Opinion
354893
08-26-2021
In re LEFTWICH, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
Lenawee Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 18-000122-NA
Before: Riordan, P.J., and Markey and Swartzle, JJ.PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right an order terminating her parental rights to the minor children, TL-I, TL-II, and TL-III, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child is returned to parent's home).We affirm.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of TL-I, TL-II, and TL-III's father. However, the father did not appeal. We have therefore omitted facts about the father that are not directly relevant to the termination of respondent's parental rights.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2018, petitioner filed an initial petition for jurisdiction over, and removal from the home of, TL-I, TL-II, and TL-III. The petition alleged, in relevant part, that the children were at risk of exposure to violence or an unsafe home environment, the children witnessed domestic violence perpetrated against respondent by the father, and TL-I had been diagnosed with several mental health conditions. On March 10, 2020, petitioner filed a supplemental petition for termination of respondent's parental rights. The petition alleged that (1) statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights to TL-I, TL-II, and TL-III pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j); (2) it was in the children's best interests to "be placed in an environment that [was] safe and permanent" because the conditions "complained of in the original petition continue[d] to exist," and there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify these conditions within a reasonable time considering the children's ages; and (3) termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
The trial court held a termination hearing, at which it heard testimony from respondent, two foster-care workers, TL-I's therapist, TL-II and TL-III's therapist, the parent-aide-services worker who oversaw visitation between respondent and her children, a psychologist from a domestic-violence shelter who provided individual therapy to respondent, a therapist who provided respondent therapy pursuant to respondent's case service plan, and an individual who helped respondent create a domestic violence safety plan. Ultimately, the trial court determined that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights to TL-I, TL-II, and TL-III pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Additionally, the trial court determined that termination of respondent's parental rights to TL-I, TL-II, and TL-III was in the children's best interests.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by finding that the statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights had been established by petitioner. We disagree.
"Challenges to a court's finding that a statutory ground for termination has been established are reviewed for clear error." In re Baham, 331 Mich.App. 737, 751; 954 N.W.2d 529 (2020). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re Sanborn, ___Mich App___, ___;___ N.W.2d___ (2021) (Docket Nos. 354915 & 354916); slip op at 9 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Appellate courts are obliged to defer to a trial court's factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Respondent argues that termination was inappropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because she complied with her case service plan, made excellent progress, and benefited from the services provided. This argument is unpersuasive. Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), termination is appropriate when:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
Here, the conditions that brought the children into care included the children witnessing domestic violence the father perpetrated against respondent, their "exposure to violence or an unsafe home environment," and mental health concerns regarding TL-I. Testimony at trial indicated that these conditions continued to exist, especially in relation to domestic violence and an unsafe home environment. On April 16, 2019, the trial court entered an order returning TL-II and TL-III to respondent's care on the condition that the father could not be in respondent's home except as directed by petitioner. The trial court further ordered the father to vacate the family home. On May 15, 2019, the trial court entered an order removing the father from the home and prohibiting him from contacting the children without petitioner's supervision. Several witnesses testified that TL-II and TL-III witnessed domestic violence after being returned to respondent's care. Specifically, TL-II and TL-III were present for an incident that occurred in May 2019, during which the father and respondent got into a physical altercation and the father threatened to burn the home down. They were also in the home during an incident in June 2019 where the father stabbed respondent. The first foster-care worker testified that respondent had been participating in services when both of these incidents occurred. TL-II and TL-III were subsequently removed again from respondent's care as a result of respondent's failure to protect them from the father and domestic violence.
The trial court issued the May 15, 2019 no-contact order against the father only; his subsequent violations of this order therefore could not be considered against respondent. See In re Kaczkowski, 325 Mich.App. 69, 75-76; 924 N.W.2d 1 (2018). However, pursuant to the April 2019 order returning TL-II and TL-III to respondent's care, TL-II and TL-III were returned to her care on the explicit condition that the father not be in respondent's home other than as directed by petitioner. Respondent did not abide by this condition. In addition to the testimony already described, the first foster-care worker testified that respondent continued to have contact with the father and asked the children to speak to the father after TL-II and TL-III were returned to her care. The first foster-care worker further testified that respondent felt it was appropriate for them to have contact with the father and prioritized the father's feelings "above the safety concerns for her children being around [the father.]" Additionally, testimony indicated that TL-I reported the father being in respondent's home during at least two visits. Although respondent denied that she had any responsibility or participation in the father coming back into her home after the no-contact order, she also testified that she got back together with the father "for [her] kids" because they were "begging" for him. Moreover, testimony from numerous witnesses indicated a concern that respondent would not stay away from the father in the future, despite his incarceration and her promise to the contrary. This concern was based on respondent's previous pattern of failing to follow through on promises to cease contact with the father. Testimony from several witnesses also indicated that respondent did not understand how the domestic violence impacted her children and had not accepted responsibility for the conditions that brought the children under the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist until the time of the termination hearing.
