Nonetheless, the persuasive authority that is available, suggests that the plaintiffs in the present case do not need to prove the elements of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In In re Littles (Littles I), 75 B.R. 240 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1987), later proceeding, In re Littles (Littles II), 90 B.R. 669 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988), modified, Crossley v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 682 (E.D.Pa. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989), the bankruptcy court had to consider whether it had jurisdiction to make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in an action by the bankrupt estate against a debt collector for violations of the FDCPA. The central issue in this jurisdictional question was whether the estate's claims for emotional distress under § 1692k(a)(1) of the FDCPA were "personal injury torts" that had to be tried in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
Not surpisingly this intention is entirely consistent with the language of the statute which reaches only those who regularly collect debts. Crossley, and the decisions of the district court, 90 B.R. 682 (E.D.Pa. 1988) and the bankruptcy court, In re Littles, 90 B.R. 669 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988), which it affirmed, placed an undue emphasis upon isolated portions of the legislative history and interpretations of this history by commentators while ignoring the language of the statute. This emphasis prompted dicta to the effect that the FDCPA covers those who collect on an "occasional basis" or "other that an `isolated' basis (which theoretically could mean more than once)."
There is no evidence that either ALSC or MAI meet the definition of "debt collectors" either, id., or that any provisions of the FDCPA were violated by them. Compare In re Littles, Littles v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 669, Bankr. No. 87-00092S, Adv. No. 87-0247S (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Recommended Opinion, Feb. 12, 1988), modified, 90 B.R. 700, Misc. No. 88-0083 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 7, 1988); and In re Crossley, Crossley v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 669 Bankr. No. 87-02394S, Adv. No. 87-0569S (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Recommended Opinion, Feb. 12, 1988), modified, 90 B.R. 682 Misc. No. 88-0084 (E.D.Pa. July 13, 1988). These Code sections read as follows:
Id. at 1701. As the court in In re Littles, 90 B.R. 669, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989), observed, the "inadequacy of the tort of intention infliction of mental distress . . . to prevent abusive collection practices" motivated Congress to draft the FDCPA. See alsoIn reHart, supra, 246 B.R. at 732 (Congress intended to "supplement inadequate state law remedies" by enacting FDCPA).
Before reaching the Third Circuit, both the bankruptcy court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that the lawyer was a debt collector under the FDCPA. See Littles v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (recommended proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law), affirmed by 90 B.R. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affirmed by Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989). Although Judge Van Antwerpen, then of the district court, determined that the issue if liability under the FDCPA was moot because of another finding of fact, he did address the issue (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), which allows a bankruptcy judge to decide issues that are not core issues, but are related to the chapter 11 proceeding).
It is the volume of the attorney's debt collection efforts that is dispositive, not the percentage such efforts amount to in the attorney's practice. Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D.Conn. 1990); In re Littles, 90 B.R. 669, 676 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988), aff'd as modified sub nom., Crossley v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 682 (E.D.Pa. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989); M. Sweig, Guidelines for Consumer Debt Collection by Attorneys Under the 1986 Amendment to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 21 New Eng.L.Rev. 697, 699 (1987); cf. Mertes v. Devitt, 734 F. Supp. 872, 874 (W.D.Wis. 1990) (stating that two collection matters per year amounting to less than 1% of the attorney's practice is not "regular" debt collection). This court is persuaded that the volume of defendant's debt collection practice is sufficiently high to constitute "regular" debt collection.
An attorney who regularly collects debts is a debt collector within the meaning of the "FDCPA". See Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569-70 (3rd Cir. 1989); Edward J. Cacace, et al. v. Joseph B. Lukas, Civil No. N-87-430 (EEB) (D.Conn. March 6, 1989); Raymond Woolfolk v. Albert G. Rubin, Civil No. N-88-266 (EEB) (D.Conn. Nov. 9, 1989); In re Littles, 90 B.R. 669 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988). Although undefined under the FDCPA, the term "regular" means "steady or uniform in course, practice, or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation."
VAN ANTWERPEN, District Judge. I have before me RECOMMENDED OPINION CONTAINING PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW submitted to me by Order dated February 12, 1988 of United States Bankruptcy Judge David A. Scholl in Bankruptcy No. 87-02394S, Adversary No. 87-0569S 90 B.R. 669. I have also before me DEFENDANT ARNOLD R. LIEBERMAN'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (filed March 4, 1988), MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (filed by plaintiff on March 21, 1988), and SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF DEFENDANT ARNOLD R. LIEBERMAN (filed April 20, 1988).
See, e.g., Smith v. Butler & Associates (In re Smith), 2008 WL 4148923, *1 (Bankr.D.Kan. Aug.29, 2008) (finding that bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over both FDCPA and related state law claims “since the United States District Courts have jurisdiction of an action to enforce any liability created by the FDCPA and jurisdiction to hear state law claims ... which are so related to the claims for which original federal jurisdiction exists as to be part of the same case or controversy”); In re Burgess, 2007 WL 130818, *2 n. 3 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2007) (recognizing that whether the bankruptcy court would have subject matter jurisdiction over debtor's FDCPA claim remained unsettled, but determining, based on an unreported decision of the district court that the bankruptcy court could exercise jurisdiction over the FDCPA claim); Littles v. Lieberman (In re Littles), 90 B.R. 669, 674 (1988), aff'd as modified by 90 B.R. 700 (E.D.Pa.1988) (finding that chapter 7 debtors' FDCPA claim was a non-core, “related to” proceeding because such claim was property of the bankruptcy estate, even if all amounts that the debtors recover are exempt). See also, Burns v. LTD Acquisitions, LLC (In re Burns), 2010 WL 642312, *4 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.
In re Goldstein, 201 B.R. 1, 3-7(Bankr. D.Me. 1996) (bankruptcy court lacks "related-to" jurisdiction over a FDCPA proceeding), with In re Belile, 209 B.R. 658, 664 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1997) (admission that non-core matter is a core matter amounts to consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction); and In re Littles, 90 B.R. 669 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988) (debtor's adversary proceeding against creditor's attorney under the FDCPA was a non-core proceeding but the bankruptcy court nevertheless had "related-to" jurisdiction). Creditrust received no consideration for either settlement agreement with Key Bank and therefore cannot be held liable for having violated agreements to which it was not a party.