Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. JJ17726, Robert S. Ambrose, Judge.
Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
DOI TODD, Acting P. J.
Appellant Leon H. appeals from the judgment declaring him a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that appellant committed the crime of possession of a concealable firearm by a minor. (Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1).) The court declared the offense to be a felony, and placed appellant on home probation.
On appeal, appellant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that he committed the charged offense, and (2) he is entitled to five days of predisposition custody credit. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
On January 9, 2010, at about 12:10 p.m., Los Angeles Police Department Officer Lisa Forsberg and her partner were on patrol in the area of Nickerson Gardens Housing Development in Los Angeles County, when they saw a group of teenagers sitting by the front door of a particular apartment unit (the unit or the apartment). When the officers drove toward the group, Forsberg saw appellant grab his waistband, turn and run toward the unit. He was running with his hand underneath his waistband, and the officers could see the butt of a handgun.
The officers got out of their car and ordered appellant to stop. He continued running and opened the back door of the unit, slamming it shut behind him. He refused to open the door at the officers’ command. The officers requested two additional police units. When the back door finally opened, the officers ordered everyone outside. Appellant was one of the individuals detained.
A search of the apartment revealed two shotguns, a small black handgun and some bullets in a duffle bag hidden under a bed. Officer Forsberg recognized the handgun as the one she had seen sticking out of appellant’s waistband “through the size, the shape and the color.” Specifically, the handgun was very small, very dark and had a small pistol grip that was almost hidden. A search of everyone detained from the apartment revealed no weapons.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, “our role on appeal is a limited one.” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.) “[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th. 342, 403.) Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness can be sufficient to uphold a conviction. (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) So long as the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s finding, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Reversal is not warranted unless it appears that “‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
A reviewing court can only reject evidence accepted by the trier of fact when the evidence is inherently improbable or factually impossible. (People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 754; People v. Headlee (1941) 18 Cal.2d 266, 267.) “‘“To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations.]”’” (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150; People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 996.) “‘“Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]”’” (People v. Mayberry, supra, at p. 150; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 361 [same]; People v. Headlee, supra, at p. 267 [“The improbability must be apparent; evidence which is unusual or inconsistent is not necessarily improbable”].)
Appellant argues that the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient to support the court’s finding that he was carrying a concealable weapon because it was “inherently improbable.” In this regard, appellant primarily targets the testimony of Officer Forsberg. He points out that on direct examination Forsberg testified that she saw “what appeared to be a butt of a handgun, ” while on cross-examination she testified that she “recognized... a handle of a gun.” (Italics added.) Appellant attempts to make a big deal out of this difference in word choice. But we find it to be a difference without significance. (See, e.g., Horacek v. Smith (1948) 33 Cal.2d 186, 192 [“It is true that Miss Horacek’s testimony was vague in many respects, but as a matter of law, the facts related by her are not inherently improbable”]; Fariba v. Dealer Services Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 156, 171 [rejecting insufficiency claim where evidence was characterized as “uncorroborated, ” “vague, ” and “not specific as to time”].) In our view, Officer Forsberg’s testimony does not even rise to the level of being inconsistent. But even if we were wrong, “the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions.” (People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 221.)
Officer Forsberg also testified that she recognized the handgun found in the unit as the one she had seen sticking out of appellant’s waistband through the size, shape and color. More specifically, she testified that she recognized the handgun because it was very small, very dark, and had a small pistol grip that was almost hidden.
Moreover, Officer Forsberg’s testimony was not the only evidence supporting the court’s finding that appellant committed the charged offense. While appellant is correct that no evidence was presented showing that any fingerprints were taken from the handgun, evidence was presented showing that after seeing the police appellant put his hand in his waistband, ran inside the unit, slammed the door shut and refused to open it. A subsequent search of the apartment revealed two shotguns and a single handgun. Everyone from inside the apartment was searched, and no weapons were found. The obvious conclusion from this evidence alone was that appellant ran into the apartment to hide the handgun that was hidden in his waistband. (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208 [circumstantial evidence “is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction”].)
We agree with the People that appellant’s contention is nothing more than an improper attempt to reargue his case and reweigh the evidence. But “credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and we will not reweigh them on appeal. [Citation.]” (Fariba v. Dealer Services Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.) We are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that appellant carried a concealable firearm.
II. Predisposition Custody Credits
Appellant challenges the juvenile court’s failure to award him any predisposition custody credits for the time he spent in custody from January 9 through January 13, 2010. He argues that because he was adjudged a ward of the court, if he ends up violating the terms of his probation he could be physically confined to a maximum three-year period. (Pen. Code, §§ 18, 12101; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777.)
While an adult is entitled to presentence custody credit pursuant to Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a), a minor’s entitlement to predisposition custody credit is determined by Welfare and Institutions Code section 726. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 535.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) provides that “[i]f the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” This section therefore requires the juvenile court to specify the maximum period of confinement when the minor is removed from the physical custody of a parent or guardian. If the minor is not removed from the physical custody of a parent or guardian, the juvenile court need not fix a maximum period of confinement, as section 726 does not apply. (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573–574.) Because appellant was placed home on probation, without confinement, the juvenile court was not required to determine whether he was entitled to custody credits. If appellant is subsequently confined, on this petition or another petition, he will be entitled to custody credits, if any, at that time. (In re Emilio C. (2004)116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067–1068.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.