing test, and both In re Autumn H. and In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, posit a high level of parental-type involvement and attachment. Even assuming those decisions overemphasized the importance of the parental role, the record here does not support appellant’s suggestion that the minor would benefit from continuing his relationship with appellant simply because of the attachment existing between them (Cf. In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822.)
Appellant suggests the record establishes the existence of a beneficial relationship between the minor and herself, precluding a finding of adoptability. The juvenile court was authorized to conclude the contrary was true. Evidence of a significant parent-child attachment by itself does not suffice. Instead, the record must show such benefit to the minor that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Here, as the court determined, the record was bereft of such a showing. Instead, there was evidence suggesting it was critical for the minor to obtain the benefits of a stable placement.
In In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, cited by appellant, the juvenile court found it was in the best interests of the minors to establish a guardianship, rather than terminate parental rights, so the minors could maintain their relationship with their mother. (Id. at 1533.) Affirming, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the minors, because their mother had maintained regular, beneficial visitation with them. (Id. at pp. 1533, 1534, 1537, 1538.)
In re Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, is distinguishable from the proceedings here. The In re Brandon C. court found ample evidence of benefit to the minors of continued contact with their mother. (Id. at pp. 1537, 1538.) Here, by contrast, the record supports the juvenile court’s implicit conclusion that there was not the kind of regular contact present in In re Brandon C., nor would there be sufficient benefit to the minor if his relationship with appellant were continued. Moreover, as the record also suggests, the minor had a need for stability and security, a need which only adoption could satisfy.
Appellant suggests that because she had maintained a significant parent-child relationship with the minor, which included a history together and allegedly regular contact while in placement, the circumstances of her case compare favorably with those found in other cases. We disagree. In In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51, cited by appellant, the Court of Appeal did not find an “exceptional case” where a beneficial relationship existed that would preclude adoption. Accordingly, the court in In re Casey D. affirmed the order that terminated parental rights. (Id. at pp. 53, 54.) However, the court in In re Casey D. did recognize the possibility that a beneficial relationship might exist despite the absence of daily contact between parent and child. (Id. at p. 51.) The difficulty for appellant here is that she cannot establish the requisite regular contact with the minor in the absence of which the exception does not apply.
Here, the issue was as follows: In light of the minor’s adoptability, would a continued relationship with appellant benefit the minor to such a degree that it would outweigh the benefits the minor would gain in a permanent adoptive home? Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s answer in the negative. On the record before it, the juvenile court could conclude, as it did impliedly, that only adoption, which is the preferred disposition (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368), would promote the best interests of the minor.
Appellant claims that, in relying on a DHHS report suggesting erroneously that she did not speak with the minor when she saw him informally, the juvenile court erred. Appellant is mistaken. The record reflects that, at the July 14, 2006, hearing, counsel for DHHS acknowledged the report was not accurate and advised the court that occasionally appellant did speak to the minor. Thereafter, at the September 28, 2006, section 366.26 hearing, the court noted “there [were] times” when appellant walked by the minor without talking to him. This statement was not inconsistent with all of the evidence adduced on the issue of the nature of the contact appellant had with the minor. The court then properly made its credibility determination. (In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 598.) As the record reflects, the juvenile court had before it all evidence on the matter, including appellant’s testimony.
After it became apparent that appellant would not reunify with the minor, the juvenile court had to find an “exceptional situation existed to forego adoption.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In this case, on the contrary, the court determined that the minor would not benefit from continuing his relationship with appellant to such a degree that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. Appellant had the burden to demonstrate the statutory exception applied. We conclude that appellant failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating parental rights. (In re Amanda D., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 821-822.)
II
The Bonding Study
Appellant claims the juvenile court erred by failing to exercise its discretion to order a bonding study. According to appellant, such a study was necessary to determine the current quality of the bond existing between the minor and appellant. Appellant also asserts a bonding study would have aided the court in its determination of the beneficial relationship exception to adoption. Appellant also asserts denial of a bonding study violated her due process rights. But, as she made no such claim in the juvenile court, she is precluded from making it on appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.)
As appellant acknowledges, the standard of review of the juvenile court’s decision whether to order a bonding assessment is abuse of discretion. Because the juvenile court is accorded wide discretion, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent “‘a manifest showing of abuse.’” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) In applying this standard, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision and determine whether that court reasonably could have refrained from ordering a bonding study. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341.)
The record contains several reports of social workers that are based both on their own observations and on the observations of others. Those reports note, as appellant emphasizes in her reply brief, the strong bond existing between appellant and minor. On the other hand, the record also contains ample evidence documenting the inconsistent visitation pattern employed by appellant. At one point, the maternal great-aunt reported appellant “rarely” visited the minor, “rarely” had been at the home of another relative where apparently the minor sometimes stayed, and “[did] not call to arrange visits” with the minor.
The record therefore contains sufficient evidence with which the juvenile court could evaluate the nature and strength of the bond existing between appellant and the minor.
While appellant’s testimony was somewhat in conflict on the issue of the contact she had with the minor, she acknowledged the informal nature of some of that contact. What is most important, however, is that the juvenile court had the benefit of obtaining substantial information about the nature of the bond existing between appellant and the minor. On this record, the juvenile court was entitled to conclude that a bonding assessment would not have been useful to the court or of assistance to appellant. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.)
The juvenile court is not obliged by statue or case law to order preparation of a bonding assessment. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) Because the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that there was little, if any, benefit to be gained from ordering preparation of a bonding study, the court acted well within its discretion in not ordering a bonding assessment. (Cf. In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197.)
Disposition
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.