Opinion
No. V88-47148.
Decided March 21, 1990.
Michael J. Downing, for the applicant.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General, and John T. Williams, for the state.
On July 22, 1988, the applicant, Theresa M. Lattanzi, filed a reparations application seeking an award for unreimbursed expenses incurred as a result of criminally injurious conduct. The record reveals that on August 14, 1985, the applicant was kidnapped and raped. The single commissioner reviewed the applicant's claim and determined that her application was not timely filed. In his decision the single commissioner stated the following:
"R.C. 2743.60(A), like R.C. 2743.56(C), requires an adult applicant to file an application within one year after the date of the occurrence of the criminally injurious conduct. R.C. 2743.60(A) deals directly with the power of this court to make an award. The section is mandatory in its terms and clearly limits the court's subject matter jurisdiction. This court has no jurisdiction to make an award of reparations where the application was filed more than one year after the date of the occurrence of the criminally injurious conduct against an adult victim." In re Lattanzi (Nov. 7, 1988), Ct. of Claims No. V88-47148sc, unreported, at page 2.
R.C. 2743.56(C) and 2743.60(A) were amended effective March 14, 1989 (see 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1191, 1203-1204).
Thus, because the applicant failed to file her application within one year of the incident, the single commissioner denied the applicant's claim.
On November 16, 1988, the applicant filed an objection and notice of appeal from the single commissioner's decision. A panel of commissioners subsequently heard the applicant's contentions, considered the evidence and pertinent law and rendered a decision on September 18, 1989. The panel found that the single commissioner did not err in his decision and thus affirmed the denial.
On October 16, 1989, the applicant filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the panel of commissioners. The matter was heard by this court on January 12, 1990. Upon consideration of the record, the court renders the following decision.
The applicant contends that the criminal incident caused her to experience a high level of stress that continued for numerous months subsequent to the event. The record reveals that she was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. In addition to the incident, the delay in the offenders' trial and the anxiety produced during the trial caused the applicant's nervousness and stress to linger for a lengthy period of time. The applicant asserts that she was of such an unstable condition as to be considered "of unsound mind" during the time period prior to her filing the instant claim. In this regard, the applicant contends that R.C. 2305.16 is applicable. That section states that an action may be instituted by a person "of unsound mind" after the disability is removed, but within the respective statute of limitations. Thus, the applicant asserts that the limitations period should have been tolled in her case due to her stress disorder.
The applicant relies upon In re Traylor (May 8, 1989), Court of Claims No. V87-80010tc, unreported; In re Miracle (June 7, 1988), Court of Claims No. V86-43048tc, unreported; and In re Irwin (1987), 33 Ohio Misc.2d 37, 515 N.E.2d 38, in support of her argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Although the limitations period was extended in each case, based on the specific facts presented, the cases are nevertheless distinguishable.
In Irwin, the applicant filed a reparations application for expenses incurred due to the death of her aunt. Originally, the applicant was informed that her aunt's death was a result of an accident. Subsequent evidence prompted the authorities to have an autopsy performed. As a result thereof, the county coroner amended the death certificate to signify that the cause of death was probable homicide. Approximately eleven months had passed before the applicant realized criminally injurious conduct had occurred. Thereafter, she filed a reparations application even though the limitations period had run. The court found that the statute of limitations should be tolled until the date that the applicant and the authorities realized that a crime had occurred. The court stated that a "case-by-case analysis [must be utilized] to remedy situations that occur which will lead to unconscionable results." Id. at 39, 515 N.E.2d at 40.
In Traylor, supra, the mother of a five-month-old child died as a result of criminally injurious conduct. Probate proceedings ensued and a guardian ad litem was eventually appointed for the minor child. The guardian ad litem filed a reparations application after the limitations period ended. The panel reviewed the claim after the single commissioner denied the application based on the statute of limitations. The panel reversed the decision and held that the statute of limitations would be tolled until a guardian ad litem was appointed to file a claim on the child's behalf. The panel based its decision on Irwin, supra, and In re Staab (Jan. 30, 1986), Court of Claims No. V84-50248jud, unreported (tolling of limitations period until guardian appointed for victim who had been in a coma from the date of the criminal incident).
