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In re Lorazepam Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation

United States District Court, D. Columbia
Oct 3, 2002
MDL Docket No. 1290 (TFH), Misc. No. 99-276, (TFH), Civ. No. 01-2646 (TFH) (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2002)

Opinion

MDL Docket No. 1290 (TFH), Misc. No. 99-276, (TFH), Civ. No. 01-2646 (TFH)

October 3, 2002


MEMORANDUM OPINION


I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Strike Portions of Second Amended Complaint [# 24]. Specifically, Defendants move to strike paragraphs 59 through 68 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. For the following reasons, the Court denies the Defendants' Motion.

II DISCUSSION

The Defendants move to strike the above-noted portions of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, claiming that such "immaterial and impertinent references contained in these ten paragraphs bear no essential or important relationship to Plaintiffs' claims" and are "wholly irrelevant allegations [that] unfairly prejudice Mylan." Def.s' Mot. at 4. For example, paragraph 59 of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that "Arkansas Congressman Marion Berry, a licensed pharmacist, stated that "I have never seen a price increase list that even comes close to what this does. It's amazing that a company [Mylan] feels that they have so little competition that they can do something like this and take advantage of our seniors this way.'" Def.'s Mot. at 4-5. Further, defendants claim that "the section entitled 'Litigation Against Defendants' could have no possible relevance to Plaintiffs' claims under the Illinois Antitrust Act" since such allegations attempt to improperly impute liability to Mylan.Id. at 5.

Plaintiffs rejoin by claiming that "paragraphs 59 through 68 of HCSC's Complaint detail the impact of of [Mylan's] pernicious price fixing scheme on consumers — facts which for the essence of this litigation . . . ." Pl.s' Opp. at 3. Further, Plaintiffs argue that "paragraphs 59 through 68 illustrate the impact on consumers and the disruption to the marketplace to which resulted from Defendants' illegal actions and are clearly relevant to this case." Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Motions to strike under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) are drastic actions and are viewed with disfavor. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790, 797 (D.D.C. 1992) (citing Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Pty., 647 F.2d 200, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

This Court has broad discretion when dealing with motions to strike portions of a pleading. Makuch v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, No. CIV.A.99-1094, 2000 WL 915767, at * 1 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2000). In exercising this discretion, the Court remains mindful of the following considerations:

Motions to strike portions of a pleading are generally disfavored. Such motions are disfavored because, so long as the complaint states a claim and is otherwise legally sufficient, the efforts of the parties and the attention of court are better spent on the substantive merits of the action rather than the contents of the pleadings. They are also disfavored "because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it often is sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic . . . ." 5A Wright Miller § 1380. All averments sought to be stricken are taken as admitted for purposes of a motion to strike.
Id. (citations omitted).

The Court is aware that Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) does not by its terms require that matters be prejudicial to be stricken. Id. at 2. The rule is phrased in the disjunctive, allowing the court to strike "from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (emphasis added)). However, "the courts view motions to strike portions of a complaint with such disfavor that many courts will grant such a motion only if the portions sought to be stricken as immaterial are also prejudicial or scandalous." Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

With this review of trial law, the Court now turns to the Defendants' Motion to Strike. Similar to the Makuch court's determination, this Court cannot say that the allegations contained in paragraphs 59 through 68 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are "immaterial and impertinent" as Defendants claim. Nor does the Court find the allegations to be "prejudicial." Further, while by no means having reached a decision on the merits of this case, the Court finds that the paragraphs in question may very well be relevant to Plaintiffs' cause of action.

After analyzing carefully the paragraphs in question and the merits of each parties' competing arguments, the Court here exercises its discretion and declines to strike the portions in question of the Second Amended Complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion To Strike Portions of Second Amended Complaint [# 24]. An appropriate Order will accompany this Opinion.


Summaries of

In re Lorazepam Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation

United States District Court, D. Columbia
Oct 3, 2002
MDL Docket No. 1290 (TFH), Misc. No. 99-276, (TFH), Civ. No. 01-2646 (TFH) (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2002)
Case details for

In re Lorazepam Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation

Case Details

Full title:IN RE LORAZEPAM CLORAZEPATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This Order applies to…

Court:United States District Court, D. Columbia

Date published: Oct 3, 2002

Citations

MDL Docket No. 1290 (TFH), Misc. No. 99-276, (TFH), Civ. No. 01-2646 (TFH) (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2002)