Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. CK57625, Elizabeth Kim, Juvenile Court Referee.
Suzanne M. Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.C.
Deborah Dentler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant E.L.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GRIMES, J.
Defendants and appellants L.C. (father) and E.L. (mother) appeal from the juvenile court orders terminating their parental rights to their three minor children, L.C., Jr., L.D.C. and D.L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26. Father and mother contend there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding of adoptability and that the court also erred in failing to apply the child-objection exception. We affirm.
Father is the presumed father of L.C., Jr., and L.D.C. and the alleged father of D.L.
All further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The record of these dependency proceedings shows an extensive history by the Department of Children and Family Services with mother and father, including a prior detention by the Department in 2005 of the two eldest children. The current detention, initiated in May 2007, just a couple of months after the first case was closed, has been pending for over three years. Because mother’s and father’s appeals relate only to the juvenile court’s August 9, 2010 orders terminating their respective parental rights, we limit our summary of the facts and procedural background to those matters pertinent to our discussion of the termination decision.
1. Initial Detention and Reunification Efforts
L.C., Jr. (hereafter Jr.), L.D.C. and D.L. (collectively the children) came to the attention of the Department in May 2007 when mother and D.L. were taken to the hospital by ambulance following D.L.’s birth at home. At the hospital, D.L. tested positive for cocaine and exhibited symptoms of in utero drug exposure. Mother admitted to the social worker who spoke with her at the hospital that she had been using cocaine while pregnant and that the baby just “came out” while she was sitting on the toilet.
The Department immediately removed the children from mother’s home and filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j), alleging primarily that the children were at substantial risk of serious physical injury or illness resulting from mother’s and father’s inability to provide regular care and supervision due to their long-term substance abuse. The petition also cited to mother’s and father’s criminal histories, mother’s excessive physical discipline of Jr. (hitting with a belt and/or hanger), D.L.’s positive test for cocaine at the time of birth, and the fact that both Jr. and L.D.C. had previously been detained by the Department in 2005 based on similar abuse and neglect allegations. The detention report further noted that mother had two other children (with other men) who had been dependents of the San Diego County Juvenile Court, that reunification had not been possible, and that the two children had reached the age of majority and had been emancipated from the system.
The record indicates that at the time of the 2007 detention, the children were in mother’s sole custody as mother and father were no longer living together and had never been married. Father may have been living temporarily in a sober living facility.
At the detention hearing held May 22, 2007, the court sustained the petition and ordered the children placed in the care of their paternal grandparents. At the time of detention, Jr. was age 9, L.D.C. was age 2, and D.L. was a week old. The court ordered family reunification services and monitored visitation for both mother and father.
D.L. is a boy, despite some erroneous references in the record to the contrary.
Jr. and L.D.C. previously lived with their grandparents from 2005 to 2007 when they were initially detained by the Department based on similar allegations of parental substance abuse, domestic violence and unsanitary housing conditions. Grandmother reported to the social worker that she was happy to take Jr. and L.D.C. again, as well as the new baby, that the children had done well while living with her before, but had gone back to “square one” when returned to mother. A paternal aunt, H.L. (aunt), assisted with the care of the children on a daily basis.
The jurisdiction and disposition report set forth that mother and father had long-term substance abuse problems, including the use of cocaine, which resulted in a detrimental home environment for the children as neither parent was able to provide for the minors’ basic needs. Mother had attempted numerous drug treatment programs but never remained sober. Neither parent was employed, and father was living in a shelter. The report further noted mother and father had “extensive criminal histories.” Mother had 11 convictions, including battery, burglary, drug possession and child cruelty. Father had six convictions, including assault with a deadly weapon, drug possession and child cruelty. Jr. and L.D.C. told the social workers they wanted to continue living with their grandparents. In an addendum report, the Department recommended that no further reunification services be provided and that the court proceed with permanency planning.
Following a contested disposition hearing on July 16, 2007, the court ordered the children suitably placed and ordered the Department to initiate an adoptive home study. The court ordered family reunification services to be terminated. The court ordered that mother and father were to continue to have monitored visitation with the children, granting the Department discretion to liberalize if appropriate.
