Opinion
No. 341078
06-14-2018
In re LONG, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Oceana Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 15-011286-NA Before: MURRAY, C.J., and MARKEY and TUKEL, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, ASL, EGL, CDL, and JNL. The trial court terminated mother's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The children's father was also a respondent to the petition; however, his case proceeded separately from mother's case.
When this case began, mother was living out of state, and she placed the children with her stepmother. However, mother's stepmother was no longer able to care for the children. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a neglect petition, which indicated that mother's issues included substance abuse, instability, and inappropriate housing. The DHHS developed a case service plan which included substance abuse service and personal counseling for mother. The children also attended counseling, and ASL, EGL, and CDL were diagnosed with ADHD and social development issues. Because of the children's special needs, mother was supposed to stay in contact with the children's counselors and attend their therapy sessions with them. Mother needed to understand the children's developmental needs and to learn the appropriate skills to parent her special needs children.
Mother first argues on appeal that the trial court clearly erred in finding that a statutory basis existed for terminating her parental rights. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3); In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). We review the trial court's determination for clear error. Id. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
Among other statutory grounds, the trial court terminated mother's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), which states:
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
We first conclude that mother was a respondent in a case brought under this chapter, and 182 days have passed since the trial court issued an initial dispositional order. The trial court entered an initial dispositional order on January 7, 2016. 182 days later was July 7, 2016. The trial court entered an order terminating mother's parental rights on October 30, 2017.
Chapter XIIA of The Probate Code, MCL 712A.1 et seq., titled, "Jurisdiction, Procedure, and Disposition Involving Minors." --------
Next, the conditions that led to adjudication included mother's substance abuse, instability, and inappropriate housing. The majority of the witnesses, including the DHHS caseworkers and various therapists and counselors testified that mother did not rectify her issues with substance abuse, housing, and emotional stability. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine multiple times during the case. A DHHS caseworker testified that even if mother had periods of sobriety, she had not addressed the underlying reasons for her substance abuse or her triggers for substance abuse. Mother's first counselor testified that mother made virtually no progress and did not benefit from her services. Mother's second counselor stated that mother made some progress, but she had not made the necessary changes. Mother's housing situation, and to a lesser extent her employment, were sporadic throughout the case. Mother herself was not able to answer what she would do differently to prevent the children from being removed from her care again considering that they had been removed three times, and she participated in services each time.
Accordingly, we are not "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made" by the trial court's finding that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating mother's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). See In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459. Because the trial court did not clearly err in finding that one statutory ground for termination existed, we need not address the additional statutory grounds for termination. See id. at 461.
Mother next argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
The trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the children's best interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459.
"If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). In determining a child's best interests, the trial court may consider the child's bond to his parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the suitability of alternative homes. See In re Olive/Metts 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The trial court may also consider a parent's substance abuse problems. See In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). The trial court may also consider the testimony and opinion of experts. See In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 45; 549 NW2d 353 (1996).
The trial court considered mother's substance abuse history and expert opinion in this case, and it concluded that mother continued to use drugs, even if on an irregular basis, and that her use posed a risk of harm to the children. The trial court noted that there was not a significant bond between mother and the children. It stated, "[A]ny bond that does exist with the children is seriously weakened by [mother's] inability to effectively parent them and their constant fear that if they were returned to their mother[']s care that they would be removed again." The trial court addressed the children's need for permanency and stability. It found that mother was not able to provide that for the children in the reasonably foreseeable future, based in part on her lack of engagement in the children's counseling. The trial court noted that mother failed to substantially comply with or benefit from the case service plan, despite services being offered. Finally, the trial court addressed the children's well-being while in foster care, noting that the children were doing "much better" in their foster home than in mother's care. It also stated, "The current foster home provides the children more physical safety, and emotional stability and security, than they have known with either parent."
The evidence supported mother's continued substance use, lack of substantial bond to the children, the children's need for permanency and stability, the children's improved well-being while in foster care, and mother's lack of compliance with and benefit from the case service plan. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake by finding that termination of mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
We affirm.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jonathan Tukel