Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ06004876
Jones, P.J.
The juvenile court adjudicated L.W. (the minor) a continued ward of the court after she pleaded guilty to murder (Pen. Code, § 187) on a felony-murder theory of liability. At the disposition hearing, defense counsel moved to continue the hearing for “at least 30 days, maybe more” to obtain a guidance clinic evaluation. Counsel contended the evaluation would help the court determine where to place the minor. The court denied the motion to continue and committed the minor to the California Youth Authority (CYA), the predecessor to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), ultimately setting a maximum term of 25 years.
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The parties and the lower court use CYA and DJJ interchangeably. (See, e.g., p. 7, infra.) We will use the initials DJJ but will not change the references to the California Youth Authority or the CYA when we quote from the record.
The minor challenges the disposition order on several grounds. She contends the court: (1) erroneously denied her request to continue the disposition hearing; (2) abused its discretion by committing her to the DJJ; (3) “improperly aggregated” the maximum term of confinement; and (4) erred by declining to award precommitment credit.
The minor has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (A124704) raising similar claims. We deny the petition by separate order filed this date.
We conclude the minor is entitled to 493 days of presentence credit. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Minor’s History of Delinquency
The minor has a lengthy delinquency history. In September 2006, the minor — then 15 years old — pleaded guilty to giving false identification to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)) and the juvenile court adjudicated her a ward of the court. The court committed the minor to Project Alert in Shasta County. In November 2006, the People filed a subsequent Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging the minor left Project Alert without permission and “remained away without permission and without notifying the [p]robation [o]fficer.” In December 2006, the minor was arrested. She admitted violating Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 and the court placed her at Heiwa House in Alameda County. She left Heiwa House without permission shortly thereafter.
In February 2007, the minor admitted soliciting prostitution (§ 647, subd. (b)) and the court placed her at Karis House in Tulare County. She left without permission the next day and was arrested. In June 2007, the minor admitted committing battery (§ 242, subd. (a)) when she kicked and punched another inmate at Alameda County Juvenile Hall. While she was being transported from juvenile hall to Trinity Ukiah in Mendocino County, the minor escaped. In late August 2007, the minor admitted loitering with the intent to commit prostitution in violation of section 653.22.
The Attempted Robbery and Murder
On August 4, 2007, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Bryan Mitchell brought the minor and her companion, Danielle M., to a hotel room he was sharing with Jeffrey Brown. One of the two young women asked Brown for a “date,” but he declined. The minor and Danielle left the room. Outside, they told a man named Jarome Collins that the men in the hotel room had “some property up in their room[.]” Collins told the minor and Danielle to go back to the hotel room and distract the two men so he could enter the room and rob them. The two women agreed, but the minor admonished Collins, “‘Don’t shoot anybody. Just scare him[.]’”
The two young women returned to the hotel room. They entered the room and told Brown they left a cell phone there. At that point, Collins knocked on the door. Mitchell answered it and stepped outside, into the hallway. Shortly thereafter, he and Collins got into a fight and Collins shot Mitchell in the neck, killing him. Inside the hotel room, either the minor or Danielle yelled at Brown, “[L]et me out, I ain’t got nothing to do with this. Some dude was right behind us, I think he was trying to rob ya’ll.” The police arrived and arrested the minor. At the police station, she told the police the victim was a “‘[p]unk-ass and that she didn’t have nothing to do with him getting shot.’”
In a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, the People alleged the minor committed murder (§ 187) while armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and committed attempted robbery (§§ 664/211). In February 2008, the minor admitted she was involved in the attempted robbery and killing and the People dismissed the attempted robbery allegation and the firearm enhancement. At defense counsel’s request, the court set the disposition hearing for March 2008.
The Disposition Hearing
At the outset of the disposition hearing, the court stated it had read and considered the following documents: (1) probation officer’s disposition report; (2) a letter from the minor; (3) a letter from the Youth Justice Institute; and (4) a report prepared by Jules Burstein, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist.