A long series of hearings thereafter ensued, including interim review hearings and numerous hearings to resolve petitions filed by mother and father pursuant to section 388 for modifications to the court’s orders as to visitation and to seek additional family reunification services. For a period of time, mother made some strides in improving her situation. She completed parenting classes and a drug rehabilitation program, as well as maintained a stable living arrangement by sharing an apartment with her cousin for over a year. In response to these efforts, the court granted mother unmonitored visits with the children.
However, after mother was allowed unmonitored visits, it was reported that mother once again engaged in irresponsible behavior. The children’s therapists wrote several letters to the court to express their concerns that unmonitored visitation was not in the best interests of the children. It was reported that, during one such unmonitored visit, mother and father took L.D.C. and D.L. with them to a motel and engaged in sex acts in their presence. Jr. also suffered a bruise near his eye. When asked about it, he stated the injury occurred at his mother’s apartment and he believed his mother had elbowed him on purpose because she was mad at him at the time. Jr. and L.D.C. reported that mother slapped D.L. during a visit, yelled at the children often (particularly Jr.), cursed in their presence, and made derogatory comments about grandmother and aunt. Grandmother and aunt reported that mother regularly missed visits with the children or ended them early. Father also routinely missed visits, although he did obtain an apartment and completed a drug treatment program. Grandmother and aunt also told the social worker the children seemed more agitated and irritable after visiting with their parents. The court ordered no further unmonitored visits and returned mother to a schedule of a monitored visitation.
In September 2009, both Jr. and L.D.C. told the social worker they did not want to have longer visits with their parents and that they only wanted to visit with them at their grandmother and aunt’s home. In early 2010, the children’s therapists once again reported their concerns to the court about the negative aspects of the children’s relationship with their mother. The court continued to allow monitored visitation for mother and father, but ordered the Department to finalize the home study so that a permanency planning hearing could be set.
2. Steps Preliminary to Permanency Planning Hearing
Initially, grandparents were considered the prospective adoptive parents, but grandfather passed away in 2009 during the pendency of the proceedings. The Department then considered grandmother and aunt for co-adoption. However, it was ultimately decided that aunt would proceed as the sole prospective adoptive parent. Aunt and grandmother nonetheless continue to live in the same home and both are caregivers for the children. The social worker consistently reported the children are well bonded with both their grandmother and aunt and receive exceptional care from them.
Father’s contention that grandmother and aunt are to be co-adoptive parents is incorrect.
The original adoption assessment report ordered by the court was completed and submitted on November 13, 2007. The updated assessment report, dated July 7, 2009, states the children expressed no concerns with being adopted by their aunt and that they wanted to live with her permanently. The Department submitted numerous supplemental reports during the pendency of the proceedings, all of which reflect the children being well cared for and consistently expressing their desire to remain living with their aunt and grandmother.
The children were regularly reported as being in good health, progressing in school, developmentally on target and thriving in the home of aunt and grandmother. The social worker described aunt and grandmother as committed to the children, providing them a positive, safe home environment filled with love and support, frequent family gatherings and celebrations, and regular attendance at church. Completion of the adoptive placement paperwork was delayed however due to difficulties in obtaining a copy of D.L.’s birth certificate. Several status reports indicated there were procedural problems with obtaining the birth certificate from the relevant authorities and that multiple requests had to be made. The status reports further indicated that no legal impediments to adoption by aunt were anticipated. Aunt had been previously approved as an adoptive parent by the Department several years earlier for another niece and nephew. The two adopted minors resided in the home with aunt, grandmother and the children.
The home study with aunt as the sole prospective adoptive parent was approved on January 7, 2010. The social worker reported no legal impediments to adoption. D.L.’s long-delayed birth certificate was finally received by the Department in May 2010. In response to the court’s request for a current report from Jr. about his “wishes on being adopted, ” the social worker reported that Jr. stated on May 20, 2010, he liked living in the home of his aunt and grandmother. He also said, “ ‘I don’t want to live with my mother because now I go to school everyday and my aunt and grandmother feed me. My mother might go to the streets and do drugs again.’ ” After the requisite notice had been provided to all interested parties, the permanency planning hearing was finally scheduled for June 2010.
