Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0680-12T2
07-03-2014
IN THE MATTER OF JAMES R. LYONS, deceased.
Stone Mandia, L.L.C., attorneys for appellant Lucy M. Lyons (Richard A. Wiener, on the briefs). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Division of Pensions and Benefits (Frantz Masse, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes and Koblitz.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and Fireman's Retirement System, Department of Treasury, PFRS No. 3-10-29588.
Stone Mandia, L.L.C., attorneys for appellant Lucy M. Lyons (Richard A. Wiener, on the briefs).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Division of Pensions and Benefits (Frantz Masse, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Lucy Lyons appeals from the final decision of the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement Systems (PFRS) denying her application to receive statutorily provided survivor benefits as the surviving wife of decedent James R. Lyons. We affirm.
The following facts are undisputed. Decedent was a member of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) from October 7, 1987, until February 4, 1991, when he transferred his PERS membership to PFRS. On September 9, 2003, decedent was declared permanently disabled and placed on Involuntary Disability as of May 1, 2003. The PFRS Board awarded decedent ordinary disability benefits and the Division of Pension and Benefits provided him a "Quotation of Retirement Benefits" that stated:
Upon your death after retirement, a monthly survivor benefit may be payable to your spouse (you must be married on the date of your death) and/or child(ren). Payments continue to your spouse for life or until your spouse remarries. Payments to children normally cease at age 18, however, there are exceptions for disabled children.
[(Emphasis added).]
Decedent completed a designation of beneficiary on September 12, 2009, selecting appellant, who was then his wife, as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance and pension benefits. The Division of Pension and Benefits acknowledged receipt of decedent's designation of beneficiary on February 27, 2009. The acknowledgement was sent to decedent to Port St. Lucie, Florida, where he was residing at the time.
On April 28, 2011, decedent and appellant entered into a formal Mediation Agreement (Dissolution of Marriage without Children) in Florida, through which they agreed, inter alia, that "the Husband shall retain the Wife as beneficiary on his pension from the State of New Jersey and on his life insurance policy." Decedent and appellant were formally divorced in Florida through a final judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and for St. Lucie County, Florida, on May 19, 2011. Decedent died four days later on May 23, 2011. It is thus undisputed that decedent was not married to appellant at the time of his death.
In denying appellant's request for pension benefits as decedent's "widow," the PFRS Board relied on N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(24)(a) and (b), which defines widow as "the woman to whom a member or retirant was married, . . . on the date of his death and who has not since remarried . . . ." As the PFRS Board Secretary clearly explained to appellant's counsel via letter dated May 15, 2012:
Consequently, since Lucy Lyons was divorced from James Lyons on May 19, 2011, she was no longer considered his spouse for purposes of collecting PFRS survivorship benefits upon his death on May 23, 2011. Accordingly, your request for Lucy Lyons to collect PFRS survivorship benefits is denied by the PFRS Board.
On appeal to this court, appellant argues that the PFRS Board's decision "intentionally" ignores our decision in rison v. Larrison, 392 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2007), in which we address "whether a police disability pension is subject to equitable distribution without any exemption for that portion of the pension benefit intended as compensation for the disability." Id. at 6-7. We answered this legal question by holding that:
In the interest of completeness, we note appellant initially filed an action in the Law Division in Mercer County, Docket No. L-1894-11, seeking to compel the Division of Pension Benefits to pay her survivorship benefits as decedent's "wife." By order dated February 22, 2012, the Law Division dismissed the case without prejudice, and provided appellant thirty days to seek relief through the administrative review process.
In addressing an equitable distribution claim against a disability pension, a reviewing court must determine "which [portion of the pension] represents a retirement component in which plaintiff would be entitled to share, and that portion which represents compensation for defendant's personal disability and personal economic loss."
[Id. at 7 (quoting Avallone v. Avallone, 275 N.J. Super. 575, 584 (App. Div. 1994)).]
As appellant herself acknowledges in her brief before us, in this case, appellant's claim here is based entirely on rights conferred by the Legislature to a "widow," as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(24)(a) and (b). We construe a statute so as "to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." N.J. Dep't of Children & Families v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20 (2013). Our first step in this approach is to analyze the statute's plain language. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 493 (2005). We look to extrinsic evidence such as legislative history, only when the language in the statute is ambiguous. A.L., supra, 213 N.J. at 20.
Here, the statutory language defining "widow" is plain and readably understandable on its face. Appellant was not decedent's widow at the time of his death because she had obtained a valid judicial decree dissolving her marriage with decedent four days before he died. Our holdings in Larrison and Avallone are therefore inapplicable to this case. The statute defining who is eligible to receive survivorship benefits controls.
Our appellate review of decisions made by State administrative agencies is well-settled. As our Supreme Court has made clear, "[i]n administrative law, the overarching informative principle guiding appellate review requires that courts defer to the specialized or technical expertise of the agency charged with administration of a regulatory system." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp., 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). We are bound to uphold the administrative agency decision "unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." Ibid. (citing In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
Applying these principles to the record before us, we discern no legal basis to interfere with the decision of the PFRS Board.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION