Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2016-0223
05-25-2017
IN RE L.G.
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Kara Crosby, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for State Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender By Susan C. L. Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JV20140319
The Honorable Deborah Pratte, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Kara Crosby, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for State Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender
By Susan C. L. Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Miller and Judge Howard concurred. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge:
The Hon. Joseph W. Howard, a retired judge of this court, is called back to active duty to serve on this case pursuant to orders of this court and our supreme court. --------
¶1 The juvenile court adjudicated L.G. delinquent after finding she had committed disorderly conduct/fighting, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(1), as alleged in a February 2016 delinquency petition, and placed her on probation for twelve months. On appeal, L.G. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that her conduct had been "seriously disruptive," as contemplated by the statute.
¶2 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court's order, In re R.E., 241 Ariz. 359, ¶ 5, 387 P.3d 1288, 1289 (App. 2017), the evidence at the adjudication hearing established the following. An off-duty police officer working as a security officer at a high school football game was trying to maintain crowd control when the game ended and he noticed two female juveniles having a physical altercation. He separated the girls, but one came from behind him and tried to assault the other again. The officer testified L.G. then tried to intercede; he explained she "actually tried to intervene in my path of travel," and continued to try to intervene as he tried to place handcuffs on the other two juveniles. L.G. did not listen to his direction to stop and, because she tried to impede him from doing his job, he had to "physically put [his] hand out and stiff arm her and tell her to get back." Nevertheless, L.G. continued to try to impede him from restraining the two juveniles.
¶3 Another officer, who was also working at the event, testified the crowd was larger than usual because of the rivalry between the teams and he was on "high alert." He saw L.G. near the other officer; she was yelling and cursing as he approached and appeared to be trying to get involved in the altercation with the other two juveniles, "actively trying to get to" one of them. The officer testified that he was trying to watch out for the other officer and that a crowd was forming because of what was occurring; he tried to grab L.G. to get her to calm down. L.G. was swinging her arms at the other girls, resisting the officer's efforts to get control of her, and yelling profanities; she refused to listen to his commands. The officer finally restrained her and placed her in handcuffs in the back of his patrol car. A crowd of people had gathered and stopped to watch him struggle with L.G. The officer had to watch the crowd around him, L.G., and the other officer, who was still trying to restrain and maintain control of the two other juveniles.
¶4 Section 13-2904(A)(1) provides that "[a] person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such person . . . [e]ngages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior." The juvenile court found L.G. had engaged in "seriously disruptive behavior," and the state had "proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt." L.G. argues that, based on an objective standard of what would disturb a reasonable person's peace, her conduct was not sufficiently disruptive to be "seriously disruptive" for purposes of the statute. As she did below, she relies, in part, on In re Julio L., 197 Ariz. 1, ¶ 10, 3 P.3d 383, 385-86 (2000), in which our supreme court observed that "[t]here is a difference between merely rude or offensive behavior and criminal conduct." She argues that "because [her] behavior did not reach a level which in any way seriously disrupted the crowd leaving the football stadium following the rivalry game," we must reverse the adjudication.
¶5 The supreme court reasoned in Julio L. that to be "seriously disruptive," the conduct had to "cause considerable distress, anxiety or inconvenience." Id. ¶ 11, quoting Webster's Dictionary 2073 (3d ed. 1971). It had "to be of the same general nature as fighting or violence," the other two categories of conduct the statute prescribes, "or conduct liable to provoke that response in others and thus to threaten the continuation of some event, function, or activity." Id. The court concluded that the juvenile's conduct in that case, which consisted of cursing at a teacher after refusing to comply with repeated requests to talk to her outside the classroom, and kicking a plastic chair that was next to him, which tipped over but did not hit anyone, had not been seriously disruptive. Id. ¶¶ 3, 11-13. The court stated it could not "equate a child's acting out through cursing or through angry or defiant words and actions with conduct proscribed by current criminal statute." Id. ¶ 14.
¶6 "In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether it 'sufficed to permit a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of [each] offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'" R.E., 241 Ariz. 359, ¶ 8, 387 P.3d at 1290, quoting In re Dayvid S., 199 Ariz. 169, ¶ 4, 15 P.3d 771, 772 (App. 2000). We do not re-weigh the evidence; rather, we will affirm an adjudication order unless "there is a complete absence of probative facts to support" the ruling or it "is contrary to any substantial evidence." In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 772, 774 (App. 2001). The interpretation and application of a statute, however, is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
¶7 The record contains reasonable evidence to support the juvenile court's findings, including its finding that Julio L. is distinguishable from this case. The instant case is also distinguishable from In re Louise C., 197 Ariz. 84, 3 P.3d 1004 (App. 1999), which the supreme court discussed in Julio L. 197 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12, 3 P.3d at 386. In Louise C., this court vacated the adjudication because the "[j]uvenile's language was not accompanied by anything that can reasonably be said to have been seriously disruptive of school activities." 197 Ariz. 84, ¶ 10, 3 P.3d at 1006.
¶8 The offense of disturbing the peace of a neighborhood does not require evidence that any particular neighbor had been disturbed; rather, the question is whether a reasonable person would have found the conduct seriously disruptive. See State v. Johnson, 112 Ariz. 383, 385, 542 P.2d 808, 810 (1975). The evidence supports the juvenile court's finding here that, based on how a person of ordinary sensibilities could be expected to react, L.G.'s conduct had disturbed the peace of the neighborhood, that is, the crowd of people attending the game. L.G. was more than just angry, defiant and, in light of her repeated use of profanities, offensive or rude. She physically attempted to impede law enforcement officers from stopping a fight between two other individuals in the middle of a public gathering of other students and their families. She had to be restrained in order to avoid escalating the situation. She created a disruption in a large crowd of people over which officers were trying to maintain orderly control. The record contains reasonable evidence to support the court's ruling, and the court did not err as a matter of law in applying the statute here.
¶9 The juvenile court's orders adjudicating L.G. delinquent based on her commission of the offense of disorderly conduct and the court's disposition are affirmed.