3. The Permanency Planning Hearing (§ 366.26)
The section 366.26 hearing was held over a period of days on June 15, 28, and 29, 2010. At the beginning of the hearing, the court admitted, without any objection, the Department’s exhibits 1 through 11, which included the adoption assessment reports. The court also took judicial notice of the dependency file and its contents without objection. Mother and father were present for all of the proceedings and represented by counsel.
Mother testified she was maintaining regular contact with her drug treatment agency, attending group counseling sessions and sharing an apartment with her cousin. She said she and the children were enjoying their visits together, going to McDonald’s or the park and also spending time at her apartment where the kids played video games and watched television. Mother said the children act happy when they are with her, smiling a lot and running around and playing like ordinary children. She said they tell her they love her and give her hugs, but sometimes L.D.C. seems sad when the visits have to end. Mother said she loves her children and knows they love her. She also testified they had great fun at the holidays, including a recent Easter egg hunt in the park and a birthday party for Jr. at her apartment. Five photographs taken at Jr.’s party were admitted into evidence.
Father testified he visits with the children on the porch of the house where his mother and sister live, monitored by his mother, because he is not allowed to have visits elsewhere. He said he believes his children love him because they act glad to see him and give him hugs. He admitted he does not bring clothes or gifts, but does try to give them a little money for school items and such when he can. He was not able to state the children’s birth dates.
L.D.C., two months shy of her sixth birthday, testified briefly at the hearing. She said she loves her mother, whom she usually calls by her first name. She testified they had fun celebrating Jr.’s 12th birthday with their mother, but that for her birthday, she wants to be with her “auntie and my grandma” and her brothers. L.D.C. said she wants to keep living at her grandmother’s house. She further testified she does not want to live with her father.
Jr., who had just turned 12, also testified. He said he enjoys visiting with his mother. Jr. said he does not think about visiting with his mother or staying overnight where she lives and that it would not matter to him if he could not visit with her in her apartment as he can always see her other places like at McDonald’s. He said he has never told his mother he wants to live with her. Jr. testified he loves his mother and knows she loves him too. He said he would like to be able to keep visiting with his mother and his father.
Jr. further testified he is happy living with his aunt and wants to continue living there until he goes to college. He said he feels safe in her home and feels happy that she wants to adopt him and be his mom. He also testified he was not sure what the differences between legal guardianship and adoption were and that no one had told him he would not be seeing his mother anymore if he were adopted.
The youngest child, D.L., was only three years old and did not testify at the hearing.
The court issued its statement of decision on August 9, 2010, finding the children adoptable by clear and convincing evidence. The court further found no statutory exception applied and that it would be detrimental to the children to return them to the custody of either parent. The court therefore terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights to Jr., L.D.C. and D.L. Mother and father timely filed separate appeals.
We note for the record that mother’s appeal was initially assigned a separate docket number (B228133). However, all documents in B228133 were refiled under B227495 and B228133 was closed. We dispose of both appeals by way of this single opinion.
DISCUSSION
1. Adoptability
Mother and father contend the juvenile court’s order finding the children adoptable is not supported by substantial evidence. In reviewing a juvenile court’s adoptability finding, “we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that [the minors were] likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order.” (In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 491.) The record below contains ample evidence to support the court’s order and mother and father have failed to show otherwise.
The purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is for the court to select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child. Once the juvenile court has determined that reunification efforts have failed and has proceeded to setting a section 366.26 hearing, “[a]doption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) “Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.... [Citation.] At this stage of the dependency proceedings, ‘it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home.’ [Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53; see also In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 410-411 [once proceedings reach the section 366.26 hearing, parental unfitness has already been resolved and focus is on determining type of permanent alternate home]; accord, In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 819.)
