Opinion
No. 353291
01-14-2021
In re A. LIMMER, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Clinton Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 18-028479-NA Before: GADOLA, P.J., and BORRELLO and M. J. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, AL, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm for the reasons stated in this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
Respondent has a lengthy history of substance abuse. She was placed on probation for possession of methamphetamine in 2016, and absconded a month into probation. She also used methamphetamine during her pregnancy, so when AL was born in December 2018, her meconium tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines and she experienced withdrawal symptoms from methamphetamine exposure in utero. Shortly thereafter, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), filed a petition requesting that the court exercise jurisdiction over the child and remove her from respondent's care. AL was removed and, after receiving medical treatment, placed with nonrelative foster parents.
On December 13, 2018, respondent entered a plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived a probable-cause determination. An initial dispositional hearing was held on February 28, 2019, at which respondent's incarceration for a probation violation, substance abuse, psychological instability, lack of income, and domestic violence history were identified as barriers to reunification. Respondent was released from incarceration in April 2019. Thereafter, she attended every parenting time made available to her. Her home was deemed appropriate, and she obtained employment. However, she did not attend domestic violence counseling.
Respondent was evaluated for both mental health and substance abuse. Inpatient treatment was recommended for her substance abuse, but respondent delayed entering. Respondent initially missed her drug screens, then tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine in July 2019. At an August 14, 2019 dispositional review, the trial court ordered respondent to comply with her drug screens and enter inpatient treatment. Respondent, however, continued to miss screens, as well as test positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine multiple times between August and October 2019. Respondent finally arranged to enter inpatient treatment on October 7, 2019, and started at an inpatient facility on November 4, 2019. Respondent was recommended a 90-day program. Respondent left the inpatient treatment facility early on December 2, 2019, to start a 14-day program at Turning Point instead. Subsequently, respondent left the Turning Point program on December 11, 2019. Her caseworker noted concerns about her attitude toward methamphetamine, testifying that respondent failed to acknowledge her substance abuse problem and would even state that methamphetamine was helpful and gave her energy to complete tasks.
On January 7, 2020, petitioner filed a supplemental petition to terminate respondent's parental rights. Following a hearing, the trial court found termination of respondent's parental rights was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and that termination of respondent's parental rights was in AL's best interests. Consequently, the court entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding sufficient evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination. We review the trial court's factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake. Id. at 709-710.
B. ANALYSIS
The trial court did not err by finding grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Termination is warranted under subdivision (c)(i) if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
Here, three hundred seventy-seven days had passed between entry of the initial dispositional order on February 28, 2019, and the termination date of March 11, 2020. Several conditions were identified as concerns in the petition and subsequent preliminary hearing. Some, such as respondent's incarceration, housing, and lack of employment, appeared to have been addressed by March 11, 2020. However, respondent's issues with substance abuse, domestic violence, and psychological instability have not been rectified.
Respondent had not attempted to enter inpatient, substance abuse treatment until October 7, 2019, despite indicating to the trial court that she would do this as early as December 13, 2018. She did not stay the recommended length of time in inpatient treatment, leaving both her 90-day and 14-day programs early. Her caseworker testified that staff at respondent's 90-day program expressed concerns about respondent's attitude toward methamphetamine, which included viewing it as something which helped her "complete things." This concern was echoed by her caseworker after respondent told her that "she missed the meth and that she missed the mind set [sic] that she had," that she missed the way methamphetamine made her feel as recently as February 2020, and that she had only completed treatment to appease the trial court. Respondent's substance abuse counselor also reported concerns with respondent "minimizing the risk" involved with her methamphetamine use after speaking with her on December 11, 2019. Overall, respondent missed 54 of 65 screens. And, although there was testimony that respondent was currently sober and working toward longer-term drug recovery, the timeframe for that recovery was uncertain.
In addition, respondent missed six mental health therapy sessions and her therapy had not progressed to the point that her trauma had been addressed. She had also not attended any domestic violence counseling. This Court held in In re White, 303 Mich App at 711-712, that even "significant progress" in one aspect of a services plan could be outweighed by continuing issues in another aspect. Similarly, in In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118-119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000), termination was proper even though the respondent had addressed her drug abuse, but had nevertheless missed several drug screens and treatment sessions. Here, given respondent's limited progress in addressing her substance-abuse issues and the issues with domestic violence, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Because the trial court did not err in finding that statutory grounds for the termination of respondent's parental rights existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and only one statutory basis for termination need be established, we need not address the additional statutory grounds found by the trial court. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).
III. BEST INTERESTS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her parental rights was in the child's best interests. After a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must also find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). We review the trial court's ruling regarding the child's best interests for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713.
B. ANALYSIS
"In deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). "[T]he parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption" are additional factors to consider. In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. A finding that termination is in the child's best interests is justified when a respondent's "ultimate success regarding her substance abuse and mental health treatments is uncertain at best." In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90.
The foster care worker assigned to respondent's case testified that respondent had a bond with AL. While this factor weighed against termination, In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42, it was duly considered by the trial court, which found that it was outweighed by the factors in favor of termination. A lack of permanence, safety, and stability in a respondent's home can outweigh a bond between a respondent and his or her child when determining the best interests of the child. In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. A child's spending over a year in foster care while a respondent demonstrates an "uncertain potential for success" can also justify a finding that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 364; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
In this case, respondent missed numerous drug screens, and tested positive several times for methamphetamine and amphetamine. This included three positives on days that she had attended parenting time with AL. Respondent did not attend her Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She did not attempt to enter inpatient treatment until October 2019 and left her inpatient treatment programs early. During and after inpatient treatment respondent expressed a concerning attitude which minimized the danger in methamphetamine use and indicated that her treatment had been motivated only by the trial court's orders. This history raised a legitimate doubt about whether respondent had truly changed her attitude toward using methamphetamine, as opposed to temporarily pausing her use in an attempt to regain parental control of AL. Respondent had also missed mental health therapy sessions and still had not attended any domestic violence counseling.
AL had already been in foster care for over a year, and respondent required several additional months of sustained substance abuse and mental health progress before she could be ready to parent. Respondent's caseworker testified that because of the significant amount of time that had already passed, AL's bond with respondent was not parental, and that AL's parental connection was instead being provided to her by her foster mother. The caseworker testified that AL's foster parents were "able to provide for all of [AL]'s needs and her well-being." She testified that AL's foster parents provided her with support and parental guidance, and that AL needed permanency, which her foster parents could provide. In light of the foregoing, the trial court's finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of AL was not clear error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michael J. Kelly