We augmented the record to include following documents: (1) the court’s March 2009 order amending the commitment order nunc pro tunc; (2) the minor’s response to the People’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) motion (which attached Burstein’s report); and (3) a letter from Robin Morales of the Youth Justice Institute to the juvenile court.
A. The Documents the Court Considered at the Disposition Hearing
The disposition report described the minor’s lengthy history of delinquency — specifically, her “history of prostitution and running away” — and characterized her behavior at juvenile hall as “poor.” The report stated the minor had “been on a modified program several times in the past for fighting, refusing to comply with staff directives and threatening to kill a [ ] pregnant staff’s unborn child. According to staff the minor believes she can do whatever she wants in the unit.”
According to the report, the minor had “shown little remorse” and had “continued her aggressive and defiant behavior in juvenile hall.” The report also noted the minor “did not appear to have much remorse for the victim. She did not once mention[ ] how she felt about what she did. Instead of giving a statement to the [probation officer] about how she felt about what she did, she gave [the probation officer] a typed statement” which mentioned the victim only “in the first sentence[ ]” but discussed, at length, “why she should not go to CYA.”
The report recommended the court place the minor at the CYA because she “has been tried on Probation and failed. She has been placed at four different placement programs and within 24 hours of placement the minor has r[u]n [away].” The report stated that “[d]ue to the seriousness and violent nature of the offense there are no other options for the minor but to be committed to the [CYA]. The minor has proven that she is in need of a locked facility due to her awol history and violent behavior. Committing the minor to the [CYA] is the only option for the minor to be held accountable for her actions and to keep the community safe.”
The report asked the court to “find that the minor’s mental and physical condition and qualifications are such as to render it probable that [ ] she will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided” by the CYA. According to the report, the minor would be able to take various classes at the CYA, including “Victimization Awareness, Decision Making, Values, and Anger Management,... learn job skills[,]” and “work on completing her education.”
In her letter to the court, the minor expressed her condolences to the victim and her awareness that she needed to take responsibility for her actions. She stated a desire to be placed in a locked facility “that is not” the CYA because she wanted to graduate from high school and have an opportunity to attend college. The minor claimed the services she needed to change her life were not available at CYA: she explained she needed to continue to work with counselors at MISSEY (Motivating, Inspiring, Supporting and Serving Sexually Exploited Youth) and to receive counseling services from the Guidance Clinic to learn “positive ways” to deal with her “issues.” Finally, the minor opined that a “therapeutic environment” would give her a “better opportunity to work on changing [her] negative behaviors[.]”
Robin Morales of the Youth Justice Institute also wrote a letter to the court. In it, she indicated she interviewed the minor for two hours in March 2008, where the minor “disclosed... an extensive history of childhood and early adolescent trauma and victimization” and informed Morales that she was diagnosed with depression and was taking medication. Morales opined the minor needed “a therapeutic treatment placement... to recover and effectively rehabilitate... to return to the community healthy and whole. With a formal mental health diagnosis [the minor] could be eligible for a Level 14 placement, such as Seneca Center or a therapeutic community such as Normative Services in Wyoming.” Finally, Morales suggested the court have the minor “formally assessed.”
In response to the People’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) motion, defense counsel submitted a 12-page report prepared by Burstein to determine whether the minor was fit to be adjudicated in juvenile court. Burstein described the minor’s chaotic upbringing and noted that one of the minor’s teachers at juvenile hall believed she “could really use a residential treatment program with a stable staff and with adults unwilling to give up on her.” The minor’s teacher believed the minor “would do really well” in a residential treatment program. During Burstein’s interview, the minor acknowledged her “emotional difficulties,” her issues regarding “personal responsibility,” and “the trauma of living in a violent neighborhood.”
Burstein concluded the minor was fit to be adjudicated in juvenile court and opined that if found “guilty of the present charges, a long-term locked residential treatment facility would constitute an infinitely superior disposition as compared to the [DJJ].” He described the DJJ as “an environment more likely to sponsor violence, sexual victimization, and the cultivation of hatred and bitterness than of anything remotely therapeutic or likely to reduce the likelihood of a relapse for its young charges. [The minor] needs treatment, not warehousing in a vicious setting notorious for it [sic] mistreatment of its young charges.” (Original italics.)
