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holding that party admissions are insufficient to establish general causation
Summary of this case from Lowery v. Sanofi-Aventis LLCOpinion
MDL No. 2:14–mn–02502–RMG
2017-01-03
IN RE: LIPITOR (ATORVASTATIN CALCIUM) MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER NO. 100
This Order relates to the cases listed in Appendix 1
Richard Mark Gergel, United States District Court Judge
Before the Court is Defendant's Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 1564). For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART.
Unless otherwise stated, the docket numbers in this Order refer to the MDL Docket, Case No. 2:14–cv–2502.
This Order addresses the motion with regard to Plaintiffs who allegedly ingested dosages of Lipitor less than 80 mg. The claims of other Plaintiffs are addressed in CMO 99.
I. Background
A. Procedural History
On February 18, 2014, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Ligation created this MDL, centralizing cases where female plaintiffs "allege that they have developed type 2 diabetes as a result of taking Pfizer's cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor." (Dkt. No. 1 at 1). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to warn physicians and consumers adequately of the risk of developing Type 2 diabetes from taking Lipitor, knew or should have known that taking Lipitor increased the risk of developing Type 2 diabetes, and negligently, recklessly, and carelessly marketed Lipitor without adequate instructions or warnings. (See id ., Dkt. No. 160).
This Court held an initial status conference on March 27, 2014, and, after a second status conference on April 25, 2014, discovery commenced when the Court entered CMO 4, which among other things, set forth an initial discovery plan. (Dkt. No. 101 at 17–24). This plan provided for certain document production by Pfizer (including electronic discovery), interrogatories served by Plaintiffs on Pfizer, and depositions of Pfizer and its current and former employees. (Id .) On May 2, 2014, the Court entered CMO 5, which required Plaintiffs to serve Plaintiff Fact Sheets and certain mandatory disclosures on Pfizer. (Dkt. No. 110).
With discovery underway, the Court turned to the process for selecting a bellwether case for trial. Under Amended CMO 6, entered on May 22, 2014, the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (PSC) and Defendant each selected seven (7) cases for the Discovery Pool in June of 2014. (Dkt. No. 148 at 4). More in depth case specific discovery was taken in these 14 cases in the Fall of 2014, including the propounding of written discovery on Discovery Pool Plaintiffs, depositions of Discovery Pool Plaintiffs, immediate family members and healthcare providers, depositions Pfizer sales representatives, and completion of a Defendant Fact Sheet by Pfizer. (Id . at 5).
On January 30, 2015, the Court convened the parties to randomly select the first cases for bellwether trials from the Discovery Pool cases. (Dkt. No. 739). By stipulation, the parties narrowed the fourteen (14) Discovery Pool cases to four (4) cases. The Court then randomly selected the first bellwether trials from these four (4) cases. The first case selected was Daniels v. Pfizer , Case No. 2:14–cv–01400, and the second case selected was Hempstead v. Pfizer , Case No. 2:14–cv–01879. Thereafter, the parties conducted additional case-specific discovery in these two cases. (See CMO 29, Dkt. No. 746; CMO 30, Dkt. No. 790).
From the beginning of this MDL, the parties have agreed that Plaintiffs must prove both general and specific causation as elements of their claims and have litigated this case as if expert testimony is needed to prove both. General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition (in this instance, whether Lipitor is capable of causing diabetes ); specific causation is whether the substance caused the injury of the particular plaintiff at issue (in this instance, whether Lipitor caused Ms. Hempstead's diabetes ). E.g., Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp ., 397 F.3d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2005). "Plaintiff[s] must first demonstrate general causation because without general causation, there can be no specific causation." Id . Here, if Lipitor is not capable of causing diabetes, it follows that it is not the cause of diabetes in particular plaintiffs.
The parties served common expert disclosures, including general causation experts, in March and April of 2015. (See CMO 29, Dkt. No. 746). Over Defendant's objection, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to supplement these disclosures in May of 2015 "to ensure this Court has the best information possible when addressing Daubert motions." (CMO 34, Dkt. No. 869 at 2). The parties then served specific causation expert disclosures in the two bellwether cases, in May and June of 2015. (See CMO 29, Dkt. No. 746; CMO 34, Dkt. No. 869). The Court allowed Plaintiffs to serve a rebuttal report by one of these case specific experts, again over Defendant's objection. (See CMO 38, Dkt. No. 967).
After full discovery, Defendant filed motions to exclude Plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony as well as Plaintiffs' specific causation expert testimony in the two bellwether cases. (Dkt. Nos. 972, 1004, 1006). As more fully explained below, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court ultimately excluded Plaintiffs' expert testimony on general causation with respect to dosages of less than 80 mg. (See CMO 49, Dkt. No. 1197; CMO 68, Dkt. No. 1469). The Plaintiffs at issue here all ingested dosages of Lipitor less than 80 mg. Thus, the Plaintiffs here do not have admissible expert testimony on general causation.
In most of these cases, the parties agree, for the purposes of this motion only, that these Plaintiffs ingested Lipitor in dosages of less than 80 mg prior to diagnosis of diabetes. (Dkt. Nos. 1658, 1680, 1748). In other cases, the parties agree that Plaintiffs allege pre-existing diabetes, i.e., that Plaintiffs were diagnosed with diabetes prior to taking Lipitor. (Dkt. No. 1680). For the cases where the parties agree that Plaintiffs were diagnosed with diabetes prior to ingesting Lipitor, it is impossible that Lipitor caused their diabetes, and the Court grants summary judgment on this ground as well.
As explained in more detail below, the Court also excluded the expert testimony of Dr. David Handshoe and Dr. Elizabeth Murphy, the two specific causation experts in the bellwether cases because their opinions were based on nothing more than an increased risk and temporal association. (CMO 55; Dkt. No. 1283; CMO 76, Dkt. No. 1517). However, Plaintiffs noted that in the SPARCL study, patients with certain characteristics and taking 80 mg of Lipitor had a relative risk ratio of developing diabetes greater than 2.0, meaning it was more likely than not that these individuals would not have developed diabetes in the absence of Lipitor. Thus, it was possible that Plaintiffs with such characteristics and taking 80 mg of Lipitor might be able to proffer a specific causation expert opinion that would survive Daubert , even if the Court's ruling in CMO 55 was correct, and the Court entered a scheduling order to identify and take to trial such a case. (See CMO 61, Dkt. No. 1323).
For an in depth discussion of relative risk and its implications, see CMO 55, Dkt. No. 1283.
However, in a hearing on the matter on January 22, 2016, Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel stated that there was no plaintiff in the MDL that met those criteria. (Dkt. No. 1347 at 5). Thus, the Court turned to where that left the MDL proceedings:
THE COURT: Let's talk for just a minute about where that leaves us .... let me ask this first from the plaintiffs: Is there any reason to believe that if we picked a 20– or 40– milligram case to try as a bellwether that you would have any
class of cases or factual presentation or new theory that might survive specific causation, assuming the correctness of the Murphy order? Mr. Hahn?
MR. HAHN: The short answer is no, sir, Your Honor, we don't. Given the Murphy order and the Court's reading of the medicine, we are not going to be able to get a differential diagnosis that's going to survive.
THE COURT: Well, it's not a differential diagnosis, you've got to show specific causation more likely than not. And you have an opinion to that ....
But if we assume for a minute that the critical question then is whether the Court is correct regarding the standard, if you are telling me, Mr. Hahn, that if I'm correct, then you're not going to have a case that survives summary judgment?
MR. HAHN: Yes, Sir.
(Dkt. No. 1347 at 9–10). The Court went on to discuss with counsel options for proceeding within the MDL. Defendant's Lead Counsel suggested the Court issue an order to show cause to see if any Plaintiff could differentiate her case and then, if not, grant summary judgment in all cases, and Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel agreed:
MR. CHEFFO [Defendant's Lead Counsel]: ... So I think what is most efficient for this litigation ... is to have that ultimately reviewed, right? And I think that what other courts in similar situations have done is they have basically said, just issue an order to show cause and said, look, you know, if anybody thinks that they are differently situated or has some kind of different argument or something else, they can come forward; if not, what we are going to do is we are going to grant judgment on that.
.... they would then ... presumably get appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Circuit Court would do what it's going to do. And I think that's the appropriate ... remedy in an MDL.
.... the most efficient way is to expeditiously grant summary judgment for all the cases on that ground, and anything else, get to the Fourth Circuit and have the Court review it.
THE COURT: Mr. Hahn, what your thoughts?
MR. HAHN [Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel]: Judge, I—I believe that Mark was cheating and reading off of my notepad. We basically agree .....
(Dkt. No. 1347 at 11–13).
The Court took counsel's suggestion and issued CMO 65, which stated,
NOTICE: THIS ORDER CONTAINS AN IMPORTANT DEADLINE FOR ALL PLAINTIFFS .
Lead Plaintiffs' counsel advised the Court in an on the record telephone conference of January 22, 2016, that, if the Court's ruling excluding the expert testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Murphy (CMO 55, Dkt. No. 1283) is correctly decided, then none of the cases now pending in the MDL will be able to survive summary judgment on the issue of specific causation. Notice is hereby given that any Plaintiff who disputes the position taken by Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel and asserts that her case can survive summary judgment on specific causation even if the Court's ruling in CMO 55 is upheld on appeal, such Plaintiff shall provide notice to the Court within 15 days of this order and set forth with specificity how her case is distinguished from the Court's ruling in CMO 55. The Court will then promptly set a schedule in each such case for identifying expert witnesses, submitting expert reports, deposing identified experts, and briefing Daubert and dispositive motions.
(Dkt. No. 1352). CMO 65 did not require any Plaintiff to marshal any evidence within 15 days. The Order only required that Plaintiffs give notice within the 15–day period. The Court explicitly stated that if any Plaintiff came forward, it would then set a pre-trial schedule in those case(s), allowing Plaintiffs time to develop expert testimony. However, not a single Plaintiff came forward. Nor did a single Plaintiff ask for an extension of time to file a notice in response to CMO 65. This Order was issued on January 25, 2016, and now, nearly eleven months later, still not a single Plaintiff has come forward in response to this Order and asked to proceed with her case.
On June 9, 2016, the Court held a Status Conference to discuss proceeding with summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 1550). Plaintiffs, for the first time, had appellate counsel appear in front of the Court. (Id .). It was in this conference that Plaintiffs' counsel indicated, for the first time in this litigation, that some plaintiffs may possibly be able to survive summary judgment despite the Court's Daubert rulings:
MR. HAHN: ... And by taking up 10, 20, and 40, your general causation opinions, and then Murphy's specific causation opinion, I don't think we can have a summary judgment as to all the other plaintiffs in the litigation, because those other plaintiffs, in some states you don't have to have [an] expert—New Mexico is one—.... there may be other plaintiffs that have—haven't had the opportunity, and plan to put up a specific causation expert that's going to give an opinion that would get them to a jury.
THE COURT: No, no, I had—I entered an order, Mr. Hahn, in which I said if any of you don't agree with the lead counsel's position about specific causation, you need, by a designated date, to identify your case and provide me the names of your experts, so we can get on with discovery.
MR. HAHN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: So I don't think we're out there with other potential cases. Now this issue of states that do not require expert testimony on causation, ... I wasn't aware there were such states.
(Dkt. No. 1550 at 7). The Court went on to state: "let's assume there are. Then the brief in opposition could say all claims from the following—from the State of New Mexico, we oppose it, because there's not a[n expert] requirement .... the plaintiff would still have to make a showing of whatever is required under that law to establish causation, even if you don't need an expert..." (Id . at 9). Thus, Court set a scheduling for briefing on summary judgment, (CMO 79, Dkt. No. 1548), and Plaintiffs had an opportunity to come forward with evidence under this new theory in opposition to summary judgment.
However, when the deadline for opposition to summary judgment came a month-and-a-half later, not a single Plaintiff came forward with evidence that she claimed precluded the entry of summary judgment. Instead, Plaintiffs argued that it was theoretically possible that some unidentified Plaintiff(s) may possibly have some unidentified circumstantial, non-expert evidence of specific causation. (Dkt. No. 1586). In this opposition, Plaintiffs readily acknowledged that any Plaintiff "who believed she could adduce a differential diagnosis that could survive Daubert notwithstanding the exclusion of Dr. Murphy's expert testimony in Hempstead " should have come forward in response to CMO 65, (Dkt. No. 1586 at 13), but argued that Plaintiffs should be allowed to present non-expert testimony to transferor courts after remand.
Given this speculative response, the Court gave Plaintiffs a third opportunity to come forward if any thought her case could survive summary judgment. The Court issued CMO 81, which stated in part:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any Plaintiff who asserts that her case can survive summary judgment on specific causation even if the Court's ruling in CMO 55 is upheld on appeal, must file a response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 1564) within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order. Any such response must specifically identify the particular Plaintiff opposing summary judgment, identify the substantive state law that she contends applies to her claims, and include all evidence that she asserts precludes the entry of summary judgment in her case.
If any Plaintiff contends that she needs additional case-specific discovery to provide such evidence, she must comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) and identify the specific facts that are yet to be discovered. Should the claims of any Plaintiff survive summary judgment based on Rule 56(d), the Court will then promptly enter a scheduling order in each such case allowing for appropriate discovery and the filing of dispositive motions after discovery.
(Dkt. No. 1599 at 3–4). Again, not a single Plaintiff came forward with evidence of specific causation. Nor did a single Plaintiff make an individualized Rule 56(d) request.
Instead, Plaintiffs filed an omnibus response arguing that, other than the two bellwether Plaintiffs, no Plaintiff has had an opportunity to develop the facts of her case. (Dkt. No. 1611). Inexplicably, Plaintiffs argued that none of the Plaintiffs (other than the two bellwether Plaintiffs) have had an opportunity to "hire experts" or "prepare expert reports," (Dkt. No. 1661 at 8), despite the fact that CMO 65 offered any Plaintiff the opportunity to do just that.
In the Rule 56(d) affidavit filed with Plaintiffs' response, Plaintiffs stated that they needed an opportunity to seek (1) "[e]vidence, testimony, and (if necessary) third-party discovery from their treating physicians," (2) "[e]xpert opinions regarding specific causation," and (3) "their patient records." (Dkt. No. 1611–1). Plaintiffs did not state any other information that they need to seek to defend against this motion for summary judgment.
Thus, the Court issued CMO 82. First, the Court held that the time for Plaintiffs to come forward and argue that they could produce expert testimony on specific causation had passed:
As an initial matter, the time for a Plaintiff to come forward and argue that she could produce an expert opinion on specific causation that would survive Daubert has passed. The Court issued an order to show cause on this seven months ago , and explicitly stated that it would allow any such plaintiff to proceed with discovery and pre-trial proceedings, and in the last seven months not a single Plaintiff has come forward. Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel testifies that he understood his admission at the January 22, 2016 status conference as a confirmation "on the ability of Plaintiffs to survive the evidentiary standards for specific-causation expert evidence set forth in CMO 55" and that he understood CMO 65 to "relate to whether individual Plaintiffs believe their case could survive the Rule 702 expert standards in CMO 55." (Dkt. No. 1611–1 at 6–7). Whatever the dispute about non-expert evidence, there can be no dispute, and according the Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel's affidavit, there is no dispute, that any Plaintiff who believed she could proffer expert evidence on specific causation that would
survive Rule 702 and Daubert was required to come forward in response to CMO 65. (See also Dkt. No. 1611 at 17 ("CMO 65 directed any Plaintiff who thought they could survive summary judgment on specific causation in light of the Court's exclusion of Dr. Murphy in CMO 55 (Doc. 1283) to come forward with new or additional expert evidence."); Dkt. No. 1611 at 18 ("Plaintiffs continued to understand the Court's order to relate to whether individual Plaintiffs believed their case could survive the Rule 702 expert standards in CMO 55, not the separate legal issue of whether the law of their state requires expert evidence.")). No Plaintiff has done so. Therefore, Plaintiffs' argument that they have not had an opportunity to seek specific causation expert testimony is meritless. The Court provided that opportunity in CMO 65, not a single Plaintiff came forward, and by not coming forward in response to CMO 65, Plaintiffs have waived that argument.
(Dkt. No. 1616 at 7–8 (emphasis in original)).
The Court went on to provide Plaintiffs with a fourth and final opportunity to come forward with non-expert evidence:
With regard to non-expert evidence, in an abundance of caution, the Court will provide Plaintiffs with a fourth and final opportunity to come forward. Plaintiffs have argued that 15 days is not sufficient time to marshal their evidence. Thus, the Court will afford them an additional 60 days. The Court notes that the only facts that Plaintiffs have stated they may need to discover (other than expert testimony) to defend against summary judgment is information from their own treating physicians and their own patient records. (Dkt. No. 1611–1 at 5). They have not requested any discovery from Defendants or other third-parties.
Given the nature of the evidence that Plaintiffs claim they need time to marshal, specifically their request to marshal their own medical records and information from their own treating physicians, the Court finds 60 days sufficient.
The Court also noted that Plaintiffs had not "stated how long they need to marshal this evidence or suggested any proposed timeline for obtaining it." (Id. at 8 n.5).
In response to CMO 82, no Plaintiff made a Rule 56(d) motion. Thus, the additional 60 days did prove sufficient. In addition to the omnibus responses to summary judgment filed by the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, (Dkt. Nos. 1586, 1611, 1684), two sets of Plaintiffs filed responses to CMO 82. Thirty-four Plaintiffs ("the Hayes Law Firm Plaintiffs") submitted their Plaintiff Fact Sheets (PFSs) and certain medical records. (Dkt. Nos. 1670, 1682, 1686, 1687, 1688). They contend that (1) they were not diabetic before taking Lipitor, (2) they were diagnosed with diabetes after taking Lipitor, and (3) they did not have certain risk factors for diabetes, even though they had others. (See Dkt. No. 1670 at 17–39). At oral argument counsel stated this was "the best thing I could come up with with nonexpert evidence," that "[t]hey are not diabetic before taking the medication, they took Lipitor and then they became diabetic." (Dkt. No. 1727 at 24).
The Douglas & London Plaintiffs did not initially submit any evidence to the Court and simply argued that summary judgment was precluded by:
(a) their respective health history and conditions as documented in their medical records, pharmacy records and/or other relevant records;
(b) their respective Plaintiff Fact Sheets ("PFS's") that have already been served
on Defendants and any and all amendments thereto;
(c) the general causation evidence identified and discussed in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 22, 2016 [Dkt. 1586]; and
(d) the substantive state law that applies to each D&L Plaintiff's respective claims.
(Dkt. No. 1689 at 5 (footnotes omitted)). The Court entered a text order stating that these Plaintiffs must submit to the Court any evidence that they wished to the Court to consider. (Dkt. No. 1695). In response, Plaintiffs literally dumped boxes upon boxes of documents on the Court, with no discernment or suggestion as to which documents they claimed precluded summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 1698, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703, 1704, 1705, 1706). Nevertheless, the Court reviewed these documents as well, almost all of which were completely irrelevant. For example, the documents include pictures from colonoscopies, EKGs, and pap smear results.
The Court held oral argument on the omnibus motion on November 1, 2016, and the matter is now before the Court for a decision.
B. The Court's Daubert Rulings
1. General Causation
On September 24–25, 2015, the Court heard extended oral argument on Defendant's motions to exclude common expert witnesses, including Plaintiffs' general causation experts. (Dkt. Nos. 1147, 1148). One of the primary issues raised both in briefing and at oral argument was the importance of dosage.
Lipitor is prescribed in four different doses: 10 mg, 20 mg, 40 mg, and 80 mg. Plaintiffs' general causation experts initially "opine[d] that Lipitor can cause diabetes, without specifying the precise dose at which this effect begins." (Dkt. No. 1159 at 26). If a study suggested an increased risk of diabetes, the experts "ascribe[d] the risk to all doses." (E.g., Dkt. No. 972 at 269). However, Pfizer argued that "[d]ose is critical to proving general causation," and that Plaintiffs lacked reliable evidence that Lipitor causes diabetes at doses less than 80 mg. (Id . at 49).
After reviewing the studies relied on by the experts and their opinions, the Court was concerned about whether Plaintiffs' experts had sufficient facts and data to support their causation opinions at all doses of Lipitor, and even whether the experts would be willing to offer an opinion at low doses, given the available data. See In re Seroquel Products Liab. Litig ., No. 6:06–MD–1769–ORL–22D, 2009 WL 3806434, at *18 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2009) (Expert offering a causation opinion "declined to even speculate" about doses of 12.5 and 25 milligrams "because she had not seen any studies evaluating doses that low."); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig ., 524 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1175–76 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("It is unsurprising that most of plaintiffs' experts agree that the available evidence at 200 mg/d [as opposed to higher doses] is inadequate to prove causation."). The Plaintiffs' experts agreed, and some even emphatically argued, that there was a dose-response relationship, meaning that any risk of diabetes is higher at higher doses of Lipitor, and the data with regard to 80 mg of Lipitor was starkly different from the data with regard to 10 mg of Lipitor. Thus, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on this issue. (Dkt. No. 1149).
See CMO 68, Dkt. No. 1469, for a full description of the data and studies relied upon by Plaintiffs' experts.
After a thorough review of relevant caselaw and the expert opinions at issue, the Court issued an order on October 22, 2015, holding that "at least where the experts agree that there is a dose-response relationship and where there is evidence that an association no longer holds at low doses, dose certainly matters, and Plaintiffs must have expert testimony that Lipitor causes, or is capable of causing, diabetes at particular dosages." (CMO 49, Dkt. No. 1197 at 11). Over Defendant's strenuous objections, the Court re-opened expert discovery and allowed additional time for Plaintiffs to serve supplemental reports offering opinions as to whether Lipitor causes diabetes at dosages of 10 mg, 20 mg, 40 mg, and 80 mg. (Seeid .). The parties served supplemental expert reports on general causation in December of 2015 and January of 2016, and then filed supplemental briefs on Pfizer's motion to exclude Plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony in February of 2016. (See CMO 50, Dkt. No. 1230; CMO 60, Dkt. No. 1318). The Court heard additional oral argument on March 18, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1460).
In a forty-page order issued on March 30, 2016, the Court ultimately excluded Plaintiffs' expert opinions on general causation, except for the opinion of Plaintiffs' epidemiologist, Dr. Singh, that Lipitor 80 mg causes diabetes. (CMO 68, Dkt. No. 1469). The Court found Dr. Singh's 10 mg opinion was not based on sufficient facts and data and that Dr. Singh did not reliably apply the epidemiological/Bradford Hill method because this method requires a statistically significant association be established through studies and such studies do not exist for Lipitor 10 mg. (Dkt. No. 1469 at 15–16). Plaintiffs conceded that Dr. Singh could not offer an opinion at Lipitor 20 mg or Lipitor 40 mg if the Court excluded his opinion regarding Lipitor 10 mg. (Id . at 24).
The Court also excluded the opinions of Dr. Quon, an endocrinologist who ostensibly reached his conclusion via a literature review but who admittedly cherry-picked studies to support his conclusion rather than considering the totality of the literature, (id . at 27–34); Dr. Roberts, a cardiologist, who claimed in her report to use the Bradford Hill method used by epidemiologists but who seemed to misunderstand the methodology's basic premise in deposition, who cherry-picked studies for consideration and failed to consider contrary evidence, and who failed to provide any analysis of particular dosages as required by CMO 49, (id . at 34–38); and Dr. Gale, who failed to provide any analysis of particular dosages as required by CMO 49 and who ascribed the risk observed at Lipitor 80 mg to all dosages of Lipitor. (Id . at 38–39). Thus, the only admissible opinion on general causation is Dr. Singh's opinion regarding Lipitor 80 mg.
2. Specific Causation
Diabetes is a complicated and progressive disease, and a number of factors, including genetics, diet, exercise, age, and weight play a significant role in the development of new onset diabetes. (See, e.g ., Dkt. No. 972 at 16–22, Dkt. No. 1047 at 9–12; Dkt. No. 1004–3 at 325–26). This makes teasing out the role of Lipitor, if there is one, in the development of a particular patient's diabetes difficult. Interestingly, none of Plaintiffs' general causation experts could think of a method to determine whether a particular patient's diabetes was caused by Lipitor or caused by other risk factors and testified that they themselves could not determine whether a particular patient's diabetes was caused by Lipitor. Plaintiffs' specific causation experts have never diagnosed a patient with Lipitor-induced (or statin-induced) diabetes outside of this litigation, and they could not identify anyone else who applied their methodologies to do so outside of this litigation.
Plaintiffs in this MDL are not the first to grapple with the problems of proving causation where the alleged injury is a complicated, progressive, multi-factor disease like diabetes. In Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP , 602 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2010), the plaintiff claimed that the drug Seroquel caused her to develop diabetes, and the Eleventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of her expert testimony on causation. The expert first testified that "she knew of no methodology for ruling out alternative causes [of diabetes ]" and then later testified that other potential causes were "not solely responsible" because plaintiff developed diabetes after taking Seroquel and other risk factors remained constant. Id . at 1249–50. The Eleventh Circuit held that this reliance on temporal proximity did not "satisfy the requirement that a differential diagnosis consider possible alternative causes." Id . at 1254. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the expert's second explanation that all risk factors work together to cause diabetes, holding that "[a]n expert ... cannot merely conclude that all risk factors for a disease are substantial contributing factors in its development." Id . at 1255.
Similarly, in Haller v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 598 F.Supp.2d 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2009), the plaintiff claimed Seroquel caused her to develop diabetes. Again, plaintiff's expert could not rule out other possible causes of diabetes or the possibility that these other risk factors were solely to blame. Id . at 1278, 1278–79. The court held that temporal connection is legally insufficient and the last additive factor argument was "largely temporal proximity in disguise." Id . at 1297–98. These same issues surfaced with Plaintiffs' specific causation experts in this MDL.
The first bellwether Plaintiff, Plaintiff Daniels, proffered the testimony of Dr. David Handshoe on the issue of specific causation. The second bellwether Plaintiff, Plaintiff Hempstead proffered the testimony of both Dr. Handshoe and Dr. Murphy on the issue of specific causation. Pfizer moved to exclude the testimony of both experts, (Dkt. Nos. 1004, 1006), and the Court held two separate days of oral argument on these motions in October and December of 2015. (Dkt. Nos. 1196, 1273).
On December 11, 2015, the Court issued CMO 55, excluding the testimony of Dr. Murphy. (Dkt. No. 1283). Dr. Murphy determined that the most reliable data suggested a relative risk ratio of developing diabetes while taking Lipitor to be around 1.6. (Dkt. No. 1006–3 at 49). Using this estimate of relative risk, 63% of the people who take Lipitor and develop diabetes would have done so in the absence of Lipitor , whereas 37% of the people who take Lipitor and develop diabetes did so only because they took Lipitor. Thus, the Court turned to Dr. Murphy's methodology for concluding that Plaintiff Hempstead was in the 37% that developed diabetes due to Lipitor, rather than the 63% that would have done so regardless. (Dkt. No. 1283 at 10).
For an in depth discussion of relative risk and its implications, see CMO 55, Dkt. No. 1283. For purposes of the motion to exclude Dr. Murphy's testimony, the Court assumed that general causation could be established. (Dkt. No. 1283 at 1).
Dr. Murphy testified that Plaintiff Hempstead's BMI, adult weight gain, family history, age, and hypertension were all significant or substantial contributing factors in Plaintiff Hempstead's development of diabetes. (Dkt. No. 1275–2 at 185, 186, 247). Dr. Murphy's opinion that Lipitor was also a substantial contributing factor to Plaintiff Hempstead's development of diabetes was based on population studies showing that Lipitor increases the risk of diabetes (an element of general causation) and a temporal relationship, i.e., that Ms. Hempstead took Lipitor before developing diabetes. (See Dkt. No. 1283 at 11–15). Dr. Murphy failed to offer any explanation as to why Ms. Hempstead's other risk factors for diabetes, alone or in combination, were not solely responsible for Ms. Hempstead's diabetes. (Id . at 28). The Court ultimately held this data and methodology insufficient under Rule 702 and excluded the testimony. (Seeid .). The Court later denied Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider its exclusion of Dr. Murphy's testimony in CMO 75, Dkt. No. 1514.
Ms. Hempstead began taking Lipitor in 1998 and was diagnosed with diabetes in 2004. (Dkt. No. 1004–34 at 4, 5).
On May 11, 2016, the Court issued CMO 76, excluding the testimony of Dr. Handshoe in both this case and the Daniels case. Dr. Handshoe testified that the best estimate of the relative risk ratio for diabetes associated with statin use was 1.25. (Dkt. No. 1004–6 at 238–39). Using this estimate of relative risk, 80% of the people who take Lipitor and develop diabetes would have done so in the absence of Lipitor , whereas 20% of the people who take Lipitor and develop diabetes did so only because they took Lipitor. Thus, the Court turned to Dr. Handshoe's methodology for concluding that Plaintiffs Daniels and Hempstead were in the 20% that developed diabetes due to Lipitor, rather than the 80% that would have done so regardless. (Dkt. No. 1517 at 7–8). Interestingly, Dr. Handshoe testified that if he walked into a room of 100 patients with diabetes, he could not pick out which ones would have "statin induced diabetes" as opposed to "non-statin induced diabetes." (Dkt. No. 1004–6 at 163). He testified he could not do this with ten people or with two people. (Id .). Thus, the Court was curious how he accomplished it in the cases of Ms. Daniels and Ms. Hempstead.
With regard to Ms. Hempstead, Dr. Handshoe stated that he felt her overweight BMI was "not clinically significant given that ... she had multiple normal blood sugars even with this weight." (Dkt. No. 1004–42 at 109). He testified that he did not know whether adult weight gain increased a patient's risk of diabetes and, therefore, did not consider it. (Dkt. No. 1004–42 at 109, 110). Dr. Handshoe acknowledged that Plaintiff Hempstead's ethnic background and age increased her risk of diabetes but summarily dismissed these as potential causes of her diabetes based on his "clinical judgment." (Id . at 142, 144, 206–08). Dr. Handshoe simply did not consider other risk factors that he testified were independent risk factors for diabetes, such as hypertension, elevated triglycerides and low HDL. (Id . at 181, 194). In the Daniels case, Dr. Handshoe testified that the diabetes risk factors were additive: "you have this risk, you have that risk, I think the risks are additive. I mean, how can you tease out that only one thing caused somebody's diabetes..." (Dkt. No. 1004–6 at 134). However, Dr. Handshoe took the opposite position in his deposition in this case. He testified that Lipitor was "the only factor" in Ms. Hempstead's development of diabetes, finding that all other factors were "not significant to my clinical judgment." (Id . at 236, 237). He testified that his analysis was based solely on temporal relationship: Ms. Hempstead took Lipitor and developed diabetes after taking Lipitor. (Id . at 145–46). The Court excluded Dr. Handshoe's testimony as unreliable for multiple reasons in CMO 76. (Dkt. No. 1517). C. Summary Judgment Arguments
In their response to this summary judgment motion and in response to the summary judgment motions filed in the two bellwether cases on the same day in this MDL, Plaintiffs raise for the first time the argument that they can survive summary judgment on both general and specific causation without expert testimony. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has admitted that Lipitor can cause Type 2 diabetes at doses lower than 80 mg and that these alleged admissions are competent evidence of general causation. (Dkt. No. 1586 at 15–26). With regard to specific causation, Plaintiffs argue that they may be able to survive summary judgment with some evidence other than expert testimony and argue that the Court should remand all of the cases in the MDL back to the transferor courts for those courts to take up the issue on specific causation. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only material facts–those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law"—will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id .
At the summary judgment stage, the court must "construe the evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Dash v. Mayweather , 731 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2013). However, "the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." Id . at 311.
III. Discussion
Here, Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs have no evidence to support two essential elements of her claims—general and specific causation. " Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must cite to evidence in the record that would allow a jury to infer that Lipitor is capable of causing diabetes at dosages of less than 80 mg and that it did in fact cause individual Plaintiffs to develop diabetes.
A. General Causation
As explained above, the Court excluded Plaintiffs' expert testimony on general causation with respect to dosages of less than 80 mg. (See CMO 49, Dkt. No. 1197; CMO 68, Dkt. No. 1469). Because Plaintiffs at issue here were prescribed and ingested Lipitor is dosages of less than 80 mg prior to their diabetes diagnosis, they have no admissible expert testimony regarding general causation. However, Plaintiffs argue that alleged admissions by Defendant are sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that four pieces of evidence constitute admissions by Defendant that Lipitor can cause diabetes at dosages less than 80 mg:
(1) An email from Senior Vice President David DeMicco;
(2) the U.S. Lipitor label stating that "[i]ncreases in HbA1c and fasting
serum glucose levels have been reported with [statins], including LIPITOR";
(3) Parke–Davis's New Drug Application (NDA) data showing that Lipitor was associated with increases in blood glucose levels;
(4) The official Lipitor website, which states that "[e]levated blood sugar levels have been reported with statins, including LIPITOR."; and
(5) Pfizer's Japanese label insert for Lipitor.
Parke–Davis is the predecessor of Pfizer.
(Dkt. No. 1586 at 16). Plaintiffs argue that these pieces of evidence are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) for the truth of the matter asserted. Except for the Japanese label, Pfizer does not dispute the admissibility of the evidence put forward by Plaintiffs. Pfizer, however, does dispute that this evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment in the absence of expert testimony.
Pfizer has filed a motion in limine to exclude the Japanese label. (Dkt. No. 1163).
1. Erie Question
Plaintiffs generally argue that state substantive law controls whether expert evidence of causation is needed to survive summary judgment in products liability cases. (Dkt. No. 1586 at 26–35). However, Plaintiffs also argue that state law does not control whether expert evidence of causation is needed to survive summary judgment if the non-expert evidence of causation at issue is a party opponent admission under Rule 801(d)(2). (Dkt. No. 1634 at 32–33). In the specific instance where non-expert testimony of causation consists of a party opponent admission, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 56 supersedes state law and requires denial of summary judgment. (Id .). Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. Either Rule 56 supersedes any state law on what type of evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment or substantive state law governs whether expert testimony is required to survive summary judgment. Thus, the Court first addresses whether federal or state law controls this question under Erie .
