So we disagree.Citing In the Interest of L. B., 319 Ga. App. 173, 735 S.E.2d 162 (2012), the mother argues that, before determining whether reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and child would be detrimental to the child under OCGA § 15-11-240 (a) (1), the juvenile court was required to consider four factors:(1) [whether the mother] unjustifiably failed to complete a previously ordered reunification plan, (2) [whether] the child had been removed from the home on at least two previous occasions, (3) [whether] any of the grounds for terminating parental rights set forth in [former] OCGA § 15-11-94 (b) exist, or (4) [whether] reasonable efforts to reunify are deemed unnecessary under [former] OCGA § 15-11-58 (a) (4).

(Citation and footnote omitted.) In the Interest of L.B., 319 Ga.App. 173, 174–175(1), 735 S.E.2d 162 (2012). The new Juvenile Code applies only to juvenile proceedings commenced on and after January 1, 2014.

Blakey, 161 Ga.App. 99, 289 S.E.2d 303 (1982); Carey v. Phillips, 137 Ga.App. 619, 224 S.E.2d 870 (1976); Doyal & Assoc., Inc. v. Blair, 138 Ga.App. 314, 226 S.E.2d 109 (1976); Thornton v. State, 136 Ga.App. 655, 222 S.E.2d 158 (1975); Watts v. Kundtz, 128 Ga.App. 797, 197 S.E.2d 859 (1973); Kazakos v. Baranan, 122 Ga.App. 594, 178 S.E.2d 222 (1970); Rossville Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 121 Ga.App. 435, 174 S.E.2d 204 (1970); Boston Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 120 Ga.App. 585, 171 S.E.2d 626 (1969); Berrie v. State, 119 Ga.App. 148, 166 S.E.2d 631 (1969); Napier v. City Prods. Corp., 111 Ga.App. 327, 141 S.E.2d 552 (1965); Turner v. Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 109 Ga.App. 721, 137 S.E.2d 385 (1964); Akins v. Beaver, 98 Ga.App. 472, 106 S.E.2d 91 (1958); Ga. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Reville, 95 Ga.App. 358, 98 S.E.2d 210 (1957); Davenport v. S.R.R. Co., 42 Ga.App. 160, 155 S.E. 340 (1930); O'Connor v. United States, 11 Ga.App. 246, 75 S.E. 110 (1912).See In the Interest of L.B., 319 Ga.App. 173, 175(1), 735 S.E.2d 162 (2012) (“[Appellant] gives us no reason to believe that any objection to taking judicial notice of the deprivation order in this case would have had any merit, nor does she identify specific evidence that she would have brought forward to challenge the earlier deprivation order. For this reason, [appellant] cannot show that the taking of judicial notice is reversible error.” (footnote omitted)); accord In the Interest of C.B., 308 Ga.App. 158, 160(2) n. 4, 706 S.E.2d 752 (2011).

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) In the Interest of L.B., 319 Ga.App. 173, 177(2), 735 S.E.2d 162 (2012). The appellee's contention that ASC's campus policemen do not fall within the statutory definition of “State officer or employee” because they are employed by ASC, a private entity, fails to take the entirety of the statute into consideration.