In re L.F.S.

2 Citing cases

  1. In re Maxwell

    456 B.R. 408 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2011)

    The plaintiff further testified that in her life, debtor was the only person with which she ever had sexual relations. In re L.F.S., 148 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1992). The plaintiff was diagnosed with herpes in June 1989, however, the debtor presented a blood test dated August 1989 which demonstrated that the debtor tested negative for herpes.

  2. In re Zentz

    157 B.R. 145 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993)   Cited 12 times
    Considering whether the attorney's fees were "a result of," "intended to compensate" for, or "on account of," the willful and malicious injury

    A finding of malice requires finding intent to do the claimed harm; a finding that the harm was caused through negligence or recklessness does not meet that high standard. Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Congress intended to bar the discharge of intentionally inflicted injuries. . . . Minihan's conduct reflected, at most, reckless disregard for the risks involved"); Miller v. Held (In re Held), 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11th Cir. 1984) ("by adopting the requirement that the conversion be willful and malicious, Congress expressly overruled prior case law that had refused dischargeability when the conversion occurred innocently or recklessly"); L.D.J. v. L.F.S. (In re L.F.S.), 148 B.R. 897 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1992) ("The standard is one of intent, and mere recklessness is not sufficient."); Bybee v. Geer (In re Geer), 137 B.R. 37, 41 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1991) ("more than recklessness is required for an exception under ยง 523(a)(6)"). As the Long court stated in relation to debtors who violate security agreements, "[d]ebtors who willfully break security agreements are testing the outer bounds of their right to a fresh start, but unless they act with malice by intending or fully expecting to harm the economic interests of the creditor, such a breach of contract does not, in and of itself, preclude a discharge."