Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIJ104742, Charles Koosed, Judge.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Jeffrey J. Koch, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P. J.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sometime over a weekend in January 2007, Lee M. (minor) broke into a classroom at Vista del Lago High School in Moreno Valley and attempted to steal two LCD projectors. On February 26, 2007, the juvenile court found true an allegation that minor had committed burglary and designated the offense a felony. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
At a dispositional hearing on March 12, 2007, the court continued minor as a ward of the court, removed him from the custody of his mother, and placed him on probation in the custody of the probation officer with the specification that he was to be placed in a suitable foster or group home facility. Terms “m” and “q” of his probation provided, respectively, that he “Not associate with anyone known to possess, sell, or use any controlled substances or any related paraphernalia,” and “[n]ot associate with individuals who are known gang members, or with persons engaged in graffiti or related activities.” Neither minor nor his attorney objected to any of the terms.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, minor argues that the two association terms are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The People agree and suggest that we modify terms “m” and “q” by substituting the words “he knows” for the single word “known” in each term. Both parties rely on the California Supreme Court’s decision In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 for the principle that minor’s failure to object to the term does not preclude us from considering his claim on appeal. They are correct.
Both are also correct that while juvenile offenders may be subject to more restrictive probation conditions than adults, in order to withstand a vagueness challenge imposed conditions must provide the probationer with notice—fair warning—of what is required of him. (In re Sheena K., supra, at pp. 889-890.) The required notice may be provided either by explicit language in the probation agreement indicating that the status of persons with whom he may not associate must be personally known to him, or by a more detailed explanation given in oral or written comments by the trial court. (Id. at p. 891.)
Here, because the single word “known” in the disputed terms does not specify personal knowledge, and because the trial court made no comments explicating the knowledge element, the language of terms “m” and “q” must be modified.
DISPOSITION
1) Term “m” of minor’s probation agreement is ordered modified to read: “Not associate with anyone whom he knows possesses, sells, or uses any controlled substances or any related paraphernalia.”
2) Term “q” is ordered modified to read: “Not associate with individuals whom he knows are gang members, or with persons whom he knows are engaged in graffiti or related activities.”
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, J., MILLER, J.