Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. SJ11633D, George W. Clarke, Judge.
O'ROURKE, J.
Virginia H. appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, Laura C., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Virginia argues the court lacked sufficient evidence to support its findings that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. We affirm the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition on behalf of then seven-year-old Laura under section 300, subdivision (j). The petition alleged Laura was at risk of abuse or neglect because her siblings had suffered physical abuse and sexual abuse at the hands of Laura's father, Manuel C. Specifically, Manuel sexually abused Laura's older sister on multiple occasions and beat her brother with a broomstick. Virginia failed to protect the minors because she allowed Manuel to remain living in the family home and have contact with Laura and her siblings. The court detained Laura in April 2006 and placed her in out-of-home care.
Laura's father, Manuel C., and her siblings are not parties in this appeal.
The court issued a no-contact order between Virginia and Manuel. Virginia initially complied with her case plan by participating in services. She completed her domestic violence services and showed insight into the effect of abuse on children. However, more than one year after the petitions had been filed a social worker made an unannounced visit to Virginia's home and found Manuel with Virginia.
After 18 months of services, the court found Virginia had not made substantive progress with her case plan. Virginia indicated she did not want Manuel in her life but she continued to have contact with him. The social worker believed this showed Virginia was not able to prevent Manuel from having access to Laura and her siblings should the children be returned to her custody. Virginia also had not completed services addressing sexual abuse for nonprotecting parents. The court held an 18-month review hearing, terminated reunification services and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26.
In the section 366.26 assessment report, the Agency reported that Laura had been living with relatives since the early stages of the dependency. She was developmentally on target, physically healthy and did well in school. Laura's relative caregiver was committed to adopting Laura. The social worker acknowledged Virginia had regular visits with Laura. During visits, Virginia played with Laura, they ate snacks together and showed affection toward one another. However, Laura did not show signs of distress after visits ended. She instead looked to her relative caregiver for support and had a strong emotional bond with her caregiver. Further, Laura told the social worker that her parents had not changed and she was fearful that she would be subjected to abuse if she was placed in their care.
Concerning Virginia's relationship with Laura, the social worker indicated that there was a bond between Virginia and Laura. However, the relationship between mother and daughter was not parental in nature and not so strong that it outweighed the benefits of adoption.
The court found Laura was likely to be adopted and that none of the exceptions of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied to preclude terminating parental rights. The court terminated parental rights and referred Laura for adoptive placement.
DISCUSSION
I
Virginia challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. She asserts she regularly visited Laura and that Laura had a strong emotional attachment to her and would benefit from ongoing contact.
A
We review the judgment for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not consider the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) The parent has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
"Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of five specified exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(E); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to the adoption preference if termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." We have interpreted the phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" to refer to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.)
To meet the burden of proof for this statutory exception, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. (Ibid.; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
B
The Agency submits Virginia had regular visits with Laura. However, Virginia did not meet her burden of showing her relationship with Laura was sufficiently beneficial to outweigh the benefits of adoption. Laura had remained out of Virginia's care and custody for about two years. Virginia did not occupy a parental role in Laura's life during the proceedings nor did she gain the ability to protect Laura from Manuel. The social worker observed visits between Laura and Virginia and these visits were appropriate. When visits ended, Laura did not show signs of distress. Laura instead expressed her belief that her parents had not changed and she feared Virginia and Manuel would reunite and fight again. The social worker acknowledged Laura had a relationship with Virginia but believed there was no beneficial parent-child relationship and any benefit Laura derived from the relationships was outweighed by the stability and security Laura would gain from being adopted.
Further, there was no evidence of a "significant, positive, emotional attachment" between Virginia and Laura such that terminating the parent-child relationship would result in great detriment to Laura. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Rather, the evidence showed Laura's need for permanence and stability through adoption outweighed any interest in preserving parental ties. Laura has an emotional attachment and strong bond with her relative caregiver and is thriving in the caregiver's home. Further, the relative caregiver is dedicated to Laura and wants to provide Laura with a permanent home. The court was entitled to find the social worker's expert opinion credible and give greater weight to her assessment and testimony than to the opinions of other service providers. We cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (In re Casey D. (1999)70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.)
We acknowledge that Virginia relies heavily on this court's recent case In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296-301. In that case, this court concluded the trial court erred by finding the beneficial relationship exception did not apply. However, the facts in In re S.B., supra, are distinguishable from those here.
To require a parent show only "some, rather than great, harm at this stage of the proceedings would defeat the purpose of dependency law." (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.) After balancing the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship against the security and sense of belonging that an adoptive placement would give Laura after two years of dependency proceedings, the court found the preference for adoption had not been overcome. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception is inapplicable. (See In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 425.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J. AARON, J.