In terminating parental rights, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) In making this determination, the court may rely on the assessment report and “any other relevant evidence.” (Ibid.) The focus of the court’s inquiry is on the child “and whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state may make it difficult to find an adoptive family.” (In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.) A proposed adoptive parent need not be identified and ready to adopt, but “there must be convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will take place within a reasonable time.” (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.)
We find there is substantial evidence in the record the children are generally adoptable. The adoption assessment report as well as the updated supplemental reports prepared and submitted during the lengthy dependency proceedings were in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements and provided the requisite information for the court to render a decision on adoptability. (§§ 366.21, subd. (i), 366.22, subd. (c); In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [“The “assessment report is ‘a cornerstone of the evidentiary structure’ upon which the court, the parents and the child are entitled to rely’ ”].)
The Department’s reports included documentation reflecting Jr.’s and L.D.C.’s progress in school, the children’s good medical status with no material health problems and up-to-date vaccinations, as well as progress during individualized counseling on emotional and behavioral issues stemming from the history of neglect. None of the children were clients of any regional center. The social worker consistently reported the children were developmentally on target and well bonded to their aunt and grandmother. Photographs in the record support the social worker’s assessment the children were generally happy and doing well living with their aunt and grandmother.
Further, there is nothing in any assessment report indicating the social worker determined the children to be adoptable based solely on their aunt’s interest in adopting them. Aside from Jr. being a preteen, which might affect his adoptability to some extent, and the fact the children’s therapists reported Jr. and L.D.C. were still working on some behavior issues stemming from the past neglect, there are no other factors identified in the record that might indicate the children are not generally adoptable. Courts routinely affirm adoptability findings for children with conditions more difficult than the relatively minor behavioral problems attributed to Jr. and LD.C. (See, e.g., In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 79-80 [children generally adoptable despite autism and additional medical issues because of other positive factors, such as “affectionate personality traits” and ability to interact well with others].)
Moreover, the fact that aunt, the prospective adoptive parent, was willing and waiting to adopt the children and the home study had been approved was further evidence the children would likely be adopted in a reasonable time. (In re Helen W., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 79-80; In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1650.) During the hearing, mother and father did not challenge any of the evidence of the positive factors supporting the children’s adoptability and failed to offer any evidence indicating the existence of any negative factors that weighed against the likelihood of adoption.
We reject mother and father’s contention the adoptability finding is in question because there was no evidence of aunt’s financial fitness to adopt or ability to meet the needs of the children. Where, as here, a dependent child is adoptable “based on factors in addition to a caregiver’s willingness to adopt, the suitability or availability of the caregiver to adopt is not a relevant inquiry.” (In re R.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 493, italics added.) General suitability to adopt is an issue reserved for resolution at the subsequent adoption hearing and is not considered at a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. (In re R.C., at p. 494; see also In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839.)
In any event, the argument is belied by the record. It was well documented by the Department the children have been in the sole care and custody of aunt and grandmother for over three years and have “thrived” while living in their home. Aunt is already functioning in the capacity of an adoptive parent of two other minors, and there is nothing material in the record revealing any concern aunt will not be able to continue to provide, from a financial perspective or otherwise, a suitable, nurturing and safe home for the children. (In re Helen W., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 80 [ample evidence foster mother would continue to meet needs of children as she had done for over two years while proceedings were pending]; In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1651 [adoptability finding for two minors properly based on young ages, good health, educational and emotional growth, and not on status of prospective adoptive parent who was a single foster mother caring for eight other children].)
Even assuming mother and father are correct and the children are only specifically adoptable, the record supports that finding as well and the termination of parental rights. Unlike In re Valerie W., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1, relied upon by mother and father, the record here contains a well-detailed assessment report, a completed adoptive home study for aunt, and a finding of no legal impediments to adoption. Mother and father failed to present any material evidence of any legal impediment to aunt’s adoption of the children, and we will not speculate as to the alleged basis for rejecting a specific adoptability finding. (In re Brandon T. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1411.)