Indeed, one of the reasons Plaintiffs argue that the Court should suggest remand of all cases to their transferor courts for resolution of specific causation issues is that state law controls this question. (Dkt. No. 1586 at 35–43).
"Under the familiar Erie doctrine, [courts] apply state substantive law and federal procedural law when reviewing state-law claims." Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors , 824 F.3d 62, 74 (4th Cir. 2016). To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies to the claims at issue, they are clearly correct. See Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co ., 723 F.2d 370, 372 (4th Cir. 1983) ("A federal standard determines the sufficiency of the evidence for submission of an issue to a jury."); Fitzgerald v. Manning , 679 F.2d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[W]hether there is sufficient evidence to create a jury issue of those essential substantive elements of the action, as defined by state law, is controlled by federal rules."); Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Ill. v. S. Ry. Corp ., 483 F.2d 1044, 1046 (4th Cir. 1973) ("We apply a federal standard to determine whether the plaintiff's case presented a jury question."). However, this is not the end of the inquiry.
Indeed, this is the standard cited by the Court above as the legal standard governing the motion at issue.
The substantive elements of a state claim, including the applicable standard of care, whether the standard has been violated, and whether the alleged violation is the cause of a plaintiff's injury, are all questions determined by state law when a court sits in diversity. Fitzgerald , 679 F.2d at 346. And a number of federal courts sitting in diversity have held that whether a plaintiff must offer admissible expert testimony regarding medical causation in complex products liability cases is a matter of substantive state law because such a rule is part of the substantive element of causation. See, e.g. , In re Mirena IUD Prod. Liab. Litig ., No. 13–MC–2434 (CS), 202 F.Supp.3d 304, 314, 2016 WL 4059224, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016) ("[T]he issue here is not so much whether the alleged admissions are admissible against [defendant] as a matter of the law of evidence, but whether as a matter of substantive products liability law admissions can substitute for expert evidence of causation, given the widely held principle that expert testimony is required in cases involving a complex or technical question outside the ken of the average lay juror."); Silverman v. Watson Pharm., Inc ., No. CIV.A. H–10–1952, 2013 WL 1645771, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2013) ("[Defendant] asks the court to conflate federal procedural law governing the admissibility of expert testimony with Texas substantive law regarding the levels of proof required to demonstrate causation in a toxic tort case.").
In other words, while the question of whether evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment is generally a matter of federal procedural law, "the 'expert testimony' rule" may be "so closely interrelated with the substantive cause of action ... that federal courts sitting in diversity cases should apply the state rule in order to fully realize state substantive policy." Hemingway v. Ochsner Clinic , 722 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir. 1984) ; see also Milam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co ., 972 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[W]here a state in furtherance of its substantive policy makes it more difficult to prove a particular type of state-law claim, the rule by which it does this, even if denominated a rule of evidence or cast in evidentiary terms, will be given effect in a diversity suit as an expression of state substantive policy."); Burke v. Air Serv Int'l, Inc ., 685 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("[S]tate law controls where it makes a precondition to recovery in a medical-malpractice action the proffer of expert testimony to prove an element of the substantive-law claim, such as standard of care or causation.") (quoting 9 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 6263, at 204 (1997)); Bryte ex rel. Bryte v. Am. Household, Inc ., 429 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting the difference between "a procedural rule governing admissibility" of expert testimony and "substantive state rules on the sufficiency of evidence"). Like other federal courts that have addressed the issue, this Court finds that a state law requirement that expert testimony is necessary to establish a particular element of a cause of action, such as causation, is a statement of state substantive policy, "intimately bound up with the state right or obligation." DiAntonio v. Northampton–Accomack Mem'l Hosp ., 628 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp ., 349 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1965) ). Because such a rule defines and limits the primary rights and obligations of the parties, it "must be applied under the Erie doctrine." Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp ., 947 F.2d 95, 109 (4th Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., Lewis v. Johnson & Johnson, 601 Fed.Appx. 205, 211 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), (holding that under Texas law "expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors."); Root v. Tempe St. Luke's Hosp., 368 Fed.Appx. 848, 848–49 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Arizona law requiring expert testimony to establish causation); Yih–Ling Shieh Wu v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. C13–955–JPD, 2014 WL 2987338, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 2, 2014) (applying Washington requiring expert testimony to establish causation between an accident and an injury); Duke v. Garcia, No. 11–CV–784–BRB/RHS, 2014 WL 1333151, at *1 n.1 (D.N.M. Feb. 28, 2014) (applying New Mexico law requiring expert testimony to establish medical causation); In re Trasylol Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 08–MD–1928, 2013 WL 1343529, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2013) (applying New York law that requires causation to be established by expert testimony).
To the extent that state substantive law requires causation to be established by expert testimony, it is also a question of state substantive law whether party-opponent admissions can substitute for expert evidence of causation. In re Mirena , 202 F.Supp.3d at 314, 2016 WL 4059224 at *8. However, as explained more fully below, the argument that party-opponent admissions can substitute for expert evidence is a recent and novel one created by plaintiffs in multi-district litigations where expert evidence has been excluded under Daubert . Thus, the state courts have not had an opportunity to pass on the specific question, and the Court must "predict what the Supreme Court of [various states] would decide." Doe v. Doe , 973 F.2d 237, 240 (4th Cir. 1992). In doing so, the Court is guided by the Fourth Circuit's admonition that "a federal court in the exercise of its diversity jurisdiction should act conservatively when asked to predict how a state court would proceed on a novel issue of state law," Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co ., 636 F.3d 88, 97–98 (4th Cir. 2011), and the few federal cases that address the issue.
If the Court's ruling is incorrect, and Plaintiffs are correct that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 supersedes any state law on what type of evidence is required to survive summary judgment, then that rule would also apply here. Federal law, under Rule 56, would govern whether expert testimony is required to survive summary judgment, and the Court need not engage in the 53 jurisdiction analysis below but simply rely on the ample federal precedent that expert testimony is required when medical causation is outside the common knowledge of lay jurors. See, e.g., Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., LLC, 766 F.3d 1296, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014) ("To prove Fixodent caused [plaintiff's injury], [plaintiffs] were required to have Daubert -qualified, general and specific-causation-expert testimony that would be admissible at trial to avoid summary judgment."), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2312, 191 L.Ed.2d 1000 (2015) ; Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 268 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]o establish causation, they must offer admissible expert testimony regarding both general causation, i.e., that xylene exposure can cause the type of ailments from which [plaintiff] claims to suffer; and specific causation, i.e., that xylene exposure actually caused his alleged neurological problems.").
2. Expert Testimony is Required Under State Substantive Law.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs dispute whether state substantive law requires expert testimony in this instance. Plaintiffs argue that state law "reflects a spectrum of subtly varying rules" that ranges from the requirement of expert testimony to no requirement at all. (Dkt. No. 1586 at 27). The variance is not nearly as great as Plaintiffs would have the Court believe.
While the specific language used by courts vary to some degree, all jurisdictions require expert testimony at least where the issues are medically complex and outside common knowledge and lay experience. See, e.g., Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc ., 680 So.2d 262, 269 (Ala. 1996) (expert testimony required to establish causation where "the nature and origin" of the injury is "beyond the understanding of the average person"); E.C. ex rel. Crocker v. Child Dev. Sch., Inc ., No. 3:10–CV–759–WKW, 2011 WL 4501560, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2011) ("[E]xpert medical testimony, and not lay testimony, is required to demonstrate proximate cause, given the complexity of E.C.'s heart condition."); Choi v. Anvil , 32 P.3d 1, 3 (Alaska 2001) (expert testimony required to establish a causal connection "where there is no reasonably apparent ... causal relationship between the event demonstrated and the result sought to be proved"); Voyles v. State , No. A–9377, 2008 WL 4951416, at *18 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2008) ("The test is whether the basis of the [casual] conclusion (once explained) can be readily understood and assessed by lay jurors."); Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC , 239 Ariz. 546, 373 P.3d 563, 566 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (expert testimony required to establish causation "unless a causal relationship is readily apparent to the trier of fact"); Gentry v. Daugherity , No. CV–13–02136–PHX–ESW, 2015 WL 1346097, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2015) ("Unless an injury is obvious to the jury, expert medical testimony is required to establish the nature and extent of the injury as well as its relationship to the accident.") (citing Arizona cases); Isham v. Booneville Cmty. Hosp ., No. 2:14–CV–2018, 2015 WL 4133098, at *2 (W.D. Ark. July 8, 2015) ("Under Arkansas law, expert witness testimony is required to prove that any negligence of Defendants was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, as Plaintiff in this case alleged medical injuries based on a theory that involved complex determinations of medical issues that would not and could not be commonly understood by a lay person."); Richardson v. Union Pac. R. Co ., 386 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Ark. App. Ct. 2011) ("[W]hen there is no obvious origin to an injury and it has multiple potential etiologies, expert testimony is necessary to establish causation."); Miranda v. Bomel Const. Co ., 187 Cal.App.4th 1326, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 538, 545–46 (2010) ("The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony."); Sclafani v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp ., 14 F.Supp.3d 1351, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 2014) ("Under California law, although juries are normally permitted to decide issues of causation without guidance from experts," issues of causation "beyond the experience of laymen and can only be explained through expert testimony."); Howell v. Centric Grp., LLC , No. 09–CV–02299–MSK–CBS, 2011 WL 4499372, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2011) ("Although causation may sometimes be inferred simply from circumstantial evidence, where questions of causation are beyond the knowledge and experience of ordinary persons, expert testimony may be required.") (applying Colorado law), aff'd , 508 Fed.Appx. 834 (10th Cir. 2013) ; Xtreme Coil Drilling Corp. v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc ., No. CIV.A. 08–CV–02750, 2010 WL 3777303, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2010) ("Under Colorado law, products liability claims involving matters outside the experience of the average layperson, like negligence claims involving such complex or technical issues, require expert testimony to prove issues such as causation."); Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co ., 302 Conn. 123, 25 A.3d 571, 584 (2011) ("If lay witnesses and common experience are not sufficient to remove the case from the realm of speculation, the plaintiff will need to present expert testimony to establish a prima facie case."); White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc. , 139 Conn.App. 39, 54 A.3d 643, 650 (2012) ( "[W]e ... consistently have held that expert testimony is required when the question involved goes beyond the field of the ordinary knowledge and experience of judges or jurors.") (internal quotations omitted), aff'd , 313 Conn. 610, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) ; Roache v. Charney , 38 A.3d 281, 286 (Del. 2012) ("When the plaintiff's claim involves bodily injuries, the causal connection between the defendant's alleged negligent conduct and the plaintiff's alleged injury must be proven by the direct testimony of a competent medical expert."); Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Trust Fund , 596 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Del. 1991) ("[I]f the matter in issue is one within the knowledge of experts only and not within the common knowledge of laymen, it is necessary for the plaintiff to introduce expert testimony in order to establish a prima facie case.") (internal quotations omitted); Lasley v. Georgetown Univ ., 688 A.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C. 1997) ("Expert testimony is not required if the issue of causation can be resolved wholly within the realm of ordinary human knowledge and experience ... or if the proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror.") (internal quotations omitted); Baltimore v. B.F. Goodrich Co ., 545 A.2d 1228, 1231 (D.C. 1988) (expert testimony required "in cases presenting medically complicated questions due to multiple and/or preexisting causes"); Benitez v. Joseph Trucking, Inc ., 68 So.3d 428, 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (expert testimony is necessary "to establish legal causation where the issue is beyond the common knowledge of laymen"); Gouveia v. Phillips , 823 So.2d 215, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (expert testimony required "when the discrete issue to be decided is not within the abilities of lay jurors"); Cowart v. Widener , 287 Ga. 622, 697 S.E.2d 779, 784 (2010) (expert testimony required "where the existence of a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury cannot be determined from common knowledge and experience and instead requires the assistance of experts with specialized medical knowledge."); Gilbert v. R.J. Taylor Mem'l Hosp., Inc ., 265 Ga. 580, 458 S.E.2d 341, 342 n.4 (1995) ("Although it is conceded that the cause of action is one for simple negligence, rather than for professional malpractice, medical questions are raised, requiring expert evidence."); Barbee v. Queen's Med. Ctr ., 119 Hawai'i 136, 194 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008) ("Hawai'i does recognize a 'common knowledge' exception to the requirement that a plaintiff must introduce expert medical testimony on causation .... The exception is similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , and ... rare in application.") (internal quotations omitted); Bernard v. Char , 79 Hawai'i 371, 903 P.2d 676, 682 (Haw. Ct. App.)
(expert testimony required where "lay jurors are ill prepared to evaluate complicated technical data for the purpose of determining ... whether there is a causal relationship between the violation of a duty and an injury to the patient"), aff'd , 79 Hawai'i 362, 903 P.2d 667 (1995) ; Easterling v. Kendall , 159 Idaho 902, 367 P.3d 1214, 1226 (2016) (expert testimony required where "the causative factors are not ordinarily within the knowledge or experience of laymen composing the jury"), reh'g denied (Mar. 31, 2016); Dodge–Farrar v. Am. Cleaning Servs. Co ., 137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954, 959 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (expert testimony required where the matter is not within "the usual and ordinary experience of the average person"); Brown v. Baker , 284 Ill.App.3d 401, 219 Ill.Dec. 754, 672 N.E.2d 69, 71 (1996) ("[A] plaintiff in a personal injury case must present the testimony of a medical expert to establish causation if the relationship between the claimed injury and the event in question requires special knowledge and training to establish."); Willis v. Westerfield , 839 N.E.2d 1179, 1188 (Ind. 2006) ("[E]xpert testimony is required where the question involves medical factors beyond the common knowledge of the layman."); Topp v. Leffers , 838 N.E.2d 1027, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (expert testimony not required "[w]hen the issue of causation is within the understanding of a lay person."); Welte v. Bello , 482 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 1992) (expert testimony not required when causation is "within the common experience of laypersons"); Donovan v. State , 445 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Iowa 1989) ("[H]ighly technical questions of diagnoses and causation which lie beyond the understanding of a layperson require introduction of expert testimony."); Pope By & For Juby v. Ransdell , 251 Kan. 112, 833 P.2d 965, 973 (1992) ("Expert testimony is necessary where normal experience and qualifications of lay persons serving as jurors does not permit them to draw proper conclusions from the facts and circumstances of the case."); Azmat v. Bauer , No. 2015–CA–000399–MR, 2016 WL 4709135, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2016) (expert testimony required in medical negligence case "in instances where causation is not so obvious as to amount to res ipsa loquitur"); Wilson v. Thyssenkrupp Budd Co ., No. 2005–CA–001567–WC, 2005 WL 3116045, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005) ("When the cause of a condition is not readily apparent to a lay person, medical testimony supporting causation is required."); Burgett v. Troy–Bilt LLC , 970 F.Supp.2d 676, 683 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (expert testimony required for topics "beyond the ken of ordinary persons"), aff'd , 579 Fed.Appx. 372 (6th Cir. 2014) ; Johnson v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co ., 7 So.3d 734, 740 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2009) ("When a conclusion regarding medical causation is not one within common knowledge, expert medical testimony is required in a tort action."); Hutchinson v. Shah , 648 So.2d 451, 452, (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994) ("When the conclusion regarding medical causation is not one within common knowledge, expert medical testimony is required."), writ denied 653 So.2d 570 (La. 1995) ; Darney v. Dragon Prod. Co., LLC , 640 F.Supp.2d 117, 123 (D. Me. 2009) ("[A] jury may not 'infer causation on complex medical facts without the aid of expert testimony.' ") (quoting Merriam v. Wanger , 757 A.2d 778, 782 (Me. 2000) ); Walter v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. , 748 A.2d 961, 972 (Me. 2000) (expert testimony not required where the "harmful results" of a negligent act "are sufficiently obvious as to lie within common knowledge"); Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp ., 134 Md.App. 512, 760 A.2d 315, 319 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) ("It is well settled that expert testimony is required when the subject of the inference is so particularly related to some science or profession that it is beyond the ken of the average layman.") (internal quotations omitted); Miskin v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. , 107 F.Supp.2d 669, 672 (D. Md. 1999) (expert testimony is necessary under Maryland law when "the evidence relating to causation involves technical medical questions beyond the common knowledge of laypersons"), aff'd , 213 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2000) (table decision); Case of Canavan , 432 Mass. 304, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1051 (2000) ("Because understanding medical causation is beyond the knowledge of the ordinary layman proof of if it must rest upon expert medical testimony.") (internal quotations and alterations omitted); Pitts v. Wingate At Brighton, Inc ., 82 Mass.App.Ct. 285, 972 N.E.2d 74, 78 (2012) ("Expert testimony is necessary where proof of medical causation lies outside the ken of lay jurors."); Hendrian v. Safety–Kleen Sys., Inc. , No. 08–CV–14371, 2015 WL 4770966, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2015) ("[E]xpert testimony is often required because the alleged injuries are not immediately obvious and the connection between exposure and injury is not a matter of common sense or everyday experience.") (internal quotations omitted); Dow v. Rheem Mfg. Co ., No. 09–13697–BC, 2011 WL 4484001, at *22 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2011) ("Though not always required, expert testimony on causation is necessary, where the claim presents 'technical issues that are beyond the common experience and understanding of the common juror.' ") (quoting Schaendorf v. Consumers Energy Co. , No. 281001, 2009 WL 563904, at *7–8 (Mich. Ct. App., March 5, 2009) ), aff'd , 527 Fed.Appx. 434 (6th Cir. 2013) ; Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc ., 578 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Minn. 1998)
("Expert opinion is required to prove causation if the issue is outside the realm of common knowledge."); Walton v. Jones , 286 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. 1979) ("[W]hen the causal relation issue is not one within the common knowledge of laymen, causation in fact cannot be determined without expert testimony.") (quotation omitted); Denham v. Holmes ex rel. Holmes , 60 So.3d 773, 789 (Miss. 2011) ("Expert testimony is required unless the matter in issue is within the common knowledge of laymen") (quoting Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1990) ); Berry v. Sw. Airlines Co ., No. CIVA 307CV305TSL–JCS, 2008 WL 3874368, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 15, 2008) ("While in less complex cases where causation may be understood with only common sense, causation may be proved by lay testimony alone; however, with injuries that are medically complicated ... expert testimony is required to prove causation."); Wright v. Barr , 62 S.W.3d 509, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) ("If there is a sophisticated injury, one that requires surgical intervention or other highly scientific techniques for diagnosis, expert medical testimony is required to prove causation."); Pro Serv. Auto., L.L.C. v. Lenan Corp ., 469 F.3d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that under Missouri law, "expert testimony is necessary where the lay jury does not possess the experience or knowledge of the subject matter sufficient to enable them to reach an intelligent opinion without help") (internal quotations and alteration omitted); Hinkle v. Shepherd Sch. Dist. No. 37 , 322 Mont. 80, 93 P.3d 1239, 1246 (2004) ("[E]xpert testimony is required when the issue presented is sufficiently beyond the common experience of the trier of fact and the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact in determining the issue or understanding the evidence."); Moralli v. Lake Cty., Mont ., 255 Mont. 23, 839 P.2d 1287, 1291 (1992) (expert testimony required in personal injury cases unless "the nature of the injury is such that laymen can plainly see, or infer from the injury, its cause"); Bernhardt v. Cty. of Scotts Bluff , 240 Neb. 423, 482 N.W.2d 262, 263 (1992) ("Unless its nature and effect are plainly apparent, an injury is a subjective condition requiring an expert opinion to establish a causal relationship between the incident and the injury or disability."); Saigen T. by & through Jacynda G. v. Mosaic , No. A–15–299, 2016 WL 4045204, at *4–5 (Neb. Ct. App. July 26, 2016) (expert testimony required except where "a causal connection between negligence ... and the resulting injury [is] apparent," i.e., "a layperson could clearly conclude that the[ ] injuries obviously stemmed from [the negligent act]") (citing cases); Neal–Lomax v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't , 574 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1199 (D. Nev. 2008) ("Under Nevada law, Plaintiffs must produce medical expert testimony to establish causation, particularly where the cause of death is not immediately apparent."), aff'd , 371 Fed.Appx. 752 (9th Cir. 2010) ; Layton v. Yankee Caithness Joint Venture, L.P ., 774 F.Supp. 576, 580 (D. Nev. 1991) ("[W]here a question of fact is beyond the comprehension of the ordinary lay person, expert testimony is required to prove that fact."); Estate of Sicotte v. Lubin & Meyer, P.C ., 157 N.H. 670, 959 A.2d 236, 239 (2008) ("Expert testimony is required where the subject presented is so distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson. Expert testimony is not required where the subject presented is within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience."); Tormenia v. First Inv'rs Realty Co ., 251 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2000) ("New Jersey law does require expert testimony ... in cases where lay jurors confront causation issues that are too complex to be understood without the assistance of specialized expert testimony.") (emphasis in original); Kelly v. Borwegen, 95 N.J.Super. 240, 230 A.2d 532, 534 (N.J. Supp. Ct. App. Div. 1967) ("[W]here a claimed disability is the natural result of the injuries sustained, the jury may, without expert opinion, find that the injuries caused such disability. However, when an injury is such as to require skilled men to determine its cause and extent, the question is one of science, and must be established by skilled professional persons.") (quoting 25A C.J.S. Damages § 162(5) ); Am. Mech. Sols., L.L.C. v. Northland Process Piping, Inc ., 184 F.Supp.3d 1030, 1061 (D.N.M. 2016) ("New Mexico, along with other jurisdictions, has required expert testimony when the issue of causation is presented in a context which is not a matter of common knowledge."); State v. Campbell , 141 N.M. 543, 546, 157 P.3d 722, 725 (2007) (noting the distinction between when expert testimony "is required to establish an element of a claim or defense [because] it would assist the jury to understand issues in the case that are beyond their knowledge" and expert testimony that is "helpful to increase a jury's existing base of knowledge"); Folz v. State , 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246, 260 (1990) ("Although in many cases expert testimony will be required to establish causation and damages, such testimony is not always necessary ....the use of expert medical testimony should be employed when the trial court reasonably decides that it is necessary to properly inform the jurors on the issues.") (internal citations omitted) ; Fane v. Zimmer, Inc ., 927 F.2d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 1991) (under New York law, expert testimony required when the subject-matter is not "within the common knowledge and experience ... of the ordinary jurymen") (quoting Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital , 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367, 370 (1941) ); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp ., 137 F.Supp.2d 147, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Under New York law, when the determination of whether an illness or injury was caused by some event or conduct is presumed not to be within common knowledge and experience, a plaintiff must produce expert opinion evidence based on suitable hypotheses in order to support a finding of causation.") (internal quotations omitted), aff'd , 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002) ; Young v. Hickory Bus. Furniture , 353 N.C. 227, 538 S.E.2d 912, 915 (2000) ("Due to the complexities of medical science, particularly with respect to diagnosis, methodology and determinations of causation, this Court has held that where the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.") (internal quotations omitted); Halvorson v. Sentry Ins ., 757 N.W.2d 398, 400 (N.D. 2008) ("[W]hen the causal relationship between a condition affecting the human body and a [negligent act] is not a matter within the common knowledge or comprehension of a layperson, the party bearing the burden of proof must present expert medical testimony establishing that relationship."); Klimple v. Bahl , 727 N.W.2d 256, 259 (N.D. 2007) ("[E]xpert testimony is required if the issue is beyond the area of common knowledge or lay comprehension, or the issue is not within the ordinary experience of the jurors.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Terry v. Caputo , 115 Ohio St.3d 351, 875 N.E.2d 72, 77 (2007)
Plaintiffs rely heavily on New Mexico, pointing to one products liability cases that survived summary judgment without direct expert testimony on specific causation. This case, Carter Farms Co. v. Hoffman–Laroche, Inc., 83 N.M. 383, 492 P.2d 1000 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971), is not apposite. In Carter Farms, the plaintiff, a sheep farmer, brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of a vaccine-type solution he used on his animals. Of the first 1000 lambs injected with the solution, over 40% developed infected abscesses at the point of injection, and 192 died within three weeks of being injected. Id. at 1001–02. In the animals that died, the abscesses at the point of injection grew until "the leg literally rotted off the animal." Id. A pathologist expert testified that that the abscesses were caused by bacteria, but there was no expert testimony that the vaccine itself was contaminated with bacteria. Id. at 1002. A veterinarian expert testified that if the vaccine had been infected with bacteria, "it was a reasonable medical probability that an abscess would develop and a leg rot off within two weeks after the leg had been injected; that it was not possible for malignant edema or blackleg to be involved; that it was '(n)ot a very good possibility at all' that the feeders (the lambs that were purchased) may have been diseased; that the existence of organisms (bacteria) on the skin of the sheep before they were purchased would be a (v)ery faint' explanation." Id. at 1002. There was also evidence that the "lambs were in good health prior to the injection" and evidence that "the method of injection did not cause the abscesses." Id. at 1002. The Court found that under these circumstances, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that the vaccines were contaminated with bacteria and caused the deaths of the lambs. Id. at 1003. These circumstances are not analogous to the ones here.
("Except as to questions of cause and effect which are so apparent as to be matters of common knowledge, the issue of causal connection between an injury and a specific subsequent physical disability involves a scientific inquiry and must be established by the opinion of medical witnesses competent to express such opinion.") (emphasis in original); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp ., 289 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[U]nder Oklahoma law, a plaintiff must introduce expert testimony if 'the fact in issue is not within the realm of ordinary experience of mankind.' ") (quoting Strubhart v. Perry Mem'l Hosp. Trust Auth ., 903 P.2d 263, 274 (Okla.1995) ); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc ., 938 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1068 (D. Or. 2013) ("Under Oregon law, when the element of causation involves a complex medical question, a plaintiff must present expert testimony that there is a reasonable medical probability of causation.") (citing Chouinard v. Health Ventures , 179 Or.App. 507, 39 P.3d 951 (2002) ); Hamil v. Bashline , 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (1978) ( "Although in certain situations involving physical injury, it is possible for a jury reasonably to infer causation from the circumstances of an accident or occurrence, it is generally acknowledged that the complexities of the human body place questions as to the cause of pain or injury beyond the knowledge of the average layperson. For a plaintiff to make out his cause of action in such a case, therefore, the law requires that expert medical testimony be employed.") (internal citations omitted); Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp ., 244 F.Supp.2d 434, 525 (W.D. Pa. 2003) ("In a case such as this one involving complex issues of causation not readily apparent to the finder of fact, plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony to carry her burden."); Velazquez v. Abbott Labs ., 901 F.Supp.2d 279, 293 (D.P.R. 2012) ("The necessity of expert opinion evidence, however, is whether the question is one of common knowledge such that lay people could reach the conclusion as intelligently as the witness.") (internal quotations omitted) (applying Puerto Rico law); In re Bausch & Lomb Inc. Contacts Lens Sol. Prod. Liab. Litig ., 693 F.Supp.2d 515, 520 (D.S.C. 2010) ("Regarding expert testimony, to prove causation Puerto Rico law requires an expert's opinion when the matter is sufficiently beyond common experience.") (internal quotations omitted), aff'd sub nom. Fernandez–Pineiro v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc ., 429 Fed.Appx. 249 (4th Cir. 2011) ; Mills v. State Sales, Inc ., 824 A.2d 461, 468 (R.I. 2003) ("[E]xpert testimony is required to establish any matter that is not obvious to a lay person and thus lies beyond common knowledge."); Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill SC, LLC , 405 S.C. 129, 747 S.E.2d 468, 481 (2013) ("The general rule in South Carolina is that where a subject is beyond the common knowledge of the jury, expert testimony is required."); Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc ., 737 N.W.2d 397, 407 (S.D. 2007) ("[E]xpert testimony is required when the issue falls outside the common experience of a jury.") (citing Caldwell v. John Morrell & Co ., 489 N.W.2d 353 (S.D.1992) ); Tomazin v. Lincare, Inc ., No. 3:13–CV–0875, 2015 WL 4545658, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. July 27, 2015) ("Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must provide admissible expert testimony as to both causation and product defect in order to prove liability in a products action .... Moreover, under Tennessee law, medical causation must be established by expert testimony.") (citing cases); Jastrebski v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc. , No. 02A01–9803–CV–00068, 1999 WL 144935, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1999) ("The product in dispute is a technically complex prescription medical device, and expert testimony is required to establish the causal connection between the alleged defect in the device and Plaintiff's claimed injuries."); Guevara v. Ferrer , 247 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. 2007) ("The general rule has long been that expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors."); Graves v. N. E. Servs., Inc. , 345 P.3d 619, 627 (Utah 2015) (expert testimony required on "scientific matters beyond the capacity of an ordinary juror"); Fox v. Brigham Young Univ ., 176 P.3d 446, 451–52 (Utah App. 2011) ("In Utah, the need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the defendants' negligent act and the plaintiff's injury depends on the nature of the injury .... Thus, where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding, there must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the injury .... It is only in the most obvious cases that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of using expert testimony to prove causation.") (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted); Egbert v. Book Press , 144 Vt. 367, 477 A.2d 968, 969 (1984) ("When the facts to be proved are such that any layman of average intelligence would know from his own knowledge and experience that the accident was the cause of the injury, no expert testimony is needed to establish the causal connection; however, where the causal connection is obscure, expert testimony is required."); Zellers v. NexTech Ne., LLC , 533 Fed.Appx. 192, 200 (4th Cir. 2013) ("To prove causation in a toxic tort action, a plaintiff must offer relevant and reliable expert testimony, as the health effects of toxic exposure to chemicals are beyond the knowledge and experience of the average layperson.") (applying Virginia law); Gauthreaux v. United States , 694 F.Supp.2d 460, 465 (E.D. Va. 2009) ("[I]n a products liability action, proof of causation must ordinarily be supported by expert testimony because of the complexity of the causation facts.") (applying Virginia law); Washington v. HOVENSA, LLC , No. CIV.A. 06–97, 2011 WL 6965855, at *1 (D.V.I. Dec. 13, 2011) ("[E]xpert testimony is required to prove causation in cases where the complexities of the human body place questions as to the cause of pain or injury beyond the knowledge of the average layperson.") (internal quotations omitted); Anders v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc ., No. CIV.A. 04–0036, 2009 WL 3007367, at *9 (D.V.I. Sept. 15, 2009) ("Proving that an alleged defect was the legal cause of an injury requires testimony from a qualified expert who can testify about specific causation, just as expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care and causation in medical malpractice cases in the Virgin Islands.") (internal quotations omitted), aff'd , 409 Fed.Appx. 539 (3d Cir. 2011) ; Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc ., 77 Wash.App. 201, 890 P.2d 469, 477 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1995) ("Expert testimony is required to establish causation when an injury involves obscure medical factors that would require an ordinary lay person to speculate or conjecture in making a finding."); Strahin v. Cleavenger , 216 W.Va. 175, 603 S.E.2d 197, 211 (2004) (expert testimony is required "where the injury is obscure, that is, the effects of which are not readily ascertainable, demonstrable or subject of common knowledge"); Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc ., 916 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that under Virginia law, plaintiff had to prove that defendant's vaccine caused plaintiff's injuries and had to do so "by expert testimony"); Kolesar v. United Agri Prod., Inc ., 246 Fed.Appx. 977, 981 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Under Wisconsin law, '[e]xpert testimony is required to prove causation if the matter does not fall within the realm of ordinary experience and lay comprehension.' ") (quoting Menick v. City of Menasha , 200 Wis.2d 737, 547 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Wis. App. 1996) ); City of Cedarburg Light & Water Comm'n v. Allis–Chalmers Mfg. Co ., 33 Wis.2d 560, 149 N.W.2d 661, 662 (1967) ("There may be cases where the issue of causation, like the issue of negligence, involves technical, scientific or medical matters which are beyond the common knowledge or experience of jurors and without the aid of expert testimony the jury could only speculate as to what inferences to draw if it were left to determine the issue. The lack of expert testimony in such cases results in an insufficiency of proof."); Bodily v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div ., 320 P.3d 240, 250 (Wyo. 2014) ("[E]xpert testimony is required to establish causation unless the injury is immediately and directly or naturally and probably the result of an accident.") (internal quotations omitted); Sayer v. Williams , 962 P.2d 165, 168 (Wyo. 1998) (expert testimony required "[i]f the origin of the injury is obscure and not readily apparent to a layman, or if there are several equally probable causes of the condition").
To be sure, Plaintiffs are correct that there are instances where expert testimony is not required to prove causation, but those circumstances—where a lay juror can infer causation from common knowledge and lay experience—are not present here. Such circumstances include an immediate onset of symptoms that naturally follow from an accident or a complete lack of any other possible cause. E.g., Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co ., 229 F.3d 1202, 1210 (8th Cir. 2000) ; Lasley v. Georgetown Univ ., 688 A.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C. 1997) ; see also Galloway v. Horne Concrete Const ., 524 Fed.Appx. 865, 872 (4th Cir. 2013) (under Maryland law, "a plaintiff was not required to prove causation by expert evidence when she drank from a spigot and developed chemical burns in her mouth immediately thereafter"); Cowart v. Widener , 287 Ga. 622, 697 S.E.2d 779, 784 (2010) ("[I]t does not require expert testimony for a lay jury to determine that a gunshot wound to the head of an otherwise healthy person who died shortly thereafter was the proximate cause of her death."); Pagett v. N. Elec. Supply Co. , 283 Minn. 228, 167 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1969) (expert testimony on causation was not required where it was "undisputed that plaintiff stepped into the coalhole, did a so-called 'spread-eagle,' and received emergency treatment at a hospital; sustained abrasions of the legs; had accompanying pain in the lower back, left hip, and upper part of the left leg, with other obvious injuries and discomforts"); Pitts v. Wingate At Brighton, Inc ., 82 Mass.App.Ct. 285, 972 N.E.2d 74, 79 (2012) ("No expert testimony is necessary for lay jurors to appreciate that allowing a nursing home patient to fall to the floor could cause a broken bone."); Dodge–Farrar v. Am. Cleaning Servs. Co ., 137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954, 959 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he causal relationship between [plaintiff's] fall and her immediate symptoms in the ankle, knee and back (the pain, swelling, and the inability to sit, stand or walk without assistance) is within the usual and ordinary experience of the average person."); Brown v. Baker , 284 Ill.App.3d 401, 219 Ill.Dec. 754, 672 N.E.2d 69, 71 (1996) ("[I]f a plaintiff suffers a cut in an accident, the jury can readily determine without expert testimony that the accident caused the cut.").
