These cases present the question of what happens when the State fails to meet this requirement.In In the Interest of M.D.H., 334 Ga.App. 394, 779 S.E.2d 433 (2015), a panel of the Court of Appeals held that the failure to comply with § 15–11–521 (b) requires dismissal of the juvenile case, but the dismissal is without prejudice. See M.D.H., 334 Ga.App. at 395, 779 S.E.2d 433. Three days later, a different panel answered the same question the opposite way, concluding that a violation of § 15–11–121 (b) requires dismissal with prejudice.

In doing so, our Supreme Court indicated that it was “particularly concerned” with whether this Court “correctly applied OCGA § 15–11–521 (b).” 334 Ga.App. 394, 779 S.E.2d 433 (2015). 335 Ga.App. 299, 779 S.E.2d 122 (2015).

See, e.g. , Kinslow v. State , 311 Ga. 768, 773-74, 860 S.E.2d 444 (2021) (noting that "several canons of construction address[ ]the importance of examining the context in which a word appears").Langley v. State , 313 Ga. 141, 143-44 (2), 868 S.E.2d 759 (2022) (punctuation omitted); accordIn the Interest of M. D. H. , 334 Ga. App. 394, 396 (2), 779 S.E.2d 433 (2015).

(c) The judge presiding may in his discretion postpone the hearing of any such case to a day in the term as to him may seem reasonable; or, if necessary to give proper time for preparation, he may continue the case until the next term of the court. See Wilson v. Wilson , 279 Ga. 302, 303, 612 S.E.2d 797 (2005) ("In the absence of more specific direction by this Court, our reversal of the judgment of the Spalding County judgment was the grant of a de novo trial on all issues contained within the judgment."); Henry v. James , 264 Ga. 527, 531 (1) (c), n. 6, 449 S.E.2d 79 (1994) (footnote in case involving a speedy trial issue following remittitur from affirmance in this Court); In the Interest of M. D. H. , 334 Ga. App. 394, 398 (2), 779 S.E.2d 433 (2015) (passing reference in context of juvenile proceeding); Belans v. Bank of America, N.A. , 309 Ga. App. 208, 209 & 210 (1), 709 S.E.2d 853 (2011) (following reversal and the entry of the remittitur, the case was reinstated in the trial court and was returned to the posture it occupied prior to judgment); Sugarloaf Mills Ltd. Partnership of Ga. v. Record Town, Inc. , 306 Ga. App. 263, 265 (1), 701 S.E.2d 881 (2010) ("[F]ollowing reversal and remand (absent contrary direction from this Court), the trial court was required to allow the tenant to prove those fees at a second trial."), overruled in part on other grounds by SRM Group, Inc. v. Travelers Property Cas. Co. of America , 308 Ga. 404, 410 (3), n. 5, 841 S.E.2d 729 (2020) ; Schreck v. Standridge , 273 Ga. App. 58, 59, n. 6, 614 S.E.2d 185 (2005) (passing reference in footnote discussing procedural stages of a case); Bolden v. State , 257 Ga. App. 474, 474, 571 S.E.2d 393 (2002) (passing reference in crimin

MCH’s briefs indicate that there is an anticipated resolution of the issues between MCH and MCCG, but the record does not demonstrate that a final resolution has been achieved, or that the Superior Court’s reversal of the Department’s grant of the LNR to MCCG has been rendered moot from the perspective of MCCG. See In the Interest of M. D. H., 334 Ga. App. 394 , 395 (1) (779 SE2d 433 ) (2015); compare Pimper, supra; Babies Right Start, supra. The motion to vacate and remand is therefore denied, and we consider herein the contentions raised by Appellants. MCCG contends that the Superior Court erred in (1) determining that the Department’s interpretation of the phrase “offered in a hospital” violates the equipment threshold provision in OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (3); (2) concluding that the Department exceeded its statutory authority by applying said provision to a hospital-based outpatient imaging center that is not located on a hospital’s main campus; (3) ordering the Department to investigate certain expenditures related to the purchase and renovation of the medical office building intended to house the equipment that is the subject of the LNR; and (4) concluding that the exemption provisions of the Certificate of Need Act are subject to the capital expenditure threshold.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of M.D.H., 334 Ga.App. 394, 396(2), 779 S.E.2d 433 (2015). We cannot engraft upon this statute a proviso excepting a case from its requirements when certain factual issues are present, absent statutory language allowing such an exception.

On Motion for Reconsideration. The state has moved for reconsideration, arguing that our recent opinion in In the Interest of M. D. H., 334 Ga. App. 394 (779 SE2d 433 ) (2015), compels a different result. We disagree.

In the Interest of J.F. , 338 Ga.App. 15, 20, 789 S.E.2d 274 (2016). Two panels of the Court of Appeals had previously decided that same question of law in contrary ways, with the first panel holding that the consequence of noncompliance with § 15-11-521 (b) is dismissal without prejudice, see In the Interest of M.D.H. , 334 Ga.App. 394, 397-399, 779 S.E.2d 433 (2015), and the second panel deciding three days later that the consequence is dismissal with prejudice, see In the Interest of D.V.H. , 335 Ga.App. 299, 300-301, 779 S.E.2d 122 (2015) ; see also id. at 301, 779 S.E.2d 122 (denying the State's motion for reconsideration based on M.D.H. ). The facts pertinent to resolving those two cases based upon the answer to the legal question were undisputed, as they are in this case: the State failed to file a juvenile delinquency petition within the time required by OCGA § 15-11-521 and did not obtain an extension of time from the trial court.