Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J37641
Haerle, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The trial court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, finding true the allegation that appellant, L.H., violated Penal Code section 243.6 (misdemeanor battery on a school employee). L.H. was placed on six months informal probation, without wardship, pursuant to Welfare and Institution Code section 725, subdivision (a).
On appeal, L.H. makes one argument: that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the school employee was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when the incident took place and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to prove that L.H. did not act in the lawful defense of another student.
We reject this argument and affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The incident took place on June 5, 2007, at Vallejo High School at around 3:10 p.m. Vice Principal Lloyd Cartwright, along with a security guard named Shawn Miller, the school’s athletic director Michael Minahen, and Vallejo Police Officer Dustin Joseph were engaged in closing the campus and telling students to leave the premises through the front campus exit. They were doing so in response to a report of a fight on campus and the fact that between 300 to 500 students were congregated in the area of the fight.
Cartwright asked appellant and her friend, D. J., to leave the campus. The ensuing encounter between Cartwright and the two girls was observed by security guard Shawn Miller. After Cartwright made his request, the two girls rose slowly from their seat on a bench. D.J. said, “I don’t need to f---ing move.” After Cartwright repeated his request, she said, “I hate this f---ing school.” According to Cartwright, D.J. responded to his request “very, very slowly . . . [moving] toward the direction of the front of the campus.” Appellant walked alongside D.J.
The use of profanity is a violation of school policy. D.J. continued to use profanity in her interaction with Cartwright. Five or six times, Cartwright requested that she return to the office with him. He planned to contact her family and “take care of the discipline issues there in the office.” D.J. twice stated, “I’m not going to go to the f---ing office with you.”
Cartwright stood in front of D.J. and made eye contact with her. As he did so, he again ordered her to accompany him to the office. D.J. refused again. She continued to walk in the opposite direction from the office, with appellant by her side.
Another student handed D.J. a cell phone and she began to make a call. Cartwright told her to turn the phone off. When she refused to do so, he took the phone away from her.
D.J. slapped Cartwright on his right arm. When the student who’d given D.J. the phone ran over to retrieve it, Miller pulled her away from D.J. and restrained her. In Miller’s view, D.J. was a danger to herself and others.
In an attempt to prevent her from hitting him again, Cartwright held down her arms in what he described as a “bear hug.” D.J. was verbal and physically abusive when he did so. Cartwright testified that in his 20 years as a school administrator, this incident “was probably the most physically out-of-control situation by a student that I’ve ever had.”
At this point, appellant entered the conflict between Cartwright and D.J. Appellant pounded on Cartwright’s arm with her fists and screamed, “Get your f---ing hands off of her.” Michael Minahen testified that he observed appellant on top of Cartwright, “beating on his arms and pulling at his arms.”
Minahen pulled appellant off Cartwright. He carried her to a grassy area and, when she got an arm free from the lock he put her in, he “brought her down to the ground.” During this time, appellant was fighting, yelling and using obscenities.
While this was occurring, D.J. continued to kick, flair her arms and shout obscenities. Cartwright and D.J. fell to the ground, and Officer Joseph placed D.J. in handcuffs.
Cartwright denied ever intentionally holding D.J. around her neck. At most, he testified, his arm might have accidentally slipped onto her neck, but “at no time did I put my arms around her neck.” Both Miller and Officer Joseph testified that neither of them saw Cartwright grab D.J. by the neck or place her in a headlock or chokehold.
Several of appellant’s friends and schoolmates testified for the defense. Each of them had seen the last part of the incident, and testified that they were walking behind Cartwright when he asked for and then grabbed D.J.’s cell phone. Each of them testified that she saw Cartwright grab D.J. by the neck and behave in a rough manner with her when she was merely trying to escape from him. They did not see D.J. punch Cartwright.
Each of the witnesses agreed, on cross-examination, that D.J. was fighting with Cartwright. They also agreed that appellant grabbed Cartwright’s arm in an effort to pull him away from D.J.
The juvenile court found that Cartwright was “entirely credible.” The court also “accept[ed] his description of who did what as the truth . . . .” He also found Miller, Minahen, and Joseph credible. The court found that the juvenile witnesses either did not see what occurred or corroborated the testimony of the adults.