A similar improper focus on the prospective adoptive parent was rejected in In re G.M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 552. There, a mother challenging a termination order claimed the juvenile court failed to consider whether there was a legal impediment to adoption by the sole prospective adoptive parent. The mother contended this had been required because the children were only specifically adoptable based on their aunt’s expressed willingness to adopt them. (Id. at pp. 563-564.) The Fifth District affirmed, stating the mother’s argument improperly ignored the evidence of factors supporting the children’s general adoptability, which obviated any consideration of legal impediments, including that they were happy, healthy, developmentally on target, and had a strong attachment to their aunt. (Id. at p. 564.)
Here, the juvenile court was likewise presented with substantial evidence of the children’s general adoptability, evidence that was unchallenged by mother and father. Indulging all reasonable inferences in the record in favor of the court’s finding, the record is more than adequate to support the court’s determination of adoptability and the corresponding termination of parental rights. (In re G.M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 564; In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333, 1336.)
Under the statutory scheme, it was mother’s and father’s burden to show that exceptional circumstances existed and that termination of parental rights would therefore be detrimental to the children. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 574; see also In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [statutory exceptions are “final check to ensure termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the minor” and the “least detrimental alternative”].) We see nothing in the record to suggest the juvenile court was incorrect in determining that mother and father failed to do so. By statute, termination of parental rights was therefore properly ordered. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1153.)
2. The Child-Objection Exception
Mother and father also contend the court erred in terminating their parental rights because Jr.’s testimony at the section 366.26 hearing demonstrated the applicability of the child-objection exception. Once again, we disagree.
At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Jr. was 12 years old. Evidence that a child 12 years of age or older objects to the termination of parental rights is one of the express statutory exceptions on which the juvenile court may rely in determining that termination would be detrimental to the best interests of the minor. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) Substantial evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that this exception did not apply. (In re Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333 [finding that substantial evidence test applies to review of court’s determination regarding applicability of one or more statutory exceptions].)
By statute, the court is mandated to consider the wishes of the minors involved in dependency proceedings and to act in their best interests at all times. (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1).) In resolving the specific question whether a child 12 years or older objects to the termination of parental rights, the “juvenile court should explore a child’s feelings toward his or her parents, foster parents, and prospective adoptive family. [Citations.] Evidence of a child’s wishes may, but need not, be in the form of direct testimony at the parental rights termination hearing; such evidence may also appear in the [Department’s] reports. [Citations.]” (In re Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334, italics added; accord, In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1592-1594.)
Here, the juvenile court had before it all of the assessment and status reports submitted by the Department, which included consistent statements from the social worker that the children, Jr. included, were happy living in the home of their aunt and grandmother and wished to remain there. As to Jr., specifically, there was also the representation by his counsel on the record that Jr. was not objecting to adoption and the termination of parental rights. (§ 317, subd. (e) [counsel for child shall interview child and advise court of child’s wishes].)
Finally, there was Jr.’s direct testimony before the court. Despite mother and father’s arguments to the contrary, the record of Jr.’s testimony does not show any objection by him to adoption or the termination of parental rights. His testimony and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom do not support a finding that Jr. objected in any way to being adopted by his aunt. Throughout the lengthy dependency proceedings and during his testimony at the section 366.26 hearing, Jr. was consistent in expressing his desire to remain living with his aunt and grandmother on a permanent basis. At most, Jr.’s testimony regarding his biological parents reflects his desire to continue visiting with his mother and father and that doing so on the porch of his aunt and grandmother’s house or at a location like McDonald’s would be sufficient. This cannot in any way be equated with an objection to adoption and the termination of parental rights. Father’s assertion that Jr. specifically stated he did not consent to adoption if it meant he could no longer see his parents misstates Jr.’s testimony. His consent was never even sought in that precise context. He acknowledged only that he would like to still be able to visit with his parents and that he would not think it was okay for someone to tell him he cannot see his mother anymore.
