The standards, not a part of the Disciplinary Rules, list aggravating and mitigating circumstances recommended to be considered in deciding an appropriate sanction. These are set forth in In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 333-34, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986). The applicable aggravating circumstances suggested by the standards are "substantial experience in the practice of law" and "multiple offenses."

American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.32(i)(1985). See also In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 333-34, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986) (setting forth the ABA standards for aggravation and mitigation and discussing their application). In the present case there is no claim that the lapse of six years (through no fault of the Bar) between the events charged and the initiation of disciplinary proceedings prejudiced the accused's defense; however, the belated imposition of a suspension may be prejudicial in the sense that it implies a judgment about the accused's present professional reliability based solely on conduct now nearly nine years in the past.

That inquiry calls for a case-by-case determination. See In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 326-29, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986). Here, as we have explained, the notes provided significant benefits for defendants, enabling them to satisfy more threatening creditors and to comply with the terms of the plan.

It is well established that borrowing money from a client constitutes a business transaction with the client for the purposes of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and that the interest of the attorney/borrower and client/lender "differ." In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986). The professional relationship, and the duties derived therefrom, are not altered by the fact that the parties involved may be friends.

See, e.g., In re McDonough, 336 Or. 36, 44, 77 P.3d 306 (2003) (finding pattern of misconduct where lawyer repeatedly committed multiple criminal offenses); In re Kluge, 332 Or. 251, 263, 27 P.3d 102 (2001) (multiple misrepresentations in various circumstances revealed pattern of dishonesty and misconduct); In re Haws, 310 Or. 741, 753, 801 P.2d 818 (1990) (finding pattern of misconduct where lawyer failed to respond fully and truthfully to 12 separate state Bar inquiries concerning alleged disciplinary violations); In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 336, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986) (finding pattern of misconduct where the accused committed the same violations in two separate cases). Although we do not hold that an ongoing course of conduct never can amount to a “pattern of misconduct,” we find that the Bar has not proved that aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence in this case.

See Matter of Parker, 269 N.W.2d 779, 780 (S.D. 1978). In keeping with the spirit of our decision, we refer to similar types of ethical transgressions in these cases: Giovanazzi v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal.3d 465, 169 Cal.Rptr. 581, 619 P.2d 1005 (1980) (3-year suspension); In re Conduct of Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986) (1-year suspension); and Committee On Prof. Ethics v. Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1982) (formal reprimand). Accordingly, believing that Attorney Martin's license to practice law should be set aside for a period of two years under the sanction of a two-year suspension, he could appreciate his wrongdoing and rectify his professional ethics by study of the South Dakota Code of Professional Conduct. Upon proper application and compliance with the conditions of readmittance and rectitude, Attorney Martin could again practice law and serve the people of his community and state for many years.

That methodology, first used by this court in In re Bristow, 301 Or. 194, 206-7 n 3, 721 P.2d 437 (1986), is of material assistance to us in setting an appropriate sanction. See also In re Germundson, 301 Or. 656, 664, 724 P.2d 793 (1986); In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 332-37, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986). The accused is suspended for a period of six months commencing on the effective date of this opinion.

The stipulation states that at that time the accused was suspended from the practice of law for failing to pay his Professional Liability Assessment and his Oregon State Bar dues. The stipulation also provides that the accused "understands that the sanction imposed in this case shall not become effective until he has been reinstated to the active practice of law pursuant to the terms of Rules of Procedure 8.1.-8.3. See In re Leubke, 301 Or. 321, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986)." The stipulation also states that the accused has provided the Bar with sufficient information to establish that he was undergoing emotional difficulties and depression during the Gamenara case and that these circumstances interfered with his ability and clouded his judgment.

The trial panel decided that a one-year suspension was the appropriate sanction, with certain conditions precedent to be met for reinstatement. The Bar urges a three-year suspension with the same conditions precedent. In In re Germundson, 301 Or. 656, 724 P.2d 793 (1986), In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986), and In re Bristow, 301 Or. 194, 721 P.2d 437 (1986), we have suggested that the American Bar Association's "Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions" (Standards) as approved February 1986 provide a good framework for determining what sanctions should be applied in disciplinary proceedings. We appreciate that the Bar has heeded that suggestion and in its brief has stepped through the suggested analysis.

We recently referred to tentative standards suggested by the American Bar Association as an "analytical framework" for the disposition of disciplinary cases. In re Luebke, 301 Or. 321, 332-34, 722 P.2d 1221 (1986). Under "factors which may be considered in mitigation" to reduce the extent of discipline imposed, the standards, without referring specifically to alcohol or other drug abuse, refer generally to "personal or emotional problems" and "physical or mental disability or impairment."