B. The Minor’s Motion to Continue
After the court announced the documents it had read and considered, defense counsel moved to continue the disposition hearing. Counsel stated the Youth Justice Institute had “been trying to locate some alternative placement for [the minor] rather than the CYA, and one of the things that would likely help them do that is a guidance clinic evaluation.” Counsel explained that “a guidance clinic evaluation and [ ] a diagnosis made of [the minor]” might “facilitate the location of some alternative placement[.]” Counsel asked the court to continue the disposition hearing for “at least 30 days, maybe more” to enable him to obtain the evaluation, because he believed there was “at least a reasonable possibility” the Youth Justice Institute could “explore the availability of alternatives” to the CYA.
The People opposed the request. They contended a continuance was an “utter waste of time and resources” for three reasons: (1) the court had already reviewed Burstein’s report; (2) the minor was an “utter danger to the community” because she had willingly participated in a crime of violence and had threatened and attacked people at juvenile hall; and (3) the probation department had concluded “there [was] just no placement realistically available” except the CYA.
The court denied the minor’s request for a continuance. It described Burstein’s analysis as a “pretty thorough evaluation of [the minor’s] current functioning and issues” and noted that the report set out the reasons why the case belonged in juvenile court (where the minor could receive a reformatory education and discipline) rather than adult court. The court concluded a guidance clinic evaluation would not help it determine where to place the minor because “we already know what we need to know for that purpose.”
3. The Commitment Order
The court concluded that, “under the circumstances of this case, given the nature of the allegation, given the nature of the crime, and given [the minor’s] history,” there was no “reasonable alternative” to committing the minor to the CYA. Although the court noted the flaws with CYA, it determined placing the minor there was the “only appropriate disposition for this crime with this minor[.]” The court explained it was not aware of a locked facility with the required level of treatment that would take “a minor with this history. It just doesn’t exist, and the best that we have, like it or not — and I don’t particularly like it, but it’s the truth here — the best we have is the Department of Juvenile Justice.” Finally, the court concluded it was probable the minor would benefit by the reformatory education and other treatment provided by DJJ.
The court initially set the maximum term of confinement “for the offenses sustained in the petition before the court, with the terms of all previously sustained petitions... aggregated” at 26 years to life. The court later amended its order nunc pro tunc to commit minor to a maximum term of 25 years. The commitment order does not reflect any presentence credit.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court’s Refusal to Continue the Disposition Hearing Was Not an Abuse of Discretion, nor Did It Prevent the Minor from Presenting a Defense
The minor contends the court’s denial of her request for a continuance was an abuse of discretion because she established good cause to continue the disposition hearing “to present alternative placements to the DJJ.”
Welfare and Institutions Code section 682, subdivision (b) governs continuances in juvenile delinquency cases. To obtain a continuance “beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be heard,” a party must file and serve written notice “at least two court days before the hearing sought to be continued, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing good cause for the continuance.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 682, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.550(b)(2).) A court may grant a continuance “only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the moving party at the hearing on the motion.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 682, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.550(b)(1).)
A party who moves for a continuance without filing and serving a written motion must show “good cause for failure to comply with those requirements.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 682, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.550(b)(3).)
“The grant or denial of a motion for continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. [Citations.] The trial court’s decision whether [ ] to grant a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (In re Lawanda L. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d423, 428; In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal. App.4th 576, 585 [“[t]he court’s denial of a request for a continuance will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion”]; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037 [same].)