On the other hand, the effects of drugs on the human body and the causation of a complicated, progressive diseases like diabetes do require expert testimony. See, e.g., Hollander , 289 F.3d at 1214 ("The alleged effect of Parlodel is not within the realm of ordinary experience: in order to assess the arguments regarding the alleged effects of the drug, the factfinder would be required to assess the wide variety of scientific evidence .... As a result, the [plaintiffs] cannot prove their claim without expert testimony."); Sullivan v. Pfizer, Inc ., No. 3:14–CV–1374 (MPS), 2016 WL 868155, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2016) ("[E]xpert testimony is necessary to determine the effect of a prescription drug, Lipitor, on the human body, and to determine whether it caused [plaintiff's] injuries, including, among others, medical diagnoses ..."); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc ., 938 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1068 (D. Or. 2013) (under Oregon law, plaintiff must present expert testimony on both general and specific causation to survive summary judgment in pharmaceutical product liability case); In re Baycol Prods. Litig ., 321 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1126 (D. Minn. 2004) ("Expert testimony is particularly important in personal injury cases involving pharmaceuticals because they involve complex questions of medical causation beyond the understanding of a lay person."); Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp ., 244 F.Supp.2d 434, 525 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (expert testimony required on both general and specific causation in pharmaceutical product liability case); Blanchard v. Eli Lilly & Co ., 207 F.Supp.2d 308, 322 (D. Vt. 2002) ("Without expert testimony that Prozac caused the deaths, it is not possible to show that any inadequacy in warning about Prozac was a substantial factor in bringing about the deaths."); Hinkle v. Shepherd Sch. Dist. No. 37 , 322 Mont. 80, 93 P.3d 1239, 1246 (2004) (development of Type I diabetes is "beyond the common experience and understanding of the trier of fact"); Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A ., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68, 75 (2003) ("Whether or not the Cipro taken by [plaintiff] was a cause of his heart attack is a matter of science that is far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the average person. A jury, comprised of lay people, is simply not qualified to determine that issue without the assistance of expert testimony establishing that Cipro can cause a myocardial infarction."); Mills v. State Sales, Inc ., 824 A.2d 461, 468 (R.I. 2003) ("[W]e do not hesitate to conclude that the existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body would have to be established through expert testimony."); Ellis v. Hartford Run Apartments LLC , 335 Ga.App. 118, 779 S.E.2d 103, 108 (2015) ("Because the plaintiffs failed to submit expert medical testimony linking [plaintiff's] exposure to mold to her medical conditions, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the claim for damages for personal injury."), reconsideration denied (Dec. 7, 2015), cert. denied (Apr. 4, 2016).
Here, expert testimony is certainly required. Diabetes is a complicated, progressive disease with a number of risk factors. Whether the drug Lipitor is capable of causing diabetes is a medically complex question outside of a lay jurors knowledge and experience, and Plaintiffs have not pointed any authority that would suggest otherwise.
3. Admissions Cannot Substitute for Expert Testimony When Required Under State Law.
The Court can find no state law cases that shed light on the question of whether party opponent admissions can substitute for expert testimony when it is normally required. Thus, the Court turns to few cases in the county to have addressed the issue.
This "novel argument" that party opponent admissions can substitute for expert testimony was raised in the Meridia MDL and "create[d] an issue of first impression" for the Meridia MDL court. In re Meridia Prod. Liab. Litig. , 328 F.Supp.2d 791, 808 (N.D. Ohio 2004), aff'd sub nom. Meridia Prod. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs. , 447 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006). The Meridia court had to reach the issue because it excluded plaintiffs' expert testimony on general causation under Rule 702 and Daubert . Id . at 802–07. The court held that the statement in the drug's label regarding blood pressure was sufficient to survive summary judgment on the issue of general causation but that statements regarding numerous other medical conditions were not.
In Meridia, "[r]ather than undertake an analysis of all fifty states' laws to determine which do and which do not require expert testimony on the issue of general causation," the court assumed "arguendo that no states' laws erect such a requirement." Id. at 802.
With regard to blood pressure, the label stated "MERIDIA SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASES BLOOD PRESSURE IN SOME PATIENTS ..." Id . at 810. The Meridia court held this language constituted "admissions of Meridia's potential to cause substantial increases in blood pressure in some patients " and held this was sufficient to survive summary judgment on general causation. Id . (emphasis in original). Importantly, however, the Meridia court went on to hold that:
The insert lists the other conditions as being "associated" with Meridia. Such admissions of temporal associations (or reports of temporal associations) are insufficient to create admissions of causation. Therefore, Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact only with respect to Meridia's capacity to cause substantial increases in blood pressure. For all other conditions, Plaintiffs have not met their burden. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to all tort claims involving harms not related to increased blood pressure.
Id . The Meridia court went on to grant summary judgment with regard to the blood pressure claims, holding that the language with regard to increased blood pressure was a sufficient warning as a matter of law. Id . at 814.
The Sixth Circuit's affirmance in the Meridia case found "no fault with the district court's treatment of the causation factor." Meridia Prod. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs. , 447 F.3d 861, 866 (6th Cir. 2006). In doing so, the court noted that (1) the district court "contrasted the strong language of 'substantially increases' with milder warning language such as 'is associated with' "; (2) the district court did not rely "on the fact of the warning to find causation" but "instead on the specific wording" (emphasis in original); and (3) "according to several record depositions," the specific wording was "the product of discussion between the FDA and the regulated party." Id . The Mirena MDL court also addressed this issue and came to the following conclusion:
A review of the cases cited by Plaintiffs—as well as common sense—suggest that if it is conceivable at all that a statement by a party opponent could be used in place of expert testimony to prove causation, the circumstances in which this might occur would be exceedingly rare, especially in the pharmaceutical or medical contexts .... the most that can be wrung from the authority cited by Plaintiffs is that if admissions could ever substitute for expert testimony in a complex case that requires expert testimony as to causation under state law, those admissions would have to be clear, unambiguous, and concrete, rather than an invitation to the jury to speculate as to their meaning.
In re Mirena IUD Prod. Liab. Litig. , No. 13–MC–2434 (CS), 202 F.Supp.3d 304, 315, 2016 WL 4059224, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016). The Mirena court noted that the Meridia court assumed no state law required expert testimony to prove causation. The Mirena court, on the other hand, did not "make the same assumption," as all jurisdictions at issue in Mirena did "have such a requirement." Id . at 316, 2016 WL 4059224 at *9. The Mirena court found this distinction "fatal to Plaintiffs' argument," id . and ultimately concluded, after a review of case law, that:
no court has held that admissions can substitute for required expert testimony, and this Court will not be the first. Such a ruling would disregard the purpose of the requirement for expert testimony, leaving jurors to speculate, and would chill free and frank discussion by manufacturers of drugs or devices.
Id . at 320, 2016 WL 4059224 at *12. Wading into the policy implications of such a holding, the court stated:
there may be myriad reasons, including an abundance of caution or the avoidance of lawsuits, why a manufacturer may warn of a possible phenomenon without being convinced that it is a genuine risk, and permitting the label to substitute for expert testimony here would present a wholly conjectural basis for a jury to determine general causation. And allowing a label to substitute for expert testimony would discourage manufacturers from exercising caution, providing potential users with less information rather than more where the science is debatable, a result inimical to the public health.
Id . at 323, 2016 WL 4059224 at *14. The only other courts to have addressed the issue have either done so in a conclusory fashion, see Meade v. Parsley , No. 2:09–CV–00388, 2010 WL 4909435, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 24, 2010) ("PLIVA's drug label, which merely warns of metoclopramide's potential side-effects without explaining the scientific basis for the warning, is no substitute for expert testimony that establishes causation in terms of reasonable probability."), or like Meridia , relied on the fact that association evidence is not evidence of causation:
Such substantive policy implications reinforces the Court's conclusion that to the extent substantive state law requires expert testimony to prove a particular element of claim, state law also determines whether alleged admissions can substitute for such expert testimony.
Defendants' labeling changes and notification letters merely relayed information about a possible association between their drug and optic neuropathy. Spontaneous reporting by a pharmaceutical company should be encouraged; it serves "as a signaling system for adverse drug reactions that may not have been detected during pre-market testing."
Haggerty v. Upjohn Co. , 950 F.Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D.Fla.1996). Such reporting does not, however, indicate causation.
Nelson v. Am. Home Prod. Corp ., 92 F.Supp.2d 954, 969 (W.D. Mo. 2000) ; see also In re Zoloft (Sertralinehydrochloride) Prod. Liab. Litig ., 176 F.Supp.3d 483, 498 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("Neither these [internal] documents, nor draft product documents or foreign product labels containing language that advises use of birth control by a woman taking Zoloft constitute an admission of causation, as opposed to acknowledging a possible association.").
The other two cases cited by Plaintiffs are inapposite. In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit considered the admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert. One of the pieces of evidence considered by the expert was a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for talc provided by the defendant, which stated "[i]nhalation of dust in high concentrations irritates mucous membranes." Id. at 264. As the Merina court noted:
the issue was not whether the MSDS statement could substitute for expert testimony. Rather, the comment regarding the MSDS was made in the context of evaluating whether the plaintiffs' expert had a sufficient basis for his specific causation opinion. The Westberry court's discussion shows no more than that an MSDS is properly considered by an expert. Nothing in Westberry suggests that a manufacturer's statement suffices to defeat summary judgment in the absence of expert testimony.
Mirena, 202 F.Supp.3d at 316, 2016 WL 4059224, at *9.
In Lewis v. Johnson & Johnson, 601 Fed.Appx. 205 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit held that under Texas law, "expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors." Id. at 211. The court went on to hold that "whether any of these defects [at issue] caused [plaintiff's] pain involves complex and technical medical issues beyond common knowledge and experience" and, therefore, her "failure to present ... expert testimony doomed her design defect claim." Id. In the last paragraph of the opinion, the panel noted "plaintiff does not argue that the remaining testimony—by, for instance, employees of the defendant—establishes causation." Id. at 212. Plaintiffs have apparently interpreted this sentence to mean that "the court in Lewis accepted that admissions by defendant's employees could prove general causation as a matter of law." (Dkt. No. 1586 at 19). However, Lewis did not pass on the issue, but simply noted that the plaintiff had not raised it so it need not be addressed.
4. DeMicco Email
The primary piece of evidence relied on Plaintiffs is a one-sentence email by Pfizer VP, Dr. DeMicco sent on September 27, 2009. On September 25, 2009, Dr. DeMicco sent an earlier email to Dr. David Waters at the University of California, San Fransico, with the statistical analysis for the occurrence of diabetes in SPARCL. Dr. Waters replied via email that SPARCL data "dovetail nicely with the TNT results," and stated:
SPARCL was a randomized clinical trial that tested whether Lipitor was effective for reducing the incidence of stroke in patients who had previously had a stroke or TIA. (Dkt. No. 972–28). Participants were randomly assigned to 80 mg of Lipitor or a placebo. (Id. at 2). Diabetes was not an endpoint in this study, but adverse event information was collected, and Pfizer conducted a post hoc analysis of the data. (Dkt. No. 972 at 24). A post hoc analysis of data from the clinical trial found a statistically significant increase in the risk of diabetes for patients randomized to 80 mg of Lipitor versus those on placebo. (Dkt. No. 972–29 at 2).
I would draw these conclusions based on this data:
1. Atorvastatin increases the risk of developing diabetes.
2. The risks of 10 and 80 mg are similar.
3. Fasting blood sugar and features of the metabolic syndrome are strong predictors of the development of diabetes in both populations.
(Dkt. No. 1591–1 at 2). Dr. DeMicco then replied, in the email at issue, that "[a]s far as the conclusions, I concur with your assessment below." (Id .).
First, this email is, at best, evidence of an association, not causation. An association does not equal causation, and epidemiologists engage in a rigorous analysis of multiple factors to determine whether an association is causal. E.g., In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 174 F.Supp.3d 911, 916 (D.S.C. 2016) ; Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co ., 605 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1175 (E.D. Wash. 2009) ; In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig ., 612 F.Supp.2d 116, 125 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (2d. ed. 2000) at 336, 374); see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp ., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[S]howing association is far removed from proving causation."); Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (RMSE) 218 (3d ed. 2011) ("[W]ork is needed to bridge the gap between association and causation."). Thus, evidence of an association does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation.
These factors are (1) strength of the association, (2) replication of the findings, (3) specificity of the association, (4) temporal relationship, (5) dose-response relationship (aka biological gradient), (6) biological plausibility, (7) consistency with other knowledge (aka coherence), (8) consideration of alternative explanations, and (9) cessation of exposure. Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 600 (3d. ed. 2011); see also Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 Proc. Royal Soc'y Med. 295, 295–300 (1965)), available at Dkt. No. 972–32.
Plaintiffs argue that the statement "increases the risk" is synonymous with "causes," and thus, they argue, Dr. DeMicco's statement, "I concur with your assessment" is an admission that Lipitor causes diabetes. Plaintiffs are "follow[ing] human nature, which is to confuse association and causation." Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp ., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). An increase in statistical risk, like the one acknowledged by Dr. DeMicco here, is evidence of association, not causation.
These emails discuss a statistical analysis that, as the later published article on the data states, found that the 80 mg dose of Lipitor"is associated with a slightly increased risk of new-onset [type 2 diabetes ]." (Dkt. No. 972–29 at 2) (emphasis added). This increased statistical risk was shown by a hazard ratio of 1.37, with a 95% confidence interval of 1.08 to 1.75. (Id .). A hazard ratio, like a relative risk ratio or odds ratio, is a "measure of association used in epidemiology." RSME at 295 (defining relative risk) (emphasis added); see also RSME at 291 (defining odds ratio and describing it as a "measure of association, often used in epidemiology"). As a statistical analysis comparing two groups, all it can show is an association, i.e. a correlation or increased risk; it cannot show causation. See In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig ., 612 F.Supp.2d 116, 125 (D. Mass. 2009) (" 'An association is not equivalent to causation,' and so epidemiological studies, on their own, 'cannot objectively prove causation.' ") (quoting RMSE 336, 374 (2d. ed. 2000)).
Explained in another way, "risk" is "[a] probability that an event will occur." RSME at 627. An "increased risk" is an "increased probability that an event will occur." Here, diabetes is more probable, more likely to occur, in the group taking Lipitor. This is the very definition of an association, and says nothing about causation. See In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig. , 150 F.Supp.3d 644, 649 (D.S.C. 2015) ("[E]ven if Plaintiffs establish that there is an association between Lipitor and diabetes ( i.e., that Lipitor increases the risk of diabetes ) and that Lipitor is capable of causing diabetes, it does not necessarily follow the Lipitor caused the development of diabetes in a particular plaintiff.") (emphasis added). As the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence explains, an association is
Later in this opinion, the Court stated that Dr. Murphy's opinion was "based only on (1) the fact that Lipitor increases the risk of diabetes (general causation) and (2) that Ms. Hempstead developed diabetes after taking Lipitor." Id. at 652. With this parenthetical, the Court was emphasizing that information regarding an increase in risk went to the matter of general causation, not specific causation. It was not equating the phrase "increased risk" with general causation.
[t]he degree of statistical relationship between two or more events or variables. Events are said to be associated when they occur more or less frequently together than one would expect by chance. Association does not necessarily imply a causal relationship.
RMSE at 619.
The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence provides an analogous example. Studies found that women with herpes were more likely to develop cervical cancer than other women. RMSE at 219. In other words, herpes increased the risk of cervical cancer ; having herpes increased the probability that women would develop cervical cancer. Some assumed this association was causal. However, "[l]ater research showed that the primary cause of cervical cancer was a human papilloma virus (HPV)," and that herpes was simply a marker of sexual activity, not the cause of cervical cancer. Id .
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Dr. DeMicco is agreeing with Dr. Waters' assessment that, according to the SPARCL data, Lipitor increases the risk of diabetes, i.e., that the probability of developing diabetes in the Lipitor group was higher, i.e., that taking 80 mg of Lipitor is associated with higher rates of diabetes. This statement speaks to association and does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff does not require the Court to conflate association and causation. See Llewellyn v. Allstate Home Loans, Inc., 711 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Although our summary judgment standard requires us to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it does not require us to make unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party."); Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e are not required to accept as true ... unwarranted deductions of fact drawn by the non-moving party.").
Courts have occasionally used "increased risk" as shorthand for general causation when differentiating general causation from specific causation. See Jenkins v. Slidella L.L.C., No. CIV.A.05–370, 2008 WL 2649510, at *4 (E.D. La. June 27, 2008) ("Defendants state that where a plaintiff claims that a substance caused his injury, he must show not merely general causation (i.e., that exposure to the substance at issue increases the risk of a particular injury), but specific causation (i.e., that the substance in question did, in fact, cause a particular individual's injury.")). Establishing an association is the first, threshold step in establishing general causation, and it is not surprising that courts may invoke this language to help differentiate the inquiries of general and specific causation. However, this fact does not change voluminous and well-established precedent that association, alone, is not sufficient to establish causation and does not change the simple factual truth that association is not causation. The parties have always agreed that establishing association is just the first step of a two-step process for establishing general causation. (See Dkt. No. 972 at 27–28; Dkt. No. 1053 at 13).
Furthermore, even if the one-sentence email indicated that Dr. DeMicco thought Lipitor caused diabetes, the Court finds such an email could not replace expert testimony when expert testimony is required by substantive state law. A single statement by a single employee (even a Vice President) in a single email about a single study is not the type of clear declaration made in the Meridia case, where the label stated that "MERIDIA SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASES BLOOD PRESSURE IN SOME PATIENTS ..." 328 F.Supp.2d at 810. Meridia is the only case where a statement by a party has been held sufficient to survive summary judgment on general causation. In affirming the Meridia case, the Sixth Circuit specifically noted the district court's contrast of this "strong language," reliance on the "specific wording." 447 F.3d at 866. The Meridia court reached the opposite conclusion when weaker wording, like that in the DeMicco email, was at issue. 328 F.Supp.2d at 810. The wording in Meridia was also "the product of discussion between the FDA and the regulated party," not a statement by one employee shot off in an email. 447 F.3d at 866.
Finally, in Meridia , the court assumed state law did not require expert testimony. Id . at 802. By contrast this Court has found that state substantive state law requires expert testimony to prove general causation in this case. "[A] federal court in the exercise of its diversity jurisdiction should act conservatively when asked to predict how a state court would proceed on a novel issue of state law." Rhodes , 636 F.3d at 97–98. Allowing a single sentence email to replace expert testimony that is required by substantive state law is novel and would dramatically change the substantive rights of parties. The Court declines to so dramatically change expert testimony requirements under substantive state law without any indication the they would do so. Therefore, the Court finds this email cannot create a genuine issue of material fact as to general causation.
5. Evidence Regarding Blood Glucose
The next three pieces of evidence are (1) statements of association only and (2) statements regarding blood glucose, not diabetes. The U.S. Lipitor label states that "[i]ncreases in HbA1c and fasting serum glucose levels have been reported with [statins], including LIPITOR." (Dkt. No. 1586–9). This statement never mentions diabetes, only blood glucose levels, and the two are not synonymous. (See Dkt. No. 1159 at 12 stating that "diagnosis of diabetes requires more than a single elevated plasma glucose level"). Furthermore, the language "have been reported" indicates temporal association, not causation. For both reasons, it fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lipitor causes diabetes in dosages less than 80 mg.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that the U.S. label's language "is not as supportive of our position" and may not be sufficient alone to survive summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 1634 at 47).
Next, Plaintiffs point to the NDA data allegedly showing that Lipitor was associated with increases in blood glucose levels. Again, increased blood glucose levels are not synonymous with full blown diabetes, and the data only indicates, at best, an association, not causation. For both reasons, it fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as with whether Lipitor causes diabetes in dosages less than 80 mg. Next, Plaintiffs point to the official Lipitor website, which states that "[e]levated blood sugar levels have been reported with statins, including LIPITOR." Again, this fails to create a genuine issue of material fact for the same reasons. It does not mention or say anything about diabetes, and it is, at best, evidence of an association. Thus, it does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation.
Whether the data even indicates this is disputed by the parties. However, for the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes the NDA data does indicate an association between Lipitor usage and increased blood glucose levels.
6. Japanese Label
Finally, Plaintiffs point to the Japanese label insert for Lipitor. The Japanese label states that "[h]yper-glycemia and diabetes melitis may occur ...." (Dkt. No. 1586–5 at 4). Again, this is not a clear statement that Lipitor causes diabetes, like in Meridia , but an acknowledgement of a possible association. See In re Zoloft , 176 F.Supp.3d at 498 ("Neither these [internal] documents, nor ... foreign product labels containing language that advises use of birth control by a woman taking Zoloft constitute an admission of causation, as opposed to acknowledging a possible association."). The label change was based on 30 adverse event reports, (Dkt. No. 1163–3 at 174–77, Dkt. No. 1762–4 at 2, Dkt. No. 1762 at 3), which "are not even sufficient to show association, because there is no comparison group." RSME at 218.
Regardless, it cannot be used to replace state substantive law requiring expert testimony. Unlike the U.S. label in Meridia , the Japanese label change at issue here was ordered by Japanese officials, specifically Japan's Ministry of Health Labor, and Welfare (MHLW), "without even discussing it with [the Japanese licensee/distributor of Lipitor]." (Dkt. No. 1761–3 at 193). There is no evidence in the record that Pfizer had any input regarding the inclusion, or wording of, the statement placed on the Japanese label or that Pfizer manifested a belief in its accuracy. Indeed, as Plaintiffs point out, Pfizer disagreed with the label change, but it went into effect anyway. (Dkt. No. 1181 at 5; Dkt. No. 1761–2 at 9–10). In short, the statement is one by MHLW, not Pfizer, and is not an admission by Pfizer.
While such a label change may have relevance to Pfizer's knowledge of adverse events, the purpose for which Plaintiffs' originally intended to introduce it, it does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lipitor is capable of causing diabetes. The Court finds that even if the state courts were to allow certain types of party opponent admissions to replace expert testimony when it is substantively required by state law, they would not find a statement placed on a foreign label by a foreign agency without any input from, or discussion with, the defendant to constitute an acceptable admission to replace expert testimony. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to general causation.
See Dkt. No. 1181.
B. Specific Causation
1. Expert Testimony is Required.
As explained above, all jurisdictions at issue here require expert testimony at least where the issues are medically complex and outside common knowledge and lay experience. Courts have held that effects of drugs on the human body and the causation of a complicated, progressive diseases like diabetes do require expert testimony. See, e.g., Hollander , 289 F.3d at 1214 ("The alleged effect of Parlodel is not within the realm of ordinary experience: in order to assess the arguments regarding the alleged effects of the drug, the factfinder would be required to assess the wide variety of scientific evidence .... As a result, the [plaintiffs] cannot prove their claim without expert testimony."); Sullivan , 2016 WL 868155, at *4 ("[E]xpert testimony is necessary to determine the effect of a prescription drug, Lipitor, on the human body, and to determine whether it caused [plaintiff's] injuries, including, among others, medical diagnoses ..."); In re Baycol Prods. Litig ., 321 F.Supp.2d at 1126 ("Expert testimony is particularly important in personal injury cases involving pharmaceuticals because they involve complex questions of medical causation beyond the understanding of a lay person."); Hinkle , 93 P.3d at 1246 (development of Type I diabetes is "beyond the common experience and understanding of the trier of fact").
If the mythic state existed that allowed pharmaceutical products liability cases to go to a jury without any expert testimony on causation, it would be a black hole for all such cases. Plaintiffs have not cited a single case in any jurisdiction that has allowed a case to survive summary judgment in circumstances analogous to the ones here.
Here, expert testimony is certainly required. Diabetes is a complicated, progressive disease with a number of risk factors. Plaintiff's general causation experts cannot even figure out how to determine whether an individual's diabetes was caused by Lipitor or other factors, and Plaintiff's specific causation expert cannot determine which people in a room of 100 people or 10 people had "statin-induced" diabetes as opposed non-statin-induced diabetes. (Dkt. No. 1004–1 at 210–11; Dkt. No. 1004–4 at 162; Dkt. No. 1004–5 at 71; Dkt. No. 1004–6 at 163). If these experts cannot make this determination, it is certainly not within the common knowledge of a lay person. A jury's finding of causation in the absence of any expert testimony would be based on impermissible speculation or conjecture. Dash , 731 F.3d at 311.
2. Expert Testimony on General Causation Combined with Non-expert Evidence
Plaintiffs next argue that in some jurisdictions, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment with a combination of (1) specific causation expert testimony that a substance is a possible cause of a plaintiff's injury and (2) "non-expert evidence." (Dkt. No. 1586 at 29). Again, this statement is true as far as it goes, but is not applicable here. See, e.g., Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered , 228 Ariz. 528, 269 P.3d 704, 706 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) ("Under some circumstances, a plaintiff's expert may opine as to possible causes of an injury if other evidence supports a causal connection."); Rodrigues v. Georgia–Pac. Corp ., 290 Ga.App. 442, 661 S.E.2d 141, 143 (2008) ("[M]edical testimony stated only in terms of a 'possible' cause may be sufficient when supplemented by probative non expert testimony on causation.") (emphasis in original).
The non-expert evidence present in these cases is probative of causation and, at least in combination with expert testimony on a "possible causes," is sufficient for a jury to infer causation without engaging in speculation; indeed, this non-expert evidence often consists of the same type of evidence that is sufficient to get to a jury without any expert testimony, such as in the case of immediate onset of symptoms. See, e.g., Smith v. Hines , 261 P.3d 1129, 1135 (Okla. 2011) (expert testimony that accident could have caused curvature of the spine combined with evidence "that there was no curvature of the spine before, but was shortly after, the accident" and plaintiff's evidence that "reasonably tended to exclude every other possible cause" was sufficient); Ketcham v. Thomas , 283 S.W.2d 642, 649–50 (Mo. 1955) (expert opinion that collision was a "possible" cause of plaintiff's constant menstrual bleeding combined with evidence "that immediately after the accident her condition changed to constant bleeding which could not be controlled and that this constant bleeding was not common and was not a symptom ... before the collision" was sufficient to survive summary judgment on whether "the accident was the cause of the constant bleeding"); Ideal Food Prod. Co. v. Rupe , 76 Ariz. 175, 261 P.2d 992, 993, 994 (1953) (evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment where plaintiff put forward expert testimony that her injury, which was diagnosed after the fall at issue, was "caused by a fall or some injury"; there was "no evidence of a prior trauma or injury that could have been the cause"; and plaintiff testified "to extreme pain after the accident and that prior to this fall she had never experienced any pain in and about her left hip"); Rodrigues , 661 S.E.2d at 144 (holding that expert testimony "unequivocally stated" that chlorine substantially contributed to plaintiff's pneumonia but noting that "even if the physician's testimony here were expressed only in terms of the chlorine being a 'possible' cause of [plaintiff's] injuries, other nonexpert evidence ... [that] he was in apparent good health, he immediately became ill upon his exposure to the chlorine, which continuously worsened into the pneumonia he suffered when he presented at the emergency room" was sufficient to survive summary judgment.).
Plaintiffs point to one jurisdiction—Pennsylvania—that has found in medical malpractice cases that expert evidence of an "increased risk of harm" along with evidence that the harm in fact occurred is sufficient to warrant a jury trial. (Dkt. No. 1586 at 33). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first found such evidence sufficient in a medical malpractice case in Hamil v. Bashline, relying on Section 323 of the Restatement of Torts, a.k.a., the Good Samaritan Rule. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286–87 (1978) ; see also Oxford Presbyterian Church v. Hindman Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, 35 Pa. D. & C.4th 289, 294 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1998) ("Ever since the case of Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978), liability has been imposed upon medical care providers under section 323 of the Restatement ... for failing to take steps which would have prevented injury, thus increasing the 'risk' of harm."). However, "[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited its holding in Hamil to cases where the issue is 'the adequacy of medical services rendered in a fact situation to which section 323(a) applies, ....' " Gans v. Gray, 612 F.Supp. 608, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Thus, for Hamil to be applicable, a case must "involve circumstances where one party undertook 'gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things.' " Cooper v. Frankford Health Care Sys., Inc., 960 A.2d 134, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 ); see also Gans, 612 F.Supp. at 614 ("The language of the Restatement indicates that a plaintiff under this section must have suffered a physical injury resulting from the negligent rendition of services, whether gratuitous or contracted for."); Ettinger v. Triangle–Pac. Corp., 799 A.2d 95, 107 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (upholding trial court's finding that "[t]he doctrine of increased risk of harm is inapplicable absent the undertaking of a service either gratuitously or for consideration"). While Section 323 is "often applied in medical malpractice suits," Pennsylvania courts have never invoked the section "in the context of a negligence-based products liability case." Lempke v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. CIV.A. 11–1237, 2012 WL 94547, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2012). Such cases do not involve the rendition of services directly to a person, and attempting to apply the theory in such a case "stretches Section 323 beyond its plain meaning and beyond the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania." Id. This Court agrees and declines to extend Hamil and its progeny to products liability cases such as this one.
However, for the cases at issue here, Plaintiff have not produced any expert evidence at all, not even expert evidence that Lipitor is a possible cause of diabetes. To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to rely on relative risk estimates of Dr. Murphy and Dr. Handshoe, Plaintiffs never disclosed either of these experts as general causation experts, and the Court has excluded the testimony of both in any event.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs had such expert testimony, they have not pointed to any probative, non-expert evidence to combine with it. Plaintiffs first state that "the MDL includes numerous patients with no history of diabetes prior to their initial Lipitor exposures." (Dkt. No. 1586 at 39). This is undoubtedly true. It is impossible that Lipitor would have caused a Plaintiff's diabetes if she developed the disease prior to ever taking the drug. However, the converse of this statement is not true. Plaintiffs may have developed diabetes after taking Lipitor, after having a grandchild, after tasting creme brulee for the first time, or after she turned 65. However, the fact that Plaintiff developed diabetes after these events does allow a reasonable jury to infer causation, without speculation and conjecture. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB , 178 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he mere fact that two events correspond in time does not mean that the two necessarily are related in any causative fashion."); McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc ., 401 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[S]imply because a person takes drugs and then suffers an injury does not show causation. Drawing such a conclusion from temporal relationships leads to the blunder of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.").
"[D]epending on the circumstances, a temporal relationship between exposure to a substance and the onset of a disease or a worsening of symptoms can provide compelling evidence of causation." Westberry , 178 F.3d at 264 (finding expert testimony admissible). Indeed, the examples of immediate onset of symptoms cited above are such examples. See Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc ., 259 F.3d 924, 931 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Under some circumstances, a strong temporal connection is powerful evidence of causation ... if a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened"); Westberry , 178 F.3d at 265 (temporal relationship compelling where it was "undisputed that inhalation of high levels of talc irritate[d] mucous membranes," plaintiff "worked in clouds of talc ... that covered him and his clothes," and every time the plaintiff stayed out of work, his sinuses improved, whereas every time plaintiff returned to work, they worsened).
But such circumstances are not present here. Plaintiffs here developed diabetes months or years after taking Lipitor and while they had other substantial risk factors for the disease. The Court has already found that the temporal relationship at issue here is insufficient to form the basis of a reliable causation opinion under Daubert . (See CMO 55, Dkt. No. 1283 at 20–27). Therefore, it is necessarily insufficient to create an issue of fact as to causation. See Hollander , 289 F.3d at 1214 ("We have already ruled that five of the eight categories of evidence on which they rely did not constitute sufficiently reliable grounds under Daubert for their experts' opinions. As a result, these categories of evidence do not raise questions of fact on issues of causation."). The attenuated temporal relationship at issue here simply leaves a jury to speculate.
Every Plaintiff who submitted case-specific evidence in response to Pfizer's omnibus motion has at least one other, and often multiple other, risk factors for diabetes according the evidence submitted by her.
3. Hayes Law Firm Plaintiffs
These Plaintiffs submitted their Plaintiff Fact Sheets (PFSs) and certain medical records. (Dkt. Nos. 1670, 1682, 1686, 1687, 1688). They contend that (1) they were not diabetic before taking Lipitor, (2) they were diagnosed with diabetes after taking Lipitor, and (3) they did not have certain risk factors. (See Dkt. No. 1670 at 17–39). At oral argument counsel stated this was "the best thing I could come up with, with nonexpert evidence," that "[t]hey are not diabetic before taking the medication, they took Lipitor and then they became diabetic." (Dkt. No. 1727 at 24). As explained above, the fact that Plaintiffs took Lipitor and sometime thereafter developed diabetes is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lipitor did in fact cause their diabetes. E.g., McClain , 401 F.3d at 1243. Any finding would be mere speculation by the jury. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment as to these plaintiffs as well.
The facts listed in Plaintiff's brief do not always correspond to the information in the PFS, and the facts in the PFSs (such as Plaintiff's weight) are often contradicted by Plaintiff's medical records.
4. Douglas & London Plaintiffs
These Plaintiffs did not initially submit any evidence to the Court and simply submitted a separate brief that argued that summary judgment was precluded by:
(a) their respective health history and conditions as documented in their medical records, pharmacy records and/or other relevant records;
(b) their respective Plaintiff Fact Sheets ("PFS's") that have already been served on Defendants and any and all amendments thereto;
(c) the general causation evidence identified and discussed in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 22, 2016 [Dkt. 1586]; and
(d) the substantive state law that applies to each D&L Plaintiff's respective claims.
