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In re Liquidation of the Home Ins. Co.

166 N.H. 84 (N.H. 2014)
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In re Liquidation of the Home Ins. Co.

17 Citing cases

  1. In re J.S.

    174 N.H. 375 (N.H. 2021)   Cited 5 times

    Our settled rules of statutory interpretation instruct that "[a]ll statutes dealing with the same subject matter are to be considered in interpreting any one of them" and, "[w]here reasonably possible, statutes should be construed as consistent with each other." In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88-89, 89 A.3d 165 (2014) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, "[w]hen interpreting two statutes which deal with a similar subject matter, we will construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute."

  2. State v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

    168 N.H. 211 (N.H. 2015)   Cited 22 times
    Finding that the trial court properly allowed the jury to determine that defendant could be held liable for its percentage of the supply market of MTBE gasoline, noting that "the State faced an impossible burden of proving which of several MTBE gasoline producers caused New Hampshire's groundwater contamination"

    RSA 524:1–b ; see RSA 524:1–a (2007). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88, 89 A.3d 165 (2014). We are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.

  3. Currier v. Newport Lodge No. 1236, Loyal Order of Moose

    589 F. Supp. 3d 210 (D.N.H. 2022)

    Nevertheless, the court's construction of RSA 507-F:4, II is "consistent with" RSA 179:5, rendering the two statutes in pari materia and interpretable as such. In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88-89, 89 A.3d 165 (2014) ("When interpreting two statutes which deal with a similar subject matter, we will construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute."). Both statutes prohibit service of alcohol to an individual "who a reasonable and prudent person would know is intoxicated." RSA 179:5, I; RSA 507-F:4, II (similarly prohibiting service if "a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances would know that the person being served is ... intoxicated").

  4. Begley v. Windsor Surry Co.

    2018 DNH 57 (D.N.H. 2018)   Cited 13 times
    Relying on Lockheed Martin Corp. v. RFI Supply, Inc., 440 F.3d 549, 556-57 (1st Cir. 2006)

    When interpreting a contract under New Hampshire law, the court must "give the language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was negotiated, and reading the document as a whole." Camden Nat'l Bank v. Greystone Select Holdings, LLC, No. 17-cv-272-JL, 2017 WL 5146166, at *2 (D.N.H. Nov. 3, 2017) (quoting In re Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88 (2014)). "The language of a contract is ambiguous if the parties to the contract could reasonably disagree as to the meaning of that language."

  5. Camden Nat'l Bank v. Greystone Select Holdings, LLC

    2017 DNH 235 (D.N.H. 2017)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that the Restatement section cited by Clapp cautions that restitution claims "occur at the margins, when a valuable performance has been rendered under a contract that is invalid, or subject to avoidance, or otherwise ineffective to regulate the parties' obligations"

    When interpreting a contract, the court must "give the language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was negotiated, and reading the document as a whole." In re Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). "The language of a contract is ambiguous if the parties to the contract could reasonably disagree as to the meaning of that language."

  6. Avarden Invs., LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co.

    2016 DNH 162 (D.N.H. 2016)

    When interpreting a contract, the court must "give the language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was negotiated, and reading the document as a whole." In re Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). Absent ambiguity, however, "the parties' intent will be determined from the plain meaning of the language used in the contract."

  7. Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Opechee Constr. Corp.

    2015 DNH 194 (D.N.H. 2015)

    When interpreting a contract, the court must "give the language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was negotiated, and reading the document as a whole." In re Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). Absent ambiguity, however, "intent will be determined from the plain meaning of the language used in the contract."

  8. Galvin v. EMC Mortgage Corp.

    50 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D.N.H. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that endorsement to a bank as trustee without specifying a trust gave rise to a "genuine dispute as to the meaning of the endorsement."

    From these provisions, it might be inferred that a “mortgagee” must hold both the mortgage and note, since “[a]ll statutes dealing with the same subject-matter are to be considered in interpreting any one of them.” In re Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 89 A.3d 165, 170 (2014). This interpretive principle has an august ancestry.

  9. Galvin v. EMC Mortgage Corp.

    27 F. Supp. 3d 224 (D.N.H. 2014)   Cited 6 times
    Interpreting in same way New Hampshire statute with same language

    From these provisions, it might be inferred that a “mortgagee” must hold both the mortgage and note, since “[a]ll statutes dealing with the same subject-matter are to be considered in interpreting any one of them.” In re Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 89 A.3d 165, 170 (N.H.2014). This interpretive principle has an august ancestry.

  10. In re Appeal of City of Concord

    168 N.H. 533 (N.H. 2016)

    Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature's intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. 84, 88, 89 A.3d 165 (2014). We review the PELRB's statutory interpretation de novo.