In Miracle, supra, the applicant suffered personal injury as a result of a gunshot would to her head. Evidence revealed that she was incompetent and unable to manage her affairs for a lengthy period of time after the assault. There was no question that the applicant required extensive medical treatment and that she had difficulty functioning on a daily basis. The single commissioner had denied the application due to the running of the statute of limitations. The panel of commissioners, however, reversed the single commissioner's denial, finding that the applicant's condition was one "of unsound mind" within the parameters of R.C. 2305.16, which tolled the limitations period in her case. The Attorney General did not appeal the panel's decision to utilize R.C. 2305.16 in rendering its decision.
The applicant in the instant claim asserts that R.C. 2305.16 should be recognized in the Victims of Crime Program and applied in her case. Upon review of the above cases and the case at bar, it is evident that they are substantially different. The facts in those cases clearly reflected the need to toll the limitations period to avoid an inequitable result. The instant case reflects no such inequity. The court agrees with the applicant that there have been inroads concerning the tolling of the statute of limitations in the Victims of Crime Program. Without fully commenting on the panel's decision in Miracle to utilize R.C. 2305.16, the court is of the opinion that if the facts of a claim demonstrate that an applicant was unable to file a timely claim due to inauspicious circumstances, those circumstances must be considered to avoid inequitable and illogical results. See Irwin and Staab, supra. The court is willing, as set forth above, to review the facts of a particular situation to ascertain if an injustice was created due to an insurmountable obstacle in timely filing an application.
Accordingly, the court agrees with the applicant's position that a person shown to be of unsound mind should have an additional period of time in which to file a claim, i.e., the statute of limitations is tolled until such disability is removed. Consequently, the ultimate issue before this court is whether the trauma suffered by the applicant was of such a nature as to render her "of unsound mind." The phrase "of unsound mind" has been used to describe:
"* * * [O]ne who from infirmity of mind is incapable of managing himself or his affairs. The term, therefore, includes insane persons * * *. It exists where there is an essential privation of the reasoning faculties, or where a person is incapable of understanding and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life * * *. But eccentricity, uncleanliness, slovenliness, neglect of person and clothing, and offensive and disgusting personal habits do not constitute unsoundness of mind. * * *" Black's Law Dictionary (5 Ed. 1979) 1380.
In Bowman v. Lemon (1926), 115 Ohio St. 326, 154 N.E. 317, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed a factual situation wherein the issue of unsound mind was evaluated. The court held that the question of whether a person is of unsound mind "should be construed in connection with Section 10213, General Code [R.C. 1.02] * * *." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. R.C. 1.02(C) states that the term "`[o]f unsound mind' includes all forms of mental retardation or derangement." The court in Bowman also held in the third paragraph of the syllabus that:
"Where a plaintiff claims to have been of unsound mind at the time a cause of action accrues, so as to suspend the statute of limitations, * * * plaintiff has the burden of proving that he was suffering from some species of mental deficiency or derangement, so as to be unable to look into his affairs, properly consult with counsel, prepare and present his case and assert and protect his rights in a court of justice * * *." See, also, Lowe v. Union Trust Co. (1931), 124 Ohio St. 302, 178 N.E. 255.
Thus, in the case at bar, the applicant has the burden of proving that her stress disorder precluded her from looking into her affairs, understanding her legal rights and filing a reparations application.
There is absolutely no doubt that the applicant experienced a horrifying criminal incident, a stressful situation thereafter concerning the criminal trial and the associated fear as a ramification of the assault. The facts in the instant case and the applicant's condition, however, are significantly different from the circumstances described in the aforementioned cases, including the mental and physical conditions of the people involved therein. The evidence demonstrates that the applicant had the ability to rationally discuss the situation with the local authorities and participate in the preparation of the prosecution of her offenders. In addition, although the applicant discontinued her work as a school administrator, she obtained employment as a teacher and curriculum supervisor. This demonstrates that she was able to function in a position of responsibility. The evidence does not show that she was incompetent to handle her daily activities or that she was deranged.
In reviewing claims appealed to the court, the court is guided by R.C. 2743.61(A) which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
"* * * If upon hearing and consideration of the record and evidence, the court decides that the decision of the commissioners appealed from is reasonable and lawful, it shall affirm the same, but if the court decides that the decision of the commissioners is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse and vacate the decision or modify it and enter judgment thereon."
Upon consideration, the court finds that the applicant has failed to prove that her stressful condition constituted mental deficiency or derangement. The applicant has not shown that she was "of unsound mind" subsequent to the criminally injurious conduct. Therefore, the court further finds that the panel's decision was reasonable and lawful and shall be affirmed.
Order affirmed.
LOWELL B. HOWARD, J., retired, of the Court of Common Pleas of Athens County, sitting by assignment.