(Dkt. No. 1689 at 5 (footnotes omitted)). The Court entered a text order stating that these Plaintiffs must file any evidence that they wished to the Court to consider. (Dkt. No. 1695). In response, Plaintiffs literally dumped boxes upon boxes of documents on the Court, with no discernment or suggestion as to which documents they claimed precluded summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 1698, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703, 1704, 1705, 1706). Nevertheless, the Court reviewed these documents as well, almost all of which were completely irrelevant. The Court has found nothing in these records that would create an issue of fact as to causation, and Plaintiffs have pointed to none. Therefore, the Court enters summary judgment as to these Plaintiffs as well.
C. The Court Need Not Suggest Remand
The PSC and the specific Plaintiffs who responded to CMO 82, complain that the Court has overstepped its role as an MDL court by addressing specific causation. Plaintiffs cite MDL courts that have declined to address "cumbersome, case-specific legal issues." In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig ., No. MDL 1407, 2004 WL 2034587, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 3, 2004). Certainly if case-specific causation issues are cumbersome, MDL courts have the discretion to suggest remand prior to resolving case-specific issues. See In re Evergreen Valley Project Litig ., 435 F.Supp. 923, 924 (J.P.M.L. 1977) ("It is not contemplated that a Section 1407 transferee judge will necessarily complete all pretrial proceedings in all actions transferred and assigned to him by the Panel, but rather that the transferee judge in his discretion will conduct the common pretrial proceedings with respect to the actions and any additional pretrial proceedings as he deems otherwise appropriate.").
This decision is in the court's discretion. Some MDL courts have chosen to address case specific causation issues with regard to motions for summary judgment and suggest remand only after a case has survived a motion for summary judgment. In In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), MDL No. 875, the MDL court has addressed at least 791 separate motions for summary judgment in individual cases from a variety jurisdictions. (See http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/MDL/MDL875/MASTER% 20Robreno% 20MDL875% 20Decisions% 20Chart% 20–% 20Updated% 2011–6–15.xls).
However, it is equally clear that "[a]n MDL transferee judge has authority to dispose of cases on the merits–for example, by ruling on motions for summary judgment." Manual for Complex Litigation, § 22.36 (4th ed. 2004) ; accord In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig ., 113 F.3d 1484, 1488 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that "transferee court in federal multidistrict proceedings has the authority to enter dispositive orders terminating cases consolidated under 28 U.S.C. § 1407" and affirming summary judgment); see also In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act Effective Scheduling Litig ., 73 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In practice, however, the vast majority of transferred cases are disposed of completely in the transferee court, either through pretrial dispositions such as summary judgment, or by trial."); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Litig ., 165 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming MDL court's entry of summary judgment based on the learned intermediary doctrine—a state law doctrine).
As the United States Supreme Court recently noted in a unanimous decision, "Congress anticipated that, during the pendency of pretrial proceedings, final decisions might be rendered in one or more of the actions consolidated pursuant to § 1407," by specifying that " 'at or before the conclusion of ... pretrial proceedings,' each of the transferred actions must be remanded to the originating district 'unless [the action] shall have been previously terminated .' " Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp ., ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 897, 904, 190 L.Ed.2d 789 (2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) ) (emphasis in original). Lexecon 's holding that Section 1407 requires transfer back to the original court when "pretrial proceedings have run their course," Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach , 523 U.S. 26, 34, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998), does not limit the ability of an MDL court to conduct pretrial proceedings, including ruling on dispositive motions, before suggesting remand.
In considering whether the Court should rule on such motions prior to transfer, the Court considers the "aims" of Section 1407 to "eliminate duplication in discovery, avoid conflicting rulings and schedules, reduce litigation cost, and save the time and effort of the parties, the attorneys, the witnesses, and the courts." Gelboim , 135 S.Ct. at 903 (quoting Manual for Complex Litigation § 20.131, p. 220 (4th ed. 2004) ). Ruling on an omnibus motion for summary judgment that involve issues common to all cases, such as whether a claim can survive summary judgment without expert testimony on specific causation, "will promote the just and efficient conduct" of these actions and, thus, is the type of "coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings" envisioned by Section 1407. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 22.36 (4th ed. 2004) ("If the summary judgment motions involve issues common to all the cases centralized before the MDL court, ... the transferee judge may be in the best position to rule."); see also In re Activated Carbon–Based Hunting Clothing Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. , 840 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1198 (D. Minn. 2012) ("Generally speaking, whether to remand 'turns on ... whether the case will benefit from further coordinated proceedings as part of the MDL.' ") (quoting In reAir Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands , 461 F.Supp. 671, 672–73 (J.P.M.L.1978) ). In this case, where no Plaintiff claims that she can produce an expert on specific causation that will survive Daubert if the Court's ruling in CMO 55 is correctly decided, it is inefficient, costly, and contrary to the purposes of the statute to suggest remand without ruling on summary judgment. This Court is familiar with the science and issues present and can dispose of the issues far more quickly and efficiently than dozens of courts spread across the country. The Court will have to consider the law of multiple jurisdictions, but it is competent to do so. Therefore, the Court declines Plaintiffs' invitation to essentially "disregard the entire course of the MDL proceedings" and suggest remand of these cases so Plaintiffs can avoid the writing on the wall. See In re Zoloft (Sertralinehydrochloride) Prod. Liab. Litig. , 176 F.Supp.3d 483, 498–99 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 1564), is GRANTED IN PART. The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion as to Plaintiffs' claims listed in Appendix 1, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Appendix 1
CLIENTLAST CLIENTFIRST CIVILNO ALL DOSES ALL DOSES INGESTED Pfizer Position PRESCRIBED PRE-DM PRE-DM (Dose Alleged) Knight Bonnie 0:13-cv-01375 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Johnson Virgie 0:13-cv-03054 10 10 Agree Jones Marguerite W. 1:13-cv-01786 40 40 Agree Hammond Daisy 1:13-cv-02765-RMG 40 40 Agree Kane Gina (Waltraud) 2:13-cv-01012-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Turner Susan Marie 2:13-cv-01108 40 40 Agree Clark Margaret 2:13-cv-01164 10 10 Agree Jones Joyce 2:13-cv-01785 40 40 Agree Gadsden Waltina 2:13-cv-01921 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Dantzler Saradell (Saradelle) 2:13-cv-02766 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Veronee Connie 2:14-cv-00052 10mg 10mg Agree Guillory Jennie 2:14-cv-00461-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Davis Kathleen 2:14-cv-00462-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Padilla Maria Rosa 2:14-cv-00463 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 40, 80 Diabetes then 40, 80 Alleges Pre-exsting Diabetes; Caston Pamela (Estate of) 2:14-cv-00465 20 20 Agree Strader Diane 2:14-cv-00469 10 10 Agree Peevy Martha 2:14-cv-00470-RMG 20 20 Agree Allen Ethel 2:14-cv-00471 20 20 Agree Pauley Betty 2:14-cv-00473-RMG 40 40 Agree Shivers Alice F. 2:14-cv-00474-RGM 10, 20 10, 20 Agree MATTHEWS PEARL 2:14-cv-00475-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Calamese Ruthie M. 2:14-cv-00476-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lewis Gwendolyn (Estate of) 2:14-cv-00477-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Holbrook Joyce 2:14-cv-00478-RMG 40 40 Agree Murphy Michele 2:14-cv-00479 20 20 Agree Lumar Jessie 2:14-cv-00481-RMG 10 10 Agree Miller Ruby 2:14-cv-00486-RMG 10 10 Agree Olson Josette 2:14-cv-00487-RMG 10 10 Agree Tipton Jeannie 2:14-cv-00490-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Johnson Faith 2:14-cv-00492 40 40 Agree Jefferson Kimberley 2:14-cv-00494-RMG 20 20 Agree House Earlene 2:14-cv-00496-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Diaz Feliza 2:14-cv-00497-RMG 20 20 Agree
Hines Kimberly 2:14-cv-00502 10 10 Agree Isom Aubrey 2:14-cv-00504-RMG 40 40 Agree Conner Rhonda 2:14-cv-00505 10 10 Agree Butler Gladys 2:14-cv-00514 20 20 Agree Ehlers Carla 2:14-cv-00516 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Gremillion Alberta 2:14-cv-00519-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Christopher Dianne 2:14-cv-00521 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Smith Vera 2:14-cv-00522 40 40 Agree Morales Christine 2:14-cv-00524-RMG 40 40 Agree McCraw Shirley 2:14-cv-00532 10 10 Agree Pryor Joyce 2:14-cv-00533 10 10 Agree Euyoque Celina 2:14-cv-00553 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Smith Janie 2:14-cv-00554 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Feather Helen M. 2:14-cv-00558 20 20 Agree Streetman Juanita 2:14-cv-00561 10 10 Agree Knutson Mary 2:14-cv-00564 40mg 40mg Agree Baker Kristie W. 2:14-cv-00565 40 40 Agree Hatton Gloria 2:14-cv-00566-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lopez Linda 2:14-cv-00567 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lowe Faustine 2:14-cv-00568-RMG 40 40 Agree Conger Carole 2:14-cv-00570 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hernandez-Lopez Elizabeth 2:14-cv-00571-RMG 10 10 Agree Jones Cliffy 2:14-cv-00572-RMG 20 20 Agree Petersen Mary 2:14-cv-00573 10mg 10mg Agree Rhoades Nancy 2:14-cv-00580-RMG 20 20 Agree Brooks Thelma 2:14-cv-00581-RMG 20 20 Agree Morgan Lillian 2:14-cv-00582 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Drains Beatrice 2:14-cv-00583 10 10 Agree Tull Carolyn 2:14-cv-00584 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Kearnes Charlotte 2:14-cv-00585 20mg 20mg Agree Day Zerita 2:14-cv-00586-RMG 10 10 Agree Hilbert Colleen 2:14-cv-00587 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Graham Nancy 2:14-cv-00588 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Jones Judy 2:14-cv-00589 10 10 Agree Howard Wanda 2:14-cv-00590 40mg 40mg Agree Sloan Marguerite 2:14-cv-00591 10mg; 20mg; 40mg 10mg; 20mg; 40mg Agree Berry Bonita 2:14-cv-00502-RMG 10 10 Agree Garrett Rebecca 2:14-cv-00593 20 20 Agree Parsons Mary 2:14-cv-00595 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Triplett Jessie 2:14-cv-00596 10 10 Agree
Dubuisson Susan 2:14-cv-00597-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Strattan Sandra 2.14-cv-00598 10mg 10mg Agree Moore Edna 2:14-cv-00599 20mg 20mg Agree Cole Anisette 2:14-cv-00600 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Magee Mary 2:14-cv-00601-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Burrow Edna 2:14-cv-00603 40 40 Agree Compton Cherie 2:14-cv-00604 10mg 10mg Agree Baldwin Seona 2:14-cv-00605-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Berkheiser Melody 2:14-cv-00606-RMG 20 20 Agree Baugh Marlon A. 2:14-cv-00607 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Williams Ruth 2:14-cv-00609-RMG 10 10 Agree Bossart Norma 2:14-cv-00610-RMG 20 20 Agree Brown Shirley 2:14-cv-00612-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree McLeod Vallinda 2:14-cv-00615 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hollandsworth Sharon 2:14-cv-00616 20mg 20mg Agree* Chatman Peggy 2:14-cv-00617-RMG 10 10 Agree Bennett Marilyn 2:14-cv-00626 20 20 Agree Wentz Constance 2:14-cv-00627 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Buckley Katie 2:14-cv-00629 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Renner Yvonitha Gail 2:14-cv-00633 10 10 Agree Smith Brenda J. 2:14-cv-00634-RMG 10 10 Agree Stephens Annie 2:14-cv-00635 10 10 Agree Plume Marite 2:14-cv-00636-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Fields Brenda 2:14-cv-00637-RMG 10 10 Agree Cawfield Deborah 2:14-cv-00638 10mg; 40mg 10mg; 40mg Agree Rincon Estela 2:14-cv-00641-RMG 10 10 Agree Corner Cassandra 2:14-cv-00642-RMG 10 10 Agree Lastoria Barbara 2:14-cv-00653-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Jones Rene J. 2:14-cv-00654 20 20 Agree Drusbasky Martha 2:14-cv-00655 40mg 40mg Agree Bryant De'Borah 2:14-cv-00656 20 20 Agree Pitchford Georgia 2:14-cv-00657-RMG 40 40 Agree Chadwick Catherine L 2:14-cv-00660 10 10 Agree Feemster Sharon 2:14-cv-00661 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Grass Sandra 2:14-cv-00662-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Jackson Yevone 2:14-cv-00663-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Shurley Nancy 2:14-cv-00664 20mg 20mg Agree Hockensmith Louise 2:14-cv-00675-RMG 10 10 Agree Karolak Jane (Estate of) 2:14-cv-00676 20 20 Agree Mathis Rosie 2:14-cv-00678-RMG 20 20 Agree
DiCenzi Patricia 2:14-cv-00680 10mg; 20mg; 40mg 10mg; 20mg; 40mg Agree Hawkins Mary 2:14-cv-00681 20 20 Agree Van Deusen Margaret Ann 2:14-cv-00683 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Jenkins Michelle 2:14-cv-00685-RMG 20 20 Agree Gipson Rosemary 2:14-cv-00686-rmg 20 20 Agree Amolsch Patricia 2:14-cv-00687 20 20 Agree Bellon Martha 2:14-cv-00688 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Lee Carol 2:14-cv-00689-RMG 20 20 Agree Baker Sandra 2:14-cv-00690 10 10 Agree Henderson Lois 2:14-cv-00691 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Woods Linda 2:14-cv-00692 40 40 Agree Kimbrough Marilyn 2:14-cv-00697-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Starnes Martha C. 2:14-cv-00698-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Carreker Doris 2:14-cv-00700-RMG 20 20 Agree Chance Patricia 2:14-cv-00702-RMG 40 40 Agree Story Royce 2:14-cv-00703-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree* Smith Denise 2:14-cv-00711-RMG 40 40 Agree Holman Christine 2:14-cv-00713-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Krone Janice 2:14-cv-00716 10mg 10mg Agree Maisonet Amino 2:14-cv-00723-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Taylor Anne G. 2:14-cv-00724-RMG 20 20 Agree Robinson Jannie Mitchell 2:14-cv-00725-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Jennings Joyce 2:14-cv-00727-RMG 10 10 Agree Robinson Helen 2:14-cv-00730-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Griffith-Gills Jacqueline 2:14-cv-00731 10 10 Agree Johnson Sheba B. 2:14-cv-00732 40 40 Agree Little Effie 2:14-cv-00733-RMG 10 10 Agree Grimes Barbara 2:14-cv-00740-RMG 10 10 Agree Austin Bessie 2:14-cv-00753-RMG 40 40 Agree Baham Deborah 2:14-cv-00772 10mg; 40mg 10mg; 40mg Agree Johnson Ruth 2:14-cv-00782 10mg 10mg Agree Anderson Judy 2:14-cv-00794-RMG 20 20 Agree Calvin Desiree 2:14-cv-00795 40mg; 60mg 40mg; 60mg Agree* Crow Dorothy 2:14-cv-00798 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Banes Kathleen 2:14-cv-00799 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Smith Joyce 2:14-cv-00802 20, 40 20, 40 Agree
Greenwood Bettye 2:14-cv-00805-RMG 10 10 Agree Bates Vesta M. 2:14-cv-00806 10 10 Agree Jones Lelia 2:14-cv-00807-RMG 10 10 Agree McCall Mary 2:14-cv-00808 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Smith Jean 2:14-cv-00809-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Tennant Dorothy 2:14-cv-00811-RMG 20 20 Agree Dangerfield Nancy 2:14-cv-00820-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hicks Esther 2:14-cv-00821-RMG 40 40 Agree Zumfelde Dianne 2:14-cv-00822-RMG 10 10 Agree Yoder Celia 2:14-cv-00823-RMG 40 40 Agree Halfhill Janet 2:14-cv-00824-RMG 10 10 Agree Philip Aleyamma 2:14-cv-00825-RMC 10 10 Agree Pitts Sarah 2:14-cv-00827 10 10 Agree Corrales Millie 2:14-cv-00828-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Kirkland Mary 2:14-cv-00833-RMG 20 20 Agree Woltcheck Yvonne 2:14-cv-00834 10mg 10mg Agree Frazier Reather Ann 2:14-cv-00843-RMG 20 20 Agree Baker Surekha 2:14-cv-00844 10 10 Agree Lott-Person Sharon 2:14-cv-00845-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Valenti Micheline J. 2:14-cv-00846-RMG 60 60 Agree Jackson Marsha 2:14-cv-00848 20mg 20mg Agree Rumph Dorothy 2:14-cv-00849-RMG 10 10 Agree Schulte Marjorie E. 2:14-cv-00850-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Williams Karlene 2:14-cv-00851 40 40 Agree Cook Cindy 2:14-cv-00852-RMG 10 10 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Heesen Cheryl 2:14-cv-00853-RMG 20 20 Agree
Manning Johnette 2:14-cv-00854-RMG 10 10 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Wingett Denise 2:14-cv-00856-RMG 10 10 Agree Gonzalez Barbara 2:14-cv-00857 10 10 Agree Davis Deeana 2:14-cv-00861 10mg 10mg Agree Hunt-Harkin Roseanne 2:14-cv-00864-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Walsh Diane 2:14-cv-00872 20 20 Agree Gordon Bonnie 2:14-cv-00879 10mg 10mg Agree Giusto Sandra 2:14-cv-00880 10. 20 10, 20 Agree Davis Jennie M. 2:14-cv-00881 10 10 Agree Reynolds Etta 2:14-cv-00882 40 40 Agree Whitener Melinda 2:14-cv-00883 20mg 20mg Agree Saddler Sharon 2:14-cv-00884 10mg 10mg Agree Delseno Judith 2:14-cv-00886 10mg 10mg Agree Gossett Ella 2:14-cv-00899-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Shepherd June 2:14-cv-00900-RMG 20 20 Agree Bach Manjeekaur 2:14-cv-00904 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Parris Betty 2:14-cv-00908 10 10 Agree Bailey Tamale G. 2:14-cv-00909 10 10 Agree Wyks Pamela 2:14-cv-00910 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Jordan Jean 2:14-cv-00912 20 20 Agree Phan Kim Ren 2:14-cv-00913 40 40 Agree Chandler Olivene 2:14-cv-00914 10 10 Agree Unger Alice 2:14-cv-00915 10 10 Agree Pham Nghiep 2:14-cv-00916 10 10 Agree Nguyen Phung Thi 2:14-cv-00917 20 20 Agree Williams Patricia A. 2:14-cv-00919-RMG 10 10 Agree Kaplan Susan 2:14-cv-00920 20 20 Agree Nguyen Chinh 2:14-cv-00922 20 20 Agree Hudson Otelia 2:14-cv-00933 40 40 Agree Zdunek Lynn 2:14-cv-00935-RMG 10.40 10, 40 Agree Grubb Linda 2:14-cv-00937 20mg 20mg Agree Schrader Sally 2:14-cv-00938-RMG 20 20 Agree DiCicco Maria 2:14-cv-00939 5, 10, 20 5, 10. 20 Agree Dotson Donna F. 2:14-cv-00940-RMG 10 10 Agree Sledz Alice 2:14-cv-00941-RMG 10 10 Agree Wood Crystal 2:14-cv-00953 40 40 Agree Lutvi Zelije 2:14-cv-00955-RMG 10.20 10, 20 Agree
Pritchard Bernice 2:14-cv-00956-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Gaiton Kim 2:14-cv-00962 10mg 10mg Agree Larimer Rebecca 2:14-cv-00963 10mg; 20mg; 40mg 10mg; 20mg; 40mg Agree Maloney Carla 2:14-cv-00964 20mg 20mg Agree Rayford Kim 2:14-cv-00965 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Trujillo Yukimi 2:14-cv-00966 10mg; 20mg; 40mg 10mg; 20mg; 40mg Agree Barker Sue 2:14-cv-00976 20mg 20mg Agree Catlin Averdella 2:14-cv-00977 10mg; 20mg; 40mg 10mg; 20mg; 40mg Agree Anderson Beverly 2:14-cv-00978 10mg 10mg Agree Culbreth Jacqueline 2:14-cv-00980 40mg 40mg Agree Dawson Elaine 2:14-cv-00982 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Brucciani Paula 2:14-cv-00983 20mg 20mg Agree Sheneman Patsy 2:14-cv-00985 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Drew Cynthia 2:14-cv-00988 40mg 40mg Agree Cravens Marque 2:14-cv-00990 40mg 40mg Agree Montoya Pamela 2:14-cv-00992 40mg 40mg Agree* Fowler Kathy 2:14-cv-00997 10mg 10mg Agree Jackson Marina 2:14-cv-00999 40mg 40mg Agree Joyce Mitchelle 2:14-cv-01001 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Bishop Virginia 2:14-cv-01002 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Orrell Rosalie 2:14-cv-01003 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Lumley Barbara 2:14-cv-01004 20mg 20mg Agree Fillmore Wanda 2:14-cv-01007 40mg 40mg Agree* Wyrick Pamela 2:14-cv-01010-RMG 10 10 Agree Hamilton Ella 2:14-cv-01011 20 20 Agree Beems Alice 2:14-cv-01012 20mg 20mg Agree Firmin Rosemary 2:14-cv-01013 20, 40 20 40 Agree Hammerschmidt Nora 2:14-cv-01014 20mg 20mg Agree Lemaire Rebecca 2:14-cv-01015 10mg 10mg Agree Stoneking Carolyn 2:14-cv-01017 20 20 Agree Sayre Cheryl 2:14-cv-01018 20 20 Agree Good-Montgomery Nancy 2:14-cv-01019-RMG 10 10 Agree Wright Melva 2:14-cv-01020 20 20 Agree Given Virginia Ann 2:14-cv-01021 20 20 Agree Porter Dorothy 2:14-cv-01026-RMG 20 20 Agree Richeson Joyce 2:14-cv-01027 10 10 Agree Goodson Lillian A. 2:14-cv-01028 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Harris Bonita 2:14-cv-01031 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Martin Mary-Lynn 2:14-cv-01034 10mg 10mg Agree
Dario Cathy 2:14-cv-01036 10mg 10mg Agree Banks Katie 2:14-cv-01037 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Croon Janet 2:14-cv-01038 10mg 10mg Agree Wallace Lisa 2:14-cv-01043-RMG 10 10 Agree Bass Bonnie 2:14-cv-01045-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Casanas Linda 2:14-cv-01051-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Calvin Phyllis 2:14-cv-01054 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Spivey Francese 2:14-cv-01071 40 40 Agree Castillo Manuela 2:14-cv-01072 20mg 20mg Agree Turpin Kathy 2:14-cv-01074 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Froug Mona 2:14-cv-01077 10mg; 20mg; 40mg 10mg; 20mg; 40mg Agree Fountain Patricia 2:14-cv-01085 10mg 10mg Agree Lawton Diane 2:14-cv-01086 10mg 10mg Agree Trueluck-Hardin Alberta 2:14-cv-01087 20mg 20mg Agree Pace Peggy 2:14-cv-01088-RMG 20 20 Agree Means Sharon 2:14-cv-01121 10mg 10mg Agree Alker Cheryl 2:14-cv-01122 20mg 20mg Agree Moffett Louise 2:14-cv-01123 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Brown-Freddie Loretta 2:14-cv-01125 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Cook Marie 2:14-cv-01128 20 20 Agree Rabak Georgetta 2:14-cv-01129-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Waller Debra 2:14-cv-01130-RMG 20 20 Agree Carter Gardeen 2:14-cv-01131-RMG 20 20 Agree Kimbrough Charlene 2:14-cv-01168 10 10 Agree
Johnson Janet 2:14-cv-01233 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree* Hervey Marlene 2:14-cv-01256-RMG 10 10 Agree Jenkins Rutha 2:14-cv-01260 20 20 Agree Frame Janelle 2:14-cv-01276-RMG 10 10 Agree Copen Edna 2:14-cv-01279-RMG 10 10 Agree Savley Nora 2:14-cv-01282-RMG 10 10 Agree Wills Ginger 2:14-cv-01283-RMG 40 40 Agree Fisher Laura 2:14-cv-01284-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Nunn Leona 2:14-cv-01286 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Green Dorothy 2:14-cv-01304-RMG 40 40 Agree Norfleet Lorraine 2:14-cv-01309 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Stack Wilma 2:14-cv-01321 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Mack Stella 2:14-cv-01322-RMG 20 20 Agree Maldonado Judy 2:14-cv-01330-RMG 20 20 Agree Andolsek Susan 2:14-cv-01331 10 10 Agree Pierce Brenda 2:14-cv-01334 10 10 Agree Green Lonzetta 2:14-cv-01335-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Landry Linda 2:14-cv-01336 10 10 Agree Move Mable 2:14-cv-01337-RMG 20 20 Agree Rivas Rosie 2:14-cv-01338 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Christy Irene 2:14-cv-01340 20 20 Agree Clack Nadine 2:14-cv-01341-RMG 40 40 Agree Higginbottom Pamela 2:14-cv-01342-RMG 10 10 Agree Dorries Freda 2:14-cv-01343-RMG 20 20 Agree Lopez Ramona 2:14-cv-01345 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hart Priscilla 2:14-cv-01347 10 10 Agree Tromp Marianne 2:14-cv-01348 5, 10, 20, 40 5, 10, 20, 40 Agree Oberding Gail 2:14-cv-01351 40mg 40mg Agree Jackson Valesca 2:14-cv-01352 20 20 Agree Wright Victorine 2:14-cv-01352 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree McCulloch Derita 2:14-cv-01353-RMG 20 20 Agree Taylor LaQuisha 2:14-cv-01358-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Burton Ida Joyce 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Coon Gloral J. 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Eversen Florence 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 20 20 Agree Leraaen Myra 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 40 40 Agree
Moore Margaret 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Oldewurtel Pamela 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 20 20 Agree Perez Olivia 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Pierzynski Kathleen 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Tatum Nancy 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Waddell Carol A. 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Alderman Dorothy 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 20 20 Agree Backes Vicki 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 40 40 Agree Blair Estate of Minnie 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Ellis Carla 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Hinson Felicia 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 20 20 Agree Marks Gladys 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Miller Anne 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 10 10 Agree Miller Ellen 2:14-cv-01359-RMG 40 40 Agree Cook Alice 2:14-cv-01370-RMG 40 40 Agree Pfau Roberta Jean 2:14-cv-01377-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Martin Bette 2:14-cv-01378 40 40 Agree Hernandez Maria 2:14-cv-01379 20 20 Agree Thompson Carole 2:14-cv-01380-RMG 20 20 Agree Stankos Judy 2:14-cv-01384-RMG 10 10 Agree Robertson Gladys 2:14-cv-01387-RMG 10 10 Agree Talton Marty 2:14-cv-01388-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Williams-Callaway Willie Mae 2:14-cv-01390-RMG 20 20 Agree Allen Helga 2:14-cv-01391-RMG 10 10 Agree Yancey Florela S. 2:14-cv-01392-RMG 20 20 Agree Bobo Janice 2:14-cv-01393-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Anderson Karen M. 2:14-cv-01394-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Rivera Edna M. 2:14-cv-01395-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Bertram Pamela 2:14-cv-01396-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Black Joyce E. 2:14-cv-01397-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Bowens Vickie L. 2:14-cv-01398-RMG 20 20 Agree DelRio Herminia 2:14-cv-01402-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Cox Marline 2:14-cv-01403-RMG 40 40 Agree Fenex Patricia 2:14-cv-01405-RMG 40 40 Agree Gonzales Treva 2:14-cv-01406-RMG 40 40 Agree Orr Marjorie 2:14-cv-01407 10 10 Agree Duffey Jo Ann 2:14-cv-01408-RMG 10 10 Agree Thompson Ella 2:14-cv-01412-RMG 20 20 Agree Harris Louise 2:14-cv-01413-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Ames Katherine P. 2:14-cv-01415-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree
Ellis-Johnson Joyce 2:14-cv-01418 10 10 Agree Arnold Bonnie 2:14-cv-01419-RMG 10 10 Agree Jones Dianna 2:14-cv-01420-RMG 20 20 Agree Baker Evelyn D. 2:14-cv-01421-RMG 20 20 Agree Whitley Leila 2:14-cv-01422-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Barrera Manuela 2:14-cv-01423-RMG 20 20 Agree Arnold Pamela I. 2:14-cv-01425-RMG 10 10 Agree Behnfield Deborah S. 2:14-cv-01428-RMG 20 20 Agree Cleland Rita 2:14-cv-01430-RMG 40 40 Agree Rockel Doris 2:14-cv-01431 10 10 Agree Berstrom Jeri 2:14-cv-01432-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Federico Rita 2:14-cv-01434-RMG 20 20 Agree Gallagher Verna M. 2:14-cv-01435-RMG 20 20 Agree Fowler Carol 2:14-cv-01436-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Stephens Patricia 2:14-cv-01438-RMG 40 40 Agree Traylor Patricia 2:14-cv-01439-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Gallegos Lucy L. 2:14-cv-01442-RMG 20 20 Agree Gomez Renate 2:14-cv-01444-RMG 40 40 Agree Waring Rebecca Hyon 2:14-cv-01445-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Waters Cheryl 2:14-cv-01446-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Watts Herminigilda 2:14-cv-01447-RMG 40 40 Agree Gougler Leila 2:14-cv-01448-RMG 10 10 Agree Wedin Sundie 2:14-cv-01449-RMG 10 10 Agree Wilhite Adrienne 2:14-cv-01450-RMG 40 40 Agree Wilson-Clark Cynthia 2:14-cv-01451-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Blankenship Esther 2:14-cv-01452-RMG 20 20 Agree Hernandez Christine 2:14-cv-01453-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Gray Edith A. 2:14-cv-01455-RMG 20 20 Agree Hand Yvette C. 2:14-cv-01458-RMG 40 40 Agree King Linda 2:14-cv-01459-RMG 40 40 Agree Krakowski Leah 2:14-cv-01460-RMG 40 40 Agree Howell Sharon 2:14-cv-01461-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Righs McLaughlin Jean M. 2:14-cv-01462-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Crowley Rena 2:14-cv-01463-RMG 10 10 Agree Flake Peggy A. 2:14-cv-01465-RMG 20 20 Agree Jungles Melanie L. 2:14-cv-01467-RMG 40 40 Agree
Norris Marilyn D. 2:14-cv-01460-RMG 20 20 Agree Martinez Vivian 2:14-cv-01470-RMG 10 10 Agree Horton Wilma 2:14-cv-01471-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Gramm Grace 2:14-cv-01472-RMG 20 20 Agree Lucero Elvira L. 2:14-cv-01473-RMG 20 20 Agree Marshall-Corny Susan 2:14-cv-01474-RMG 10 10 Agree Harrison Rupp Gertrude Ann 2:14-cv-01475-RMG 40 40 Agree Craven Diana L. 2:14-cv-01476-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Jones Shirley 2:14-cv-01478-RMG 20 20 Agree Hernandez Rita 2:14-cv-01479-RMG 40 40 Agree Duran Lillian M. 2:14-cv-01480-RMG 20 20 Agree Nicolau Alice J. 2:14-cv-01481-RMG 40 40 Agree Gaccetta Carol M. 2:14-cv-01483-RMG 40 40 Agree Tolhurst Linda 2:14-cv-01484-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Pigford Jane 2:14-cv-01485-RMG 10 10 Agree Ristoff Joan 2:14-cv-01487-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Olives Nancy 2:14-cv-01409-RMG 10 10 Agree Wait Sandra 2:14-cv-01490-RMG 40 40 Agree Pollok Christine R. 2:14-cv-01491-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Quillin Barbara 2:14-cv-01492-RMG 10 10 Agree Victorian Patricia 2:14-cv-01493-RMG 40 40 Agree* Reyes Delfina 2:14-cv-01494-RMG 40 40 Agree Sailas Barbara M. 2:14-cv-01496-RMG 40 40 Agree Packwood Deborah 2:14-cv-01497-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree* Sambrano Maryann 2:14-cv-01498-RMG 10 10 Agree Altaro Kathleen 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Amadon Sharon 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Ammons Johnnie 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Aronson Judie 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Bagley Shelia 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 40 40 Agree Barrett Linda 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Bethune Glenda 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree
