Opinion
21-P-50
12-21-2021
Lei YIN'S CASE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The employee, Dr. Lei Yin, appeals pro se from a decision of the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents (reviewing board) summarily affirming an administrative judge's decision denying the employee's claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on a psychological disability. To the extent that we are able to discern the employee's claims, and assuming that they rise to the level of appellate argument, see Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), the employee argues that his termination from employment was based on Biogen's intentional desire to cover up the manipulation of its research data, and that the administrative judge was biased against him at the hearing. Consequently, the employee argues, the board erred in affirming the decision of the administrative judge. We affirm.
Background. We summarize the relevant facts found by the administrative judge and adopted by the board. The employee was employed by a staffing agency, Integrated Resources, Inc. (IRI), and through IRI began working at Biogen in April 2011, performing research laboratory tests for drug development; he was tasked with replicating certain research testing under the supervision of Dr. Susan Kalled. When the employee's test results differed from Dr. Kalled's, it became clear that the employee was using a different protocol than the one he had been instructed to use. The employee conceded the use of a different protocol, contrary to Dr. Kalled's instructions, based on his disagreement with her methodology. The employee was terminated on July 6, 2011.
Since his termination, the employee has not worked, despite seeking similar medical research employment. He began psychiatric treatment after his termination, and at the time of the hearing, he reported suffering from a variety of physical and psychological problems. At the time of the hearing, the employee was receiving Social Security disability compensation.
The administrative judge did not make an explicit finding that the employee's symptoms only manifested after he was terminated. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume without deciding that they did so.
Following his termination, the employee filed various legal actions against Biogen and certain of its employees, and against IRI. As relevant to the workers’ compensation matter now before us, the employee sought compensation for psychological injuries he alleged he sustained as a result of his work at Biogen and his termination. Following a two-day hearing, the administrative judge determined that "all of the actions taken by Biogen ... were bona fide personnel actions. Therefore, any psychiatric disability, whether caused by the actions complained of by the employee or not, are not compensable pursuant to [G. L. c. 152,] § 1 (7A)." The reviewing board summarily affirmed the decision, and the employee appealed.
The employee also filed a demand for arbitration against IRI; the employee was successful on his claim for breach of contract and was awarded $5,040.
The employee sought partial disability compensation under G. L. c. 152, § 35, from July 7, 2011 to January 4, 2012; § 34 temporary total disability compensation from January 5, 2012 to January 3, 2015; § 34A permanent and total disability compensation from January 4, 2015 to the present and continuing; and medical benefits pursuant to § 11A.
Implicit in the judge's decision that the actions of Biogen and its employees were bona fide personnel actions, and that the employee's injuries were not compensable, is the determination that these actions were done in "good faith," G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A), with the "absence of malice." Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 282 (2006).
Discussion. "We examine the reviewing board's decision pursuant to the standards of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). Under § 14 (7), ‘[w]e may reverse or modify the board's decision where, among other reasons, it is based on an error of law, or is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ Spaniol's Case, 466 Mass. 102, 106 (2013). See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c ), (g )." Wright's Case, 486 Mass. 98, 107 (2020). "Findings of fact, assessments of credibility, and determinations of the weight to be given the evidence are the exclusive function of the administrative judge." Pilon's Case, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 169 (2007).
If the reviewing board summarily affirms the decision of the administrative judge, this court looks to the decision of the administrative judge to determine whether the board's action was proper. See Haley's Case, 356 Mass. 678, 679–680 (1970).
1. Denial of benefits. Pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A), "[n]o mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a bona fide personnel action including ... termination [unless] such action which is the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury." See Upton's Case, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 415 (2013). "Good faith is defined ... as an honest belief, the absence of malice, or the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage over another." Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 282 (2006).
We discern no error in the administrative judge's determination that the actions taken by Biogen and its employees, and the employee's termination by IRI, were bona fide personnel actions. See G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A). The administrative judge credited the testimony of Dr. Kalled that on multiple occasions she conveyed to the employee that he must follow her protocol, see Pilon's Case, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 169, and the employee conceded that he refused to do so.
2. Bias against the employee. The employee also alleges that he was subjected to a "sham trial" in violation of his due process rights because the administrative judge was biased against him. We do not agree.
The employee first claims that the administrative judge limited his ability to present his case. The record does not support this argument; at the hearing the employee was represented by counsel, testified on his own behalf, submitted documentary evidence and witnesses, and cross-examined witnesses from Biogen. See generally O'Brien’s Case, 424 Mass. 16, 22 (1996). Second, the employee argues that the administrative judge never ruled on his emergency motion to obtain access to his work notebook, which was held as proprietary information by Biogen. The administrative judge did, however, explicitly rule on this motion and allowed the employee to review the notebook in the court room subject to limited restrictions to protect Biogen's propriety information. Finally, the employee alleges that the administrative judge made false statements in his November 20, 2018 decision. The employee's claim is vague and does not refer to any specific statement; in any event, the employee has not shown that there were any false statements.
Decision of reviewing board affirmed.