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In re Lauren C.

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.
Nov 17, 2003
No. B166886 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003)

Opinion

B166886.

11-17-2003

In re LAUREN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER C., Defendant and Appellant.

Christopher C., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Christopher, the father of dependent minor Lauren, appeals from the order terminating his parental rights. We discern that father claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that the court was biased against him and his wife who suffers from mental illness. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS

Lauren came to the attention of the juvenile court on September 6, 2001, when she was two months old, after respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on her behalf.

Previously, DCFS had provided extensive, in-home services to Laurens parents. DCFSs involvement began when a reporter from a battered womans shelter made a referral after mother disclosed father punched and kicked her while mother held Lauren in her arms. Shortly thereafter, another referral was made after police arrested father for slapping Lauren and hitting and scratching mother. Mother stated father had regularly hit Lauren since her birth.

At the initial detention hearing, the court detained Lauren in foster care and allowed father monitored visits and mother unmonitored visits.

By October 9, DCFS had provided the parents with referrals for counseling, parenting classes and domestic violence programs. Father had enrolled in an anger management program and attended two classes. Mother refused to go to a domestic violence shelter although she had previously admitted to a social worker, a counselor and a police officer that father had repeatedly hit Lauren since Laurens release from the hospital, beat mother daily, and threatened to kill mother. Mother now denied any abuse had taken place despite having bruises in various stages of healing.

Father admitted hitting and slapping mother, but denied culpability, stating mother would get crazy and the situation was her fault. Father stated he had no criminal history, but his criminal records showed extensive past criminal behavior, requiring registry as a sex offender.

By early November, father again was incarcerated for domestic violence. Father had not visited Lauren since her detention and had not contacted the DCFS social worker.

The court sustained an amended petition, declared Lauren a dependent, removed her from parental custody, and ordered reunification and visitation for the parents.

Lauren progressed well in foster care. Despite receiving many referrals, mother failed to enroll in any programs, but visited Lauren weekly. Father had not contacted DCFS for several months, had not responded to the social workers telephone calls and had not visited Lauren at all.

In May 2002, DCFS reported mother vacillated about whether to leave father. Despite many efforts by the social worker, mother always decided in favor of staying with father, even after she disclosed he repeatedly raped her. DCFS also reported that in March father had contacted the social worker for the first time and yelled and cursed at her. The social worker had attempted prior contacts with father, including mailing him letters on six occasions, sending referrals on four occasions, and making many offers for father to use the telephone in the DCFS office to make any necessary calls.

Father continued to attend anger management counseling, but missed several sessions, and did not participate in any other court-ordered programs. Father failed to visit Lauren even though the social worker had arranged visits close to his home. Mother completed a parenting class, but was not participatory and otherwise failed to comply with the case plan. Mother visited Lauren, but was often late and missed visits. Mother was inappropriate during visits and refused to follow the social workers direction to behave more appropriately.

Lauren continued to thrive in foster care. DCFS completed an adoption assessment. The current caretakers were identified as the prospective adoptive parents.

By June 14, father still had not contacted the social worker or foster parents, had failed to visit Lauren and showed no additional compliance with the case plan. DCFS was no longer aware of the parents whereabouts.

On July 2, the social worker met with father, who was back in jail. Father stated he loved Lauren, wanted to resume custody of her and was receiving counseling in prison to deal with domestic issues.

On August 1, the court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing (".26 hearing").

The report for the .26 hearing indicated mother had stopped visiting in May, and father, who was still incarcerated, had failed to visit altogether.

Father met with the social worker on December 2 and reported he and mother were living together, but were homeless. Father believed DCFS had discriminated against them because of mothers mental illness (he said she was paranoid and schizophrenic). Father did not believe DCFS had adequately addressed that issue and should have given mother a psychological evaluation and medication. The social worker documented fathers concerns and, even though not required to do so as reunification services had been terminated, gave him bus tokens to enable visits with Lauren. Even so, father still failed to visit Lauren.

On March 5, 2003, the court held the section .26 hearing and received into evidence various reports and heard testimony from the parents.

Father testified he had failed to visit Lauren because mother threatened to call the police if he did; otherwise, he would have visited. Father said he had done nothing wrong, and, before court involvement, he had asked the social worker to obtain a psychological evaluation of mother, but nothing had happened.

Mother testified that she had failed to visit Lauren for several months and that she continued to reside with father.

With the concurrence of Laurens attorney, the court terminated parental rights and freed Lauren to be adopted by the foster parents who had cared for her for almost two years.

Father filed a timely notice of appeal.

On June 30, this court issued a notice that counsel appointed to represent father indicated an inability to find any arguable issues. Subsequently, father filed a letter brief challenging the order.

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Father complains that everyone in the court system discriminated against him and his wife who suffers from mental illness. Father asserts his attorney and his wifes attorney did nothing to get their daughter back.

Father lacks standing to raise the issue of the alleged ineffective assistance of mothers counsel. (See In re Joshua M. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 801, 807 ["We are unaware of any authority for the proposition that one parent can claim ineffective assistance of the other parents counsel when the other parent has not appealed. Indeed, the general rule is that `"[a]n appellant cannot urge errors which effect only another party who does not appeal.""].)

"A parent seeking review of a claimed violation of section 317.5 must show a violation of the statute, i.e., that counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys practicing in the field of juvenile dependency law." (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1667-1668.) "The parent must also establish the claimed error was prejudicial. . . . Thus the parent must demonstrate that it is `reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (Citations omitted.) (Id., at p. 1668.)

At a .26 hearing, once the court finds the child is likely to be adopted, it must terminate parental rights unless one of the enumerated exceptions is met. (In re Jasmine J. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1807.) The only relevant exception in this case was section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), which provides that parental rights need not be terminated where parents "have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." Father did not maintain regular visits — he never visited Lauren after she was detained. (See In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1254.)

Moreover, father raised no objection to his counsel in the juvenile court and points to no errors committed by his counsel at the .26 hearing, at which his counsel presented evidence. DCFS provided extensive services to the parents. Fathers parental rights were terminated because he failed to comply with the case plan or visit Lauren regularly.

II. Court Error And Bias

Father suggests that the court erred by failing to order an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation for himself and his wife and that the court was prejudiced against mother because of her mental illness.

"A party on appeal cannot successfully complain because the trial court failed to do something which it was not asked to do." (In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 603.) Father complained to the social worker mother should have been given an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation. When the court terminated reunification services, it noted "[a]nd giving her [mother] the benefit of the doubt, where I thought 730 might help me fashion some sort of reunification plan that was meaningful, it doesnt appear to me that she would comply even if I ordered one." However, no party requested the court to order an evaluation then or at any other time.

Even assuming arguendo father has standing to raise the issue of the courts alleged bias against mother, his only example of the alleged bias is that the court allowed mother to testify on her own behalf. That claim is without merit as mother was called as a witness by her own attorney and father did not object. (See Gimbel v. Laramie (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 77, 85-86.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

We concur: PERLUSS, P.J., and ZELON, J.

Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.


Summaries of

In re Lauren C.

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.
Nov 17, 2003
No. B166886 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003)
Case details for

In re Lauren C.

Case Details

Full title:In re LAUREN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.

Date published: Nov 17, 2003

Citations

No. B166886 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003)