Testimony further indicated that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify these conditions within a reasonable time considering the children's ages. Despite engaging in services, respondent continued to deny responsibility for the role she played in her children's removal. Moreover, testimony indicated that respondent's participation in certain services was not particularly strong until the preceding year. The safety-plan manager testified that, even within the preceding year, respondent only demonstrated strong engagement with her safety plan for about six to nine months. Even the domestic-violence-shelter therapist, who provided generally favorable testimony for respondent, testified that respondent had not consistently attended therapy sessions with her until the previous year and that she believed respondent's efforts to change became genuine only after the father stabbed respondent. Reviewing the record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred in finding that a statutory ground existed to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). In re Sanborn, ___Mich App at ___; slip op at 9.
Having concluded that one statutory ground for termination was established, we need not address whether the remaining two statutory grounds were established as well. See In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. 406, 410; 890 N.W.2d 676 (2016) ("[B]ecause only one ground for termination need be established, we decline to address whether MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) supported termination in regard to BS."). Regardless, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that those two statutory grounds were established. With respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), the evidence showed that respondent failed to sufficiently benefit from her service plan, and witnesses expressed concerns regarding respondent's ability to properly parent the children. With respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child is returned to parent's home), not only did TL-I's therapist and TL-II and TL-III's therapist each opine that returning to the home would be emotionally damaging for the children, but TL-II and TL-III were in fact returned to the home during this case, at which point they witnessed additional, extreme violence between respondent and the father.
III. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
"We review for clear error the trial court's determination regarding the children's best interests." In re Rippy, 330 Mich.App. 350, 360; 948 N.W.2d 131 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The focus at the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent." In re Keillor, 325 Mich.App. 80, 93; 923 N.W.2d 617 (2018) (cleaned up). "Best interests are determined on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In assessing a child's best interests, a trial court may consider such factors as a child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. The trial court may also consider how long the child was in foster care or placed with relatives, along with the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parents' home within the foreseeable future, if at all. [In re Mota, ___ Mich. App___, ___; ___ N.W.2d___ (2021) (Docket No. 351830); slip op at 11 (cleaned up).]
"If, as here, termination is sought under a supplemental petition, the court considers legally admissible evidence and must state its findings of fact and conclusions of law." In re Rood, 483 Mich. 73, 101-102; 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009) (footnotes omitted). "In making its best-interest determination, the trial court may consider the whole record, including evidence introduced by any party." In re Medina, 317 Mich.App. 219, 237; 894 N.W.2d 653 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A. TL-I
Respondent argues the trial court clearly erred by terminating her parental rights to TL-I because the record demonstrated that TL-I was strongly bonded to her and could be safely returned to her care within a reasonable time considering his age. We disagree.
First, petitioner presented evidence that TL-I did not have a strong bond with respondent. The second foster-care worker testified that respondent and TL-I had a "very limited" bond, and TL-I distrusted respondent. The second foster-care worker also testified that TL-I did not want to live with respondent and was only open to reengaging with her as an adult. TL-I's therapist testified that TL-I did not want to have a relationship with respondent and identified respondent as a significant trigger and "barrier to him doing well." Second, petitioner presented evidence regarding respondent's poor parenting ability. TL-I's therapist testified that TL-I reported having to assume the parental role for his siblings, instead of respondent. TL-I's therapist further testified that, during visits with respondent, TL-I reported feeling that respondent was trying to manipulate him. Third, petitioner presented evidence regarding the advantages of TL-I's foster home over respondent's home. The second foster-care worker and TL-I's therapist testified that TL-I was doing well in his foster placement. Consequently, TL-I received stability and permanency in his foster home and was able to act his age. By contrast, TL-I felt unsafe in respondent's care, had to take on parental responsibilities for his younger siblings when he lived with respondent, and also had to protect himself, respondent, and his siblings. Fourth, petitioner presented evidence of respondent's troubled visitation history with TL-I. Testimony indicated that TL-I reported that the father was inside respondent's home during visitation on at least two occasions, even though he was not supposed to be there. TL-I got upset by the father's presence in the home and left shortly after the visit began. TL-I's therapist believed that reestablishing visitation-or even communication-between respondent and TL-I "would cause an increase in his triggers and PTSD," as well as have other negative side effects. Finally, petitioner presented evidence that TL-I could not be returned to respondent's home in the foreseeable future, if at all. Testimony indicated that, at the time of the termination hearing, TL-I did not want to have any type of relationship with respondent. His visitation with respondent had been suspended.
Respondent, on the other hand, testified that she needed "a little while longer" to be financially able to support the children. Testimony from the domestic-violence-shelter therapist and respondent indicated that it would likely take years for respondent to address her trauma. Although the case-service therapist believed respondent could potentially parent the children in a healthy manner, she believed this would take "quite a while." Respondent continued to demonstrate an inability to control her emotions as recently as June 2020 and July 2020. At the time of the termination hearing, the parent-aide-services worker believed respondent could properly care for her children "in short periods," but not all day, every day. The second foster-care worker affirmed that, based on respondent's conduct, the second foster-care worker did not believe respondent could properly care for the children within a reasonable time, even if she were financially able to do so. All of this indicated that it was unlikely TL-I could be returned to respondent's care in the foreseeable future. Reviewing this record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial clearly erred by determining that terminating respondent's parental rights to TL-I was in his best interests. In re Sanborn, Mich.App. at; slip op at 10.
