Opinion
No. 341428
07-19-2018
In re MARION/MARTINEZ, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED St. Clair Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 16-000247-NA Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and SERVITTO and BECKERING, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor children, PM, XM, and JM, under MCL 712A.19(3)(c)(i) (conditions at adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (risk of harm if child returned). We affirm.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) opened a case against respondent for improper supervision because law enforcement went to the home and found the children left alone and unsupervised. Law enforcement was called to respondent's home a second time for a domestic situation involving respondent and her boyfriend. Respondent was arrested for obstruction after she provided a false name to the police officer because she had active warrants. The children were removed and placed in foster care in July 2016.
Respondent was incarcerated for the obstruction charge from December 2016 until March 2017. She participated in services, including parenting classes, therapy, domestic violence groups, and anger management. In September 2017, DHHS recommended that termination proceedings be initiated because respondent failed to accept responsibility for the children coming into care, failed to show a benefit from services, and refused to make any meaningful changes in her parenting style. The trial court ultimately terminated respondent's parental rights, and this appeal followed.
First, respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). This Court reviews "the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009); see also MCR 3.977(K). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
Termination of parental rights is appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when the respondent parent has "not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions existing by the time of the adjudication." In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Termination is proper pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) when "[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age." Termination is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) when "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent."
While MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was amended by 2018 PA 58, the statutory amendments are not pertinent to our analysis. --------
In this case, the original dispositional order was entered on September 23, 2016. The termination hearing was held on November 8, 2017. Thus, more than 182 days had "elapsed since the issuance of [the] initial dispositional order." MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The record supports the trial court's conclusion that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). While respondent did participate in services, specifically therapy, parenting classes, domestic violence groups, and anger management, the testimony at the termination hearing showed that respondent failed to show a benefit from these services. In this case, the children were brought into care partly because of improper supervision. However, two caseworkers, Brenan Casler and Katie Ofeno, both testified that respondent was unwilling to change her parenting style and Casler further stated that respondent did not respond well to suggestions and redirection from DHHS staff. Similarly, respondent shared with Ofeno that she could not parent in the manner that she wanted to because DHHS was watching her.
Further, the children were brought into care because law enforcement was called to respondent's home because of a domestic incident between respondent and her boyfriend. Throughout the case, respondent was dishonest regarding her relationship with her boyfriend. For example, she would tell DHHS staff that she and her boyfriend were not together, but they were seen together in the community, and respondent's boyfriend would attend visits with the children even though he declined to participate in services. Moreover, respondent was asked to leave a Women's Domestic Violence group on June 14, 2017 because she was physically aggressive toward a new member. She also was aggressive to caseworkers. For example, on May 17, 2017 respondent swore at foster care licensing supervisor Amy Sherrod, and Sherrod recalled other instances where respondent was physically and verbally aggressive, "cussing at us, spitting gum, leaving the office, just slamming doors, being very combatative." Ofeno recounted similar behavior during her interactions with respondent.
Respondent was arrested at the beginning of this case, and she was incarcerated from December 2016 until March 2017 because she provided an alias to a police officer. Respondent explained that she lied to the police because she had active warrants and she did not want to be arrested. Ofeno testified that respondent still had active warrants in Detroit and Warren. In addition, respondent did not provide proof of a legal source of income until about two weeks before the termination hearing. She also did not have suitable housing for herself and the children. Respondent was currently living with her own mother and had not found a new home.
At the time of the termination hearing, PM was 10 years old, XM was nine years old, and JM was six years old. They had been in care for about 16 months. Throughout these proceedings, respondent failed to accept responsibility for the children coming into care. At the termination hearing, she stated that the children had only been left alone and unsupervised because she thought her boyfriend was home with them. In addition, she maintained that the children were only in care because she was arrested and there were no adults to care for the children. Considering respondent's failure to accept responsibility for her actions leading to the children being placed in care and to show a significant benefit after participating in services for 16 months, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was appropriate pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). See In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710-711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (recognizing that "[a] parent's failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and custody[ ]" and "a parent's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent's home").
Respondent also briefly argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We disagree.
"[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews the trial court's decision regarding the child's best interests for clear error. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297.
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 40. When the trial court undertakes the best interests analysis, the interests of the child are of primary focus, rather than those of the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. "The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the child's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. "In deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). A trial court can also consider the length of time the child "was in foster care or placed with relatives," and whether it was likely that "the child could be returned to [the parent's] home within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
In this case, the trial court recognized that there was a bond between respondent and all three of the children. However, respondent failed to address her significant issues with domestic violence and anger management. In addition, she continued to have active warrants. The record reflects that respondent saw no reason to change, and she failed to comply with the case-service plan. Ultimately, the trial court found that the children would be returning to the exact same situation from which they were removed. Instead, the children needed permanence, stability and safety. The record evidence well supported the trial court's ruling. Although respondent participated in services, she failed to comply with the case-service plan because she failed to address her parenting skills, domestic violence issues, and anger management problems. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Jane M. Beckering