Opinion
A24-0452
09-16-2024
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. R. S. and R. M. G., Parents.
Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-JV-23-980
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Larson, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
ELISE L. LARSON, JUDGE.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant M.S. (mother) appeals a district court decision to file a default order after denying her request to participate remotely at a pretrial hearing. The default order regards respondent Dakota County Social Services Department's (the county) petition to transfer permanent legal and physical custody of one of her children to R.G., the child's father, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (2022) (transfer petition). A full recitation of the facts and procedural history can be found in the companion opinion related to the county's petition to terminate mother's parental rights to two other children pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2022) (TPR petition). See In re Welfare of Child. of M.R.S., No. A24-0444 (Minn.App. Sept. 16, 2024).
We note that in 2024, the legislature made substantial changes to Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4. See 2024 Minn. Laws. ch. 115, art. 18, § 39, at 1402-03. However, because the changes took effect on August 1, 2024, see Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (2022), and because the district court ordered transfer of permanent legal and physical custody before that date, we review the decision under the former statute.
2. As relevant here, the district court scheduled a pretrial hearing on both petitions for January 3, 2024. After mother failed to appear, the county moved for the district court to proceed in her absence. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 18.01. The district court instead rescheduled the pretrial hearing for January 31, 2024. The district court "strongly indicated to [mother's] counsel that it would be important for [mother] to understand [she] would need to appear in person at [the] next hearing." Mother then failed to appear at the rescheduled pretrial hearing. The county again moved for the district court to proceed in her absence. Mother's counsel opposed the motion and asked the district court to allow mother to appear remotely or by telephone. The district court granted the county's motion, noting that it granted "an additional pretrial [hearing] to give [mother] the opportunity to appear in person prior to any trial" and that it "emphasized the importance of . . . being present . . . with the understanding that default was a real possibility."
3. After the county presented its case, and mother's counsel cross-examined the county's witnesses, the district court filed orders granting both the transfer petition and TPR petition. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 18.02. As relevant to the transfer petition, the district court found that the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification but that mother largely failed to engage in those efforts. The district court also noted that the child was doing well in R.G.'s home and that R.G. was willing and had the capacity "to give the child the love, affection and guidance she requires in order to raise her to adulthood." Finally, the district court determined that "[i]t [was] in the best interests of the child that permanent . . . legal [and physical] custody . . . be transferred" to R.G.
4. Thereafter, mother moved to vacate the orders granting the transfer petition and TPR petition, see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 22.02, and requested a post-trial hearing on her motion. Mother claimed the district court violated her due-process rights when it denied her request to appear remotely for the January 31, 2024 hearing, but did not attach any affidavit or other supporting evidence to her motion. Later that month, the district court filed an order denying mother's motion, along with her request for a hearing, determining that her "constitutional rights were not violated."
5. On appeal, mother claims the district court's decision to deny her request to participate remotely violated procedural due process. Mother raised an identical argument in her companion appeal. See In re Welfare of Child. of M.R.S., No. A24-0444 (Minn.App. Sept. 16, 2024). For the same reasons we identified in the companion case, we conclude that mother's due-process claim fails.
6. We need only resolve whether a parent's due-process rights are violated when the district court proceeds by default if the parent shows prejudice warranting reversal. In re Welfare of Child. of G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d 222, 238 (Minn. 2023); see also In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008) ("[P]rejudice as the result of [an] alleged [due process] violation is an essential component of the . . . analysis."); In re Welfare of Child. of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn.App. 2008) (dispensing with alleged due-process violation on the ground it was not prejudicial). To identify prejudice, we first evaluate "the district court's findings to determine whether they address the statutory criteria" for granting the county's petition and whether those findings are clearly erroneous. G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d at 239. Second, we evaluate whether the parent demonstrated that the evidence she would have provided if not for the alleged due-process violation would have materially affected the outcome of the case. Id. at 240-42.
7. Here, mother does not dispute that the district court addressed the relevant statutory criteria when it granted the transfer petition. Instead, she relies on the second step in the prejudice analysis, arguing that her participation in the hearing would have impacted the outcome.
8. In G.A.H., the district court proceeded with a TPR trial in the mother's absence and did not allow the mother's counsel to call witnesses or cross-examine the GAL. Id. at 228-29. The mother submitted an affidavit along with her motion for a new trial, explaining the testimony she would have offered and identifying two character witnesses she would have called on her behalf. Id. at 230, 240-41. Despite this offer of proof in the record, the supreme court concluded that it was insufficient to carry her burden to show prejudice. Id. at 241-42.
9. Here, mother has provided even less information. Unlike G.A.H., mother did not attach any offer of proof to her motion to vacate. On appeal, mother asserts that her testimony would have explained the "steps she was taking to complete the agency's case plans." But arguments made in an appellate brief are not evidence. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 ("The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases."). Further, unlike G.A.H., the district court allowed mother's attorney to participate in the evidentiary hearing by cross-examining the county's witnesses. Therefore, although mother was not physically present or able to appear remotely, mother's counsel still represented her interests at the hearing.
10. For these reasons, we conclude that mother did not meet her burden to show that her remote participation would have materially affected the district court's decision to transfer permanent legal and physical custody of her child to R.G. Because mother has failed to show prejudice from the district court's alleged due-process violation, we affirm.
Like in the companion case, mother appears to argue the district court violated her due-process rights when it denied her motion to vacate without a hearing. But mother does not cite any legal authority governing motions to vacate to support her argument. "[I]nadequately briefed issues are not properly before an appellate court." In re Welfare of Child. of V.R.R., 2 N.W.3d 587, 595 (Minn.App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 2024). Therefore, to the extent she separately raises a due-process challenge regarding the motion to vacate, mother forfeited the issue.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. The district court's order transferring permanent legal and physical custody is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.