Bishop Virginia 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Bray-McDole Debra J. 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 40 40 Agree Bruce Sylvia 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 20 20 Agree Castaneda Maria 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 40 40 Agree Charleville Patsy 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Corallo Joanne 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Day Betty 2:14-cv-01499-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Dixson Martha 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 20 20 Agree Franks Shirley 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 20 20 Agree Friedland Dorothy 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 20 20 Agree Galbraith Betty 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 40 40 Agree Gravitte Retha 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree Hendrix Mary 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 40 40 Agree Joyce Lois A. 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 20 20 Agree Lowery Peggy 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 40 40 Agree McDonald Skye 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 20 20 Agree McKelvey Dianna 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 20 20 Agree Pitkin Judy 2:14-cv-01499-RMG 10 10 Agree* Banks Nancy 2:14-cv-01500-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Bennett Margaret 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Diaz Providencia 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Fuchs Ellen 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Garcia Magdalena 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Giddings Paulene 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Gunawan Fenny 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Harris Earlene 2:14-cv-01900-RMG 20 20 Agree Lee Marietta 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Lester Patricia 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 40 40 Agree Martinez Olga 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree McGee Shirley 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Nelson Victoria 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Orsello Jean 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree
Pitak Florence 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Schiffman Edith (deceased) 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Steele Pauline 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Sterback Lucille E. (deceased) 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Street Zeffar 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Sukhoo Binwattie 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Summers Sandra 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Tagle Maria Elena 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Traylor Fannie 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Trolman Hillary 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 40 40 Agree Tukes Margaret Lee 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Turk Eloise O. 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Walker Theresa W. 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree Ward Carnelia K. 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 20 20 Agree* Washington Oheila 2:14-cv-01500-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Wehling Helen J. 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 40 40 Agree Whitehead Dorothy 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Wilder Robbie Nell 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Willis Teresa T. 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Wilson Karen Ann 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 80 20 Agree Young Shirley A. 2:14-cv-01500-RMG 10 10 Agree Case Brenda 2:14-cv-01501 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Walker Eloise 2:14-cv-01501 10 10 Agree Rawdon Elizabeth 2:14-cv-01502-RMG 20 20 Agree Martin Jean 2:14-cv-01503-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Romero Debra Leann 2:14-cv-01504-RMG 10 10 Agree Tinius Mary L. 2:14-cv-01505-RMG 20 20 Agree Souturas Rosemary 2:14-cv-01508-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Ross Debra 2:14-cv-01509-RMG 10 10 Agree Routt Beverly J. 2:14-cv-01511-RMG 10 10 Agree Smiley Beverly 2:14-cv-01512-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Stone Lois W. 2:14-cv-01513-RMG 20 20 Agree Lesker Brandy 2:14-cv-01514-RMG 20 20 Agree Ridder Viola E. 2:14-cv-01515-RMG 10 10 Agree Nash Yvonne 2:14-cv-01516-RMG 40 40 Agree*
Maes Marita 2:14-cv-01517-RMC 20 20 Agree Leon Martha E, 2:14-cv-01520-RMG 40 40 Agree Sebben Coralynne 2:14-cv-01521-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserve Rights Smith Lydia M. 2:14-cv-01522-RMG 40 40 Agree Snyder Benetta B. 2:14-cv-01526-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Spackman Gillian M. 2:14-cv-01528-RMG 40 40 Agree Marshall Gloria Jean 2:14-cv-01529-RMG 20 20 Agree Coleman Jackie 2:14-cv-01550-RMG 10 10 Agree Copeland Gail 2:14-cv-01551-RMG 40 40 Agree Cooperstein Ann 2:14-cv-01554-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Neves Nanette 2:14-cv-01555-RMG 10 10 Agree Failla Lynda 2:14-cv-01556-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Zappardino Jennie 2:14-cv-01557-RMG 10 10 Agree Jackson Diane 2:14-cv-01558-RMG 40 40 Agree Pierson Faith 2:14-cv-01559-RMG 10 10 Agree Ahladianakis Argiro 2:14-cv-01560-RMG 20 20 Agree Demming Annette 2:14-cv-01561-RMG 20 20 Agree Kroll Sharon 2:14-cv-01562-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Honoken Mary 2:14-cv-01563 10 10 Agree Bryant Georgia 2:14-cv-01564 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Rumph Annie 2:14-cv-01570-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Silmon Charlotte 2:14-cv-01571-RMG 10 10 Agree Gagante Merli 2:14-cv-01575 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hammack Joyce 2:14-cv-01576-RMG 20 20 Agree Mayavski Margaret E 2:14-cv-01581-RMG 20 20 Agree Payne Barbara 2:14-cv-01582-RMG 20 20 Agree Smith Connie 2:14-cv-01587-RMG 20 20 Agree Hand Carolyn 2:14-cv-01590-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Finley Lela 2:14-cv-01591-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Brown Ella 2:14-cv-01592-RMG 20 20 Agree
Eddy Barbara 2:14-cv-01594-RMG 20 20 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Gerber Dorothy 2:14-cv-01595-RMG 10 10 Agree Bier Davida 2:14-cv-01596-RMG 10 10 Agree Kiter Marty 2:14-cv-01597-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Stage Sandra 2:14-cv-01598-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Martino Francene 2:14-cv-01599-RMG 20 20 Agree Georgeson Lorraine 2:14-cv-01600-RMG 40 40 Agree Soule Heather 2:14-cv-01601-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Leonard Kathie 2:14-cv-01604-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Katarzynski Margaret 2:14-cv-01605-RMG 10 10 Agree Green Josephine 2:14-cv-01608-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Ogline Virginia 2:14-cv-01609-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Watkins Dorothy 2:14-cv-01611-RMG 20 20 Agree Lang Regina 2:14-cv-01612-RMG 10 10 Agree Murtiff Margaret 2:14-cv-01613-RMG 20 20 Agree Bosma Doris 2:14-cv-01614-RMG 10 10 Agree Miller Bonnie 2:14-cv-01617-RMG 20 20 Agree Tomlin Marlynn 2:14-cv-01618-RMG 40 40 Agree Hill Elizabeth 2:14-cv-01619 40 40 Agree Cole Patricia 2:14-cv-01620 40 40 Agree Zaffuto Judith 2:14-cv-01624-RMG 20 20 Agree Evans Clara 2:14-cv-01625-RMG 20 20 Agree Mather Barbara 2:14-cv-01627-RMG 20 20 Agree Reed Cheryl 2:14-cv-01628-RMG 10 10 Agree Balentine Linda 2:14-cv-01629-RMG 20 20 Agree Steele Brenda 2:14-cv-01631-RMG 10 10 Agree Parks Pamela 2:14-cv-01632-RMG 10 10 Agree Diaz Celia 2:14-cv-01635 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown: Reserves Rights Kelley Brenda 2:14-cv-01637-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree
Roberts Brenda 2:14-cv-01661 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Acevedo Yadira D. 2:14-cv-01691 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Angangan Dorothy 2:14-cv-01705 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Blair Mildred 2:14-cv-01707 10 10 Agree Capone Angela 2:14-cv-01708 10 10 Agree Clements Nancy S. 2:14-cv-01709 20 20 Agree Cline Frances 2:14-cv-01710 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Elliott Vivian 2:14-cv-01712 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Johnson Barbara 2:14-cv-01713 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lisker Carol 2:14-cv-01714 10 10 Agree Hubbard Dinah Kaye 2:14-cv-01715-RMG 20 20 Agree McCoy Marieellanna 2:14-cv-01717 20 20 Agree Stanford Helen 2:14-cv-01710 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Thomas Patricia 2:14-cv-01720 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Walsh Janet 2:14-cv-01721 10 10 Agree Lindsay Helen 2:14-cv-01722-RMG 20 20 Agree Newsom Brenda 2:14-cv-01723-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Johnson Velma 2:14-cv-01724-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Harfield Mary K. 2:14-cv-01726 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree McAuliffe Linda 2:14-cv-01728 20 20 Agree McLean Lola 2:14-cv-01730 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Roberts Mary 2:14-cv-01734 10 10 Agree Winkelman Kelly 2:14-cv-01737 20 20 Agree Weiman Janice 2:14-cv-01738 10 10 Agree Zwicker Barbara 2:14-cv-01739 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Savolt Jessie 2:14-cv-01740 10 10 Agree Hughes Matte M. 2:14-cv-01741 20 20 Agree Holmes Vernestine 2:14-cv-01742 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Ford Susan 2:14-cv-01752-RMG 40 40 Agree Shuster Arlene 2:14-cv-01753-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Wiley Lori 2:14-cv-01754-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Shaw Sandra J. 2:14-cv-01755-RMG 10 10 Agree Williams Kimberli 2:14-cv-01781 10 10 Agree Whipple Julia 2:14-cv-01782 40 40 Agree Thomas Johnann 2:14-cv-01786 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Davis Barbara A. 2:14-cv-01798 40 40 Agree
Foerch Donna 2:14-cv-01813-RMG 40 40 Agree Allen Rosezel 2:14-cv-01817-RMG 20 20 Agree Parker Dorothy 2:14-cv-01820 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Carter Beverly 2:14-cv-01821 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Chinn Kay C. 2:14-cv-01826 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Wiegard Judy 2:14-cv-01827 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Williams Vivian 2:14-cv-01828 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Conner Gielsa 2:14-cv-01847-RMG 10 10 Agree Jones Pamela 2:14-cv-01848-RMG 10 10 Agree Barnes Gloria 2:14-cv-01850 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Barnett Arnesta 2:14-cv-01851 20 20, 40 Agree Honeycutt Kathy 2:14-cv-01853 10 10 Agree Wright Doris 2:14-cv-01854 10 10 Agree Dickson Betty 2:14-cv-01882-RMG 10 10 Agree Smith Karen 2:14-cv-01884 10mg; 40mg 10mg; 40mg Agree Slaughter Debra 2:14-cv-01895 10 10 Agree Evans Delores 2:14-cv-01899-RMG 20 20 Agree Jenkins Cheryl 2:14-cv-01917-RMG 10 10 Agree Lavender Olivia 2:14-cv-01923-RMG 10 10 Agree Nickels Patty 2:14-cv-01924-RMG 10 10 Agree Combs Rosalee 2:14-cv-01926-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 10 Diabetes then 10 Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Martin Charlene 2:14-cv-01929-RMG 40 40 Agree Ayala Elaine 2:14-cv-01934-RMG 20 20 Agree LeBlanc Katherine 2:14-cv-01939 10 10 Agree Wright Henrie Joyce 2:14-cv-01940 10 10 Agree Adams-Dodson Mary C. 2:14-cv-01941 10 10 Agree Chavez Carmen 2:14-cv-01942 20 20 Agree Cloud Ruth Ann 2:14-cv-01943 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Coffey Barbara J. 2:14-cv-01945 10 10 Agree Knierien Christine M. 2:14-cv-01952 10 10 Agree Cogswell Sherry M. 2:14-cv-01960 20 20 Agree
Thompson Suzanne 2:14-cv-01968-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hoover Mary 2:14-cv-01975-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Block Theresa 2:14-cv-01991 10 10 Agree Benavides Josefina 2:14-cv-01998 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Glaser Karen 2:14-cv-02005 40 40 Agree Pearson Irene 2:14-cv-02030-RMG 20 20 Agree Key Joanne 2:14-cv-02040-RMG 20 20 Agree Bennett Gail 2:14-cv-02055-RMG 10 10 Agree Ackroyd Carolyn 2:14-cv-02079 40 40 Agree Brooks Marcella 2:14-cv-02079 20 20 Agree Henson Lydia 2:14-cv-02079 10 10 Agree Ingram Levira 2:14-cv-02079 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Jones Eletta 2:14-cv-02079 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Little Christine 2:14-cv-02079 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Polley Norma 2:14-cv-02079 10, 40 10, 40, Agree Turner Perita 2:14-cv-02079 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Warren Kim 2:14-cv-02079 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Westbrook Sandra 2:14-cv-02079 20 20 Agree Wilkinson Jennifer 2:14-cv-02079 20 20 Agree Buggage Yvonne 2:14-cv-02090-RMG 40 40 Agree Roundtree Margaret 2:4-cv-02108-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Schweitzer Joyce 2:14-cv-02109-RMG 40 40 Agree Gottlieb Joan 2:14-cv-02111 10mg 10mg Agree West Kimberly 2:14-cv-02112-RMG 20 20 Agree Bennett Glenda 2:14-cv-02113-RMG 40 40 Agree Francis Linda 2:14-cv-02114-RMG 10 10 Agree Welch Carolyn 2:14-cv-02116 10mg 10mg Agree Turley Mildred 2:14-cv-02159-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree House Anita A. 2:14-cv-02169-RMG 10, 20, 40, 60 10, 20, 40, 60 Agree Howes Elaine D. 2:14-cv-02170-RMG 20 20 Agree Beckner Lucy M 2:14-cv-02172-RMG 20 20 Agree Humphrey Doris A 2:14-cv-02173-RMG 40 40 Agree Boudreau Elizabeth 2:14-cv-02174-RMG 20 20 Agree Dingle Elizabeth S. 2:14-cv-02175-RMG 20 20 Agree Crupie Barbara S. 2:14-cv-02176-RMG 10 10 Agree Mallory Naomi 2:14-cv-02177-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Norris Karen D. 2:14-cv-02178-RMG 40 40 Agree Ortega Domitila 2:14-cv-02180-RMG 20 20 Agree Methvin Loretta J 2:14-cv-02181-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Perez Anita D. 2:14-cv-02182-RMG 10 10 Agree
Maga Lucille 2:14-cv-02190-RMG 20 20 Agree Cannon Lucille 2:14-cv-02216-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Serrano Maria 2:14-cv-02217-RMG 20 20 Agree Cain Minnie 2:14-cv-02237-RMG 40 40 Agree Pruitt-Smith Etta 2:14-cv-02239-RMG 40 40 Agree Roue Katherine 2:14-cv-02240-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Williams Marilyn 2:14-cv-02259 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Beckum Patty 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Davis Marilyn 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Fullylove Rhoda 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Granado Christine 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They will Dismiss with Prejudice Gutierrez Jesusa 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Hernandez Rosa 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Johnson Joann 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Kay Patricia 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice
Kiester Vicki 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Kutach Nona 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Legg Elsie 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Mahoney Eva 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice McCoy Carolyn 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Mendoza Susanna 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Moore Pamela 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Newman Monica 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Pierson Lana 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Richardson Deloise 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice
Robertson Deidra 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Ryan Amporn 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Schulz Myrtis 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Sindrey Janet 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Sisney Georgia 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Starrett Terry 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Stewart Vera 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Thompson Ida 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Virden Kelly 2:14-cv-02272 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice
Ellisor Mary 2:14-cv-02295-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 80 Diabetes then 80 Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Beasley Brenda 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Bermudez Carmen 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Blue Joyce 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Bockelmann Patricia 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Colello Rosa 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Hardman Rechilda 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Jennings Janet 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Kinsler Gloria 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice
Leonardo Aura 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Pegram Gloria 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Rodriguez Patricia 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Stroud Sharon 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Thompson Dorothy 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Townsend Patricia 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Wonderling Verna 2:14-cv-02319 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Standifer Heather 2:14-cv-02338-RMG 20 20 Agree McDowell Viveca 2:14-cv-02422 40 40 Agree Austill Dorothy 214-cv-02432-RMG 40 40 Agree Shelton Rosie 2:14-cv-02433-RMG 10 10 Agree Alldredge Linda L 2:14-cv-02447-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Edwards Linda M. 2:14-cv-02449 20 20 Agree Fontenot Rosie 2:14-cv-02451-RMG 40 40 Agree Hoffman Joan B 2:14-cv-02452-RMG 10 10 Agree Doyle Sandra M. 2:14-cv-02453-RMG 10 10 Agree Howard Virginia A. 2:14-cv-02454 10 10 Agree Johnston Bonnie 2:14-cv-02455-RMG 10 10 Agree Lozowski Millie 2:14-cv-02456-RMG 40 40 Agree
Leonard Janie 2:14-cv-02457-RMG 20 20 Agree Meneley Marilyn 2:14-cv-02459-RMG 20 20 Agree Ogletree Jane 2:14-cv-02460-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Springer Linda Jane 2:14-cv-02461-RMG 20 20 Agree Smith Janelle 2:14-cv-02462-RMG 20 20 Agree Thornton Rosie 2:14-cv-02465-RMG 40 40 Agree Shaw Ernestine Ann 2:14-cv-0247B-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Rawlings Deborah 2:14-cv-02477-RMG 20 20 Agree Wortham Bertha 2:14-cv-02478-RMG 10 10 Agree Wengert Linda Faye 2:14-cv-02479-RMG 20 20 Agree Sherman Bonette 2:14-cv-02480-RMG 40 40 Agree Keyne Simone R. 2:14-cv-02481-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Fine Lilly 2:14-cv-02482-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Bruner Linda C. 2:14-cv-02485-RMG 40 40 Agree Cain Jane 2:14-cv-02486-RMG 40 40 Agree Lasater Sherry 2:14-cv-02488-RMG 20 20 Agree Taylor Joanne 2:14-cv-02489-RMG 10 10 Agree Carr Zenobia 2:14-cv-02490 40 40 Agree Swaim Sharon 2:14-cv-02492-RMG 40 40 Agree Colbert Ora Lee 2:14-cv-02495-RMG 10 10 Agree Banks Lottie 2:14-cv-02497-RMG 10 10 Agree Bradshaw Betty 2:14-cv-02498-RMG 20 20 Agree Mohr Kathy S. 2:14-cv-02499-RMG 20 20 Agree Curtis Betty A. 2:14-cv-02500-RMG 20 20 Agree Hastings Sharon K. 2:14-cv-02501-RMG 40 40 Agree Hollin Vicki 2:14-cv-02504-RMG 10 10 Agree Giles Gloria 2:14-cv-02505-RMG 10 10 Agree Vancas Florence 2:14-cv-02506-RMG 40 40 Agree Johnson Sybil 2:14-cv-02507-RMG 20 20 Agree Alexander Denise 2:14-cv-02508-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree McGinty Betty L 2:14-cv-02509-RMG 40 40 Agree Bailey Barbara 2:14-cv-02510-RMG 10 10 Agree Barksdale Clara 2:14-cv-02514 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Berger Maureen 2:14-cv-02514 40 40 Agree Calabro Ida 2:14-cv-02514 40 40 Agree Curtis Bettye 2:14-cv-02514 40 40 Agree Lenger Judith 2:14-cv-02514 40 40 Agree Mandola Frances 2:14-cv-02514 10 20 Agree Pearce Lilliam 2:14-cv-02514 20 20 Agree Robinson Rose 2:14-cv-02514 10 10 Agree
Woolfork Alma 2:14-cv-02514 20 20 Agree Persells Mary 2:14-cv-02525 10 10 Agree Nabors JoAnn 2:14-cv-02526 5, 10, 20 5, 10, 20 Agree Lankin Dorothy 2:14-cv-02529-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Brothers Judy R. 2:14-cv-02560 10 10 Agree Holzapfel Veronica L. 2:14-cv-02566 10 10 Agree Battiste Delores K. 2:14-cv-02590 10 10 Agree Bridges Juliaette P. 2:14-cv-02591 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lemaster Martha 2:14-cv-02600-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Jones Charlandra 2:14-cv-02601-RMG 40 40 Agree Smith Christine 2:14-cv-02602-RMG 10 10 Agree Langdon Regina 2:14-cv-02603-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Coleman Dorothy 2:14-cv-02608-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Weston Diana 2:14-cv-02609-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Ralph Amelia 2:14-cv-02610 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Slone Judith Ann 2:14-cv-02627 10 10 Agree Staggs Joyce M. 2:14-cv-02628 20 20 Agree Vaca Rosa M. 2:14-cv-02629-RMG 40 40 Agree Taylor Ophelia 2:14-cv-02631-RMG 20 20 Agree Holloway Alice 2:14-cv-02642 20 20 Agree Ledet Barbara 2:14-cv-02643-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kelly Janet 2:14-cv-02647 10mg 10mg Agree Hill Gloria 2:14-cv-02648 10mg 10mg Agree Jones Mae 2:14-cv-02649 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Prosser Geneva 2:14-cv-02650 10mg 10mg Agree Wright Edwina 2:14-cv-02651-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Jones Agnes 2:14-cv-02652-RMG 40 40 Plaintiffs Advised They Will Dismiss with Prejudice Chase Beverly 2:14-cv-02653 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kennedy Judith 2:14-cv-02657-RMG 40 40 Agree Hull Patricia 2:14-cv-02681-RMG 10 10 Agree Krumrey Eileen 2:14-cv-02682-RMG 10 10 Agree Allen Polly 2:14-cv-02688 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Jones Janice 2:14-cv-02690 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Austin Sue 2:14-cv-02699 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Dale Carol 2:14-cv-02701-RMG 10 10 Agree Garza Cynthia 2:14-cv-02702-RMG 10 10 Agree Larry-Stapleton Hallie 2:14-cv-02719-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree
Lyle Florence 2:14-cv-02720-RMG 20 20 Agree Shepherd Glenda 2:14-cv-02721-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Weir Saran L. 2:14-cv-02722-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Wetta Janet E. (Estate of) 2:14-cv-02723-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Brockelmeyer Patricia 2:14-cv-02725-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lair Kathleen 2:14-cv-02727 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Thornton Virginia 2:14-cv-02753-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Bourgeois Vera 2:14-cv-02756-RMG 10 10 Agree Smith Antonia C. 2:14-cv-02760-RMG 10 10 Agree Brinson Velma Lee 2:14-cv-02763-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Flanery Hildreth 2:14-cv-02764-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Robinson Addie M. 2:14-cv-02768-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Clewis Marian R. 2:14-cv-02769-RMG 20 20 Agree Olabi Safaa 2:14-cv-02776-RMG 10 10 Agree Black Edith 2:14-cv-02780 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Boggs Blondina 2:14-cv-02793 20 20 Agree Chester Roslyn 2:14-cv-02794 20 20 Agree Goldberg Tanya 2:14-cv-02795 40 40 Agree Harris Carol T. 2:14-cv-02796 10 10 Agree Hart Judy E. 2:14-cv-02797 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Johnston Patricia A. 2:14-cv-02799 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Journigan Bettye 2:14-cv-02802 10 10 Agree Kelly Kay F. 2:14-cv-02803 10, 20 10, 20 Agree King Terry L. 2:14-cv-02804 10 10 Agree Lesko Marsha 2:14-cv-02805 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Seals Lynette 2:14-cv-02809 40 40 Agree Vellone So Y 2:14-cv-02811 20, 40 20, 40 Agree West Joyce 2:14-cv-02812 40 40 Agree Barker Elizabeth 2:14-cv-02816 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Metheney Judy 2:14-cv-02825-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Gibson Lovie N. 2:14-cv-02826 40 40 Agree White Rebecca 2:14-cv-02831-RMG 10 10 Agree Setler Gwendolyn 2:14-cv-02837-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Strazzante Eleanor 2:14-cv-02838-RMG 40 40 Agree Baker Francene 2:14-cv-02840 10 10 Agree Paris Michele L. 2:14-cv-02870-RMG 20 20 Agree Scherf Ellen 2:14-cv-02871-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Bowman Dorothy 2:14-cv-02877 20 20 Agree Overdier Penny 2:14-cv-02886-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Williams Beverlee 2:14-cv-02887 10, 20 10, 20 Agree
Mowry Tammy 2:14-cv-02888 40 40 Agree Frankie Thomas 2:14-cv-02889-RMG 40 40 Agree Babb Debby A. 2:14-cv-02901 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Byas Grace R. 2:14-cv-02903 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Graham Barbara A. 2:14-cv-02904 40 40 Agree Griffin Rosie J. 2:14-cv-02905 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Haley Gladys V. 2:14-cv-02912 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Hall Barbara L. 2:14-cv-02913 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Blevins Connie S. 2:14-cv-02916 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Harvey Rhonda K. 2:14-cv-02917 10 10 Agree Hatfield Goldie Lawonne 2:14-cv-02919 20 20 Agree Densmore Loretta 2:14-cv-02921 10 10 Agree Belew Mary 2:14-cv-02924-RMG 10, 20, 30 10, 20, 30 Agree Carnes Nedra 2:14-cv-02926-RMG 40 40 Agree Clark Doris 2:14-cv-02929-RMG 10 10 Agree Coffeen Jackie 2:14-cv-02930-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Crudup Betty 2:14-cv-02932-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Deitman Anna 2:14-cv-02934-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Ebner Judy 2:14-cv-02937-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Evans Rethell 2:14-cv-02938-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Sanford Linda 2:14-cv-02943-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Cherry Jerlean 2:14-cv-02946-RMG 20 20 Agree Adams Donna F. 2:14-cv-02954 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Olsson Alberta 2:14-cv-02963-RMG 20 20 Agree Nichols Claudette 2:14-cv-02964-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Clark Ruby G. 2:14-cv-02967 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Gordon Shirley 2:14-cv-02968 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Bell Donna 2:14-cv-02974 10 10 Agree Haskins Darlene R. 2:14-cv-02976 20 20 Agree Haymes Anette 2:14-cv-02980 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hill Netella J. 2:14-cv-02981 40 40 Agree Hollar Jeanette 2:14-cv-02982 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Jay Charlene V. 2:14-cv-02983 10 10 Agree Kilbreth Donna S. 2:14-cv-02986 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kirchoff Sherry L. 2:14-cv-02987 10 10 Agree Livingston Linda 2:14-cv-02988 10 10 Agree Marshall Edna 2:14-cv-02989 40, 60 40, 60 Agree Jones Brenda 2:14-cv-02998-RMG 40 40 Agree Hill Rebecca 2:14-cv-02999-RMG 10 10 Agree Brown Ruth 2:14-cv-03000-RMG 20 20 Agree
Robinson Debbie 2:14-cv-03002-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Koone Mary E. 2:14-cv-03011 20 20 Agree Schultz Joyce 2:14-cv-03028 10 10 Agree Grantham Joyce 2:14-cv-03030 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Daugherty Donna 2:14-cv-03033-RMG 20 20 Agree Scott Betty 2:14-cv-03034 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Gosner Susan 2:14-cv-03036-RMG 20 20 Agree Gray Carmeleta 2:14-cv-03037-RMG 40 40 Agree Hammonds Joan 2:14-cv-03040-RMG 20 20 Agree Hando Dona 2:14-cv-03041-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hartsfield Betty 2:14-cv-03042-RMG 20 20 Agree Heredia Olga 2:14-cv-03043-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hickson Marlene 2:14-cv-03047-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hollinger Shauna 2:14-cv-03048-RMG 20 20 Agree Kampelman Dixie 2:14-cv-03050-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Thomas Martha 2:14-cv-03057-RMG 20 20 Agree Marcewicz Nancy 2:14-cv-03072 20 20 Agree McFarland Marilyn 2:14-cv-03073 20, 40 20, 40 Agree McGuirl Yolanda 2:14-cv-03074 20 20 Agree McMahan Debra 2:14-cv-03075 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Palmer Arenda 2:14-cv-03076 20 20 Agree Pellerito Judith 2:14-cv-03077 10 10 Agree Pind Sherrie 2:14-cv-03078 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Pratt Victoria 2:14-cv-03079 10 10 Agree Quansah Doris 2:14-cv-03080 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Reppert Tina 2:14-cv-03081 40 40 Agree Robinett Twila 2:14-cv-03083 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Rogers Pamela 2:14-cv-03084 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Rosario Yvette 2:14-cv-03085 40 40 Agree Passmore Cynthia 2:14-cv-03086 10 10 Agree Moseley Victory 2:14-cv-03087-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Frazee Carol 2:14-cv-03088-RMG 10 10 Agree Church Rita 2:14-cv-03090 40, 20, 40 40, 20, 40 Agree Compton Betty 2:14-cv-03093 10 10 Agree* Jones Gloria 2:14-cv-03096 40 40 Agree Frank Ruddy 2:14-cv-03098 10 10 Agree*
English Brenda 2:14-cv-03100 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Bledsoe Gaynell 2:14-cv-03102 10 10 Agree* Fisher Dora 2:14-cv-03103 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Robinson Susan 2:14-cv-03105 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Spencer Nancy 2:14-cv-03106 20 20 Agree Green Beatrice 2:14-cv-03107 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Wiseman Kimberly 2:14-cv-03108 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Clark Barbara 2:14-cv-03110 10 10 Agree* Forbes Michelle 2:14-cv-03112 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Bendingfield Ruth 2:14-cv-03115 20 20 Agree Stallings Joan 2:14-cv-03116 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Cleek Linda 2:14-cv-03121 10 10 Agree Burdine Sharon 2:14-cv-03122 40, 20 40, 20 Agree Hoffpauir Zulah 2:14-cv-03127 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Wempe Betty 2:14-cv-03130 20 20 Agree Megason Patricia 2:14-cv-03131-RMG 10 10 Agree Robinson Albertine 2:14-cv-03132 20 20 Agree Baird Patsy 2:14-cv-03137 10, 20, 40, 20 10, 20, 40, 20 Agree Sproles Diane 2:14-cv-03139-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Sanders Peggy 2:14-cv-03140-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Roy Jeannine 2:14-cv-03142-RMG 10 10 Agree Nabor Tamara 2:14-cv-03143-RMG 20 20 Agree Palella Stella 2:14-cv-03145-RMG 10 10 Agree McGowens Doreather 2:14-cv-03146-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree PERICH JUDITH 2:14-cv-03149-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Boone Maureen 2:14-cv-03154 20 20 Agree Ashley Heather 2:14-cv-03166 20 20 Agree
Austin Sheila 2:14-cv-03169 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Russell Sandra 2:14-cv-03182 20 20 Agree Scott Darlene 2:14-cv-03183 20 20 Agree Smith Sheryl 2:14-cv-03184 10 10 Agree Steele Suzanne 2:14-cv-03185 40 40 Agree Stewart Rhonda 2:14-cv-03186 20 20 Agree Swobody Cathey 2:14-cv-03187 10 10 Agree Thomas Denise 2:14-cv-03188 20 20 Agree Turner Darlene 2:14-cv-03189 10 10 Agree Watson Virgie 2:14-cv-03190 40 40 Agree Zohlman Lisa 2:14-cv-03192 10 10 Agree Smith Diane 2:14-cv-03193 20(Generic), 20(Generic), Agree 40(Generic), 40 40(Generic), 40 Franco Dolores 2:14-cv-03196 10, 40, 20 10, 40, 20 Agree Sturges Ardelia 2:14-cv-03197 10 10 Agree Wesley Rose 2:14-cv-03199 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Addison Regina 2:14-cv-03200 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Carter Dona 2:14-cv-03201 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Pasha Edith 2:14-cv-03202 10 10 Agree Siderio Lucille 2:14-cv-03204 10 10 Agree Ingram Brenda 2:14-cv-03205 40 40 Agree Kasik Christine 2:14-cv-03206-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Gross Elsie 2:14-cv-03216-RMG 10 10 Agree Robinson Thelma 2:14-cv-03219-RMG 20 20 Agree Jennewein Peggy 2:14-cv-03243 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Williams Pamela 2:14-cv-03249 40 40 Agree Oliver Ellen 2:14-cv-03253-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Abson Amanda 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Advincula Pura 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Albright Evelyn 2:14-cv-03255 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Arnold Ruthie 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree
