Opinion
No. COA02-1468
Filed 1 July 2003 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent, Christine Marie Dupree Liberato, from judgment entered 6 May 2002 by Judge Rebecca B. Knight in District Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 June 2003.
John C. Adams, for Buncombe County Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellee. Judy N. Rudolph, attorney advocate, for Guardian ad Litem-appellee. Scott B. Lewis, for Christine Marie Dupree Liberato, respondent-appellant.
Buncombe County No. 01 J 121 Buncombe County No. 01 J 122 Buncombe County No. 01 J 162.
Respondent, Christine Marie Dupree Liberato, appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to her three minor children. As grounds for termination of her parental rights, the court concluded that respondent: (1) physically abused one child;(2) neglected all three children; (3) left the children in foster care without showing, to the satisfaction of the court, that reasonable progress had been made in correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the children; and (4) respondent's willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's care. On appeal, respondent contends the court erred by terminating her parental rights. After carefully reviewing the record, we find no error, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the District Court, Buncombe County.
When a juvenile court finds the existence of a statutory ground authorizing termination of the parental rights of a parent, it "shall issue an order terminating the parental rights of such parent with respect to the juvenile unless the court shall further determine that the best interests of the juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be terminated." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2002). The child's best interests are paramount over the interest of the parent. In re Parker, 90 N.C. App. 423, 431, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1988). The court's decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). "A ruling committed to a trial court's discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).
Respondent does not contest the specific grounds the trial court found in terminating her parental rights. Instead, respondent argues that it is not in the best interests of the children that her parental rights be terminated. Respondent asserts that the two eldest children, who are currently residing with relatives who intend to adopt them, have a permanent placement plan. Seemingly, respondent concedes that the placement is in the best interests of the children, but that "termination of [her] parental rights . . . provides no conceivable advantage to the minor children . . . [as it] severs their right to receive support" from respondent.
Respondent's arguments are not supported by the record or law. For instance, one of the grounds for termination found by the court is that respondent failed to pay a reasonable portion of the costs of care of the children. However, respondent's argument that the trial court abused its discretion relies, almost exclusively, on the notion that termination of her parental rights "severs the [children's] right to receive support from" respondent. However, respondent does not cite us to any evidence in the record to show that respondent is likely to pay for a reasonable portion of the care of the children. Consequently, respondent has failed to cite any evidence in the record that could possibly lead to the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights. Accordingly, the corresponding assignments of error are overruled. Respondent also requests this Court to review the record for possible error pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Such review is not available for appeals from orders terminating parental rights. In re Harrison, 136 N.C. App. 831, 833, 833, 526 S.E.2d 502, 503 (2000).
Respondent also argues equal permanence may be achieved by appointment of the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather as guardians. However, appointment of a guardian is not permanent as the guardianship may be terminated at any time by court order. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-601(a) (2002).
We hold the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating respondent's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court, Buncombe County.
Affirmed.
Judge TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).