Opinion
No. COA15-1040
04-05-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: M.A.N.
Senior Associate County Attorney Kathleen Arundell Jackson, for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth & Family Services, petitioner-appellee. Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam, for mother, respondent-appellant. W. Michael Spivey for father, respondent-appellant. Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for guardian ad litem.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mecklenburg County, No. 14 JA 505 Appeal by respondents from orders entered 12 June 2015 by Judge Louis A. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2016. Senior Associate County Attorney Kathleen Arundell Jackson, for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth & Family Services, petitioner-appellee. Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam, for mother, respondent-appellant. W. Michael Spivey for father, respondent-appellant. Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for guardian ad litem. DIETZ, Judge.
Respondents are the parents of an infant named Mason. Mason suffered severe second degree burns when his father immersed him in scalding hot water. While being treated at a burn center, medical workers discovered evidence of past fractures to his ribs, pelvis, and leg. Mason's father is currently in prison, having pleaded guilty to felony child abuse. Mason's mother maintains her relationship with the father and has not acknowledged the danger he poses to Mason's well-being.
We use a pseudonym to protect the juvenile's identity.
DSS petitioned for temporary custody of Mason, which the trial court granted, and after a series of review hearings, the court ultimately awarded legal custody of Mason to his maternal grandparents. Both of Mason's parents appealed, arguing that the court's findings failed to satisfy various statutory criteria. As explained further below, the trial court's challenged orders contain the necessary factual findings required by law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's orders.
Facts and Procedural History
On 5 July 2014, respondent-mother left six-month-old Mason in the care of respondent-father while she was at work. When respondent-mother returned home that day, she discovered that Mason had been severely burned. She took Mason to an urgent care center, and Mason ultimately received treatment at UNC-Chapel Hill Burn Center for first and second degree burns to his buttocks, legs, and genital area caused by immersion in scalding hot water. Further examination of Mason at the burn center disclosed that Mason had several healing fractures of his ribs, pelvis, and leg.
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services filed a juvenile petition on 14 July 2014 seeking an adjudication that Mason was an abused and neglected juvenile. The trial court adjudicated Mason an abused and neglected juvenile at a hearing on 17 October 2014, and awarded legal custody of Mason to DSS.
The trial court conducted a review hearing on 20 January 2015 and entered an order approving a permanent plan of guardianship with a concurrent goal of reunification. On 6 April 2015, respondent-father pleaded guilty to felony child abuse and received a twenty-month prison sentence. The trial court conducted the next review hearing on 13 May 2015 and entered an order concluding that it was in Mason's best interests to award legal custody to his maternal grandparents. Both parents timely appealed.
Analysis
I. Respondent-father's challenge to the findings concerning placement within six months
Respondent-father argues that the trial court's findings failed to address whether it was possible to place Mason with either parent within the next six months—one of the statutory factors identified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e). As explained below, we disagree.
When a child is not placed with a parent at a permanency planning hearing, the court is required to find, if relevant, "[w]hether it is possible for the juvenile to be placed with a parent within the next six months and, if not, why such placement is not in the juvenile's best interests." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e)(1). In making findings of fact mandated by a statute, a trial court need not list all of the factors or recite the statutory language verbatim so long as its "order embraces the substance of the statutory provisions." In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 169, 752 S.E.2d 453, 456 (2013).
Here, the trial court found that respondent-father could not be released from prison any earlier than within nine months, which is plainly outside the six-month window of this statutory factor. Moreover, the court found that the mother intends to reside with the child in the maternal grandparents' home but insisted on maintaining a relationship with respondent-father, even marrying him with knowledge that he had abused Mason. The court found that this called into question respondent-mother's commitment to keeping the child safe. Finally, the court stated that it chose awarding custody, instead of guardianship, of the child to the maternal grandparents so it would be easier for the mother to reunify with the child if the mother were to show more insight into the father's need for additional, intensive services or if the parents were to show that "barriers to reunification have been fully ameliorated." These findings of fact demonstrate that the trial court considered and addressed the statutory criteria in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e)(1).
II. Respondent-mother's challenge to the trial court's findings on unfitness
Respondent-mother first argues that the trial court failed to find that she is unfit to parent her child or that her conduct has been inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status as a parent. As explained below, we reject this argument.