B. TL-II
Respondent argues the trial court clearly erred by terminating her parental rights to TL-II because the record demonstrated that TL-II was strongly bonded to her and could be safely returned to her care within a reasonable time considering his age. We disagree.
First, petitioner presented evidence that TL-II's bond with respondent was unhealthy. The parent-aide-services worker testified that TL-II was bonded to respondent and loved her. However, TL-II and TL-III's therapist testified that TL-II's bond with respondent "tend[ed] to be tenuous," TL-II and respondent had ongoing arguments, and TL-II did not feel safe with respondent. TL-II and TL-III's therapist expressed concern regarding respondent's bond with TL-II because of TL-II's diagnosis of Reactive Detachment Disorder. Second, petitioner presented evidence regarding respondent's parenting ability. Although testimony indicated that respondent loved her children, showed them affection, participated in visitation, and brought them meals and activities during visits, several witnesses expressed concerns regarding respondent's ability to parent. The parent-aide-services worker testified that she did not believe respondent could properly care for the children on a fulltime basis. The second foster-care worker testified that respondent "struggle[d]" to parent, demanded her children talked or did what she wanted them to do, and had difficulty regaining control when the children got angry. Third, petitioner presented evidence regarding the advantages of TL-II's foster home over respondent's home. TL-II and TL-III's therapist testified that TL-II had not expressed any concerns regarding safety in her foster mother's home, was generally happy and comfortable there, felt a sense of stability there, and enjoyed having other children in the home. In contrast, TL-II had ongoing arguments with respondent, did not feel safe with respondent, and did not feel like respondent could or would protect her. Additionally, testimony indicated that TL-II was exposed to domestic violence when returned to respondent's care. Fourth, petitioner presented evidence of respondent's troubled visitation history with TL-II. Respondent admitted to fighting with TL-II during visits and stated that arguing with TL-II was sometimes necessary to get her to open up. The parent-aide-services worker testified that, between July 2019 and March 2020, she observed visits that concerned her. As recently as March 2020, respondent and TL-II argued so much during a visit that the parent-aide-services worker threatened to end the visit early if they did not stop. Respondent's visitation with TL-II was ultimately suspended.
Petitioner also presented evidence regarding respondent's history of domestic violence. Ample testimony indicated that TL-II witnessed further domestic violence in respondent's home after being returned to respondent's care. This occurred despite the fact that TL-II had been returned to respondent's care on the condition that the father not be allowed in the home except when directed by petitioner. The first foster-care worker testified that respondent significantly failed to protect her children from the father and domestic violence during the period when TL-II was returned to her care.
Finally, petitioner presented evidence that TL-II could not be returned to respondent's home in the foreseeable future, if at all. As outlined in greater detail earlier, testimony indicated that respondent needed more time to financially support the children, it would likely take several years for respondent to address her trauma, it would take "quite a while" for respondent to be able to parent the children in a healthy manner, and respondent continued to demonstrate an inability to control her emotions and an inability to care for the children on a long-term basis. Reviewing this record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred by determining that terminating respondent's parental rights to TL-II was in her best interests. In re Sanborn, ___ Mich.App. at ___; slip op at 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
C. TL-III
Respondent argues the trial court clearly erred by terminating her parental rights to TL-III because the record demonstrated that TL-III was strongly bonded to her and could be safely returned to her care within a reasonable time considering his age. We disagree.
First, petitioner presented evidence that TL-III's bond with respondent was unhealthy. TL-II and TL-III's therapist described TL-III's bond with respondent as "enmeshed." TL-II and TL-III's therapist also testified that TL-III's bond with respondent "tend[ed] to be tenuous" and expressed concern regarding that bond because of TL-III's diagnosis of Reactive Detachment Disorder. Second, petitioner presented evidence regarding respondent's parenting ability. In addition to that already discussed, TL-III's bonding assessment with respondent indicated that respondent provided him inconsistent structure, struggled when required to complete tasks, and was uncomfortable with nurturing activities. During visits, TL-III was "kind of the parent," worried about respondent, and felt that he needed to protect her. Third, petitioner presented evidence regarding the advantages of TL-III's foster home over respondent's home. TL-II and TL-III's therapist testified that TL-III was happy and comfortable in his foster home, had not expressed any concerns regarding feeling safe there, felt a sense of stability there, and enjoyed the other children in the home. Other testimony indicated that TL-III was doing well in foster care and had made a lot of progress there. In contrast, the second foster-care worker testified that TL-III recognized that he had not been happy in respondent's care and that it had been an unhealthy environment. Fourth, petitioner presented evidence regarding respondent's visitation history with TL-III. As with the other children, TL-III was observed taking on the parenting role during visits with respondent. Respondent's visitation with TL-III was ultimately suspended as well.
Finally, for the same reasons outlined earlier, petitioner presented evidence that TL-III could not be returned to respondent's home in the foreseeable future, if at all. Reviewing this record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial clearly erred by determining that terminating respondent's parental rights to TL-III was in her best interests. In re Sanborn, ___Mich App at ___; slip op at 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err by terminating respondent's parental rights. Therefore, we affirm.