In re Lopez-Sanchez

Full title: IN THE INTEREST OF LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, CRISTHIAN

Court: STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT

Date published: Jun 1, 2018

NUMBER 2018 CJ 0318 (La. Ct. App. Jun. 1, 2018)

Opinion

NUMBER 2018 CJ 0318

06-01-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, CRISTHIAN

Ricky L. Babin, D.A. Donaldsonville, LA and Donald D. Candell, A.D.A. Lindsey Manda, A.D.A. Gonzales, LA and Michael Poirrier, A.D.A. Pierre Part, LA Attorneys for Appellee State of Louisiana Jaesa Woods McLin Nicole Tamilyn Bowyer Kenner, LA Attorneys for Appellant Minor Child CL,S

WELCH, J.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appealed from the 23^rd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Ascension, Louisiana
Trial Court Number J-19022 Honorable Katherine Tess Stromberg, Judge Ricky L. Babin, D.A.
Donaldsonville, LA

and
Donald D. Candell, A.D.A.
Lindsey Manda, A.D.A.
Gonzales, LA

and
Michael Poirrier, A.D.A.
Pierre Part, LA Attorneys for Appellee
State of Louisiana Jaesa Woods McLin
Nicole Tamilyn Bowyer
Kenner, LA Attorneys for Appellant
Minor Child CL,S BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ. WELCH, J.

Celenia Sanchez-Hernandez challenges the denial of her petition for a finding of eligibility for special immigrant juvenile status, which she filed on behalf of her son, Cristhian Lopez-Sanchez. For reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

In 1990, Congress enacted the special immigrant juvenile provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J) ¹ that allows immigrant juveniles, or any person acting on their behalf, to petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services for special immigrant juvenile status, which then enables the immigrant juvenile to be granted lawful permanent residency in the United States. See State in Interest of Jimenez, 2015-1788 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 8/25/16), 199 So.3d 1218, 1219. To be eligible for special immigrant juvenile status, an immigrant juvenile must obtain an order from a state juvenile court² finding that the juvenile satisfies certain criteria. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. §204.11.³

1 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J) provides, in pertinent part, that the term "special immigrant" means an immigrant (i) who is present in the United States who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with one or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; and (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.

2 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §204.11(a), a "[j]uvenile court means a court located in the United States having jurisdiction under [s]tate law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles."

3 8 C.F.R. §204.11(c) provides that an alien is eligible for classification as a special immigrant juvenile if the alien (1) is under twenty-one years of age; (2) is unmarried; (3) has been declared dependent upon a juvenile court located in the United States in accordance with state law governing such declarations of dependency, while the alien was in the United States and under the jurisdiction of the court; (4) has been deemed eligible by the juvenile court for long-term foster care; (5) continues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency or eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended; and (6) has been the subject of judicial proceedings or administrative proceedings authorized or recognized by the juvenile court in which it has been determined that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the country of nationality or last habitual residence of the beneficiary or his or her parents.
Notably, the requirement that a juvenile seeking special immigrant status be eligible for longterm foster care was removed by a 2009 amendment to 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J).

The petitioner, Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez, is the mother of Cristhian, a minor child.⁴ Both Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez and Cristhian are native citizens of Honduras and are undocumented immigrants currently residing in Ascension Parish. On July 13, 2017, Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez filed a petition on behalf of Cristhian in the juvenile court for Ascension Parish seeking a finding of eligibility for special immigrant juvenile status.⁵ According to the allegations of the petition, Cristhian was born and lived his entire life in Honduras prior to coming to the United States with his mother. At the time of his birth, Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez and Cristhian's father were married; however, at the age of three years old, Cristhian was allegedly abandoned by his father when his father took another partner in Honduras. Thereafter, Cristhian's father never contacted him or offered him financial or practical support. Due to the abandonment, Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez came to the United States with Cristhian in order to financially provide for him. Since relocating to the United States, Cristhian's father has not had any contact with him nor has he provided any financial support. Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez alleged that it was in Cristhian's best interest to remain in the United States, since he was abandoned by his father and lacked anyone in Honduras who could provide him support and care. Accordingly, Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez sought a determination regarding the child's eligibility for special immigrant juvenile status in accordance with 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. §204.11.

