Opinion
13-24-00244-CR
05-15-2024
IN RE LAWRENCE CLOUD
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Pena
MEMORANDUM OPINION
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) ("When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case."); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
Lawrence Cloud, proceeding pro se, has filed a pleading in this Court seeking relief for various complaints. This Court previously affirmed Cloud's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. See Cloud v. State, No. 13-19-00508-CR, 2021 WL 2584397 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Cloud does not have a pending appeal in this Court and he does not reference a different final judgment that is subject to appeal or a separately appealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we liberally construe Cloud's pleading as a petition for writ of mandamus. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 19.1 (delineating the plenary power of the appellate courts), 25.2 (governing the perfection of appeal in criminal cases), 52 (describing the requirements for filing original proceedings); In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“The function of the writ of mandamus is to compel action by those who by virtue of their official or quasi-official positions are charged with a positive duty to act.”). Cloud contends, inter alia, that there was no probable cause for his arrest, that his conviction was supported by fabricated evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish both that the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary or judicial decision and that there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged harm. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding); In re Harris, 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be denied. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). It is the relator's burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus relief. See id.; In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding); see also Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) ("Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks."). The relator bears the burden to provide a sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief. In re Schreck, 642 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d at 839.
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, is of the opinion that Cloud has not met his burden to obtain mandamus relief. Further, we note that the exclusive method for a collateral attack on a final felony conviction is through a writ of habeas corpus filed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 11.07; Ater v. Eighth Ct. of Apps., 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) ("We are the only court with jurisdiction in final post-conviction felony proceedings."); see also Calton v. Schiller, 498 S.W.3d 247, 252 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.