Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J08-00609
Jenkins, J.
This is an appeal from the dispositional order in a juvenile matter in which appellant L.M., a minor, entered a no contest plea to felony charges of battery causing serious bodily injury and grand theft. Appellant was thereafter committed to a juvenile facility for a 9-month mandatory program and ordered to serve an additional 90-day conditional release/parole period. Appellant contends the juvenile court’s decision with respect to his commitment was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2008, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), charging appellant, born December 22, 1993, with one felony count of assault with means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Penal Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). On May 9, 2008, an amended petition was filed, charging appellant with one felony count of battery causing great bodily injury (Penal Code, § 243, subd. (d)) and one felony count of grand theft from a person (id., § 487, subd. (c)). Appellant thereafter entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he plead no contest to the amended charges and the juvenile court dismissed the original charge.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On May 23, 2008, a dispositional hearing was held, before which the juvenile court read and considered the disposition report filed by the Probation Department. This report revealed the following information regarding appellant’s crimes.
On April 4, 2008, police were dispatched to a skate park, where officers found a young male, B.A., bleeding from the head after having been hit repeatedly with a baseball bat. The perpetrators had fled on foot. B.A. was airlifted to a nearby hospital where he was treated for, among other injuries, an eight-inch head laceration, a concussion and multiple bruises on his arms, back and chest. In response to police questioning, B.A reported that he recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators, but did not recognize the other individual. B.A. did not know why he had been attacked, but acknowledged engaging in “trash talk” with appellant in the past at the skate park. B.A.’s mother later reported that his medical bills for his injuries totaled between $50,000 and $70,000.
Police subsequently arrested appellant. When appellant was later interviewed by police at juvenile hall, he admitted going to the skate park with his friend, J.B., and his girlfriend, N.E., with a baseball bat to confront B.A., whom they recognized as N.E.’s former boyfriend. Appellant claimed that J.B. told him to fight B.A. and that B.A. had threatened him because he was now dating N.E. According to a plan, appellant and J.B. thus went to the skate park and hid behind some bushes while N.E. brought B.A. over to them. J.B. then hit B.A. once with the bat before dropping it. Appellant picked up the bat and hit B.A. in the ribs and twice in the front of the head. Afterwards, believing B.A. was carrying the drug ecstasy, appellant told him to empty his pockets, at which point J.B. stole B.A.’s video game console and gold necklace. Appellant and N.E. then went to J.B.’s house to take a shower.
During the police interview, appellant expressed remorse for his crimes, reporting that his actions were “scary” and gave him “the chills.” When asked whether he believed probation would help him, appellant stated that he can sometimes “get out of line,” and that probation may ensure that he acts more responsibly. Appellant denied, however, having an anger management problem.
Appellant’s parents stated that they were “shocked” at the charges, given that he had never been involved in a similar incident and was busy with school and sports. Appellant’s parents further stated that they were willing to “do anything” to help their son, and that, given the chance, they believed he would redeem himself. Both parents and appellant reported having good relationships with each other.
Appellant’s parents never married, and appellant lived primarily with his mother, spending alternate weekends with his father.
Based on this information, the Probation Department (the department) recommended, among other things, that appellant be ordered to serve a mandatory nine-month program at the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility, a local juvenile facility (the juvenile facility). In so recommending, the department noted that, given the “extreme violence” of his crime, appellant appeared to have a serious anger management problem. In addition, appellant had previously been suspended from school for punching another student in the face, and had struggled academically, “fail[ing] numerous classes.” As such, appellant “appears to need a highly structured setting in order to address his behavioral issues and to get back on track academically. The egregious nature of the offense and [appellant’s] clear disregard for the welfare of another human being indicate a strong need for community safety.”
Appellant had already been screened for the juvenile facility and, due to the extreme violence of his attack, was found suitable for the nine-month mandatory program.
At the hearing, appellant’s counsel advised the court that his one-day school suspension was the result of “horseplay” with another student, and that he was doing “quite well” in school with the exception of failing one class (math).
Following the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court and removed him from his parents’ custody. Based upon the recommendation in the disposition report, the juvenile court committed appellant to the juvenile facility for the 9-month mandatory program, followed by an additional 90-day conditional release/parole period. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant raises a single argument on appeal. Appellant claims the juvenile court erred in removing him from home and committing him to the juvenile facility for a nine-month mandatory program because there was insufficient evidence that such commitment would be of probable benefit to him or that reasonable efforts had been made to avoid his removal.
A juvenile court has broad discretion in ordering the appropriate disposition in a juvenile delinquency matter. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473; In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379; In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396.)
On appeal, a juvenile court’s commitment decision is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. As such, we must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the decision and affirm so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396; In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473.) In doing so, we defer to the juvenile court on decisions regarding the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)
With respect to juvenile courts’ commitment decisions, California law is designed to both rehabilitate minors and ensure public safety. (§ 202; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396; In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473.) Accordingly, section 202 mandates as follows:
“Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court who are in need of protective services shall receive care, treatment, and guidance consistent with their best interest and the best interest of the public. Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter. If a minor has been removed from the custody of his or her parents, family preservation and family reunification are appropriate goals for the juvenile court to consider when determining the disposition of a minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct when those goals are consistent with his or her best interests and the best interests of the public. When the minor is no longer a ward of the juvenile court, the guidance he or she received should enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community.” (§ 202, subd. (b).)