Baldwin Mary Lee 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Biszantz Kathy 2:14-cv-03255 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Brooks Frances 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Bryant Robbie 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Burkham Yolanda 2:14-cv-03255 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Burr Dorothy 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Carr Jeanette 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Charles Ute 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Cook Linda 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Coram Rachel 2:14-cv-03255 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Cousins Bonnie 2:14-cv-03255 10 Unknown Agree Danielly Joyce 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree* Davis Gloria 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Don Patricia 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Duvall Linda 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Fetty Rhonda 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Frey Barbara 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Gaddy Phyllid 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Gamage Donna 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Gibbs Kim 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Giddens Eleanor 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Gordon Kathleen 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Green Faye 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Green Rowena 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree
Hall Tera 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree* Hillyard Angela 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Holden Karen 2:14-cv-03255 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hutchinson Audrey 2:14-cv-03255 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hutnyan Gayle 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Jones Brenda 2:14-cv-03255 20 Unknown Agree Jordan Carol 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Ketcham Beatriz 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Lang Gloria 2:14-cv-03255 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Leslie Terri 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Lewis Pamela 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Love-Seatts Alvella 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree McNair Patricia 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Moiyallah Dedeh 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Morrow Beverly 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Mullins Roberta 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Navas Diane 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Nichols Belinda 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Pollard Olivia 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree
Rogers Frances 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Romersa Susan 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Royal Lurethia 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Sam Yvonne 2:14-cv-03255 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Schuld Patricia 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Shining Woman Marsha 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Steventon Esther 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Thomas Gwendolyn 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Trimble Ludie 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Ward Margaret 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Weathers Jacqueline 2:14-cv-03255 20 20 Agree Weaver Mary 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Weinreich Isabel 2:14-cv-03255 40 40 Agree Williamson Cynthia 2:14-cv-03255 5 5 Agree Winters Julita 2:14-cv-03255 10 10 Agree Schroeder Cynthia 2:14-cv-03255-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Duffy A.K.A. Gomes Maria 2:14-cv-03257 10 10 Agree Ebarb Susan 2:14-cv-03260 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Bracey-Showers Pearlie 2:14-cv-03263-RMG 10 10 Agree Carver Carolyn 2:14-cv-03264-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Chikeka Chinyere 2:14-cv-03265-RMG 20 20 Agree Doyle Bertina 2:14-cv-03266-RMG 20 20 Agree Hawk Mae 2:14-cv-03267-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Jones Almeta 2:14-cv-03274-RMG 20 20 Agree Khouli Shafea 2:14-cv-03275-RMG 20 20 Agree Larocque Susan 2:14-cv-03277-RMG 10 10 Agree Cutts Jacqueline D. 2:14-cv-03278 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Brown Myra D 2:14-cv-03279 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Conley Connie 2:14-cv-03285 20 20 Agree Jenkins LaTonya J. 2:14-cv-03288 20 20 Agree Jones Beverly L 2:14-cv-03290 10, 20 10, 20 Agree
McCormack Brenda Kay 2:14-cv-03292 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Walker Sharon 2:14-cv-03294 20 20 Agree Washington Magnolia 2:14-cv-03295 10 10 Agree Santana Tahira 2:14-cv-03296 10 10 Agree Steinmeyer Bonnetta 2:14-cv-03297 10, 20 10, 20 Agree DuPree Ponchita 2:14-cv-03298 10 10 Agree Moses Myrtle 2:14-cv-03300 40 40 Agree Welker Karen 2:14-cv-03301 10 10 Agree Williams Pamela 2:14-cv-03302 10 10 Agree Wiliamson Betty 2:14-cv-03303 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Shaker Cecilia 2:14-cv-03313 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Moreland Katherine 2:14-cv-03314 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Moody Fredia 2:14-cv-03320 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Mckenzie Shirley 2:14-cv-03322 10 10 Agree Noe Candy 2:14-cv-03323 30 30 Agree Edwards Thelma 2:14-cv-03324 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Troxell Janet 2:14-cv-03327 20, 10 20, 10 Agree Johnvin Lois 2:14-cv-03332-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Clark Mary 2:14-cv-03336 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Dinsmore Denise 2:14-cv-03354 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Alcala Norma 2:14-cv-03355 20 20 Agree Allen Ruth 2:14-cv-03356 20 20 Agree* Appiah Lucy 2:14-cv-03357 10 10 Agree Angel Frances 2:14-cv-03359 20 20 Agree
Shelton Paulette 2:14-cv-03360 40 40 Agree McGee Brenda 2:14-cv-03361 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Meyers Maria 2:14-cv-03369 40, 10, 40 40, 10, 40 Agree* Beaupre Ann 2:14-cv-03371 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Baltazar Rosetta 2:14-cv-03372 20, 10, 20 20, 10, 20 Agree Dalton Myrtle 2:14-cv-03377 10 10 Agree Johnson Mary L. 2:14-cv-03379-RMG 10 10 Agree Jones Carolyn 2:14-cv-03380 10 10 Agree Johnson Alice 2:14-cv-03381 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Danzer Shelley 2:14-cv-03408-RMG 10 10 Agree Bradley Linda 2:14-cv-03409 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Gelet Sandra 2:14-cv-03410 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hanson Frances 2:14-cv-03411 40 40 Agree Jackson Laverne 2:14-cv-03414 10 10 Agree Johnson Susan 2:14-cv-03415 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lozada Theresa 2:14-cv-03416 50 50 Agree Wright Margerite 2:14-cv-03438 20, 40 20, 40 Agree* Kiser Lynn 2:14-cv-03448 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hunt Angela 2:14-cv-03455 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Dunnagan Peggy 2:14-cv-03461-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Epperson Judy 2:14-cv-03462-RMG 10 10 Agree Goins Penny 2:14-cv-03463-RMG 20 20 Agree Hebbard Judy 2:14-cv-03469-RMG 20 20 Agree Orellana Silvia 2:14-cv-03483-RMG 10 10 Agree Smith Betty 2:14-cv-03490-RMG 10 10 Agree Winston Cheryl 2:14-cv-03492-RMG 20 20 Agree Williams Annie 2:14-cv-03493-RMG 10, 20 10, 2 Agree Shinhoster Mary 2:14-cv-03498-RMG 40 40 Agree Ewing Louise 2:14-cv-03523-RMG 40 40 Agree Gardner JoAnn 2:14-cv-03524-RMG 20 20 Agree Dixon Betty 2:14-cv-03526-RMG 10 10 Agree Bell Deborah 2:14-cv-03529 10, 20 10, 20 Agree De Roy Van Lotte 2:14-cv-03530-RMG 10 10 Agree Zuydewijn Moss Linda 2:14-cv-03537-RMG 40 40 Agree Loretta Ogletree 2:14-cv-03538-RMG 10 10 Agree Murphy Deborah 2:14-cv-03541-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Carolyn Phillips 2:14-cv-03549-RMG 20 20 Agree Bryant Carolyn 2:14-cv-03557 40 40 Agree Culver Delores 2:14-cv-03558 10, 20 10, 20 Agree
Anderson Marilyn 2:14-cv-03580 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Sawyer Esther 2:14-cv-03584-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Massey Sandra 2:14-cv-03585-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Mudrinich Benita 2:14-cv-03587-RMG 10 10 Agree Marcellino Joan 2:14-cv-03588-RMG 10 10 Agree Henderson Melody 2:14-cv-03591-RMG 20 20 Agree Judith Root 2:14-cv-03599-RMG 10 10 Agree McBurrows Carrie 2:14-cv-03602-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree McLawhorn Margie 2:14-cv-03604-RMG 10 10 Agree Barbara Salsgiver 2:14-cv-03608-RMG 10 10 Agree Baird Veroma 2:14-cv-03611 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Winters Janice 2:14-cv-03619-RMG 20 20 Agree Black Linda K. 2:14-cv-03621 5, 10 5, 10 Agree Lipsey Annie 2:14-cv-03622-RMG 20 20 Agree Peale Renee 2:14-cv-03623-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Patricia Varnado 2:14-cv-03641-RMG 20 20 Agree Cynthia Stampley 2:14-cv-03642-RMG 10 10 Agree Barbara Wade 2:14-cv-03645-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Thomas Clara 2:14-cv-03650-RMG 20 20 Agree McDonald Laura 2:14-cv-03657-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Talley-Lesko Palma J. 2:14-cv-03663-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Doyle Patricia 2:14-cv-03665 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Barney Deborah 2:14-cv-03666-RMG 40 40 Agree George Fiona 2:14-cv-03669-RMG 20 20 Agree Kelly Schlenker 2:14-cv-03682-RMG 40 40 Agree Gloria Ponce 2:14-cv-03696-RMG 10 10 Agree Carmen Santiago 2:14-cv-03697-RMG 10 10 Agree McCormick Dawn 2:14-cv-03698-RMG 20 (Generic) 20 (Generic) Agree Barbara Walker 2:14-cv-03700-RMG 10 10 Agree Winters Delores 2:14-cv-03705-RMG 20 20 Agree Morris Carol 2:14-cv-03723-RMG 10 10 Agree Moon Kathy 2:14-cv-03735-RMG 10 10 Agree Garritty Mary 2:14-cv-03738-RMG 40 40 Agree Neuenschwander Karen 2:14-cv-03742-RMG 20 20 Agree Shaw Joy 2:14-cv-03753-RMG 10 10 Agree Perry Aleta 2:14-cv-03765-RMG 40 40 Agree
Bates Connie 2:14-cv-03767-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Bissonnette Crystal 2:14-cv-03782 10 10 Agree Collins Gwen 2:14-cv-03789 20 20 Agree Alexander Myrtle C. (Estate of) 2:14-cv-03807 10 10 Agree Washington Louella 2:14-cv-03812-RMG 20 20 Agree Kratz Karen 2:14-cv-03816 20 20 Agree Chambliss Ruby F. 2:14-cv-03819-RMG 20 20 Agree Bing Jennie 2:14-cv-03843-RMG 40 40 Agree Twedt Arlette 2:14-cv-03855 10 10 Agree O'Brien Gail 2:14-cv-03863-RMG 10 10 Agree Allen Alana 2:14-cv-03872 10 10 Agree Cook Bessie 2:14-cv-03879 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Ware Patricia K. 2:14-cv-03880 10 10 Agree Orison Eva 2:14-cv-03895 40 40 Agree BOONE MARGIE 2:14-cv-03897 40 40 Agree Hernandez Caridad 2:14-cv-03898 20 20 Agree Walker Theresa 2:14-cv-03908 Uknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges, Unknown; Reserves Rights Perry Josephine M 2:14-cv-03918-RMG 40 40 Agree Toler Juanita 2:14-cv-03938 20 20 Agree Harvey Delois 2:14-cv-03939 20 20 Agree Bowden Betty 2:14-cv-03940 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Briscoe Lana P. 2:14-cv-03950 20 20 Agree Damon Bonnie 2:14-cv-03951 10 10 Agree Dempsey Sandra 2:14-cv-03952 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Gorbett Vicki A. 2:14-cv-03953 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hartsfield Judy 2:14-cv-03954 10 10 Agree Henderson Linda S. 2:14-cv-03955 10 10 Agree Himelfarb Susan 2:14-cv-03956 20 20 Agree Jenkins Brenda 2:14-cv-03957 40 40 Agree Kennedy Carole A. 2:14-cv-03958 10 10 Agree Lower Lula 2:14-cv-03959 10, 20 10, 20 Agree James Pennelifa 2:14-cv-03961 10 10 Agree Slider Jody 2:14-cv-03962 40 40 Agree Ross Jennifer 2:14-cv-03963 40 40 Agree Dalton Deborah Ann 2:14-cv-03964 20 20 Agree
Brown Susan 2:14-cv-03965 10, 20 10, 20 Agree DeSomma Barbara 2:14-cv-03968 10 10 Agree Birk-Alcorn Cynthia 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Burrell Mary 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Campbell Sara 2:14-cv-03973 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Cicero Patty 2:14-cv-03973 10 10 Agree Cox Barbara 2:14-cv-03973 10 10 Agree Curry Rebecca 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Davidson Brenda 2:14-cv-03973 20, 40 20, 40 Agree DiMasi Tammy 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Drake Dinah 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree Felts Lou Ellen 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Glover Alice 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Gonzales Lawanna 2:14-cv-03973 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Hunt Lola 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree Jolly Hazel 2:14-cv-03973 10 10 Agree Jones Mary 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Kennedy Regina 2:14-cv-03973 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Klahr Linda 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree Marshall Nancy C. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree McGill Joyce D. 2:14-cv-03973 10 10 Agree* McGovern Celmira H. 2:14-cv-03973 20, 40 20, 40 Agree* Mefkief Helen A. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree* Merriweather Marylon F. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree Moore Loretta H. 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree Moore Easter E. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree North Pauline M. 2:14-cv-03973 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Phelps LuAnn 2:14-cv-03973 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 40 Diabetes then 40 Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Robinson Susan J. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree* Sanders Mary E. 2:14-cv-03973 10 10 Agree Sexton Martha M. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree Sipple Sherree M. 2:14-cv-03973 10, 20 10, 20 Agree* Sterling Carol A. 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree* Stevens Linda M. 2:14-cv-03973 20, 40 20, 40 Agree
Uriarte Tina R. 2:14-cv-03973 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Vawter Janis M. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree Weese Linda C. 2:14-cv-03973 20 20 Agree* Wells Carolyn J. 2:14-cv-03973 40 40 Agree* Wilson Sevella M. 2:14-cv-03973 10 10 Agree* Wright Patra D. 2:14-cv-03973 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Burton Oberia 2:14-cv-03983 10 10 Agree Agee Flora 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 20 mg 20 mg Agree* Archibold Dorothy 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree Ballet Patrice 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree* Bradley Dorothy 2:14-cv-03995-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 20 mg Diabetes then 20 mg Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Carey Nekitha 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree Cole Teresa 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 40 mg 40 mg Agree* Davis Betty 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 40 mg 40 mg Agree Davis Tracy 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree Everett Angela 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 40 mg 40 mg Agree Finkley Erma 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree Garabedian Maggy 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 40 mg 40 mg Agree Gregory Phyllis 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree Hartfield Teresa 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 20 mg 20 mg Agree Holder Betty 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 20 mg 20 mg Agree Johnson Betty 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 20 mg 20 mg Agree Lee Lillian 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 20 mg 20 mg Agree Marshall Rose 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 20 mg 50 mg Agree Mayhew Mary 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 20 mg 20 mg Agree* Morgan Lou 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 40 mg 40 mg Agree Robinson Doris 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 40 mg 40 mg Agree Rowland Doris 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Rowland Doris 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 40 mg 40 mg Agree Smiley Linda 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree
Webb Sheila 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree* Wilson Susan 2:14-cv-03995-RMG 10 mg 10 mg Agree* Umstattd Deborah 2:14-cv-03997 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Thompson Lorene 2:14-cv-03998 10 10 Agree Mack Bobby 2:14-cv-03990 10 10 Agree Canales Evelyn 2:14-cv-04000 20 20 Agree Marshall Theresa 2:14-cv-04011 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Sterger Sharon J. 2:14-cv-04023-RMG 40 40 Agree Cerniglia Barbara 2:14-cv-04029 20 20 Agree Sharp Cecelia 2:14-cv-04030 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Taplin Bernice 2:14-cv-04031 20 20 Agree Schoen Brenda 2:14-cv-04040 10 10 Agree Black Hattie 2:14-cv-04041 40 40 Agree Lopez Rosemary 2:14-cv-04053 10 10 Agree Ross Cheryl 2:14-cv-04057 10, 20 10, 20 Agree O'bryant Shirley 2:14-cv-04059 10 10 Agree Dupard Rose 2:14-cv-04065-RMG 20 20 Agree Shepherd Joyce 2:14-cv-04072-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree McConahay LaDonna 2:14-cv-04073-RMG 20 20 Agree Ainsworth Vicky 2:14-cv-04099-RMG 20 20 Agree Abbott Betty 2:14-cv-04102 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Applebee Eugenia 2:14-cv-04103 10 10 Agree Baboolal Ann 2:14-cv-04104 10 10 Agree Backen Melissa 2:14-cv-04105 40 40 Agree* Bailey Rilma 2:14-cv-04107 10 10 Agree Batt Ellen 2:14-cv-04109 20 20 Agree Belmar Jeaneen 2:14-cv-04110 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Delmore-Lockett Ora 2:14-cv-04111 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Bennett Patricia 2:14-cv-04113 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Blevins Lillie 2:14-cv-04116 20 20 Agree Bolton Syndonia 2:14-cv-04117 20 20 Agree* Bryant Lois 2:14-cv-04119 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Burkhart Teresa 2:14-cv-04120 40 40 Agree Morisset Jean 2:14-cv-04132-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Holley Patricia 2:14-cv-04133 40 40 Agree Robbins Georgia 2:14-cv-04164 40 40 Agree
Zimmerman Carolyn 2:14-cv-04165 10 10 Agree Gray Renate 2:14-cv-04166 10 10 Agree Lung Nancy 2:14-cv-04167 10 10 Agree Medeiros Denise 2:14-cv-04168 10 10 Agree Von Minden Bonnie 2:14-cv-04174 20 mg; 10mg 20 mg; 10mg Agree Boutwell Verna 2:14-cv-04187 20, 10 20, 10 Agree Jordan Dianna 2:14-cv-04188 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Brown Diane 2:14-cv-04205-RMG 10 10 Agree Hill Deborah 2:14-cv-04213 40 40 Agree Baldwin Jeannine 2:14-cv-04223 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Byrd Ella M. 2:14-cv-04226-RMG 40 40 Agree HERNANDEZ MARY LOU 2:14-cv-04228 20 20 Agree Conley Maly 2:14-cv-04229 40, 40(Generic) 40, 40(Generic) Agree Willis Linda 2:14-cv-04230 40 40 Agree Partain Shari 2:14-cv-04254 20 20 Agree Hearon Dorothy 2:14-cv-04255 20 20 Agree Burlingame Linda 2:14-cv-04256 40 40 Agree Easley Marguerite 2:14-cv-04257 10 10 Agree Vendola Lorri 2:14-cv-04258 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Carlile Minh M. 2:14-cv-04259 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Edwards Debra 2:14-cv-04300 10 10 Agree Hendricks Lucille 2:14-cv-04301 10 10 Agree Jones Evelyn 2:14-cv-04303 20 20 Agree Womack Yolanda 2:14-cv-04304 10 10 Agree Netzley Sharon 2:14-cv-04306-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree HOLT TERESA 2:14-cv-04307-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Taylor Glenda 2:14-cv-04308 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Keathley Gloria 2:14-cv-04309-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Garrett Mildred 2:14-cv-04315 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hixson Judythe 2:14-cv-04328-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Belardo Mildred 2:14-cv-04329 20 20 Agree Wolf Elaine 2:14-cv-04333-RMG 5, 10, 20 5, 10, 20 Agree Eliasen Donna L 2:14-cv-04346 5, 10 5, 10 Agree Freeman Jan 2:14-cv-04349 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Reid Lisa M. 2:14-cv-04350-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree O'Neal Laurette 2:14-cv-04351-RMG 10 10 Agree Leslie Marge 2:14-cv-04353-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Miller Marcia F. 2:14-cv-04354-RMG 10 10 Agree Snyder Barbara 2:14-cv-04374-RMG 10 10 Agree Davidson Patricia 2:14-cv-04378 10 10 Agree
Hiester Judith 2:14-cv-04382 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Raper Ruth 2:14-cv-04398 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Patterson Irene 2:14-cv-04409-RMG 20 20 Agree Schwartz Linda Kay 2:14-cv-04414-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Brewer Mary 2:14-cv-04417 10 10 Agree McGaugh Linda 2:14-cv-04418-RMG 20 20 Agree Barnes JoAnn W. 2:14-cv-04444-RMG 20 20 Agree Saunders Wanda S. 2:14-cv-04447-RMG 20 20 Agree Miller Barbara 2:14-cv-04451-RMG 40 40 Agree Joyner Kathleen 2:14-cv-04456 5, 10 5, 10 Agree Sexton Carrol 2:14-cv-04467-RMG 20 20 Agree Watts Annie 2:14-cv-04468 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Royal Delores M. 2:14-cv-04475-RMG 10 10 Agree Trachtenberg Carol A. 2:14-cv-04476-RMG 20 20 Agree Vasko Mary 2:14-cv-04480 10 10 Agree Lewis Marcia 2:14-cv-04530 40 40 Agree Enemali Janet 2:14-cv-04545 10 10 Agree Phillips Christine 2:14-cv-04549 10 10 Agree Guarino Angela 2:14-cv-04550 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Metzger Betty 2:14-cv-04551 10 10 Agree Walker Carolyn A. (Estate 2:14-cv-04569-RMG 40 (Lipitor), 10-40 40 (Lipitor), 10-40 Agree of) (Caduet) (Caduet) Stewart Elizabeth E. 2:14-cv-04574 10 10 Agree Hebert Betty 2:14-cv-04590 20 20 Agree Bonsai Audrey 2:14-cv-04680-RMG 40 40 Agree Cooper Regina 2:14-cv-04681-RMG 10 10 Agree* Harrington Sandra 2:14-cv-04682-RMG 10 10 Agree* Blair Antoinette 2:14-cv-04692-RMG 20 20 Agree Pressley Elizabeth 2:14-cv-04693-RMG 40 40 Agree Jones Credell 2:14-cv-04698-RMG 40 40 Agree Johnson Carolyn V. 2:14-cv-04700-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Bentley Mary 2:14-cv-04701-RMG 40 40 Agree McKinney Ana M. 2:14-cv-04702-RMG 20 20 Agree Clay Betty 2:14-cv-04704-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Offutt Brenda 2:14-cv-04715 40 40 Agree Johannes Paula 2:14-cv-04729-RMG 10 10 Agree Dailey Virginia 2:14-cv-04735-RMG 20 20 Agree Brager Roberta 2:14-cv-04741 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Wolfe Eloise 2:14-cv-04743 10mg 10mg Agree Halbert Della 2:14-cv-04749 20, 10, 20, 40 20, 10, 20, 40 Agree
Moberley Marsha 2:14-cv-04751-RMG 40 40 Agree Biswanger Janet 2:14-cv-04778 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Heald Susan I. 2:14-cv-04779 10 10 Agree Walker Pamela 2:14-cv-04780 20 20 Agree Quaschnick Gail 2:14-cv-04781 40 40 Agree Mower Bonnie 2:14-cv-04784 10 10 Agree Round Sherrell 2:14-cv-04792-RMG 20 20 Agree Tarrasky Robin 2:14-cv-04820-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Robinson Shirley A. 2:14-cv-04822-RMG 40 40 Agree Robinson Beverly I. 2:14-cv-04823-RMG 20 20 Agree Morrison Diane 2:14-cv-04824-RMG 10, 20 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Golden Bernice 2:14-cv-04825 20 20 Agree Lombardino Darline 2:14-cv-04841-RMG 20 20 Agree Ortgiesen Carol I. 2:14-cv-04842-RMG 10 10 Agree Roberts Sharon 2:14-cv-04843 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Taylor Sharon 2:14-cv-04844-RMG 10 10 Agree Paletta Chrie 2:14-cv-04846-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Brown Rita 2:14-cv-04847-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Rosenstein Karen B. 2:14-cv-04868-RMG 10 10 Agree Camp Sheila 2:14-cv-04871-RMG 20 20 Agree Vickie Smith 2:14-cv-04872-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Joeann Zuefeldt 2:14-cv-04873-RMG 20 20 Agree CURTIS DONITA 2:14-cv-04875-RMG 20 20 Agree Ragland Beverly 2:14-cv-04876-RMG 20 20 Agree* Medley Adelina 2:14-cv-04877-RMG 40 40 Agree* Hooks Judy 2:14-cv-04878-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Pavelka Tamera 2:14-cv-04879-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Black Tanya 2:14-cv-04885 20 20 Agree Williams Orelia 2:14-cv-04888-RMG 40 40 Agree Morrow Patricia 2:14-cv-04891-RMG 10 10 Agree Sanders Annie 2:14-cv-04892-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Smallwood Virginia 2:14-cv-04894-RMG 10 10 Agree Schottel Ruth E. 2:14-cv-04899-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Pennell Mary 2:14-cv-04900 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Toadvine Janet 2:14-cv-04907 20 20 Agree Owen Denise 2:14-cv-04909-RMG 40 40 Agree
Holly Terry 2:14-cv-04912-RMG 40 40 Agree Moses Marlene 2:14-cv-04913-RMG 40, 10, 40, 20 40, 10, 40, 20 Agree Koscher Jacqueline 2:14-cv-04915 10mg 10mg Agree Morrison Marsha 2:14-cv-04918 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Limeberry Barbara 2:14-cv-04925-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 10, 20 Diabetes then 10, 20 Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights McCartney Arlene 2:14-cv-04926-RMG 40 40 Agree Sims Gilda 2:15-cv-00012-RMG 40 40 Agree Sweeney Nancy 2:15-cv-00013-RMG 10 10 Agree Santiago Irma 2:15-cv-00014-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Brank Flossie 2:15-cv-00026 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Carr Carol 2:15-cv-00027-RMG 10 10 Agree Cates Teresa (Estate of) 2:15-cv-00028-RMG 20 20 Agree Goldfarb Rachel 2:15-cv-00034 10 10 Agree Fayssoux Kathy 2:15-cv-00035 10, 40 10, 40 Agree D'Agui Adelaide 2:15-cv-00036 40 40 Agree Cotter Donna 2:15-cv-00037 10 10 Agree Wilson Chapok 2:15-cv-00038 10 10 Agree Messer Hazel 2:15-cv-00039 40 40 Agree* Madison Barbara 2:15-cv-00040 20 20 Agree Blanks Lisa 2:15-cv-00041 20 20 Agree Banks Iris 2:15-cv-00042-RMG 20 20 Agree Babbitt Audrey 2:15-cv-00043 10, 20, 14 10, 20, 40 Agree Murdock Lynn 2:15-cv-00010-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Regala Susan 2:15-cv-00064 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Haessly Jacqueline 2:15-cv-00069 10 10 Agree Hewell Janice (Estate of) 2:15-cv-00071 20 20 Agree Hill Annie (Estate of) 2:15-cv-00072 20 20 Agree Baffler Janet W. 2:15-cv-00074 10 10 Agree Heath Peggy 2:15-cv-00075 20 20 Agree Day Patricia 2:15-cv-00078 20 20 Agree Christopher Rebecca 2:15-cv-00080-RMG 40 40 Agree Folsom Barbara 2:15-cv-00081 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree
Williams Susie 2:15-cv-00082 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Ollis Linda 2:15-cv-00083 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Anderson Sharon P. 2:15-cv-00096 10 10 Agree Halsing Nankyong 2:15-cv-00097 40 40 Agree Taylor Edna 2:15-cv-00101 20 20 Agree Thomas Brenda M. 2:15-cv-00110-RMG 20 20 Agree Gaddie Judy 2:15-cv-00111 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Frase Jacqueline 2:15-cv-00118 20 20 Agree Mahon Joyce 2:15-cv-00119-RMG 20, 10 20, 10 Agree Maddox Cassandra 2:15-cv-00121-RMG 10 10 Agree Taylor Cynthia 2:15-cv-00122-RMG 40 40 Agree Washington-Davidson Barbara 2:15-cv-00124-RMG 20 20 Agree Johnson Tiffany 2:15-cv-00127 40 40 Agree Bartley Linda 2:15-cv-00128-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Fultz Jacklyn 2:15-cv-00135 40 40 Agree Bowie Katherine 2:15-cv-00136 10 10 Agree Korb Edith 2:15-cv-00143 10, 20 10, 20 Agree London Mary 2:15-cv-00144 20 20 Agree Miller Margaret 2:15-cv-00145 10 10 Agree Rubin Edie 2:15-cv-00147 40 40 Agree Wheeler Patricia 2:15-cv-00148 10 10 Agree Whitford Linda 2:15-cv-00149 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hicks Lisa 2:15-cv-00150 10 10 Agree Gregory Sharon 2:15-cv-00151 10 10 Agree Hardley Jeanette 2:15-cv-00152 10 10 Agree Henning Carol 2:15-cv-00153 20 20 Agree Hinkle Glenna 2:15-cv-00154 20 20 Agree Merritt Carrie 2:15-cv-00155 20 20 Agree Moore Martha 2:15-cv-00156 10 10 Agree Randolph Carolyn 2:15-cv-00157 20 20 Agree Winthrop Judith 2:15-cv-00158 20 20 Agree Gross Bernita 2:15-cv-00159 10 10 Agree Fisher Anna 2:15-cv-00165 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Nation Carol 2:15-cv-00169-RMG 20 20 Agree Ray Ronald Scott 2:15-cv-00180-RMG 20 20 Agree Robin Melba 2:15-cv-00181-RMG 20 20 Agree
Gaines Janie M. 2:15-cv-00182-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 10 Diabetes then 10 Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Carrier JoAnn 2:15-cv-00183 40 40 Agree Williams Laryssa 2:15-cv-00192-RMG 20 20 Agree Rives India 2:15-cv-00193-RMG 20 20 Agree Young Sandra 2:15-cv-00197-RMG 10 10 Agree Herbert Wilhelmina 2:15-cv-00225 10 10 Agree Clay Alphia 2:15-cv-00226 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Brannan Nancy 2:15-cv-00227 10, 20, 10 10, 20, 10 Agree Davis Sarah 2:15-cv-00228 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Anglin Gioconda 2:15-cv-00229 10 10 Agree Klein Barbara 2:15-cv-00230 40 40 Agree Kelley Sharon Denise 2:15-cv-00232 40 40 Agree Ardoin Janice 2:15-cv-00233 10 10 Agree Inman Patricia 2:15-cv-00234 20 20 Agree Dunbar Jennifer 2:15-cv-00238 20 20 Agree Johnson Margaret 2:15-cv-00241 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Mason Diane 2:15-cv-00242 40 40 Agree Brown Brenda 2:15-cv-00252 40 40 Agree Wilmere Michelle 2:15-cv-00255 20 20 Agree Pasley Mae 2:15-cv-00256 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Atkins Mary 2:15-cv-00257 10 10 Agree Brabant Sandra 2:15-cv-00258 20 20 Agree Bradley Judy 2:15-cv-00259 10 10 Agree Bradford Mary 2:15-cv-00266 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Durand Claire 2:15-cv-00270-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Schiraldi Jean 2:15-cv-00285 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Saro Carmen 2:15-cv-00286 10 10 Agree Rodriguez Luz 2:15-cv-00287 10 10 Agree Amari Edna 2:15-cv-00289 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Durant Francine C. 2:15-cv-00293 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Elmore Bobbie 2:15-cv-00294 10 10 Agree Fisher Sandra L 2:15-cv-00295 40 40 Agree Grinnell Annie 2:15-cv-00313 20 20 Agree Hanson Charlotte 2:15-cv-00314 10 10 Agree Williams Jessica 2:15-cv-00319 20 20 Agree
Williamson Mattie 2:15-cv-00322 40, 20 40, 20 Agree Ogentho Erica 2:15-cv-00323 10 10 Agree Sebastian Tina 2:15-cv-00324 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Bramlette Betty 2:15-cv-00325 40 40 Agree Smith Linda 2:15-cv-00327 20 20 Agree Vance Frances 2:15-cv-00328 40 40 Agree Latimore Onell 2:15-cv-00332 5, 10 5, 10 Agree Henley Elizabeth 2:15-cv-00334 40 40 Agree Wright Linda 2:15-cv-00336 20 20 Agree Peale Barbara 2:15-cv-00337 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Hulce Debra 2:15-cv-00334 20 20 Agree Decker Janice 2:15-cv-00341 40, 40 40, 40 Agree Jay Marian 2:15-cv-00349 20 20 Agree Royce Melanie 2:15-cv-00350-RMG 10 10 Agree Johnson Dianne 2:15-cv-00352-RMG 40 40 Agree Wise Lois 2:11-cv-00353 20 20 Agree Anderson Hattie 2:15-cv-00354-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Portney Harriet 2:15-cv-00301-RMG 40 40 Agree Judkins Barbara 2:15-cv-00369 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Karns Ennis 2:15-cv-00370 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Koller Alice 2:15-cv-00371 10 10 Agree Greer Karen 2:15-cv-00373-RMG 10 10 Agree Welch Jean L 2:15-cv-00377-RMG 10 10 Agree Bailey Helen 2:15-cv-00378-RMG 40 40 Agree Amos Joann 2:15-cv-00382-RMG 20 20 Agree Delano Dorothy 2:15-cv-00384 10 10 Agree Kunkel Brenda 2:15-cv-00385 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Rodriguez Linda 2:15-cv-00394-RMG 10 10 Agree Langbein Joyce 2:15-cv-00395-RMG 20 20 Agree James Ella 2:15-cv-00397 20, 10, 40 20, 10, 40 Agree Horne Elizabeth 2:15-cv-00398 10, 20, 10 10, 20, 10 Agree Williams Sandra 2:15-cv-00401 10 10 Agree Marshall Theresa 2:15-cv-00402 10 10 Agree Helie Mary Jane 2:15-cv-00409 10 10 Agree Wilson Mertis L 2:15-cv-00410-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Poirier Judith 2:15-cv-00413-RMG 40 40 Agree Taborn Julie 2:15-cv-00414-RMG 10 10 Agree Cirri Antonietta 2:15-cv-00415-RMG 10 10 Agree Ming Jeanie 2:15-cv-00417-RMG 20 20 Agree Kompare Kathryn 2:15-cv-00418-RMG 10 10 Agree