As an initial matter, we reject the People’s contention that the court properly denied the motion to continue because the minor did not comply with Welfare and Institutions Code section 682 and the court rules for obtaining a continuance. The People concede “the prosecutor did not specifically object” that the minor’s motion to continue was untimely or procedurally deficient. The People, however, argue the prosecutor’s timeliness objection was somehow “implicit in his opposition” to the motion. We disagree. The prosecutor complained that a continuance would be a waste of time and resources. The prosecutor did not argue the motion was untimely or procedurally defective, nor did he somehow imply that the motion was faulty in these respects. As a result, the People have forfeited their claim that the minor failed to comply with the procedural requirements to obtain a continuance.
As noted above, “‘good cause’” is a necessary predicate for a continuance. (In re Maurice E. (2005) 132 Cal. App.4th 474, 480 (Maurice E.).) “[T]he standard for granting a continuance in juvenile court [is] the same as in ‘adult court,’ and [ ] delinquency ‘cases can only be continued if the moving party demonstrates good cause for the continuance[.]’” (Id. at p. 480, quoting Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3216.) “‘There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’” (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118, quoting Ungar v. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575, 589.)
The California Supreme Court has concluded the denial of a continuance is not an abuse of discretion where the continuance would not be useful or helpful. (Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1118; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1013, overruled on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) For example, in Mungia, the California Supreme Court upheld the denial of a motion to continue trial to determine whether trial counsel’s heart attack would prevent him from representing the defendant. (Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1118.) The court explained that the lower court was aware the prosecutor had suffered a heart attack requiring hospitalization and “[f]rom the trial court’s perspective, there was little to indicate that the issue of [the prosecutor’s] fitness to try the case would be resolved in the near future. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to wait for more information.” (Id. at p. 1119.) Similarly, in Frye, our high court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a request for an open-ended continuance to enable the defendant to seek medical treatment for his mental health issues. (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1013.) The Frye court explained that the lower court could have reasonably inferred “that a postponement for treatment was not likely to result in any positive change in [the] defendant’s mental state.” (Ibid.)
The same is true here. The court concluded the guidance clinic evaluation was unnecessary because the court had all of the information it needed to determine where to place the minor. The court had the disposition report, which concluded “there are no other options for the minor but to be committed to the [CYA]” because she had “proven that she is in need of a locked facility due to her awol history and violent behavior.” The court also had before it Burstein’s thoughtful and thorough report, where he opined the minor was fit to be adjudicated in juvenile court and should be placed in a locked, long-term residential treatment facility, not the DJJ. Burstein explained that the minor needed “treatment, not warehousing in a vicious setting notorious for it [sic] mistreatment of its young charges.” (Original italics.) He also noted that one of the minor’s teachers believed she “could really use a residential treatment program with a stable staff and with adults unwilling to give up on her.”
The court also stated it had read and considered the letter from the Youth Justice Institute, where Morales opined the minor should not be committed to the CYA because she needed “a therapeutic treatment placement... to recover and effectively rehabilitate... to return to the community healthy and whole.” Morales also noted that “[w]ith a formal mental health diagnosis [the minor] could be eligible for a Level 14 placement, such as Seneca Center or a therapeutic community such as Normative Services in Wyoming.” Finally, the court considered the minor’s letter, where she urged the court to place her in a locked facility other than the CYA because she needed a “therapeutic environment.”
Based on the foregoing, the court had before it all of the information it needed to determine where to place the minor. The guidance clinic evaluation was therefore unlikely to result in any change in the court’s analysis or its decision. As a result, an open-ended continuance to allow defense counsel to obtain a guidance clinic evaluation was unnecessary, and the court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it declined to continue the disposition hearing. (In re Chuong D. (2006) 135 Cal. App.4th 1303, 1313.)
The minor’s reliance on Maurice E., supra, 132 Cal. App.4th at page 481, is misplaced. In that case, the prosecution’s key witness, a police officer, was unable to testify at the second day of the minor’s two-day jurisdiction hearing because he had only made arrangements for one day of child care and had to take care of his newborn child. (Id. at pp. 476-477.) The court continued the jurisdiction hearing without objection. On appeal, the court rejected the minor’s contention that the juvenile court erred by continuing the hearing, concluding the lower court did not abuse its discretion “in determining, after considering the prosecutor’s offer of proof, that the importance of the missing officer’s testimony and the reason for which the officer was not present were sufficient to constitute [ ] good cause.” (Id. at p. 481.)
