Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County No. 507918. Nancy B. Williamsen, Commissioner.
Kathleen M. Mallinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Harris, Acting P.J., Levy, J., Gomes, J.
OPINION
Amanda M. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her son, Lucas. Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel submitted a letter dated September 13, 2007, advising that no brief would be forthcoming (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). By order dated September 25, 2007, we extended time for appellant to personally file a letter brief.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant has filed such a letter brief with this court. In it, she raises a variety of complaints, many of which we cannot review. Those complaints which remain are not arguable, as discussed below.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Five-year-old Lucas has been a dependent child since January 2005 due to his parents’ drug abuse. Following roughly 20 months of reunification services and foster care for Lucas, the court returned the child to his parents’ care subject to family maintenance services.
However, Lucas’ return was short-lived. In September 2006, appellant left the family home and, when located, tested positive for drugs. Eventually, in December 2006, the court once again removed Lucas from parental custody, denied reunification services, and set a permanency planning hearing for the child. Although the court gave appellant notice of her writ remedy to challenge its decision, she did not pursue writ review with this court.
In April 2007, respondent Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) prepared a permanency planning report recommending that the court find Lucas adoptable and terminate parental rights. The agency had placed Lucas with the same foster parents who cared for him before his return to appellant. Notably, the court declared the foster couple Lucas’ de facto parents in the spring of 2006. The foster parents were committed to adopting Lucas.
In its favorable preliminary assessment of the foster parents, the agency reported it received information which led to an emergency response investigation. It was alleged that when the foster father was a child, he had molested his younger siblings. In the end, the agency determined that the allegations were “unfounded.”
Based on the agency’s report, appellant’s counsel sought discovery of the information the agency had reviewed concerning the foster father. The court granted the request and in the process postponed the permanency planning hearing.
Thereafter, appellant’s counsel filed a petition to change Lucas’ placement from the foster parents to the maternal great-grandmother (§ 388). Notably, there was no evidence that Lucas had any relationship with his maternal great-grandmother or that she had ever pursued his placement. Appellant argued Lucas was at risk of molestation in the foster parents’ home. The court calendared the petition to be heard on the same date set for the permanency planning hearing.
The court eventually conducted its permanency planning hearing for Lucas in June 2007. Appellant did not attend the hearing and her attorney had no additional evidence to introduce. The court denied appellant’s petition to change Lucas’ placement. It expressly found the petition did not state facts that showed it would be in Lucas’ best interest to change placement. The court was satisfied that a thorough investigation was conducted.
On the issue of permanency planning, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Lucas was adoptable and termination would not be detrimental to him. Accordingly, the court terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Nonreviewable Claims
Appellant criticizes the agency and the court on numerous grounds for acts or omissions which are outside the scope of our review. For example, she claims the agency reported misinformation to the court throughout Lucas’s dependency, especially regarding her drug abuse, and treated the father of Jacob, another child of hers, more favorably than it treated her in connection with Lucas. She further challenges the reunification plan the agency implemented for her. She also accuses the court of conducting a review in Jacob’s case in the absence of her attorney and not giving her the same rights and opportunity as the father with regard to Jacob. She further claims the court denied her request for a bonding study.
The scope of our review is limited by appellant’s notice of appeal. (Hardin v. Elvitsky (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 357, 363-364.) An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed. (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563.) Here, appellant appealed from the June 2007 termination order. Thus, previous orders as well as the evidence underlying those decisions are no longer subject to appellate review. They are final determinations.
Furthermore, on appeal from a termination order, a parent is not entitled to review of the court’s rulings resulting in its setting order if the parent failed to pursue writ review. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).) Here, as previously mentioned, appellant did not seek writ relief from the December 2006 setting order.
Moreover, to the extent appellant complains about Jacob’s dependency, she overlooks the fact that her appeal is unrelated to Jacob. Instead, she appealed from the order terminating her rights to Lucas.
Remaining Claims
Having reviewed the appellate record, we conclude appellant’s remaining contentions do not amount to claims that the juvenile court committed an error affecting the outcome of this case. (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.) Thus, the juvenile court’s decision is presumptively correct. (Ibid.)
First, appellant claims she was to be afforded a bonding hearing at the June 2007 proceeding. However, there is no record to support this claim.
Second, she mentions the court’s denial of her section 388 petition but does not explain how that ruling was erroneous. In this regard, we observe it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error on the record. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The fact that appellant apparently believed the accusations against the foster father does not mean the trial court was bound to agree with her. There was other evidence before the court from which it could determine that the agency investigated those allegations and found them to be unfounded, as well as find a change in Lucas’ placement was not in his best interests.
Third, appellant claims the agency wrongfully withheld information from her and her attorney regarding the foster father’s past and denied her visits with Lucas in the spring of 2007. Once again, however, she fails to cite any evidence to support her claims, let alone how she was prejudiced by the agency’s alleged omissions. To the extent she complains about the lack of an exit visit following the court’s termination orders, appellant overlooks the court’s order entitling her to such a visit, albeit highly supervised, if she requested it.
Last, appellant appears to argue the court should have found termination was detrimental to Lucas based on bonds he allegedly shared with her and her other children. Appellant, however, is in no position to raise this argument on appeal, as she failed to raise it in the trial court. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) Provided a dependent child is likely to be adopted, the statutory presumption at the permanency planning stage is that termination is in the child’s best interests and therefore not detrimental. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see also In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1343-1344.) Although section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) acknowledges that termination is detrimental under specifically designated circumstances, a finding of no detriment is not a prerequisite to the termination of parental rights. (Ibid.; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) It is up to a parent to prove that termination would be detrimental. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343.) Here, appellant presented no evidence of any detriment to Lucas. Indeed, as previously noted, appellant did not attend the permanency planning and her attorney had no evidence to introduce.
“An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (E.g., Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 . . . .) Hence, the appellant must make a challenge. In so doing, he must raise claims of reversible error or other defect (see ibid.), and ‘present argument and authority on each point made’ (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591 . . .; accord, In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 278 . . .). If he does not, he may, in the court’s discretion, be deemed to have abandoned his appeal. (Berger v. Godden [(1985)] 163 Cal.App.3d [1113] at p. 1119.) In that event, it may order dismissal. (Ibid.) Such a result is appropriate here. With no error or other defect claimed against the orders appealed from, the Court of Appeal was presented with no reason to proceed to the merits of any unraised ‘points’—and, a fortiori, no reason to reverse or even modify the orders in question. (See People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 289 . . . .)” (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
Having reviewed appellant’s letter brief and the record herein, we conclude appellant raises no arguable issue regarding the court’s decision. Having found no claim of trial court error in appellant’s letter as to matters within the scope of this appeal, we conclude appellant has abandoned the appeal from the order terminating her parental rights and will dismiss this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.