Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV106183.
SCOTLAND, P. J.
On March 29, 2007, the juvenile court found that Malcolm B. (appellant), who was 17 years old at that time, committed first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) During the course of protracted dispositional hearings, the People filed a petition to have appellant, who was then 18 years old, committed to the Department of Developmental Services (DDS) pursuant to section 6500. On December 12, 2007, the court found appellant was “mentally retarded and a danger to himself and others,” and ordered him committed to DDS for one year.
On appeal, appellant contends the commitment order must be reversed because the juvenile court did not find, and there was not sufficient evidence to prove, that appellant was a danger to himself or others or that his mental retardation caused him to have serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior. We disagree and shall affirm the order.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to section 6500, a “mentally retarded person” may be committed to DDS for one year if the person is found to be a danger to self or to others. To withstand a constitutional due process challenge, section 6500 must be read to require a finding that the person’s mental retardation caused the person to have serious difficulty in controlling his or her dangerous behavior. (People v. Bailie (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 841, 847-850 (hereafter Bailie).)
Appellant contends “the juvenile court never found that [he] was a danger to himself or others; nor was there evidence of such. Moreover, the court did not find, and the prosecution never pled nor proved, that [appellant’s] mental retardation caused him serious difficulty in controlling [his] dangerous behavior.” He asserts that, instead of making these required findings, “[t]he court simply stated: ‘I believe that it’s very much in [appellant’s] interest to have a more structured environment than can be provided by anyone on the outside and, consequently, I am going to order his commitment to the State Department of Developmental Services....’”
On review, we presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the juvenile court understood and applied the constitutionally required interpretation of section 6500. (People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456; Evid. Code, § 664.) This is so because Bailie was published over a year before the petition in this case was filed and sustained. Thus, the juvenile court must be deemed to have found that defendant was mentally retarded, that he was a danger to himself or others, and that his mental retardation caused defendant to have serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior.
Appellant claims the prosecution “never pled” that appellant’s mental retardation caused him serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior. But, by not filing a demurrer to the petition on ground he now asserts, he forfeited this issue for appellate review. (People v. Upsher (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318 [to avoid forfeiture, “[o]bjections to defects in the form of an accusatory pleading must be made by way of demurrer”].) In any event, the claim of error fails on its merits.
The petition stated appellant “is mentally retarded and a danger to (himself/herself) and others within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code Section 6500.” Because Bailie had been the law for over a year prior to the filing of the petition, and because section 6500 has remained unaltered since Bailie was published, the phrase “within the meaning of... Section 6500” included a causal nexus between defendant’s mental retardation and his dangerous behavior.
We also reject appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove either that he was a danger to himself or others or, if so proved, that there was a causal connection between his mental retardation and his dangerous conduct.
“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, [we] must determine from the entire record whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, [we] must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432; see, e.g., People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 465-466 [SVP proceedings]; People v. Martin (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 714, 719 [MDO proceedings]; People v. Overly (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 203, 207 [extended commitment for insanity proceedings].)
Appellant was evaluated by Alta California Regional Center (ACRC) and the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). An ACRC assessment, conducted on October 10, 2007, observed that appellant’s full scale IQ was 48, placing him in the moderately retarded range; in July 1997, when he was eight, he was placed on informal probation for burglarizing a neighbor’s residence; he was again placed on informal probation in July 2000 for stealing a woman’s purse at a market; in February 2004, he was declared a ward of the court for felony burglary, having broken into four to five homes; in November 2005, then age 16, he stole a bicycle from a 12-year-old boy, using threats to obtain it, and was committed to the Sacramento County Boys Ranch; in December 2006, he and family members burglarized a neighbor’s home; he was placed in three different out-of-home programs, but absconded from each of them; and he admitted smoking “a joint” of marijuana every day since he was 14 and taking pills.
Appellant argues the foregoing evidence fails to establish he was a danger to himself or others. In his view, his “offenses are all property crimes” and the People “can point to no evidence showing that [he] is ‘dangerous,’ meaning, having the potential for infliction of substantial harm upon himself or upon others.” The argument misses a critical point.
The minor is a recidivist residential burglar, which is an “extremely serious crime presenting a high degree of danger to society. ‘“Burglary laws are based primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by the usual burglary situation--the danger that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inviting more violence.” [Citation.]’” (People v. Weaver (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 119, 127.)
In addition, appellant is a substance abuser who had shown his resistance to treatment by refusing to remain in programs designed to help him alter his criminal lifestyle.
These facts constituted substantial evidence that appellant was a danger both to himself and to others within the meaning of section 6500.
Appellant claims the evidence failed to prove his “mental retardation cause[d] him to have serious difficulty controlling [his] ‘dangerous’ behavior.” According to him, the professional evaluations showed only that his mental retardation rendered him “easily influenced by others, particularly family members, to take part in property crimes.” We are not persuaded.
The evaluations by mental health professionals contained the following statements: “Records indicate that [appellant] is easily manipulated and influenced by more sophisticated people in order to impress them to gain their friendship. He is described as a loyal follower willing to do anything to please others.” “Due to his moderate retardation, he is easily influenced.” “He is functioning within the lowest one percent of the population, and probably the bottom quarter of the bottom percent relative to others his age.” “He is easily led by more aggressively antisocial others into stealing behavior....” Indeed, even appellant recognized he was susceptible to the influence of others--he told an interviewer, “I know now not to hang around my friends; they make me do those things” and “I need to stop robbing people.”
From this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could infer it was appellant’s mental retardation that caused him serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior.
DISPOSITION
The order committing appellant to DDS is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS , J., NICHOLSON , J.