Lumpkin Judith A. 2:15-cv-00421-RMG 10 10 Agree Perez Maria 2:15-cv-00430-RMG 10 10 Agree WRIGHT CEOLA 2:15-cv-00435-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Mitchell Truthie 2:15-cv-00436-RMG 10 10 Agree ZEIGLER CATHERINE 2:15-cv-00446-RMG 20 20 Agree Craver Connie 2:15-cv-00447 40 40 Agree Wohlfarth Mary 2:15-cv-00449 10 10 Agree Arp Shelia 2:15-cv-00450 40 40 Agree Gower Cynthia 2:15-cv-00452 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Pittman Lillie 2:15-cv-00453 10 10 Agree Chavez Mary Lou 2:15-cv-00455 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Leviness Gilda 2:15-cv-00456 20 20 Agree Regalado Katy 2:15-cv-00457 10 10 Agree Clifton Barbara 2:15-cv-00458 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lopez Mendez Juana 2:15-cv-00460 40 40 Agree Green-Owens Mary 2:15-cv-00461 10 10 Agree Eygabroad Jane 2:15-cv-00462 10, 20 10, 20 Agree White Ella 2:15-cv-00464 20, 40 20, 40 Agree* Thomas Vickie 2:15-cv-00466 10 10 Agree Marshall Nancy 2:15-cv-00467 20 20 Agree Gaffney Linda 2:15-cv-00468 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Flynn Violet 2:15-cv-00470 10mg; 20mg; 40mg; 10mg; 20mg; 40mg; Agree Hall Alyce 2:15-cv-00471 10 10 Agree Kelly Betty 2:15-cv-00472 10 10 Agree Chambers Terrie 2:15-cv-00473 10 10 Agree Rochester Sue 2:15-cv-00476 20 20 Agree Cunningham Joyce 2:15-cv-00477 10 10 Agree Nguyen Chelsea 2:15-cv-00479 10 10 Agree Bell Mamie 2:15-cv-00480 10, 20, 40 10, 20 Agree Harris Hynethia 2:15-cv-00497 10 10 Agree Hinkson Lucinda 2:15-cv-00497 40 40 Agree Sanders Geraldine 2:15-cv-00499 20 20 Agree McCauley Anna 2:15-cv-00500 10 10 Agree VandeVelde Donna 2:15-cv-00501 40 40 Agree Braun Constance 2:15-cv-00509 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Apruzzese Joan 2:15-cv-00511 10 10 Agree Burchfield Margaret 2:15-cv-00514 20 20 Agree Burns Susan L 2:15-cv-00515 10 10 Agree Goldsmith Debra 2:15-cv-00541 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Harmon Doreen 2:15-cv-00542 10 10 Agree
Delph Ruth 2:15-cv-00543 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Michael Tawny Lee 2:15-cv-00549 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Harmon Patricia A. 2:15-cv-00557-RMG 10 10 Agree Allen Shirley 2:15-cv-00558 20 20 Agree Biggs Nancy L 2:15-cv-00566 20 20 Agree Hawley Susan 2:15-cv-00568 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Harris Jessie 2:15-cv-00569 40 40 Agree Brayman Linda 2:15-cv-00575-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Ferguson Norma 2:15-cv-00576 10 10 Agree Robinson Doretha 2:15-cv-00577-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Corwin Sandra 2:15-cv-00578-RMG 10 10 Agree Bishop Carolyn 2:15-cv-00584 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Gibson Penny L 2:15-cv-00585 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Melvin Gloria 2:15-cv-00591-RMG 10 10 Agree Levine Tina 2:15-cv-00592 40 40 Agree Rooker Charlene 2:15-cv-00601-RMG 10 10 Agree (Charlotte) Hoskins Joyce 2:15-cv-00602-RMG 10 10 Agree Burton Maray 2:15-cv-00605-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Scott Honest 2:15-cv-00607 10 10 Agree Morris Lula 2:15-cv-00608 20 20 Agree Jackson Bobbie A. 2:15-cv-00613 20 20 Agree Hilliard Samantha 2:15-cv-00614 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Dorreliand Ghistaine 2:15-cv-00615 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Al-Ahmad Nabila 2:15-cv-00616 40 40 Agree Aiken Sarah 2:15-cv-00617 10 10 Agree Anctil Sherryl 2:15-cv-00618 30, 40 30, 40 Agree Hines Joan 2:15-cv-00622 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Instenes Franacee D. 2:15-cv-00623 40 40 Agree Barfoot Viola 2:15-cv-00635 10 10 Agree Koon Karen S. 2:15-cv-00636 20 20 Agree Bradley Phyllis 2:15-cv-00655 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Jacobs Delores 2:15-cv-00659-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Richardson Loretta 2:15-cv-00660-RMG 20 20 Agree Zeisler Kimberley 2:15-cv-00661-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Stratton Bonnie 2:15-cv-00672 40 40 Agree Nowlin Clara 2:15-cv-00673 10 10 Agree Pardi Alena 2:15-cv-00674 10 10 Agree Cavalier Deborah 2:15-cv-00677 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Latham Nona 2:15-cv-00678 40 40 Agree
McAdams Shirley 2:15-cv-00679 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Puckett Wanda 2:15-cv-00680 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Welch Helen 2:15-cv-00681 20 20 Agree Lorenzen Barbara 2:15-cv-00685-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Treat Shirley 2:15-cv-00686-RMG 10 10 Agree Meyer Lorna 2:15-cv-00687-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Rebecca Simmons 2:15-cv-00693-RMG 20 20 Agree Sinnott Kathleen 2:15-cv-00699-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Williamson Brenda 2:15-cv-00700-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Kidd Sharon 2:15-cv-00725-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Jenkins Barbara 2:15-cv-00726 10 10 Agree Holley Joyce 2:15-cv-00727 10, 20 10, 20 Agree WESBERRY SHERRIE 2:15-cv-00732-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lueth Kathleen 2:15-cv-00739-RMG 20 20 Agree* Sheridan Sandra 2:15-cv-00740-RMG 20 20 Agree Hyman Billie 2:15-cv-00744-RMG 20 20 Agree McCants Jamie 2:15-cv-00746-RMG 20 20 Agree Baker Elizabeth 2:15-cv-00748-RMG 10 10 Agree Malloy Susie 2:15-cv-00750 10 10 Agree TERRY MARY JANE 2:15-cv-00755-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Cash Patricia 2:15-cv-00758 20 20 Agree Cooper Betty 2:15-cv-00760 20, 40, 20 20, 40, 20 Agree White Dianne 2:15-cv-00761 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Green-King Mary 2:15-cv-00763 10 10 Agree Wilkerson Gloristine 2:15-cv-00765 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Pruitt Kathy Gorilla 2:15-cv-00767-RMG 20 20 Agree Purnell Barbara 2:15-cv-00768-RMG 20 20 Agree Streeter Mary 2:15-cv-00769 10 10 Agree Killian Cassandra 2:15-cv-00788 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Pittman Tammy 2:15-cv-00791-RMG 20 20 Agree O'Leary Deborah 2:15-cv-00792-RMG 10 10 Agree Rodgers Judith 2:15-cv-00753-RMG 20 20 Agree McCorvey Beulah 2:15-cv-00796-RMG 20 20 Agree Pope Patricia S. 2:15-cv-00800-RMG 20 20 Agree Sirois Sheila 2:15-cv-00801-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Stall Carolyn Y. 2:15-cv-00004-RMG 10 10 Agree Harris Sandra 2:15-cv-00006 10 10 Agree Vaughn Joanna 2:15-cv-00010-RMG 20 20 Agree Noisette Inez 2:15-cv-00814 10mg; 10mg; Agree Prosie Alice 2:15-cv-00819 10mg; 20mg; 10mg; 20mg; Agree
Bell Priscilla 2:15-cv-00820 10 10 Agree Bartley Gemma 2:15-cv-00823 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Jones Cathy 2:15-cv-00824 20mg; 20mg; Agree Baughman Barbara 2:15-cv-00825-RMG 10 10 Agree Edwards Chiquinita 2:15-cv-00826-RMG 20 20 Agree Hanna Barbara 2:15-cv-00827-RMG 20 20 Agree Hennessy Lisa 2:15-cv-00828-RMG 10 10 Agree Hooks Charlotte 2:15-cv-00829-RMG 10 10 Agree Lockhart Dorothy 2:15-cv-00830-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Maloney Beth 2:15-cv-00832-RMG 40, 20 40, 20 Agree Martin Rena 2:15-cv-00833-RMG 40 40 Agree Messer-Holliday Donna 2:15-cv-00834-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Miller Sue (Lydia) 2:15-cv-00035-RMG 20 20 Agree Reed Mary 2:15-cv-00836-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Reid Sherry 2:15-cv-00837-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Sellers Frances 2:15-cv-00838-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Spears Deborah 2:15-cv-00839-RMG 40, 20 40, 20 Agree
Taylor Clementine 2:15-cv-00840-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes: Reserves Rights Thompson Robin 2:15-cv-00841-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Wheeler Deborah 2:15-cv-00842-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes: Reserves Rights Spoke Marcine 2:15-cv-00843 10 10 Agree Wilborn Danielle 2:15-cv-00844-RMG 20 20 Agree Greatheart Yvonne M. 2:15-cv-00845 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Wray Delores 2:15-cv-00846-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Marshall Shirley 2:15-cv-00847-RMG 10 10 Agree Jackson Olor 2:15-cv-00849 40 40 Agree Moffitt-Woods Philippa 2:15-cv-00851-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree White Dorothy 2:15-cv-00856-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Odum Helen 2:15-cv-00857-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Radley Barbara 2:15-cv-00858-RMG 20 20 Agree Brame Sandra 2:15-cv-00862 10 10 Agree Young Dorothy 2:15-cv-00863 20 20 Agree Knapek Shirley 2:15-cv-00866 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Bernard Melissa 2:15-cv-00860 20 20 Agree Ramsey Carlon 2:15-cv-00873-RMG 10 10 Agree Sires Pamela 2:15-cv-00874-RMG 20 20 Agree Wilson Mildred 2:15-cv-00082 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Martin Rosetta 2:15-cv-00883 20 20 Agree McMullen Anita 2:15-cv-00885 40 40 Agree Douglas Mary 2:15-cv-00886 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Nelson Virgie 2:15-cv-00889 20 20 Agree Gibson Mary 2:15-cv-00891 20, 40 20, 40 Agree* Thomas Carrie 2:15-cv-00092 10 10 Agree Fontana Henrietta 2:15-cv-00893 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Pernell Gearldine 2:15-cv-00094 10 10 Agree Pich Samath 2:15-cv-00896-RMG 20 20 Agree Johnson Sandra 2:15-cv-00898 10 10 Agree
Busch Kathleen 2:15-cv-00899-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Yakes Deborah L. 2:15-cv-00900-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree York Julia Ann 2:15-cv-00902-RMG 20 20 Agree Thomas Vivian 2:15-cv-00903-RMG 10 10 Agree Mecca Randi 2:15-cv-00905-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Michael Flor 2:15-cv-00906-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Williams Dianna 2:15-cv-00908 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Seyferth Karin 2:15-cv-00909 20 20 Agree McCoy Patricia 2:15-cv-00911 10 10 Agree Pendergrast Carol 2:15-cv-00913 10 10 Agree Swanigan Calverta Tate 2:15-cv-00914-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Williams Sylvia F. 2:15-cv-00915-RMG 10 10 Agree Maysonet Carmen J. 2:15-cv-00916 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Compton Joanne 2:15-cv-00919-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Parker Sharon 2:15-cv-00932-RMG 20 20 Agree Everly Tommie 2:15-cv-00938 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kessler Sharon 2:15-cv-00939 10 10 Agree Beard Beverly 2:15-cv-00940-RMG 40 40 Agree Newell-Lewis Kathy 2:15-cv-00941 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Richards Elizabeth 2:15-cv-00942 10 10 Agree Stier Scottie 2:15-cv-00947 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Bomgardner Judy 2:15-cv-00950-RMG 20, 40 20 Agree Warns Candace Lea 2:15-cv-00951 20 20 Agree Vandling Laura 2:15-cv-00952 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Manning Harvey 2:15-cv-00955-RMG 20 20 Agree Moore Gwendolyn 2:15-cv-00956-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Robinson Peggy 2:15-cv-00958-RMG 20 20 Agree Sechler Helen 2:15-cv-00959-RMG 40 40 Agree Taylor Pansey 2:15-cv-00960-RMG 40 40 Agree Taylor Pauline 2:15-cv-00961-RMG 40 40 Agree Thomas Mary 2:15-cv-00962-RMG 20 20 Agree Washington Barbarl 2:15-cv-00964-RMG 10 10 Agree Waters Lillie 2:15-cv-00965-RMG 10 10 Agree Williams Vergie 2:15-cv-00966-RMG 20 20 Agree Dillon Leatrice 2:15-cv-00967-RMG 20 20 Agree HARRIS ANNIE 2:15-cv-00968-RMG 40 40 Agree
CAMPBELL BERTHA 2:15-cv-00969-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Brinson Catherine 2:15-cv-00971-RMG 10 10 Agree Grafton Sandra 2:15-cv-00972-RMG 20 20 Agree Lopez Betty 2:15-cv-00987-RMG 10 10 Agree Koker Sandra 2:15-cv-00988-RMG 20 20 Agree Niles Rebecca 2:15-cv-00989-RMG 40 40 Agree Roberts Amanda 2:15-cv-00991-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown: Reserves Rights Wilson Joanne 2:15-cv-00992-RMG 20 20 Agree De Simone Olimpia 2:15-cv-00997-RMG 10 10 Agree Jordan Terry 2:15-cv-00998-RMG 10 10 Agree Kelly Yvonne 2:15-cv-00999-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Sutton Lee Nora 2:15-cv-01007-RMG 20 20 Agree Harrison Priscilla 2:15-cv-01015 10 10 Agree West Laura E. 2:15-cv-01022-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hickey Martha (Estate of) 2:15-cv-01024 10, 20, 40, 60 10, 20, 40, 60 Agree Hampton Mary 2:15-cv-01025 20 mg three times 20 mg three times Agree per week per week Segers Chin 2:15-cv-01027 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Reed Rebecca 2:15-cv-01028 20 20 Agree Moth Joyce 2:15-cv-01029 40 40 Agree Di Profio Kathy 2:15-cv-01030 10 10 Agree Gammage Dorothy 2:15-cv-01033 20 20 Agree Black Jerilyn 2:15-cv-01043 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Bryson Mary Jo 2:15-cv-01049-RMG 20 20 Agree Everett Judy 2:15-cv-01050 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Blackwell Tina 2:15-cv-01054-RMG 40 40 Agree Booze-Flowers Sheryle 2:15-cv-1058 10mg 10mg Agree Dreyer Pamela S. 2:15-cv-01066 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Jarrell Teresita 2:15-cv-01067 40 40 Agree Daley Patricia J. 2:15-cv-01068 20 20 Agree Browning Mary 2:15-cv-01091 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Barr Linda Hill 2:15-cv-01092 40 40 Agree Williams Dora A. 2:15-cv-01110 10mg 10mg Agree
Davis Julia 2:15-cv-01121-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Kurkowski Linda 2:15-cv-01133 10 10 Agree Allmond Sharon 2:15-cv-01139-RMG 40 40 Agree Grillo Debra 2:15-cv-01140-RMG 20 20 Agree Heflin Janice 2:15-cv-01143-RMG 20 20 Agree Lottie Patricia 2:15-cv-01145-RMG 20 20 Agree Waters Rosetta 2:15-cv-01146-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Smith-Timmons Rhonda 2:15-cv-01147-RMG 20 20 Agree Engebretson Karen Kaye (Estate 2:15-cv-01153 40, 60 40, 60 Agree of) Flippo Peggy 2:15-cv-01154 30 30 Agree Fugiel Anita 2:15-cv-01155 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lee Jennifer 2:15-cv-01159 20mg 20mg Agree Hadley Helen 2:15-cv-01163-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Hanson Patricia 2:15-cv-01164 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Harry-Orr Linda 2:15-cv-01165 10 10 Agree Harrison Mary 2:15-cv-01166 40 40 Agree Gager Dixie 2:15-cv-01179 10 10 Agree Chase Betty A. 2:15-cv-01182 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Haye (Densky) Jody 2:15-cv-01198-RMG 40 40 Agree Keough Sandra 2:15-cv-01199-RMG 10 10 Agree Berling Lucille 2:15-cv-01203 40 40 Agree Frederick Patricia 2:15-cv-01211 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Brechner Jerilyn 2:15-cv-01221 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Santa Cruz Maria 2:15-cv-01228-RMG 10 10 Agree Vodek Rebecca 2:15-cv-01229-RMG 10 10 Agree Davis Blontee 2:15-cv-01231-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Cease Charlene D. 2:15-cv-01233 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hamilton Nonda 2:15-cv-01234 10 10 Agree Korade Ann 2:15-cv-01242 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Allison Deborah 2:15-cv-01243-RMG 10, 20 10, 30 Agree NorthCutt Judy Kay 2:15-cv-01248-RMG 5, 10, 20 5, 10, 20 Agree Farmer Sarah 2:15-cv-01249-RMG 20 20 Agree Dickerson Sandra 2:15-cv-01289 Lipitor 10, 20; Lipitor 10, 20; Agree Caduet 5/20 Caduet 5/20 Bush Jean L. 2:15-cv-01290 10 10 Agree Henry Jacquelyn 2:15-cv-01291 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Jimenez Gwendolyn 2:15-cv-01292 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kemp Brenda 2:15-cv-01295 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Korb Catherine M. 2:15-cv-01296 10 10 Agree
King Beverly 2:15-cv-01319 20 20 Agree Castro Tracy 2:15-cv-01321-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Coffelt Cheryl 2:15-cv-01329-RMG 10 10 Agree Pryor JoAnne 2:15-cv-01347 20mg 20mg Agree Bedigian Vianca 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 10 10 Agree Berryhill Dora 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 20 20 Agree Calvetti Nancy 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 20 20 Agree Deitsch Marie 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 10 10 Agree Fisher Karen 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 20 20 Agree Harper Eunice 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 20 20 Agree Haygood Jo Ann 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 40 40 Agree* Mabe Cheryl 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 20 20 Agree Porter Elsie 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 10 10 Agree Romero Nora 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 10 10 Agree Snodgrass Mary Ann 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 20 20 Agree Thompson Iris 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 10 10 Agree Webb Patricia 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 40 40 Agree Webb Debra 2:15-cv-01356-RMG 20 20 Agree Creveling-Alma Donna M. 2:15-cv-01368 10 10 Agree Kincaid Mary 2:15-cv-01369 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Guss Linda 2:15-cv-01372-RMG 20 20 Agree Johnson Linda 2:15-cv-01374 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Davis Brenda 2:15-cv-01375 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Tyler Margaret 2:15-cv-01396-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Cohan-Zakay Guity 2:15-cv-01405 10 10 Agree Cohen Cathryn G. 2:15-cv-01406 10 10 Agree Knotts Carol M. 2:15-cv-01408 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Melton Shirley 2:15-cv-01410-RMG 40 40 Agree Williams Carolyn 2:15-cv-01411-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Waggoner Virginia 2:15-cv-01412-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Fetcko Denise 2:15-cv-01419 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Graff Peggy Gail 2:15-cv-01420 20 20 Agree Kroeze Susan Kay 2:15-cv-01421 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hoke Jacintha 2:15-cv-01423 10 10 Agree Good Mardena 2:15-cv-01424 20mg; 10mg 20mg; 10mg Agree Carter Linda 2:15-cv-01425 40mg 40mg Agree Flemings Teresa 2:15-cv-01426 10mg 10mg Agree Resurrection Belen 2:15-cv-01428 10mg 10mg Agree Wilson Geraldine 2:15-cv-01429 10mg 10 mg Agree Tagavilla Zenalda 2:15-cv-01440-RMG 10 10 Agree
Whitworth Carol 2:15-cv-01441-RMG 20 20 Agree Hither Billie 2:15-cv-01442 10 10 Agree Huitt Carol 2:15-cv-01444 10 10 Agree Cowan Brenda 2:15-cv-01445 40 40 Agree Kicinski Pauline 2:15-cv-01446 10 10 Agree Reese Brenda 2:15-cv-01447 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kaye Carol 2:15-cv-01449-RMG 40 40 Agree Lee Macy 2:15-cv-01450 10 10 Agree* Benson Lara 2:15-cv-01452-RMG 40 40 Agree Mason Marilyn 2:15-cv-01453-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Burch Tracy 2:15-cv-01454 20 20 Agree Hawks Barbara 2:15-cv-01461 10 10 Agree Cunningham Sarah 2:15-cv-01464-RMG 20 20 Agree* Bukowski Mary 2:15-cv-01497 10 10 Agree Sparks Lori 2:15-cv-01498-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Gruden Barbara A. 2:15-cv-01500 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Dominick-McFarlane Carole 2:15-cv-01521-RMG 10 10 Agree Lewicki Teresa 2:15-cv-01522 10, 20, 10, 20 10, 20, 10, 20 Agree Hartman Linda 2:15-cv-01527 10 10 Agree Charlton Marsetta 2:15-cv-01528 20 20 Agree Hemmingsen Janyce 2:15-cv-01529 10 10 Agree Rison Edwina H. 2:15-cv-01539-RMG 10 10 Agree Stokes Claudette 2:15-cv-01542 20, 40 20, 40 Agree* Jackson Wynette F. 2:15-cv-01543-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hartman Kay 2:15-cv-01544-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree RATCLIFF CLARA 2:15-cv-01564-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree NELSON RHONDA 2:15-cv-01565-RMG 10 10 Agree Baldwin Susan 2:15-cv-01574 10 10 Agree Ferrarini Lynda M. 2:15-cv-01575 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Spencer Mary 2:15-cv-01576 10 10 Agree Burns Peggy 2:15-cv-01578 20 20 Agree Holland Jacqueline 2:15-cv-01579-RMG 20 20 Agree Kraft Rosemarie 2:15-cv-01580 10 10 Agree Holman Phyllis 2:15-cv-01586-RMG 40 40 Agree Lewis Thelma 2:15-cv-01591 20 20 Agree Hansen Oleta 2:15-cv-01639 40 40 Agree Chenier Patsy 2:15-cv-01640 10 10 Agree Collins Betty Jane 2:15-cv-01641 20 20 Agree Cummings Barbara 2:15-cv-01642 10 10 Agree
Jackson Delores 2:15-cv-01665 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Famolare Virginia 2:15-cv-01666 5, 20 5, 20 Agree Garvin Rosa 2:15-cv-01667 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hill Annie M. 2:15-cv-01668 10 10 Agree Brengel Dorothy 2:15-cv-01669 10, 20 10, 20 Agree KOUNS JENNIFER 2:15-cv-01685-RMG 20 20 Agree Campbell Carol 2:15-cv-01686 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree* Cates Louise 2:15-cv-01687 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Clark Jacqueline 2:15-cv-01689 40 40 Agree Curtis Agnes 2:15-cv-01692 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Knapp Tammy 2:15-cv-01693 40 40 Agree* Tube Skeeter M. 2:15-cv-01694-RMG 20 20 Agree Lindsey Johnnie 2:15-cv-01700-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree McGonigle Bonnie 2:15-cv-01707-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Roberson Lou Ellen 2:15-cv-01708-RMG 40 40 Agree Person Rose 2:15-cv-01709-RMG 20 20 Agree Bender Betty 2:15-cv-01711 20 20 Agree Currie Joann 2:15-cv-01712 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Erickson Cynthia 2:15-cv-01713 40, 20 40, 20 Agree Scott Angela 2:15-cv-01745 40mg 40mg Agree Graham Arnie Faye 2:15-cv-01746 10 10 Agree Patterson Mary 2:15-cv-01747 20 20 Agree Wallenhorst Joyce 2:15-cv-01760 40mg 40mg Agree Atcheson Lucille 2:15-cv-01762-RMG 10 10 Agree Hughes Cindy S. 2:15-cv-01764-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Swinney Linda 2:15-cv-01770 40 40 Agree Hess Ellen 2:15-cv-01783 10 10 Agree Vitale Linda 2:15-cv-01792-RMG 10 10 Agree Dunn Shirley 2:15-cv-01794 20, 40 20, 40 Agree McCormick Geralynn J. 2:15-cv-01795 20 20 Agree Neil Mavis 2:15-cv-01805 10mg 10mg Agree Haas Carolyn 2:15-cv-01808 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Jones Linda 2:15-cv-01812-RMG 10 10 Agree Graham Barbara 2:15-cv-01815 10 10 Agree Bailey Martha Ann 2:15-cv-01816 20 20 Agree Fuess Kathryn 2:15-cv-01817 20 20 Agree Clarke Bernice 2:15-cv-01820 10 10 Agree Galbiso Denise 2:15-cv-01821 10 10 Agree Winfrey Delilah 2:15-cv-01828-RMG 10 10 Agree Parrott Lois 2:15-cv-01829-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree
Bowers Judith A. 2:15-cv-01831 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Brand Judy 2:15-cv-01832 20 20 Agree Drury Rebecca 2:15-cv-01833 20 20 Agree Harris Gayle 2:15-cv-01834 20 20 Agree Nagy Donna 2:15-cv-01835-RMG 10 10 Agree Russell Carmane 2:15-cv-01836-RMG 40 40 Agree Zavelovich Eugenia 2:15-cv-01837-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Pennington Norma 2:15-cv-01838-RMG 5, 10 5, 10 Agree Pinches Pat 2:15-cv-01840-RMG 20 20 Agree Rodriguez Evangelina 2:15-cv-01841-RMG 10 10 Agree Crawford Jeanette 2:15-cv-01849 40 40 Agree Hartley Lisa 2:15-cv-01851 10mg 10mg Agree Schaffer Doris 2:15-cv-01852 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Townsel Altresa 2:15-cv-01853 10mg; 20mg; 40mg 10mg; 20mg; 40mg Agree Underwood Julie 2:15-cv-01854 10mg 10mg Agree Welch Gamette 2:15-cv-01855 10mg 10mg Agree Hemmes Margaret 2:15-cv-01857 20 20 Agree Piszczek Queen 2:15-cv-01861-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Jackson Carolyn 2:15-cv-01862 10mg 10mg Agree Riordan Patricia 2:15-cv-01863-RMG 40 40 Agree SHEAR DEBORAH 2:15-cv-01864-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree MILLER SHARON 2:15-cv-01865-RMG 40 40 Agree Sibert Joyce M. 2:15-cv-01869-RMG 10 10 Agree Parrish Loucella 2:15-cv-01879 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Thomas Annie 2:15-cv-01880 20 20 Agree Vernotica Linda 2:15-cv-01897-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lyall Vi 2:15-cv-01898-RMG 10 10 Agree Douglass Ellen 2:15-cv-01901 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Williams Dora L 2:15-cv-01902 20mg 20mg Agree Smith Ermagene 2:15-cv-01903 10mg 10mg Agree Ambarchian Karmen 2:15-cv-01911 10 10 Agree Antonyan Veganush 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Lane Wanda 2:15-cv-01911 20 20 Agree
LaTorre Myra 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Mayo Nedra 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights McKee Margo 2:15-cv-01911 40 40 Agree Miller Beverly 2:15-cv-01911 40 40 Agree Mueller Elizabeth 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Parsamyan Elizabeth 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Peddicord Meighan 2:15-cv-01911 40 40 Agree Poghosyan Areknazan 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Pogosyan Asyor 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Ritzel Carolyn 2:15-cv-01911 20 20 Agree Sanders Helen 2:15-cv-01911 40 40 Agree Simms Roberta 2:15-cv-01911 20 20 Agree
Smith Donna 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Smith Sophia 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights St.Juliene Ramsey Darlene 2:15-cv-01911 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Stocks Viola 2:15-cv-01911 10 10 Agree Suggs Pearl 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Taltoan Cecilia 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Tamba Angela 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Taylor Sandra 2:15-cv-01911 20 20 Agree Tennessee Delores 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Terjanyan Alvard 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights
Thompson Caroline 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Trdadyan Arasksi 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Vanburen Katherine 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Wagner Brenda 2:15-cv-01911 10 10 Agree Walker Lawanda 2:15-cv-01911 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Walker Vandora 2:15-cv-01911 10 10 Agree Watkins Christine 2:15-cv-01911 10 10 Agree Wesley Donita 2:15-cv-01911 40 40 Agree Wiley Joy 2:15-cv-01911 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Wilmerton Betty 2:15-cv-01911 40 40 Agree Worthy Martha 2:15-cv-01911 10 10 Agree Arutyunyan Araks 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Bondurant Gloria 2:15-cv-01912 20 20 Agree Carter Dale 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree Drake Sandra 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree
Forest Patricia 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Galstian Larisa 2:15-cv-01912 20 20 Agree Garcia Martha 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Gilbert Pauline 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Ginyard Valerie 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Gordon Dawn 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Graves Beverly 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Green Claudette 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Green Sallie 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights
Hanks Glenda 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Harrington Eddre 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Heath-Thomas Jennie 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Honeycutt Linda 2:15-cv-01912 10 10 Agree Jackson Laura 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree Jenkins Darlene 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Jenkins Gwen 2:15-cv-01912 10 10 Agree Johnese Mary 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree* Johnson Mae 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Jones Margaret 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Khachatryan Srbui 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights
Leadbetter Robin 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Mack Doris 2:15-cv-01912 20 20 Agree McKinney Charlotte 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree Melendez Suenil 2:15-cv-01912 20 20 Agree Mercer Lucile 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree Pittaway Barbara 2:15-cv-01912 10 10 Agree Porter Susie 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Pugh Marjorie 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree Rolland Flora 2:15-cv-01912 10 10 Agree Ruiz Maria 2:15-cv-01912 20 20 Agree Scott Kathy 2:15-cv-01912 20 20 Agree Smith Lydia 2:15-cv-01912 60 60 Agree Smith Patricia 2:15-cv-01912 40 40 Agree Starrett Kathleen 2:15-cv-01912 20 20 Agree Thomas Mary 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Ward Carrie 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Williams Dorothy 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights
Wilson Ardina 2:15-cv-01912 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Ali Violet 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Ayrapetyan Mariam 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Bardwell Edna 2:15-cv-01913 20 20 Agree Bassett Linda 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Bowman Cordelia 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Bowman Melva 2:15-cv-01913 40 40 Agree Brantley-Garrett Lillie 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Britten Margie 2:15-cv-01913 20 20 Agree Brooks Deloris 2:15-cv-01913 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Brooms Sherrie 2:15-cv-01913 40 40 Agree Butler Brenda 2:15-cv-01913 20 20 Agree
Byron Elizabeth 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Cater Elizabeth 2:15-cv-01913 40 40 Agree Change Ruth 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Disagree - 40 mg Christian Brenda 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Coleman Cynthia 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Coleman Geneva 2:15-cv-01913 10 10 Agree Cordell Julie 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Cubic Geraldine 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Curtis Ode 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Doane Gladys 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights
Faulkner Althea 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Hardy-Cole Debra 2:15-cv-01913 20 20 Agree Jackson Phyllis 2:15-cv-01913 20 20 Agree McDowall Claudette 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Radl Margaret 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Rosales Beatriz 2:15-cv-01913 20 20 Agree Sharkey Vera 2:15-cv-01913 10 10 Agree Thompson Sarah 2:15-cv-01913 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Williams Amber 2:15-cv-01913 20 20 Agree Williams Marlene 2:15-cv-01913 10 10 Agree Winn Sharon 2:15-cv-01913 Alleges Pre-exsiting Alleges Preexisting Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 40 Diabetes then 40 Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Srun Heng Ya 2:15-cv-01915-RMG 40 40 Agree Dols Eileen 2:15-cv-01916 10 10 Agree Eckert Helen Ann 2:15-cv-01917 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Graves Brenda 2:15-cv-01910 10 10 Agree Hoenig Nancy 2:15-cv-01920 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Dorrity Myra 2:15-cv-01924 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hernandez Elida 2:15-cv-01925 10 10 Agree Huseby Kirsten 2:15-cv-01926 10 10 Agree