When "apply[ing] the best interest of the child test in a custody dispute between a parent and a nonparent, a trial court must find that the natural parent is unfit or that his or her conduct is inconsistent with a parent's constitutionally protected status." In re P.A., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 772 S.E.2d 240, 249 (2015). But here, the trial court unquestionably found that respondent-mother was unfit to parent Mason. In Finding of Fact 7 in the challenged custody order, the court found that both parents "are not fit and proper persons to have the care, custody, and control of the child at this time." Respondent-mother likewise overlooks Conclusion of Law 4, where the trial court concluded that both parents "are not fit and proper persons to have custody of the child at this time, but are fit persons to have visitation with the child[.]" As noted above, these findings are supported by the record in this case, including respondent-mother's unwillingness to recognize the danger posed by the father until he addressed his own parenting issues. Thus, we reject respondent-mother's argument that the trial court failed to address whether she is fit to parent the child.
III. Respondent-mother's challenge to the trial court's verification of the custodians' resources
Respondent-mother next contends that the trial court erred by failing to verify the custodians' resources as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1. Again, we disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1 provides that, when a trial court appoints a custodian at a review or permanency planning hearing, it "shall verify that the person receiving custody . . . understands the legal significance of the placement . . . and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile." We have held that the trial court is not required to make specific findings of fact to satisfy this verification requirement if the record shows that the custodian has adequate resources and understands the legal significance of the placement. In re J.E., 182 N.C. App. 612, 616-17, 643 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007).
In its 13 May 2015 review hearing order, the court found that the grandparents were willing and able to provide for the child as legal custodians and that they understood the significance of their role as legal custodians. In the custody order, the court found that the grandparents "have appropriately provided for the child's basic, developmental, and medical needs"; that the grandparents "understand the legal and financial obligations of legal custodians"; and that they "are fit and proper persons to have the care, custody, and control of [Mason] as the child's legal custodian." These findings are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1.
IV. Respondent-mother's challenge to the trial judge's "personal" retention of jurisdiction
Lastly, respondent-mother contends that the trial court undermined her right to further review by personally retaining jurisdiction over the case. We disagree.
Respondent-mother cites In re McLean, 135 N.C. App. 387, 521 S.E.2d 121 (1999) for the proposition that a trial judge may not personally retain jurisdiction over a case. McLean, however, predates the Family Court program. In In re M.A.I.B.K., this Court discussed the origin and history of that program with approval:
[T]he Tenth Judicial District has a specialized division of the District Court known as Family Court. The Family Court program began with a pilot program in three judicial districts in 1999, and the Administrative Office of the Courts has since expanded the Family Court program to eleven judicial districts in North Carolina. One of the primary characteristics of the Family Court is its "one judge, one family" policy. This policy is "[o]ten cited as the most critical component of any successful family court," as it helps "avoid the fragmentation, the duplication of effort and expense, and the potential for conflicting court orders" in a domestic case.184 N.C. App. 218, 225, 645 S.E.2d 881, 886 (2007). The Twenty-sixth Judicial District, from which the present case originates, has adopted local rules "promulgated with the intent to reinforce the one judge one family model" described above. 26th Jud. Dist. Juv. Abuse & Neglect R. 10. The trial judge's statement that, "What I'm trying to say is the case is going to be heard by me" and the order's provision stating that, "Should the parents return to Court to modify the father's visitation or seek legal custody, such motion shall be heard by the undersigned" are both consistent with the purpose of the Family Court program. Accordingly, there was nothing improper about the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over this case.
Pursuant to the authority granted by North Carolina General Statues, section 7A-146, the Tenth Judicial District has adopted local rules which govern its juvenile Family Court cases. These rules require judicial assignment of one judge to each juvenile's case.
Respondent-mother also asserts that the trial court "undermined" her right to further review in statements it made concerning its retention of jurisdiction. We reject these arguments as well. The record shows that the trial court did not undermine her right to further review; indeed, the court scheduled another review hearing for 12 November 2015. Likewise, the court did not indicate that it would prevent respondent-mother from asserting arguments at the hearing; it simply reminded the parties that they are not permitted to make baseless claims. Accordingly, we reject respondent-mother's arguments.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's orders.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).