Termination of parental rights was upheld on similar testimony from the minor in In re Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 1326. There, the minor was 15 at the time of the section 366.26 hearing and had been living with his aunt and uncle who were the prospective adoptive parents. (Id. at p. 1331.) Counsel for the mother asked the minor “if he wanted to be adopted, [and] he replied ‘Yes.’ He explained he saw his aunt and uncle as being ‘basically like [his] parents’ and would feel ‘comfortable if [he] was adopted by them.’ ” (Id. at p. 1332.) Counsel for the mother then posed the following questions to the minor: “Q: ‘Okay. Would you want to be adopted if... there was a chance you couldn’t ever see your mom again?’ [¶] A: ‘No, because I would like to see my mom again.’ [¶] Q[:] ‘Did the social worker tell you that if you were adopted there is a chance that you might never see your mom again?’ [¶] A: ‘No.’ [¶] Q[:] ‘Would you want to be adopted if you couldn’t see your mom again?’ A: ‘No.’ ” (Ibid.) On cross-examination, the minor then reiterated he would be happy to be adopted by his aunt and uncle, that he felt safe and comfortable with them, and that he hoped they would also be allowed to adopt his younger sister. (Ibid.)
In affirming the juvenile court, the Fourth District explained that such testimony from the minor, in its totality, was not an unequivocal objection to the termination of parental rights. (In re Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.) “[The minor’s] statements do not constitute unequivocal objections. Rather, the statements appear to reveal an internal conflict between his hope to be adopted and live in a stable and loving environment, and his hope to see [his mother] again.” (Id. at p. 1335.) The court aptly noted that isolated portions of testimony are not considered in a vacuum. “It was the juvenile court’s task to determine the testimony that accurately represented [the minor’s] state of mind with respect to adoption.... Given the deference we must accord to a juvenile court’s factual findings, it was reasonable for the court to resolve conflicts in favor of finding that [the minor] favored adoption.... The evidence afforded the juvenile court a reasonable basis for ascertaining [the minor’s] wishes.” (Ibid.)
Similarly here, the juvenile court was in the best position to judge the credibility of Jr.’s testimony and to consider it in context with the rest of the evidence relevant to Jr.’s state of mind about his permanent living arrangements and adoption, not the least of which was three years of consistent and unambiguous statements of his desire to remain living in the home of his aunt and grandmother. We cannot disregard the totality of the evidence before the court and isolate one response by Jr. that he would not want to stop visiting with his mother. Given our standard of review, we cannot reweigh the evidence nor can we conclude that Jr.’s desire to continue visiting with his parents undermines the juvenile’s court determination that Jr. desired to remain living with his aunt and grandmother and would be happy to be adopted.
To the extent mother’s and father’s arguments can be construed as implying the court was required to compel Jr. to voice an express rejection of his biological parents as the only way to consent to adoption and avoid application of the child-objection exception, we reject such an argument and find no support in the case law to impose such an onerous and emotionally devastating task on a minor child. “ ‘To ask children with whom they prefer to live or to ascertain what they wish through other evidence is one thing. To ask those children to choose whether they ever see their natural parent again or to give voice to approving that termination is a significantly different prospect.... [W]e conclude that in considering the child’s expression of preferences, it is not required that the child specifically understand the proceeding is in the nature of a termination of parental rights.’ [Citation.] [¶] What the court must strive to do is ‘to explore the minor’s feelings regarding his/her biological parents, foster parents, and prospective adoptive parents, if any, as well as his/her current living arrangements.’ ” (In re Amanda D., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 820, italics omitted.)
Such testimony was elicited from Jr. at the section 366.26 hearing and was contained in the Department’s assessment reports. Jr. unequivocally stated his preference for continuing to live with his aunt and grandmother and did not voice any desire to live with either his mother or his father. Such evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that Jr. did not object to the termination of parental rights. It is outside the scope of our review to reweigh the reasonable inferences arising from Jr.’s testimony as to his feelings in this regard and we thus decline to do so.
We note for the record the social worker reported aunt would like the children to be able to maintain contact with their parents in an appropriate setting. Despite mother’s and father’s suggestions to the contrary, we perceive no reason to believe aunt, if approved for adoption, would forbid the children to visit with their parents if the children desire to do so and mother and father engage in behavior that makes continued visitation appropriate.
DISPOSITION
The August 9, 2010 orders of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of mother and father with respect to Jr., L.D.C. and D.L. are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BIGELOW, P. J., FLIER, J.