Knisley Lorena 2:15-cv-01927 5, 10 5, 10 Agree Minatra Sandra 2:15-cv-01939-RMG 10 10 Agree Schmidtzinksky Theresa 2:15-cv-01940-RMG 10 10 Agree Shelton Mary Alice 2:15-cv-01942 Maddox Gracie 2:15-cv-01968-RMG 20 20 Agree Smola Vicki 2:15-cv-01974 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Wadibia Carol 2:15-cv-01987-RMG 10 10 Agree Eidsness Linda 2:15-cv-01991 40 40 Agree Campbell Cynthia 2:15-cv-01994-RMG 10 10 Agree Pickel Susan 2:15-cv-01998-RMG 5, 10, 20 5, 10, 20 Agree Longoria, JoAnn JoAnn 2:15-cv-02001 40 40 Agree Wegner Ina May 2:15-cv-02018-RMG 20 20 Agree Gouff Alice 2:15-cv-02026 20 20 Agree Dunn Luecreasia 2:15-cv-02031 20 20 Agree Pruett Rosalind 2:15-cv-02032 20 20 Agree MILFORD CLAIRE 2:15-cv-02033-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kazanas Judith 2:15-cv-02037 40 mg twice per 40 mg twice per Agree week week Kosnitch Josephine 2:15-cv-02047-RMG 20 20 Agree Smith Sandra 2:15-cv-02061 20 (Generic), 40 20 (Generic), 40 Agree (Generic), 40 (Generic), 40 Tristano Nancy 2:15-cv-02067 40 40 Agree Nichols Kathy 2:15-cv-02070 20 20 Agree Buchanan Debra 2:15-cv-02072 40 40 Agree Cale Audrey 2:15-cv-02081 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Metcalfe June 2:15-cv-02090-RMG 10 10 Agree Brown Laura 2:15-cv-02153 20 20 Agree Richardson Esver 2:15-cv-02154-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hedden Willie 2:15-cv-02155 10 10 Agree McDonald Paula M. 2:15-cv-02156-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Dunovant Joe Ann 2:15-cv-02160 20 20 Agree Mildes Terry 2:15-cv-02171-RMG 20 20 Agree McDonald Deborah 2:15-cv-02172-RMG; 40 40 Agree Oster Eileen 2:15-cv-02175-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Fusco Louise 2:15-cv-02176 20 20 Agree Mosby Alice 2:15-cv-02180 10 10 Agree Tague Elida 2:15-cv-02181 20 20 Agree Anderson Diane 2:15-cv-02182 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Peterson Helen 2:15-cv-02183-RMG 10 10 Agree Essah Lima 2:15-cv-02184 10, 20 10, 20 Agree
Peavey Dorothy 2:15-cv-02105 10 10 Agree Duncan Rose 2:15-cv-02191 10 10 Agree Singh Reinell (Estate of) 2:15-cv-02197 10 10 Agree Tucker Victoria 2:15-cv-02201 RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Johnson Barbara 2:15-cv-02202-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Melton Jean 2:15-cv-02206-RMG 10 10 Agree Milham Joanne 2:15-cv-02211-RMG 10 10 Agree ABERNATHY BONNIE 2:15-cv-02215-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Bentley Rebecca Joan 2:15-cv-02219 10 10 Agree Slycord Barbara 2:15-cv-02225-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Barreto Celia 2:15-cv-02232 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Davis Denise Vow 2:15-cv-02233 10 10 Agree Hunter Patricia 2:15-cv-02234 40 40 Agree Thacker Joan 2:15-cv-02236-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Scott Judy 2:15-cv-02237 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Westerlund Margot 2:15-cv-02242-RMC 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Wyatt LaVell 2:15-cv-02252-RMG 20 20 Agree White Josephine 2:15-cv-02254 40 40 Agree Dates Farah 2:15-cv-02255-RMG 40 40 Agree Cushman Deborah 2:15-cv-02256-RMG 10 10 Agree Folsom Gaye 2:15-cv-02283 20 20 Agree Stephens Jacquelyn 2:15-cv-02285-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Smith Sandra J. 2:15-cv-02286-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree O'Connell Irene 2:15-cv-02287-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Michaels Michelle 2:15-cv-02288-RMG 20 20 Agree Orla Barbara 2:15-cv-02295 20 20 Agree Taylor Irene 2:15-cv-0229B-RMG 10 10 Agree Payne Betty 2:15-cv-02299-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Orlando Shirley 2:15-cv-02300-RMG 10 10 Agree Bodenhamer Nancy J. 2:15-cv-02308 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Peterson Dr. Kari, ED.D 2:15-cv-02309-RMG 10 10 Agree Davis Sybil 2:15-cv-02310 40 40 Agree Lund Marcia 2:15-cv-02320-RMG 5-10 (Caduet), 10 5-10 (Caduet), 10 Agree (Lipitor), 40 (Lipitor), 40 (Lipitor), 10-20 (Lipitor), 10-20 (Caduet) (Caduet) Tidwell Jo Ann 2:15-cv-02326 Mays Eloise 2:15-cv-02334 10 10 Agree Lee Mona 2:15-cv-02335 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Milano Christina 2:15-cv-02336-RMG 10 10 Agree
Pettit Darlene 2:15-cv-02337-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Magoon Alice 2:15-cv-02351 20 20 Agree Shu Lee-Fen 2:15-cv-02355-RMG 20 20 Agree Shultz Billie 2:15-cv-02363 10, 20 20 Agree Doherty Carol 2:15-cv-02364 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hubbard Betty 2:15-cv-02369 20 20 Agree Welch Vickie 2:15-cv-02376-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Chrisman Judy 2:15-cv-02381 20 20 Agree Graves Carol S. 2:15-cv-02382 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Moskaluk Mary Ann 2:15-cv-02384-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Owens Linda 2:15-cv-02385-RMG 20 20 Agree Rawlings Debra 2:15-cv-02401-RMG 10 10 Agree Sands Pearl 2:15-cv-02404 20 20 Agree Larkin Diane 2:15-cv-02405-RMG 10 10 Agree Oliver Brenda 2:15-cv-02406-RMG 10 10 Agree Moulder Patricia 2:15-cv-02407-RMG 10 10 Agree Ruggles Sherry 2:15-cv-02421-RMG 10 10 Agree Smith Bonita 2:15-cv-02422-RMG 20 20 Agree Workman Joan 2:15-cv-02455-RMG 10 10 Agree Shaw Mindie J. 2:15-cv-02456-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Mowrey Rebecca 2:15-cv-02460-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Tucci Patricia 2:15-cv-02461-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Bearden Brenda 2:15-cv-02467 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Squyres Margie 2:15-cv-02472-RMG 20 20 Agree Holmes Deborah 2:15-cv-02483-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Alexander Colleen 2:15-cv-02486 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Leslie Deborah 2:15-cv-02487-RMG 20 20 Agree Parrish Eileen Jo 2:15-cv-02488-RMG 20 20 Agree Lariscy Maxine 2:15-cv-02489-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Tillery Linda J. 2:15-cv-02490-RMG 10 10 Agree Totten Delores 2:15-cv-02493 20 20 Agree LeJeune Vienna 2:15-cv-02494 40 40 Agree
Florence Lois 2:15-cv-02495 40 40 Agree Venzant Margaret 2:15-cv-02497 20 20 Agree Lewis Ella 2:15-cv-02498 40 40 Agree Herbertson Ann 2:15-cv-02500 10 10 Agree Staples Sheila 2:15-cv-02501 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Land Wanda 2:15-cv-02502-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Peters Lynne 2:15-cv-02505-RMG 20 20 Agree Sher Nina 2:15-cv-02506-RMG 10 10 Agree Zucker Miriam 2:15-cv-02512-RMG 40 40 Agree Moreland-Carmona Joy 2:15-cv-02515 40 40 Agree Sargent Adele 2:15-cv-02520-RMG 20 20 Agree Boudrie Pamela L. 2:15-cv-02522 20 20 Agree Payne Annette Leone 2:15-cv-02528-RMG 10 10 Agree Carroll Susan 2:15-cv-02541-RMG 20 20 Agree Taylor Beverly 2:15-cv-02555-RMG 10 10 Agree Povlitzki Mary Ann 2:15-cv-02565-RMG 10 10 Agree Walker Paula 2:15-cv-02576-RMG 10 10 Agree Villanueva Margaretta 2:15-cv-02597-RMG 40 40 Agree Wiggans Evelyn 2:15-cv-02598 40 40 Agree Snell Anne 2:15-cv-02599 20 20 Agree Rivello Lauralee 2:15-cv-02601 20 20 Agree Coleman Doris M. 2:15-cv-02602 10 10 Agree Kaissar Faye 2:15-cv-02605 10 10 Agree Marsh Betty 2:15-cv-02606 10 10 Agree Buzard Annette M. 2:15-cv-02612-RMG 10 10 Agree Jewell Cheryl 2:15-cv-02615 20 20 Agree Abel Kathleen 2:15-cv-02619 20 20 Agree Farris Linda 2:15-cv-02620 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Darrington Bessie 2:15-cv-02630 20 20 Agree BUTLER JOAN 2:15-cv-02643-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree WALKER GINA 2:15-cv-02644-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Cummings Anna 2:15-cv-02650 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Huey Marie B. 2:15-cv-02651-RMG 10 10 Agree JACKSON ELAINE 2:15-cv-02652-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Grzelak Diane M. 2:15-cv-02660 20 20 Agree Tanner Dawn S. 2:15-cv-02679-RMG 10 10 Agree Sands Marcia 2:15-cv-02680-RMG 20 20 Agree Thompson Judith 2:15-cv-02681-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Tillman Sandra E. 2:15-cv-02682-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree
Williams G96Mae 2:15-cv-02683-RMG 20 20 Agree Fry Eleanor 2:15-cv-02691-RMG 40 40 Agree Widmayer Lulu 2:15-cv-02694 20 20 Agree Gallman Ellen 2:15-cv-02709 10 10 Agree Elwell Peggy 2:15-cv-02720 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Jump Shirley 2:15-cv-02729-RMG 10 10 Agree Leonard Cathy 2:15-cv-02732 10 10 Agree Roth Elizabeth 2:15-cv-02747-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Rankin DEBORAPatricia 2:15-cv-02752-RMG 40 40 Agree Tannenbaum Harriet 2:15-cv-02753-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Knotts Judy 2:15-cv-02769 10 10 Agree Varnado Thelma 2:15-cv-02771-RMG 10 10 Agree Crawford Joan 2:15-cv-02775 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kasey Regina 2:15-cv-02792 20 20 Agree Moore Donna 2:15-cv-02799-RMG 40 40 Agree Thompson Brenda 2:15-cv-02825 40, 20 40, 20 Agree Meyers Barbara 2:15-cv-02826 10 10 Agree Birkelbach Laura 2:15-cv-02835 20 20 Agree Hodges Jacqueline 2:15-cv-02836 10 10 Agree Nelson Pamela 2:15-cv-02837-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Wong Linda 2:15-cv-02848-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree FERNANDEZ MARIA 2:15-cv-02851-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Abelli Anna 2:15-cv-02854-RMG 10 10 Agree Brant Sharon W. 2:15-cv-02881 5 5 Agree Hickey Julie 2:15-cv-02885 20 20 Agree Cook Shirley 2:15-cv-02887 10 10 Agree WARREN BETTY 2:15-cv-02915-RMG 20 20 Agree MAGEE LORETTA 2:15-cv-02917-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree MOORE PATRICIA 2:15-cv-02918-RMG 40 40 Agree STALLINGS SARAH 2:15-cv-02919-RMG 40 40 Agree WARD SHELIA 2:15-cv-02920-RMG 20 20 Agree WOODS SHIRLEY 2:15-cv-02921-RMG 20 20 Agree Generette Janet 2:15-cv-02925 10mg 10mg Agree Lipnit Mariana 2:15-cv-02946 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Lee Constance 2:15-cv-02973 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Baker Susan 2:15-cv-02976 20 20 Agree Coleman Linda 2:15-cv-02984 10 10 Agree Reed Nora 2:15-cv-02993-RMG 10 10 Agree Glickman Danielle 2:15-cv-02997-RMG 20 20 Agree
Hoffman Kim 2:15-cv-03004 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes Diabetes Alleges Preexisting Diabetes; Reserves Rights Cullen Evelyn 2:15-cv-03005 20 20 Agree Gurevich Adele 2:15-cv-03006 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Agosto-Sanchez Nidia (Nilda) 2:15-cv-03007 20 20 Agree Peeler Fran 2:15-cv-03016 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Franklin Melonise 2:15-cv-03032-RMG 10 10 Agree Gatrell Kay 2:15-cv-03033-RMG 10 10 Agree Gonzalez Yolanda 2:15-cv-03035-RMG 20 20 Agree Gross Sarah 2:15-cv-03037 10 10 Agree Freeman Wanda 2:15-cv-03049-RMG 10 10 Agree Henderson Dorothy 2:15-cv-03065-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Isom Althaun 2:15-cv-03066-RMG 40 40 Agree Hanes Sandra L. 2:15-cv-03080-RMG 20 20 Agree Franza Linda 2:15-cv-03090 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lee Charlene 2:15-cv-03092-RMG 20 20 Agree Lopez Carmen 2:15-cv-03093-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Lopiccolo Kathryn Christine 2:15-cv-03094-RMG 40 40 Agree James Minnie 2:15-cv-03097-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lynch Iris 2:15-cv-03100-RMG 40 40 Agree Martin McSwain Shirley Elaine 2:15-cv-03101-RMG 10 10 Agree Mcneal Mildred 2:15-cv-03104-RMG 20 20 Agree Stevens Jonnie 2:15-cv-03111-RMG 10 10 Agree Lobdell Barbara 2:15-cv-03115-RMG 20 20 Agree WILLIAMS GWENDOLYN 2:15-cv-03118-RMG 20 20 Agree Thayer Anita 2:15-cv-03119 20 20 Agree McQuirk Mary Lynn 2:15-cv-03124-RMG 40 40 Agree Northime Elizabeth 2:15-cv-03125-RMG 20 20 Agree Engelbrecht Brenda 2:15-cv-03126 20 20 Agree Gasper Diane 2:15-cv-03127 20 20 Agree Tatman Christine M. 2:15-cv-03137-RMG 10 10 Agree San Jose Gregoria 2:15-cv-03139 10 10 Agree Bunch Betty 2:15-cv-03144-RMG 20 20 Agree Ruffo Sallie 2:15-cv-03146-RMG 10 10 Agree Stanaland Barbara 2:15-cv-03148-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Mills Patricia 2:15-cv-03151-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Robles Doris 2:15-cv-03153-RMG 20 20 Agree
Morris Judy 2:15-cv-03154-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Warren Lottie 2:15-cv-03168-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Webster Vittoria 2:15-cv-03171-RMG 10 10 Agree White Dorothy 2:15-cv-03172-RMG 40 40 Agree Actor Mary 2:15-cv-03181 20 20 Agree Brake Carolyn 2:15-cv-03183 20 20 Agree Francis Daphne 2:15-cv-03191-RMG 10 10 Agree Artis Pearlie 2:15-cv-03205-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Blackshear Martha 2:15-cv-03206-RMG 20 20 Agree Cane Ana 2:15-cv-03208-RMG 20 20 Agree Henck Margaret 2:15-cv-03215-RMG 40 40 Agree Bueker Karen 2:15-cv-03223 20 20 Agree Evans Francine 2:15-cv-03229-RMG 40 40 Agree Everette Etta 2:15-cv-03230-RMG 20 20 Agree Holycross Donetta 2:15-cv-03235-RMG 40 40 Agree Elias Karen L. 2:15-cv-03242-RMG 20 20 Agree Worzack Constance 2:15-cv-03244 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Laureano Elizabeth 2:15-cv-03277 20 20 Agree Marks Mary D. 2:15-cv-03281-RMG 20 20 Agree Walker Shirley Ann 2:15-cv-03284-RMG 30 30 Agree Carter Martha J. 2:15-cv-03288 10 10 Agree Wade Genia 2:15-cv-03296-RMG 10 10 Agree Cauthen Anita 2:15-cv-03297 20 20 Agree Watkins Louise 2:15-cv-03299-RMG 10 10 Agree Young Shirley A. 2:15-cv-03301-RMG 20 20 Agree Eason Carolyn 2:15-cv-03312 20 20 Agree Fox Sherri 2:15-cv-03314 20 20 Agree Dorso Mary Ann 2:15-cv-03323 10 10 Agree McGee Violett 2:15-cv-03325-RMG 20 20 Agree Sandburg Rhonda M. 2:15-cv-03326-RMG 20 20 Agree McAllister Lori 2:15-cv-03350 20 20 Agree Davis Pearl L. 2:15-cv-03351-RMG 20 20 Agree Gonzalez Nelida 2:15-cv-03356 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Otero Cruz Santo 2:15-cv-03365 40, 20 40, 20 Agree Herron Hortense 2:15-cv-03371 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Traylor Toni 2:15-cv-03372-RMG 40 40 Agree Armstrong Dale 2:15-cv-03390 20 20 Agree Sunderland-Rios Kathlene 2:15-cv-03391 40 40 Agree Torres Oquendo Nydia M. 2:15-cv-03403 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Hughes Rudell 2:15-cv-03412-RMG 10 10 Agree
Giannini Pamela 2:15-cv-03415-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Mason Patricia 2:15-cv-03418 10 10 Agree Charles Diane 2:15-cv-03428 10 10 Agree Echeverry Gloria 2:15-cv-03429 40 40 Agree Rodriguez Lydia 2:15-cv-03430 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Sanchez Elisa 2:15-cv-03431 40 40 Agree Stidham Virginia 2:15-cv-03434-RMG 10 10 Agree Troup Rollie M. 2:15-cv-03435-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Kornegay Phyllis 2:15-cv-03446 10 10 Agree Roberts Lisa 2:15-cv-03452-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Spehn Lisa 2:15-cv-03453 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Webb Tanya 2:15-cv-03454-RMG 20 20 Agree Williams Charmaine 2:15-cv-03463 10 10 Agree Lepine Julie 2:15-cv-03464 10 10 Agree Hollinger Beatrice 2:15-cv-03468 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Farrell Eulalia 2:15-cv-03476 20, 40 20, 40 Agree John Linda 2:15-cv-03487-RMG 10 10 Agree Wells-Williams Lillie 2:15-cv-03488 10mg 10mg Agree Williams Liem 2:15-cv-03489 20 20 Agree Collins Jacqueline A. 2:15-cv-03491 40 40 Agree HAMMONTREE JUDY 2:15-cv-03492-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree* Fowler Mary Anthanette 2:15-cv-03496 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Angjeli Rozeta 2:15-cv-03503 10 10 Agree Daly Patricia 2:15-cv-03508 20 20 Agree Gonzalez Carmen 2:15-cv-03531-RMG 20 20 Agree Borges Myrna 2:15-cv-03539-RMG 20 20 Agree Heinrich Nelia 2:15-cv-03541-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Perez Rosa 2:15-cv-03543-RMG 40 40 Agree Barrick Christina 2:15-cv-03548 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree VANCE BARBARA 2:15-cv-03561-RMG 20 20 Agree Taylor Julia 2:15-cv-03564-RMG 20 20 Agree Williams Mary 2:15-cv-03566-RMG 20 20 Agree Grey Diana 2:15-cv-03567-RMG 10 10 Agree Overkleeft-Fullerton Hendrika 2:15-cv-03569 20 20 Agree Massingale MaryAnn 2:15-cv-03573-RMG 40 40 Agree Spielman Virginia 2:15-cv-03574-RMG 40 40 Agree Tapp Lisa 2:15-cv-03575-RMG 40 40 Agree Matos Vivian 2:15-cv-03576-RMG 20 20 Agree
Davis AKA Davis-Bill Linda 2:15-cv-03585-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Spear Victoria 2:15-cv-03587-RMG 10 10 Agree Burgos Luz 2:15-cv-03595-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Vallecillo Magda 2:15-cv-03598-RMG 10 10 Agree Reeves Nancy 2:15-cv-03618-RMG 20, 30, 40 20, 30, 40 Agree Scholer Lois 2:15-cv-03619-RMG 10 10 Agree Jackson Annette W. 2:15-cv-03629 10 10 Agree DAWSON WILLIE 2:15-cv-03640-RMG 10 10 Agree Rosalez Nancy 2:15-cv-03658 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lambiris Lika 2:15-cv-03680-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Bagley Sharon 2:15-cv-03682 10 10 Agree Oraschin Eleanor 2:15-cv-03693-RMG 20 20 Agree Ruiz Overlinda 2:15-cv-03722-RMG 10 10 Agree Lee Janice 2:15-cv-03723-RMG 20 20 Agree Kearney Olivia 2:15-cv-03744-RMG 40 40 Agree Saulter Caroline 2:15-cv-03745-RMG 40 40 Agree Appel Rita 2:15-cv-03748 10mg 10mg Agree Moody Teresa 2:15-cv-03759-RMG 10 10 Agree Orlowski Michele 2:15-cv-03760-RMG 20 20 Agree Simons Genoveva 2:15-cv-03761-RMG 20 20 Agree Gibson Regina 2:15-cv-03762-RMG 40 40 Agree Velazquez Lourdes 2:15-cv-03763-RMG 40, 20 40, 20 Agree Ron de Lopez Armida 2:15-cv-03764-RMG 40 40 Agree Williams Judy 2:15-cv-03784-RMG 10 10 Agree Woods-Copes Donna 2:15-cv-03785-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Strickland Judith 2:15-cv-03786-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Caban Carmen 2:15-cv-03788-RMG 20, 10, 40 40 Agree Eddy Vera 2:15-cv-03789-RMG 20, 145 20, 145 Agree Navarro Manuela 2:15-cv-03791-RMG 20 20 Agree Byrd Carrie 2:15-cv-03795 10 10 Agree* Calhoun Amanda 2:15-cv-03796 10 10 Agree Connell Linda 2:15-cv-03797 20 20 Agree Dion Norma 2:15-cv-03798 20 20 Agree Driggers Penny 2:15-cv-03799 40 40 Agree Duncan Jeraldine 2:15-cv-03800 40 40 Agree Easterling Yvonne 2:15-cv-03801 10 10 Agree Elliott Lucy 2:15-cv-03802 10 10 Agree Fitzhugh Glenda 2:15-cv-03803 20 20 Agree Flintom Shirley 2:15-cv-03804 40 40 Agree
Forister Connie 2:15-cv-03805 40 40 Agree Glasgow Patricia 2:15-cv-03807 40 40 Agree Gothart Mary 2:15-cv-03808 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Haddon Betty 2:15-cv-03809 10 10 Agree* Hammond Carelene 2:15-cv-03810 10 10 Agree Harris Sandra 2:15-cv-03812 40 40 Agree Hawthorne Cassandra 2:15-cv-03813 20 20 Agree Hayes Evola 2:15-cv-03814 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Moore Adrian 2:15-cv-03816 20 20 Agree Dye Joyce 2:15-cv-03817 20 20 Agree Thomas Beverly 2:15-cv-03818 10 10 Agree Reed Sharon 2:15-cv-03819 40 40 Agree Hendricks Andrea 2:15-cv-03820 20 20 Agree Hillman Christeen 2:15-cv-03821 40 40 Agree Holley Willie 2:15-cv-03822 10 10 Agree Holmes Helen 2:15-cv-03823 10 10 Agree Hughston Judy 2:15-cv-03824 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Johnson Estate of Anna 2:15-cv-03825 10 10 Agree Jones Ozella 2:15-cv-03826 20 20 Agree Jones Rebecca 2:15-cv-03827 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Kato Kathleen 2:15-cv-03828 10 10 Agree Kesler Mary Ann 2:15-cv-03829 40 40 Agree* King Janet 2:15-cv-03830 40 40 Agree Lacount-Kelly Loretta 2:15-cv-03831 20 20 Agree Love Doris 2:15-cv-03832 20 20 Agree Lowhorn Donna 2:15-cv-03833 20 20 Agree Majors Gay 2:15-cv-03835 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Martin Gail 2:15-cv-03836 10 10 Agree Massey Gwendolyn 2:15-cv-03837 40 40 Agree Mauro Janice 2:15-cv-03838 20, 40 20, 40 Agree* McCamy Beth 2:15-cv-03839 20 20 Agree Maddox Mary 2:15-cv-03840 40 40 Agree Johnson Kim 2:15-cv-03849 10mg; 40mg 10mg; 40mg Agree McGalliard Dorothy 2:15-cv-03850 20 20 Agree McFalls Shirley 2:15-cv-03851 10 10 Agree* Medenblik Jackelyn 2:15-cv-03852 40 40 Agree Murphy Dorothy 2:15-cv-03853 40 40 Agree Neale Gwenda 2:15-cv-03854 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Nixon Barbara 2:15-cv-03857 20 20 Agree Orr Louise 2:15-cv-03859 10, 40 10, 40 Agree
Payton Lillian 2:15-cv-03861 40 40 Agree Peters Rosetta 2:15-cv-03863 40 40 Agree Pinkston Gail 2:15-cv-03864 20 20 Agree Price Kay 2:15-cv-03866 20 20 Agree Pugh Sherrie 2:15-cv-03867 40 40 Agree Phillips Sandra 2:15-cv-03869 10 10 Agree* Creecy Ellen 2:15-cv-03871 20 20 Agree* Replinger Toshiko 2:15-cv-03872 10 10 Agree Crittendon Kim 2:15-cv-03874 10 10 Agree Ramirez Maricela 2:15-cv-03875 40 40 Agree Daly Teresa 2:15-cv-03876 10 10 Agree Parker Clairessa 2:15-cv-03877 20 20 Agree O'Kane Vita 2:15-cv-03878 10 10 Agree Nunez Antonia 2:15-cv-03879 40 40 Agree McClellan Shirley 2:15-cv-03881 40 40 Agree Massey Teresa (Terri) 2:15-cv-03882 10 10 Agree Davis Doris 2:15-cv-03884 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Martinez Davila Josephine (Josefina) 2:15-cv-03885 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Dingess Brenda 2:15-cv-03886 40 40 Agree Dunn Julie 2:15-cv-03888 20 20 Agree Mancil Joan 2:15-cv-03889 20 20 Agree Durando Carol 2:15-cv-03891 20 20 Agree Edwards Betty 2:15-cv-03892 20 20 Agree Long Arlene 2:15-cv-03893 40 40 Agree Floyd Alberta 2:15-cv-03894 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Foggie Catherine 2:15-cv-03896 10 10 Agree Forward Kay 2:15-cv-03898 10 10 Agree Frazier Janice 2:15-cv-03900 40 40 Agree Fuchs Debra 2:15-cv-03902 20 20 Agree Green Arlene 2:15-cv-03903 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hall Beulah 2:15-cv-03905 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Hayes Margaret 2:15-cv-03906 10 10 Agree Heatherly Linda 2:15-cv-03907 40 40 Agree Hicks Doris 2:15-cv-03908 20 20 Agree Hill Beverly 2:15-cv-03909 10 10 Agree Holmes Rosie 2:15-cv-03911 10 10 Agree Horvath Diann 2:15-cv-03912 40 40 Agree Hough Jo Ann 2:15-cv-03913 40 40 Agree Hughes Peggy 2:15-cv-03914 40 40 Agree
Ignasiak Paulette 2:15-cv-03915 10 10 Agree Jacobs Sandy 2:15-cv-03916 20 20 Agree Lambert Donna 2:15-cv-03917 20 20 Agree Richardson Connie 2:15-cv-03925 40 40 Agree Robinson Sandra 2:15-cv-03927 10 10 Agree Roche Carla 2:15-cv-03928 40 40 Agree Roldan Alicia 2:15-cv-03929 20 20 Agree Rone Patricia 2:15-cv-03930 20 20 Agree Roquemore Elwanda 2:15-cv-03932 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Shiflett Nola 2:15-cv-03936 10 10 Agree Shows Estate of Lucy 2:15-cv-03937 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Simpson Ester 2:15-cv-03938 20 20 Agree Slone Viola 2:15-cv-03939 40 40 Agree Sopko Lynette 2:15-cv-03940 40 40 Agree Stevens Ella 2:15-cv-03941 40 40 Agree Stockton Shirley 2:15-cv-03942 20 20 Agree Stoffer Charlotte 2:15-cv-03943 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Strozier Carolyn 2:15-cv-03944 20 20 Agree Thompson Betty 2:15-cv-03948 20 20 Agree Throckmorton Judith 2:15-cv-03949 40 40 Agree* Tipping Judy 2:15-cv-03950 20 20 Agree Tripp Ella 2:15-cv-03952 20 20 Agree Troncale Mary Jo 2:15-cv-03954 20 20 Agree Turner Peggy 2:15-cv-03955 20 20 Agree Villot Lou 2:15-cv-03956 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Whaley (Dec.) Martha 2:15-cv-03958 20 20 Agree Williams Barbara 2:15-cv-03959 10 10 Agree* Woolfolk Jennifer 2:15-cv-03961 40 40 Agree Wright Janet 2:15-cv-03962 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Youngs Anna 2:15-cv-03964 20 20 Agree Zerba Iris 2:15-cv-03965 40 40 Agree Stephens Angela 2:15-cv-03967-RMG 10 10 Agree Reshef Margaret 2:15-cv-03960-RMG 20 20 Agree Williams Minnie 2:15-cv-03970-RMG 40 40 Agree Riley Jeanne 2:15-cv-03971-RMC 10 10 Agree Cameron Renee J. 2:15-cv-03974-RMG 40 40 Agree Guertin Rebel L. 2:15-cv-039980-RMG 10 10 Agree King Nancy 2:15-cv-03981-RMG 20 20 Agree Washington Brenda 2:15-cv-03982-RMG 20 20 Agree Meadows Donna 2:15-cv-03984 20 20 Agree
Whitley Bonnie 2:15-cv-04015-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Abson-Starling Ruthie 2:15-cv-04026-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Adair Susan 2:15-cv-04027-RMG 20 20 Agree Flores Maria 2:15-cv-04028-RMG 40 40 Agree Pereira Alexandrina 2:15-cv-04029-RMG 10 10 Agree Broadhead Shirley 2:15-cv-04034-RMG 10 10 Agree Strader Phyllis 2:15-cv-04035-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Hott Shawn 2:15-cv-04036-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Smith Georganna 2:15-cv-04037-RMG 20 20 Agree Bryant Joyce 2:15-cv-04038 10mg; 20mg 10mg; 20mg Agree Dorton Donna 2:15-cv-04041 10mg 10mg Agree Anderson BJ 2:15-cv-04046-RMG 20 20 Agree Ayala Bladt Carmen 2:15-cv-04048-RMG 20 20 Agree Barley Maggie 2:15-cv-04049-RMG 20 20 Agree Baggett Elizabeth 2:15-cv-04050-RMG 20 20 Agree JENKINS GENEVIEVE 2:15-cv-04052-RMG 10 10 Agree KODIAK DIANA 2:15-cv-04053-RMG 10 10 Agree CHRISTIAN SHIRLEY 2:15-cv-04054-RMG 20 20 Agree EASTMAN JOAN 2:15-cv-04055-RMG 20 20 Agree Matter Pamela 2:15-cv-04056-RMG 10 10 Agree Doyle Jenise 2:15-cv-04057-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Bergeron Nancy 2:15-cv-04068-RMG 20 20 Agree Bynum Barbara 2:15-cv-04069-RMG 20 20 Agree Caballero Dora 2:15-cv-04070-RMG 40 40 Agree Tracy Laverne 2:15-cv-04075 20mg 20mg Agree Humble Sherry 2:15-cv-04078 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Hamilton Annie 2:15-cv-04096 20mg 20mg Agree Mallow Linda L. 2:15-cv-04122-RMC 20 20 Agree Weaver Kelley 2:15-cv-04123-RMG 20 20 Agree Whelband Lillian 2:15-cv-04124-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lewis-Lester Angel 2:15-cv-04126-RMG 40 40 Agree Garcia Bertha 2:15-cv-04127-RMG 40 40 Agree Wethington Rita 2:15-cv-04128-RMG 10 10 Agree Garcia Miriam 2:15-cv-04129 40 40 Agree Gruber Laurette 2:15-cv-04130 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Woolfolk Theresa 2:15-cv-04138-RMG 40 40 Agree
Ling Sharon 2:15-cv-04139-RMG 20 20 Agree Noll Maureen 2:15-cv-04141-RMG 40 40 Agree Coleman Mary 2:15-cv-04158-RMG 20 20 Agree Cino Marla 2:15-cv-04159-RMG 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Ceaser Janace 2:15-cv-04221 20 20 Agree Goldsmith Jacqueline 2:15-cv-04222 20 20 Agree Pardee Jean 2:15-cv-04224 20 20 Agree McLennan Dawn 2:15-cv-04234 40mg 40mg Agree Tharrington Kimberly R. 2:15-cv-04239 20 20 Agree Jones Mary Ann 2:15-cv-04240 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Tyler Nenita 2:15-cv-04243 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Woodberry Rosa 2:15-cv-04245 10 10 Agree Smith Gracie 2:15-cv-04267-RMG 10 10 Agree Touchard Myriam 2:15-cv-04272 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 20, 40 Diabetes then 20, 40 Alleges Pre-Existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Oakley Gloria T. 2:15-cv-04278-RMG 40 40 Agree Wilson Doris 2:15-cv-04282-RMG 10 10 Agree Gillard Nettie 2:15-cv-04295-RMG 20 20 Agree Osorio Marta 2:15-cv-04344 10 10 Agree Whittington Marion 2:15-cv-04346 40 40 Agree McCorkle Ossie 2:15-cv-04373 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Lee Christina 2:15-cv-04376 40 40 Agree Vohs Mary 2:15-cv-04377 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Allen Julia 2:15-cv-04392 20 20 Agree Lewis Judy 2:15-cv-04393 20 20 Agree Hennington-Taylor Sharon 2:15-cv-04394 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Wydra Peggy 2:15-cv-04396-RMG 10 10 Agree DALESANDRO CAROL 2:15-cv-04402-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree SOUTHWARD ARETA 2:15-cv-04403-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree JESSEN GLORIA 2:15-cv-04404-RMG 20 20 Agree THOMPSON MARY 2:15-cv-04405-RMG 20 20 Agree ROPER ROSE 2:15-cv-04406-RMG 10 10 Agree Walker Terry 2:15-cv-04416-RMG 10 10 Agree
Stanton Florene 2:15-cv-04418 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Flugence Alona 2:15-cv-04425 20 20 Agree Churchman Teri 2:15-cv-04426 20 20 Agree James Betty 2:15-cv-04427 Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 40 Diabetes then 40 Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Gross Darlene 2:15-cv-04428 20 20 Agree Hulett Carolyn 2:15-cv-04429 Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Norman Cheryl 2:15-cv-04432 40 40 Agree Holt Roberta 2:15-cv-04433 10mg 10mg Agree Baldwin (Dec.) Polly 2:15-cv-04507 10 10 Agree Chaney Annie 2:15-cv-04508 20 20 Agree Choice Stephanie 2:15-cv-04509 10 10 Agree Cole Frances 2:15-cv-04510 10 10 Agree Davis Erma 2:15-cv-04517 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Johnson Linda 2:15-cv-04524 20mg 20mg Agree Morciglio Ivette 2:15-cv-04527 40 40 Agree Stewart Sandra 2:15-cv-04528 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Friday Diane 2:15-cv-04529 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Hopewell Elaine 2:15-cv-04539 20 20 Agree Lee Mary 2:15-cv-04540 20 20 Agree Loftin Jane 2:15-cv-04541 40 40 Agree* Moshiri Soraya 2:15-cv-04543 40 40 Agree Quedens Joy 2:15-cv-04544 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Teague Judy 2:15-cv-04545 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Wright Patricia 2:15-cv-04546 10 10 Agree Smith Elizabeth M. 2:15-cv-04547 10 10 Agree Foote Beverly 2:15-cv-04572-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Somers Diane 2:15-cv-04578 20mg 20mg Agree Wilson Sungerett 2:15-cv-04646-RMG 20 20 Agree McGlone Thelma 2:15-cv-04659 40mg 40mg Agree Leflore Kathleen 2:15-cv-04687 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Casal Lourdes 2:15-cv-04705 10 10 Agree
Salser Becky 2:15-cv-04706 20 20 Agree Gamble Mary 2:15-cv-04707 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Samrow Brenda 2:15-cv-04708 20 20 Agree Anderson Becki 2:15-cv-04709-RMG 10 10 Agree Boyer Linda J. 2:15-cv-04710 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Lee Betty 2:15-cv-04740-RMG 10 10 Agree Peters Philippa 2:15-cv-04752 20 20 Agree* Halbert Norma 2:15-cv-04764-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Flanagan Carol 2:15-cv-04766 20 20 Agree Seal Linda 2:15-cv-04790-RMG 10 10 Agree Sapkaroski Daryl (Krste) 2:15-cv-04815 10, 20 10, 20 Agree DeCicco Deborah 2:15-cv-04833-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Miller Patricia 2:15-cv-04834-RMG 20 20 Agree Thompson Jane 2:15-cv-04869 20, 40, 20(Generic), 20, 40, 20(Generic), Agree Wilson Marva 2:15-cv-04904 20mg; 40mg 20mg; 40mg Agree Wurzelbacher Jacqueline 2:15-cv-04921-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Steed Orlesia 2:15-cv-04945 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Brown Theresa 2:15-cv-04987-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Myers Carol 2:15-cv-05003 10mg 10mg Agree Foster Dorothy C. 2:15-cv-05014 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Webber Claudia J. 2:15-cv-05015-RMG 20 20 Agree Adams Cathy 2:15-cv-05019-RMG Alleges Pre-existing Alleges Pre-existing Agree Plaintiff Diabetes then 10 Diabetes then 10 Alleges Pre-existing Diabetes; Reserves Rights Watrus Jean 2:15-cv-05046-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Rader Sandra 2:15-cv-05056-RMG Unknown Unknown Agree Plaintiff Alleges Unknown; Reserves Rights Brown Shirley 2:15-cv-05088 40 40 Agree James Gladys 2:15-cv-05089 20 20 Agree Sheffey Grace 2:15-cv-05102 20mg 20mg Agree Presley Deborah 2:16-cv-00007-RMG 40 40 Agree Simpson Patricia 2:16-cv-00008 20 20 Agree Derflinger Caridad 2:16-cv-00013 20 20 Agree Diehl Dolores 2:16-cv-00022 10 10 Agree Herstein Claire 2:16-cv-00047-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Newvine Jennifer 2:16-cv-00054-RMG 20 20 Agree Gann Peggy 2:16-cv-00055-RMG 20 20 Agree Woodard Eloise 2:16-cv-00056-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree Devore Elizabeth 2:16-cv-00057-RMG 20 20 Agree Eason Mary 2:16-cv-00061-RMG 10, 40 10, 40 Agree McCall Marian 3:13-cv-02764-RMG; 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Brooks Linda 3:14-cv-00154-RMG 20 20 Agree Christiano Janet 3:14-cv-00545-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Papcun Christine 4:13-cv-01422 10, 20, 40 10, 20, 40 Agree Fernandez Patricia 4:13-cv-01423 10 10 Agree McClaim Harriet 4:13-cv-02148-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree Haynesworth Rose Marie 4:13-cv-02767-RMG 10 10 Agree Farr Emily 5:13-cv-02741-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Mosley Rhonda 5:14-cv-00155 20mg 20mg Agree Keitt Rosa 5:14-cv-00525-RMG 20 20 Agree Blackham Irene 6:14-cv-00530-RMG 20, 40 20, 40 Agree Durocher Juanita 7:13-cv-01965 20 20 Agree Williams Brenda 8:13-cv-01421 10 10 Agree Adams Janice 8:13-cv-01735-RMC 10 10 Agree Thompson Shelby 8:13-cv-02763-RMG 40 40 Agree Long Sherrill 8:13-cv-02768-RMG 10, 20 10, 20 Agree