Some lower courts have held that the Edwards line of cases does not control situations when the collateral is real property. See In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200, 202-03 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); In re Carpinella, 201 B.R. 34, 35 n. 1 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996). But see In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535, 536-37 (Bankr.
See 700 F.2d at 1056-57. Contrary to the Debtors' contention, we believe that In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992) improperly interpreted In re Bell. The court in In re Laubacher adopted the "retain and maintain" option because the involved property was real property. However, just because a debtor may not redeem real property under § 722 does not mean that § 521 may be ignored. While § 521 is expressly limited to consumer debts, it is not limited to debts secured by personal property.
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits and many bankruptcy courts agree that the options stated in the statute are not exclusive and that a debtor who is not in default may elect to retain the property and make the payments specified in the contract with the creditor. Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546 (10th Cir.) (failure to comply with § 521(2)(A) does not give a secured creditor an automatic right to repossess collateral); Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's holding that "by giving notice of retention and intent to continue paying the loan according to the contract, the debtor complied with § 521(2)"); accord In re Johnson, 114 B.R. 799, 799-800 (Bankr.D.D.C. 1990); In re Stefano, 134 B.R. 824, 827 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1991); In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 1992); First Nat'l Bank of Union Co. v. Shubert, 147 B.R. 618 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1992); In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992); see also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 521.09A, at 521-49 to -50 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed. 1996) (section requires an election of reaffirmation or redemption only "if applicable").
§ 722 ("An individual debtor may . . . redeem tangible personal property. . . ."); In reLaubacher, 150 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio 1992) ("Section 722 is by its terms inapplicable to real property. . . ."); In re Douthart, 123 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr D.N.H. 1990) ("[I]t is evident from a reading of section 722 that Congress did not intend to permit chapter 7 debtors to redeem real property. . . .").
In two cases, lower courts in this circuit limited Bell's applicability to personalty, the collateral in Bell, because § 722 only authorizes the redemption of personal property from the lien of a creditor. See Teachers Credit Union v. Rowan (In re Rowan), 1994 WL 16168505 (W.D. Mich. 1994); In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992). But see In re Lock, 243 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) ("[W]e believe that In re Laubacher . . . improperly interpreted In re Bell. . . . [J]ust because a debtor may not redeem real property under § 722 does not mean that § 521 may be ignored.").
In re Manring, 129 B.R. 198 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1991) (Koger, J.). See also, In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992); In re Harper, 143 B.R. 682 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1992). Cf., In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1994) (Federman, J.)
In re Manring, 129 B.R. 198 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (Koger, J.). See also, In re Laucbacher, 150 B.R. 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); In re Harper, 143 B.R. 682 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992). Cf., In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (Federman, J.)
portedly rely on a "plain meaning" of the statute as well. McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 592, 142 L.Ed.2d 535 (1998); Capital Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1055, 140 L.Ed.2d 118 (1998); Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West (In re West), 882 F.2d 1543, (10th Cir. 1989); In re Harper, 143 B.R. 682, 686 (Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1992); In re Stefano, 134 B.R. 824, 826 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1991); In re Donley, 131 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1991); In re McNeil, 128 B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1991); In re Castillo, 209 B.R. 59, 64 (Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1997); In re Doss, 203 B.R. 57, 58 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1996); Sears Roebuck Co. v. Lamirande, 199 B.R. 221, 223 (D.Mass. 1996); In re Parlato, 185 B.R. 413, 415 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1995); In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992); In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327, 329 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 1992); Matter of Windham, 136 B.R. 878, 881 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992); In re Carpinella, 201 B.R. 34, 35 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1996); In re McDaniel, 129 B.R. 301, 303 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1991); In re Shubert, 147 B.R. 618, 619 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1992); In re Manring, 129 B.R. 198, 199 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1991); Julio M. Zapata, Taming the Bankruptcy Code's Toothless Tiger, 11 U.S.C. § 521(2), 72 WASH. L.REV. 1195 (1997); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 521.10 (15th ed. rev. 1998).
There are simply two inapposite interpretations given to section 521(2). Cases which hold that debtors can retain collateral without either reaffirming the debt or redeeming the collateral so long as they remain current on installment payments are: In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio 1992); In re Harper, 143 B.R. 682 (Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1992); In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327 (W.D.Ark. 1992); In re Windham, 136 B.R. 878 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992); GNC Community Federal Credit Union v. Stefano (In re Stefano), 134 B.R. 824 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1991); In re Donley, 131 B.R. 193 (Bankr. N.D.Fla. 1991); In re McNeill, 128 B.R. 603 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1991); In re Hunter, 121 B.R. 609 (Bankr.N.D.Ala. 1990); Century Bank at Broadway v. Peacock (In re Peacock), 87 B.R. 657 (Bankr.D.Colo.