Further, before committing a minor to a juvenile facility, the juvenile court must be “fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority.” (§ 734.) Moreover, because a juvenile’s commitment cannot be based solely on retribution grounds (§ 202, subd. (e)(5)), “there must continue to be evidence demonstrating (1) probable benefit to the minor and (2) that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate.” (In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.)
“However, the specific reasons for such commitment need not be stated in the record. Rather that determination must be supported by substantial evidence contained within the record.” (In re Robert D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 767, 773; see also In re Teofilia A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 577.)
Here, the juvenile court reasoned as follows in deciding to commit appellant to the juvenile facility:
“I am familiar with this case because I have had it ever since it came into the court system. You know, it’s really an egregious offense. It is not a couple of teenagers getting into a fight and knocking someone down. These particular kids lured the victim to this spot so they could assault him. They planned it. They had a baseball bat with them. They used that on this other kid and beat him up.
“It points out in the [probation] report that when the other minor, [J.B.], dropped the bat, [appellant] picked up the bat and started hitting the kid while he was down on the ground on the head.
“Then when it’s all over with, he casually goes with the girl, [N.E.], and they go take a shower at her place. That’s just cold. It’s a cold action by him. It’s a crime that, sure, he may appear remorseful about now and say that he’s remorseful. But he has been sitting here in Juvenile Hall and he is sorry for it. I am sure he is sorry for it. But it is amazing the other boy did not die. He had to be air-lifted to a trauma center.
“The [medical] bills – who knows what the bills are going to be? Right now, they are $50,000 to $70,000, just the medical bills for that kid. And then they robbed the kid along with that. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“I am adjudging the Minor to be a Ward of the Court. . . . I find that the welfare of the Minor requires that his custody be removed from his parents, under Section 726(a)(3) . . . I will commit you to the Boys Ranch for a 9-month Mandatory Program, plus an additional 90-day conditional release/parole period. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“You are to attend any and all counseling as directed by the probation officer, including anger management and peer pressure resistance.”
Appellant claims the juvenile court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. Appellant reasons that, “[d]espite the numerous factors in [his] social history which weighed towards home placement, the court emphasized the nature of the offense as the primary reason for ordering his removal from his school and family. [¶] In addition, there is nothing about [his] single offense, in the context of his social history, which suggests that he posed a danger to the public.” Moreover, appellant reasons, “the record is devoid of any evidence to support the finding that the probation department’s recommendation represents [his] interests.” In particular, appellant claims the department failed to provide the juvenile court individualized case information that would have allowed it to render an appropriate disposition.
We disagree. True, the record reveals that appellant has a close and supportive family which appears willing to do what is necessary to rehabilitate him, including sending him to anger management classes. Also true, appellant is an active participant in team sports with aspirations to attend University of California, he has no known gang affiliations, and he has not previously been referred to the department or sent to juvenile hall. These facts weighing in appellant’s favor, however, cannot be viewed in isolation. In rendering its decision, the juvenile court also had before it evidence that appellant engaged in an act of extreme violence in committing this crime, that he preplanned the crime and stepped in to continue its commission with vigor once his friend and accomplice put down the weapon, and that, after committing the crime, he casually left the scene with his girlfriend to take a shower. Moreover, contrary to appellant’s suggestion, the record makes clear that this was not his first known act of violence against a peer. The probation report, read and considered by the juvenile court, noted that appellant had been suspended from school for punching another student in the face. Appellant’s attorney claimed appellant’s act was mere “horseplay,” but the juvenile court could properly reject such description, particularly given that school officials apparently found it more serious, choosing the rather severe punishment of suspending him.
Further, while the parents were indeed supportive, they also expressed concern regarding appellant’s susceptibility to peer pressure and his anger management problems, which they believed played a role in his crimes. The juvenile court could reasonably have concluded, given their concerns, that appellant would benefit from a more restrictive facility, with the discipline and counseling it offered, rather than home placement.
Moreover, we disagree with appellant’s claim that the juvenile court failed to make reasonable efforts to avoid removing him from home before committing him to the juvenile facility. As set forth above, juvenile law requires the court to consider less restrictive alternatives before removing a minor from home for commitment to a juvenile facility. (E.g., In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473.) In particular, “ ‘ “[t]he statutory scheme . . . contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders in cases such as that now before us -- namely, home placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility and, as a last resort, Youth Authority placement.” ’ ” (In re Teofilia A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 578.) However, “it is clear that a commitment to the Youth Authority may be made in the first instance, without previous resort to less restrictive placements. (In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151 [257 Cal.Rptr. 134].)” (In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473.)
Here, despite the extreme violence of appellant’s crime, the juvenile court did not commit appellant in the first instance to the Youth Authority, the most restrictive placement available to it. Rather, the juvenile court committed him to the juvenile facility, a less restrictive group home for boys, for a long-term program. Before doing so, the juvenile court listened at the hearing to requests by appellant’s attorney and his parents that he receive a lesser commitment. Then, stating its reasoning on the record (as set forth above), the juvenile court denied, albeit implicitly, their requests. On this record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court’s decision was erroneous. (In re Robert D., supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 773; see also In re Teofilia A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577 [“there must be some evidence to support the judge’s implied determination that he sub silentio considered and rejected reasonable alternative dispositions”].)
Accordingly, given the substantial evidence of appellant’s inability to control anger, his disregard for the safety and welfare of others, and his escalating criminal conduct, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing him to the juvenile facility for the nine-month mandatory program. (§ 734; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.) The dispositional order must therefore be affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.