Maurice E. has no application here. In that case, the prosecution’s main witness was unable to testify for one day of a two-day jurisdiction hearing, so the court continued the jurisdiction hearing for six days to enable the police officer to testify. (Maurice E., supra, 132 Cal. App.4th at p. 477.) Here, defense counsel requested an open-ended continuance. And in Maurice E., the police officer’s inability to testify made it impossible to complete the jurisdiction hearing. Here, the court had the information it needed to conduct the disposition hearing.
The minor also contends the denial of her motion to continue deprived her of the ability to present a defense at the disposition hearing. Specifically, she claims the court’s refusal to continue the hearing to enable her to obtain the guidance clinic evaluation — which she describes as “relevant and necessary” for the court’s placement determination — deprived her of the opportunity to present mitigating evidence at the disposition hearing. She relies on In re Deon W. (1998) 64 Cal. App.4th 143, 146 (Deon W.). In that case, the minor requested a contested disposition hearing and the juvenile court refused. It declared the minor a ward of the court and entered a placement order. (Id. at p. 146.) The appellate court concluded the minor was entitled to “have a current social study prepared for the hearing and to produce evidence indicating there were other more appropriate dispositions available to the court.” (Id. at p. 147.)
Deon W. has no application here. In this case, the court conducted a contested disposition hearing. It also allowed the minor to produce evidence to support her argument that the court should not commit her to the DJJ. As discussed above, the minor’s letter, the letter from the Youth Justice Institute, and Burstein’s report advocated placing the minor in a “locked” or “secure” residential treatment facility. Moreover, a representative from the Youth Justice Institute appeared at the disposition hearing, along with a staff member from SACEY/SPA (Sexually Abused and Commercially Exploited Youth Program/Safe Place Alternative). The representative from the Youth Justice Institute agreed with the recommendation that a “long-term locked residential treatment facility” was “superior” to the DJJ. This is not a situation like the one in Deon W., where the court entered a placement order without conducting a disposition hearing. Accordingly, we reject the minor’s claim that she was deprived of her constitutional right to present a defense at the disposition hearing.
II. The Minor’s Commitment to the DJJ Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Next, the minor argues the court abused its discretion by committing her to the DJJ. Her principal contention is the court committed her to the DJJ without “[e]vidence of probable benefit.” She also faults the court for committing her without considering “the appropriateness or effectiveness of any less restrictive placement.”
The twin purposes of the juvenile dependency laws are: (1) to serve the “‘best interests’ of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and ‘enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,’ and (2) to ‘provide for the protection and safety of the public....’” (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal. App.4th 608, 614-615 (Charles G.), quoting Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (a), (b), & (d); see also In re Schmidt (2006) 143 Cal. App.4th 694, 716.)
To accomplish these objectives, the juvenile court has the “authority to order delinquent wards to receive ‘care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of [the juvenile court law]....’ [Citation.]” (Charles G., supra, 115 Cal. App.4th at p. 615, quoting Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) Juvenile courts have “broad discretion to choose... various forms of custodial confinement [ ] to hold juveniles accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public.” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.)
“A juvenile court’s commitment order may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] The appellate court “‘“indulge[s] all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.]”’” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal. App.4th 1317, 1329-1330 (Robert H.).) A DJJ commitment must be supported by substantial evidence: (1) of probable benefit to the minor; and (2) that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal. App.4th 1241, 1250 (M.S.) ([a “DJJ commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate”].)
A. There Is Substantial Evidence of Probable Benefit
We are not persuaded by the minor’s contention that a “DJJ commitment will [not] benefit” her. The disposition report concluded “the minor’s mental and physical condition and qualifications are such as to render it probable that [ ] she will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided” by the CYA. The report also noted the minor would be able to take various classes at the CYA, including Victimization Awareness, Decision Making, Values, and Anger Management, and that she would also learn job skills and “work on completing her education[.]” The court adopted these findings at the disposition hearing.