4 We note that after the petition herein was filed and the matter heard by the trial court, Cristhian Lopez-Sanchez turned eighteen years of age; thus, he is no longer a minor child. See La. C.C. art. 29 and La. Ch.C. arts. 116(3) and (14); c.f. Jimenez, 199 So.3d at 1218-1219.

5 See La. Ch.C. arts. 302 and 303; 8 C.F.R. §204.11(a).

After a hearing on August 21, 2017, the juvenile court denied Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez's petition in open court and on that same date, the juvenile court signed a document entitled "JUDGMENT." Subsequently, on September 21, 2017, the juvenile court issued written reasons for judgment, essentially finding that there was no basis to declare Cristhian dependent on the juvenile court. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(i) and 8 C.F.R. §204.11(c)(3). In addition, the juvenile court found that there was no showing that reunification with Cristhian's father was not viable due to abuse, abandonment, or neglect. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(i). From these rulings of the juvenile court, Ms. Sanchez-Hernandez has appealed.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Texas Gas Exploration Corp. v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., 2011-0520 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 11/9/11), 79 So.3d 1054, 1059, writ denied, 2012-0360 (La. 4/9/12), 85 So.3d 698. This Court's appellate jurisdiction extends to "final judgments," which are those that determine the merits in whole or in part. See La. C.C.P. art. 1841 and 2083.

A valid judgment must be "precise, definite, and certain." Laird v. St. Tammany Parish Safe Harbor, 2002-0045 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So.2d 364, 365. Moreover, a final appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. See Carter v. Williamson Eye Center, 2001-2016 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 11/27/02), 837 So.2d 43, 44. These determinations should be evident from the language of a judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Laird, 836 So.2d at 366. Thus, a judgment that does not contain decretal language cannot be considered as a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review such a judgment. See Johnson v. Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, 2005-0337 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 3/24/06), 934 So.2d 66, 67.

In this case, the August 21, 2017 judgment that the petitioner sought to appeal was a judgment that purported to make all of the findings necessary for Cristhian to be eligible for special immigrant juvenile status; however, the judge drew a diagonal line through all but one of the paragraphs of the judgment, wrote "denied" underneath the last paragraph, and then signed and dated the judgment. While it appears from the August 21, 2017 judgment that the juvenile court declined to make some of the necessary findings for Cristhian to be eligible for special immigrant juvenile status, we find that the judgment is defective and is not a final judgment for the purpose of an appeal because it does not contain appropriate decretal language, it does not clearly or precisely specify what relief was being denied, and it does not dismiss any claims or the petition. In the absence of a valid final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the matter and we dismiss the appeal from the August 21, 2017 judgment.⁶

6 We recognize that this court has discretion to convert an appeal on a non-appealable judgment to an application for supervisory writs. See Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005-0074 (La. 6/29/05), 914 So.2d 34, 39. Generally, appellate courts have exercised that discretion when the motion for appeal was filed within the thirty-day time period allowed for the filing of an application for supervisory writs under Rule 4-3 of the Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, and where reversal of the district court's decision would terminate the litigation, or where clear error in the district court's judgment, if not corrected, will create a grave injustice. However, when the jurisdictional defect lies in the non-finality of a judgment (as opposed to an appeal from an interlocutory appeal), an appellate court will generally refrain from the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction when an adequate remedy exists by appeal, particularly when an adequate remedy by appeal will exist upon the entry of the requisite precise, definite, and certain decretal language necessary for appellate review. This is because in the absence of proper decretal language, the judgment is defective; and this court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits, even if we were to convert the matter to an application for supervisory writs. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to convert this appeal of a judgment that is not final for lack of decretal language to an application for supervisory writs. See Boyd Louisiana Racing, Inc. v. Bridges, 2015-0393 pp.2-4 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 12/23/15) (unpublished). --------

CONCLUSION

For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the appeal of the August 21, 2017 judgment is dismissed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Celenia Sanchez-Hernandez.

APPEAL DISMISSED.