The court then asked for further briefing on the issue of whether appellant had a defense to the crime if Cartwright’s behavior justified her actions. At a subsequent hearing, the court concluded that Cartwright’s behavior was lawful, and D.J. was not acting in lawful self-defense. The court also found that appellant intentionally “interfere[d] with Mr. Cartwright in the lawful pursuit of his duties. . . . [¶] I see no basis for her defense being a reasonable defense of her friend.”
The court concluded that the People proved, as to appellant, a “violation of 243.6 of the Penal Code, battery on a school employee . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.”
This timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Cartwright was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when the battery took place. She also argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion that appellant was not acting in the lawful defense of her friend, D.J. We disagree.
Under the usual test on appeal, we affirm the juvenile court so long as there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion. Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the finding challenged on appeal. The reviewing court has no power to overturn the trier of fact on determinations such as the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, or to question the inferences or deductions drawn from the evidence made by the trial court. In short, it is not our function to redetermine the facts. (In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 194-195.) Put simply, the record will be viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, finding, or decision made by the juvenile court. (In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 628-629; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.) Applying these principles to the record here, we conclude there was more than ample evidence from which the juvenile court could conclude that appellant committed a battery, in violation of section 243.6.
The juvenile court found that appellant violated Penal Code section 243.6, which provides: “When a battery is committed against a school employee engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or in retaliation for an act performed in the course of his or her duties, whether on or off campus, during the school day or at any other time, and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a school employee, the battery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment. However, if an injury is inflicted on the victim, the battery shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years.”
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Cartwright was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when the battery took place. First, as the juvenile court pointed out, having determined that the adult witnesses of this event were credible, that Cartwright ordered D.J. to accompany him to the office, an order she disregarded by walking away from him. There is nothing untoward about Cartwright’s determination that D.J.’s obscenity-laced defiance merited a trip to Cartwright’s office. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, “‘[i]t is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.’” (Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 656.)
When D.J. attempted to make a cell phone call while Cartwright was directing her to his office, Cartwright reasonably removed the telephone from D.J.’s hand. This action was certainly part of Cartwright’s lawful performance of his duties. Thus, for example, in In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 563, the court explained that “[w]hile at school, a student may be stopped, told to remain in or leave a classroom, directed to go to a particular classroom, given an errand, sent to study hall, called to the office, or held after school. Unlike a citizen on the street, a minor student is ‘subject to the ordering and direction of teachers and administrators. . . . [¶] [A student is] not free to roam the halls or to remain in the classroom as long as she please[s], even if she behave[s] herself. She [is] deprived of liberty to some degree from the moment she enter[s] school . . . .’” Cartwright’s determination that D.J.’s use of the cell phone should cease was not unreasonable.
The trial court found that when D.J. “turned to swing and then . . . did indeed strike the first blow to Mr. Cartwright . . . . [¶] [She] turned that situation into a physical one [and] was then property restrained by Mr. Cartwright so as to prevent further physical acting out, as she continued, then, to act in that physically combative manner.” The record fully supports this factual conclusion. Moreover, the amount of physical control exercised by Cartwright is, in our view, entirely consistent with Education Code section 44807, which permits public school officials to exercise physical control over students, so long as it is “reasonably necessary to maintain order . . . .” This degree of physical control, is the same degree of physical control “‘a parent would be legally privileged to exercise . . . .’” (In re Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 563; Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 874.)
The record, therefore, contains substantial evidence that Cartwright’s restraint of D.J. was undertaken in the lawful performance of his duty.
Therefore, we reject appellant’s argument that her battery on Cartwright was justified because he was not, in fact, acting in the lawful performance of his duty and she was lawfully coming to her friend’s aid. As we have pointed out, appellant did not have a right to come to D.J.’s “aid,” for the simple reason that Cartwright’s actions were part of the lawful performance of his duty.
Appellant’s arguments to the contrary rely on evidence and inferences favorable to her. However, “fact-specific arguments which ignore the substantial evidence standard of review are not appropriate. . . . [O]ur sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court’s finding . . . .” (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) We conclude that, viewed in its entirety, the evidence before the juvenile court is sufficient to support the jurisdictional finding quoted above.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.