We disagree with the minor’s suggestion that her “depression, adolescent trauma and victimization” were overlooked by the juvenile court when it committed her to the DJJ. Both the letter from the Youth Justice Institute and Burstein’s report chronicled the minor’s difficult childhood and her emotional issues. At the dispositional hearing, the court mentioned it had read and considered these documents. We cannot conclude the court ignored the minor’s mental health needs when it committed her to the DJJ. The court merely concluded she would be best served by a commitment to the DJJ, a conclusion supported by substantial evidence. (M.S., supra, 174 Cal. App.4th at p. 1251; see also Inre Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d1392, 1397 [minor’s “best interests require an environment providing firm, strict discipline for his ‘out of control’ behavior, evidenced by his participation in a violent crime,” and that “without such discipline and realignment of his social and moral structure he poses a demonstrated threat to public safety[.]”]; In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal. App.4th 1392, 1397; In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal. App.4th 368, 379-380.)
B. There is Substantial Evidence Less Restrictive Alternatives Were Ineffective and Inappropriate
The minor also complains the court committed her to the DJJ without considering “the appropriateness or effectiveness of any less restrictive placement.” She contends the court failed to make a “careful analysis of the correct considerations” before committing her. We disagree. The court reviewed Burstein’s 12-page report, the letter from the Youth Justice Institute, the minor’s letter, and argument from counsel and from a representative of the Youth Justice Institute. The court stated it had considered the minor’s background and her history of depression and adolescent trauma, as well as the circumstances of the crime.
The court’s conclusion that committing the minor to a less restrictive facility was inappropriate is supported by ample evidence. The minor had been placed in less restrictive settings several times and had escaped each time. As a result, she demonstrated she was unlikely to succeed in a less restrictive residential facility. Moreover, she exhibited “aggressive and defiant” behavior in juvenile hall: she fought with other juveniles, refused to comply with staff directives, and even threatened to kill a pregnant staff member’s unborn child. Finally, the minor had a lengthy history of criminal conduct which ranged from soliciting prostitution to battery. She engaged in a succession of criminal acts that culminated in participating in attempted robbery and murder. The nature, gravity, and repetition of criminal offenses support the minor’s commitment to the DJJ. (Robert H., supra, 96 Cal. App.4th at p. 1330 [“The gravity of the offense is by statute a proper consideration at disposition”].) As a result, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that less restrictive methods were both ineffective and inappropriate. (Travis W., supra, 107 Cal. App.4th at p. 379.)
III. The Court Properly Calculated the Minor’s Maximum Term of Confinement
As stated above, the court initially set the minor’s maximum confinement time at 26 years. It later amended the commitment order to set the maximum confinement time at 25 years.
The minor argues the court improperly aggregated her maximum confinement time because she did not receive notice of the People’s intent to aggregate several of her previously sustained Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions. She also contends the maximum term of confinement should have been 25, not 26 years. In response, the People argue the issue is moot because the court issued a minute order committing the minor to the DJJ for a maximum of 25 years. The People are correct. In its nunc pro tunc order, the court properly committed the minor to 25 years. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (c).) As result, we need not address the minor’s contention that the court improperly aggravated her maximum time of confinement.
IV. The Minor is Entitled to 493 Days of Precommitment Credit
Finally, the minor contends — and the People concede — she is entitled to 493 days of precommitment credit. (See In re J.M. (2009) 170 Cal. App.4th 1253, 1256-1257 [minor entitled to credit for time he was detained in a secure facility prior to his commitment]; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 536 [pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c), the minor must be given precommitment credit for days he was detained in juvenile hall pending resolution of the charges against him].) Accordingly, the minor is entitled to 493 days of precommitment custody credit.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court is ordered to file an amended commitment order reflecting that the minor is entitled to 493 days of precommitment credit and to forward a certified copy of the amended commitment order to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice Facilities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Needham, J., Bruiniers, J.